Cabo Ligado Monthly: April 2022
April At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED recorded 15 organized political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in April, resulting in 33 reported fatalities
Reported fatalities were highest in Mueda district, where insurgents carried out an attack on civilians and clashed with Mozambican and Rwandan forces, resulting in at least 18 reported fatalities
Other political violence events took place in Nangade, Macomia, and Montepuez districts in Cabo Delgado
Vital Trends
Food shortages are dictating insurgent tactics, leading them to undertake risky raids to get food, to release hostages, and in some cases to give themselves up
Rwandan troops have been seen operating in districts thought until now to be outside their area of operation
Authorities continue to urge displaced people to return
In This Report
SADC’s mission in Mozambique – a long road ahead appears inevitable
Cabo Delgado and southern Tanzania’s development
Mozambican political parties and the conflict in Cabo Delgado
Rwandan forces reach their limit trying to cover a wider area
April Situation Summary
Nangade and Macomia remained the focus of attention in April. Small groups of fighters continued to move within Nangade district, hemmed in by the Rwandan presence in Mueda and Palma districts, and a full Ruvuma river blocking easy passage to Tanzania. Minor clashes and sightings predominated, with the exception of the 5 April assault on a Mozambican army base at Mandimba in which three soldiers were killed. Seemingly free movement of insurgents in the district finally led to the temporary closure of the Nangade-Mueda road on 1 May, and prompted the first operations by Rwandan security forces in Nangade itself.
Along the coast, marine traffic to Matemo island remained suspended following the 16 March attack. Some insurgent movement was reported at Quifuque island, off Mocímboa da Praia, and on the Palma coast, but this was prompted by insurgents’ need to source supplies. Whether this will continue with the upcoming departure of the South African Navy’s SAS Spioenkop remains to be seen. The frigate had the capacity to operate in shallow waters through use of power boats.
Minister of National Defense, Cristóvão Artur Chume, made clear the government’s satisfaction with military progress, and also claimed some progress on the return of displaced people in an interview with Chatham House. He also sketched out a wide-ranging agenda for security sector reform. As well as the need to re-equip forces that compare unfavorably to those of neighboring countries, he also stressed the need for greater discipline so that the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) can “instill confidence in the population.” This lack of confidence was again apparent in April, where in Palma district allegations of abuse by FDS were once again taken by community members to Rwandan rather than Mozambican military authorities. Minister Chume also pointed to the need for the Local Forces – militias formed by Frelimo civil war veterans – to be better controlled, and announced that a statute for their regulation is in preparation.
SADC’s Mission in Mozambique – A Long Road Ahead Appears Inevitable
By Piers Pigou, Cabo Ligado
The third extension of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) on 12 April has brought into sharp relief several key challenges in the pursuit of a sustainable solution to the conflict in Cabo Delgado. In terms of immediate challenges, these include putting in place a clearer results-oriented timeframe for deployment, security cooperation between Rwandan, SADC, and Mozambican security forces and how this impacts more broadly on pacification and normalization efforts, and the challenge of finding funding to underwrite continued operations.
Although the Organ Troika April communiqué did not specify that the current extension was for another three months, media reports claim SADC’s January 2022 decision authorizes deployment until 15 July. Some Southern African leaders are keen to push for a one-year extension period beyond this, as recurrent three-month extension frustrates options for planning and related fund-raising. To promote that option, South Africa has already authorized funding to underwrite continued deployment until mid-April 2023, with a budget allocation of almost R2.8 billion (around $170 million). This reinforces the regional commitment towards a longer-term deployment, which is most likely necessary as the force segues from a peace enforcement to a peacekeeping focus. This will see the SAMIM force retain a peace enforcement capacity, whilst extending into a peacekeeping presence in areas that have been sufficiently stabilized.
Herein lies the challenge, as SAMIM areas of responsibility (AORs), especially in Macomia and Nangade districts have remained pointedly unstable, notwithstanding undeniable progress in degrading insurgent capacity. This frustrates plans for reconstruction and the return of displaced people, which in turn puts further pressure on the Mozambican government which is keen to fast-track ‘normalization’ efforts that it knows is required to expedite the restart of liquefied natural gas (LNG) activities.
A clearer and longer-term timeframe should provide the basis for more realistic planning around SAMIM’s broader mandate to help restore law and order and functioning pillars of state in Cabo Delgado. How this relates to the terms of reference in the bilateral Rwandan-Mozambican security agreement is unclear, as the detail of this arrangement remains secret. And how SAMIM navigates efforts in this direction will depend largely on the willingness of Rwandan and Mozambican authorities to invest in greater collaboration on this front.
Notwithstanding the impressive results from Rwandan and to a lesser extent SAMIM forces in the field, a total of 4,000 international personnel in support of Mozambican security forces will struggle to maintain widespread pacification of insurgents in the current circumstances. Security efforts need first to be consolidated. The first batch of Mozambique’s newly minted European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Rapid Reaction trainees will be deployed after equipment arrives in June; it is unclear how this will be done, and what role, if any, might be played by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) or SAMIM to mentor them in the field. In the absence of combat experience, such mentoring could be pivotal, and possibly linked to prospective EU funding. The training will only be complete in another 24 months, and the capacity developed will not be able to replace the numbers of foreign troops currently in play. It is hoped that by then, the joint efforts of SAMIM and the RDF will have sufficiently destroyed insurgent capacity. This, however, is not a given.
Both SAMIM and the Rwandans maintain they are working well together; the reality is not that straightforward. Since October 2021, the three forces have committed to improved coordination, communication, and operational collaboration. Both SAMIM and Rwanda have highlighted the importance of this cooperation, and have been collaborating. SAMIM Force Commander, Major General Xolani Mankayi, toured SAMIM’s forward operating bases in late April and met on 29 April in Macomia with Rwanda’s Security Forces’ Joint Task Force Commander, Major General Innocent Kabandana, and Mozambique’s land force commander, Major General Tiago Nampele, to discuss operational matters. Although both Rwanda and SAMIM refer to “joint operations,” multiple sources point out that this still does not include joint physical operations, which some believe reflects ongoing tensions between the two forces.
The April deployments of RDF into Macomia, Mueda, and Nangade, which were previously SAMIM AORs, have involved a measure of intelligence sharing on operational aspects. Unconfirmed reports claim Mozambican authorities requested Rwandan forces move into these areas in the face of ongoing insecurity. According to some, the RDF rebuffed offers of a joint physical operation with South African troops to pursue insurgents into one of their last major strongholds in the Catupa forests, east of Chai in Macomia district. The terrain in this area is particularly difficult and would present any of the joint forces with significant challenges. Unconfirmed reports suggest the Rwandans, who deployed over 300 troops into the Catupa operation, have faced stiff resistance and made only limited progress.
Unsurprisingly, the RDF deployments into SAMIM AORs have exacerbated comparisons between the two external forces. Some understandably point to the different results achieved by the respective missions. Quite clearly, Rwandan forces have had significantly greater battlefield success, in terms of operational outcomes, such as killed and captured insurgents, recovered weaponry, and disrupted communications networks. The two forces have significantly distinct capacities, and for some, the Rwandans are clearly a more effective well-oiled machine. From a security perspective, the respective Rwandan and SAMIM AORs present different challenges; SAMIM has significantly fewer assets in play, and has operated on an estimated 50 percent of the Rwandan budget, which is estimated at almost $1 million a day.
Both SADC and the Rwandans have made it clear that they now need financial support to continue their operations. Whilst SADC can continue to operate up to a point on its current self-funding model, this approach of budget counterinsurgency is far from ideal, as evidenced by the limited air assets currently deployed. Although there is no public breakdown of expenditure and contributions towards the intervention from the eight force contributing countries (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia), South Africa is carrying and will continue to carry the bulk of SAMIM’s funding costs moving forward. For how much longer Rwanda can continue to underwrite operations is moot. Many analysts and Cabo Delgado watchers simply disbelieve the claim that Rwanda is self-financing, especially if costs are really as high as currently estimated.
SAMIM has now joined the Rwandans by applying to the European Peace Facility for support. Although no final decision has been made by the EU, both parties are likely to receive some support. However, this will only happen later in the year, and will only cover non-lethal expenses and is likely to be modest compared to what is being sought. The European External Action Service has proposed €20 million of assistance to Rwanda, and is likely to make a positive recommendation for SAMIM support, but again for only a limited amount. This leaves open the question of how and from whom additional longer-term funding support might be secured.
Cabo Delgado and Southern Tanzania’s Development
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
Tanzania’s response to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is arguably more critical than that of any other SADC and East African Community member. Its southern regions of Mtwara and Ruvuma border the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and border communities' lives have straddled the Ruvuma river for generations. The October 2020 attack on Kitaya village in Mtwara was one of the insurgents’ largest and most daring attacks, while communities along the border, and Tanzanians living in Cabo Delgado have suffered numerous smaller attacks. Tanzania’s seeming lack of engagement should not be interpreted as disinterest. Locally, lives have been taken, and livelihoods disrupted while nationally, key economic and security interests have been threatened. Economically, Tanzania envisions Mtwara having an economically strategic role as a regional port, and as having a vital role to play in the development of Shell’s offshore natural gas fields. The response to the conflict in Cabo Delgado is partly shaped by these interests.
In terms of direct impact of the conflict on southern Tanzania, Tanzania has been faring well. Since the Rwandan intervention in Cabo Delgado of July 2021, and the subsequent SADC intervention, there have been just seven recorded political violence events in Mtwara, the most recent being in February 2022. Half of these have involved looting of shops for supplies, and include just one clash with Tanzanian security forces. One would not expect this low rate of attacks to change, even as the level of the Ruvuma river begins to decline this month following the end of the masika rain season.
These achievements should be qualified in that they only refer to Mtwara region. Border areas of the neighboring Ruvuma region are much less populous, with weaker infrastructure. This presents a significant opportunity for the insurgency to maintain supply lines in the future. They need to be further qualified as media outlets do not cover security issues in southern Tanzania, while access for humanitarian agencies and the diplomatic community remains restricted.
Nevertheless, preventing serious incidents is a notable achievement, given that, according to SADC documents from November 2021 meetings on the conflict, the insurgents aimed to establish permanent settlements in Tanzania, and secure crossing routes. This has been achieved in a number of ways. Since 2017, there have been security operations in Mtwara region, following the break up of an armed group in Pwani region, and the escape of some of that group to Cabo Delgado. This may have thrown the net too wide – the release of people held on terrorist charges earlier this year suggests so – but may also have been bluntly effective. Since the attack on Kitaya, there has been in Mtwara a combination of a network of checkpoints manned by village militia, location specific curfews, restrictions on agriculture along the banks of the Ruvuma, and enhanced security patrols. These measures have not been universally popular, according to people in Mtwara, but there has been no particular resistance.
This success in Tanzania has not been repeated in the very different environment of Nangade district, where Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) is deployed as part of the SAMIM alongside the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF). SAMIM Force Commander, Major General Xolani Mankanyi, made a visit to Nangade in early May. An official report of his visit to LDF troops noted that Major General Mankanyi “emphasized more on the importance of frequent patrolling to dominate the area.” Mankanyi’s concern reflects complaints from communities in Nangade that SAMIM troops have failed to prevent insurgents moving freely and undertaking attacks across the district. The appearance of Rwandan troops over April may also prompt a more proactive approach from the Tanzania and Lesotho contingents.
The lack of information on security issues in southern Tanzania is repeated for TPDF involvement in Cabo Delgado. On the one hand, this may seem to backfire on Tanzania, but more positively, it allows Tanzanian authorities to control public discourse in ways that support the country’s strategic ambitions. Foremost amongst those now is the LNG project. Finalization of a Host Government Agreement to govern relations between the government of Tanzania, Equinor, Shell, and their partners is expected to be announced in May. The $30 billion project would transform Tanzania’s economy, and the southern coastal regions of Pwani, Lindi, and Mtwara in particular. Though the LNG plant itself is to be built in Lindi, Mtwara is a vital service port for Block 1, licensed to Shell. Mtwara port is currently being expanded, as part of Tanzania Ports Authority’s efforts to upgrade the country’s major seaports of Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and Mtwara. If the LNG project goes ahead, it will be transformed as a service base for Shell’s offshore operations. With so much at stake, managing the presentation of the security context matters as much as managing security itself. The potential investment is a considerable incentive to ensure that Mtwara remains as free as possible from Cabo Delgado spillover.
In the longer term, the LNG project has the potential to increase Tanzanian influence over Cabo Delgado. Dar es Salaam is just 450 km north of Palma, compared to Maputo which is almost 2,000 km south. Mtwara’s better infrastructure compared to Palma, and Dar es Salaam’s proximity may see much business and traffic related to Palma’s LNG project coming through Tanzania. Its much better security profile will of course help also. Mtwara port itself would have the capacity to serve both projects, with better connections. Tanzania is not disinterested when it comes to Cabo Delgado.
Mozambican Political Parties and the Conflict in Cabo Delgado
By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado
Political perspectives on the conflict in Cabo Delgado are focused around the central question of whether the insurgency is driven by internal or external factors. For opposition parties this has led to a reactive approach that has focused on internal issues, and Frelimo misrule. Within Frelimo too there is division on causes. Thus far in the conflict, the opposition has affected discourse at specific times, such as in the 2019 elections, or when military intervention was being considered in 2021. Yet while the power lies with Frelimo, there is evidence that its divisions and internal processes handicap the response to the conflict as potential successors maneuver to succeed President Filipe Nyusi.
“It’s Frelimo who brought Al Shabaab,” was the phrase chanted in Kimwani by the crowd at a Renamo election campaign rally in Mocímboa da Praia in October 2019. The chant at the rally for Renamo presidential candidate, Ossufo Momade, raised a wider debate around the origin and motivations of the armed attacks that started in 2017. The Renamo candidate capitalized on the sentiment of the moment, saying that “Al Shabaab” emerged as a result of the brutality of the Mozambican state against locals engaged in illegal mining – in reference to the aggression and torture of artisanal ruby miners by police forces between 2016 and 2017 in Namanhumbir, as well as in other areas of the province. Momade also said that the inaction of the government and the absence of an adequate response to the attacks was a sign that the government had no interest in ending the violence. Momade also accused the Frelimo government of creating the insurgent group to prevent the population from benefiting from the wealth of the province. This approach, very much in the heat of the election period, was also made by the then-presidential candidate of the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), the late Daviz Simango.
The Frelimo candidate and incumbent president Filipe Nyusi called Renamo's accusation offensive, saying no government has an interest in killing the people it governs. Nyusi also said the opposition party should show solidarity with the victims and not politicize the situation.
With the election campaign over and a new government cycle beginning, the political parties unanimously acknowledged the seriousness of the situation in Cabo Delgado, from the threat to social and economic stability to forced displacement, and systemic human rights violations. The intensification of attacks and the worsening humanitarian crisis forced the political parties to demand more information from a government that until then had treated the situation in Cabo Delgado with great secrecy. The opposition wanted to know from the government the nature of the problem, whether it was a matter of public order or an external threat, so as to advise it on the best course of action.
In April 2021, the MDM and Renamo parties joined calls for the intervention of foreign forces to contain the spread of violence and the humanitarian crisis, after acknowledging the inability of the FDS to respond to the situation, something that the government began to consider, particularly after the attack on the town of Palma in March of the same year.
The eventual arrival of Rwandan and SADC troops again generated disagreement over how the process was managed. Renamo and MDM accused the government of not having followed the legal procedures, and of not having asked parliament to approve the foreign deployments, thus violating the constitution. Frelimo argued that the government followed all legal protocols.
Foreign forces from Rwanda and SADC were crucial in reducing the insurgents' ability to pose a threat, even though the insurgents had expanded their attacks into Niassa province in late 2021. The initial success of the Rwandan intervention in particular was acknowledged by the opposition, but Renamo warned that a reduction in insurgent capacity did not mean the end of the insurgency.
For the MDM, although the joint forces are bringing stability on the ground, the solution to the crisis should not focus on the military option, but on the adoption of inclusive political, economic, and social measures to respond to the problems of poverty, inequality, and vulnerability of the population in the north of the country.
Although opposition parties have raised questions about the government's handling of the situation in Cabo Delgado, it is questionable to what extent the government has been influenced by pressure from opposition parties. Frelimo is seemingly more driven by its own internal processes, which to a great extent are now focused on ensuring a clear victory in the 2023 municipal elections, and in the general elections in 2024. This may explain its focus on external actors in explaining the insurgency. Examining actual grievances might spark internal bloodletting, as well as highlighting state failure. This has a real impact on delivering initiatives in response to the insurgency. The delays to the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy (ERDIN) may be an example of that. These issues will not be worked out quickly. One step towards it may be the Frelimo Central Committee meeting scheduled for the 27 and 28 of May, and the party congress to be held in September. At the level of public opinion, the political parties relegated the debates on the impact of the conflict and the government's management of the crisis to civil society and media organizations. At the parliamentary level, the government has strong support from the majority Frelimo party, which is bound to the government's actions and decisions. Internal party mechanisms will matter more.
The municipal elections in 2023 will be the next indicator of how the political system, and all the parties within it are responding. The first issue will be ensuring a credible vote in towns that have been overwhelmed by displaced people, making election management a challenge, and providing opportunities for electoral fraud. The second issue will be the rhetoric used on the ground, and the extent to which it may be inciteful. The level of grievance held by the population, displaced or otherwise, will affect both the conduct of the election, its outcomes, and any subsequent fallout.
Rwandan Forces Reach Their Limit Trying to Cover a Wider Area
By Fernando Lima, Guest Contributor
Throughout April, Rwandan forces have found themselves in action in Macomia district to the south, and in Mueda district to the west of their strongholds in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. According to Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence, Rwandan forces have been active in Macomia since the end of March, centered on Catupa forest, east of Chai and west of the coastal towns of Mucojo and Quiterajo. Clashes between insurgents and “allied forces” in Catupa forest were reported on 28 April. Another security source reported clashes there on 27 April, with unconfirmed reports of RDF fatalities. In Mueda district five days earlier, Rwandan and Mozambican forces successfully intercepted a group of insurgents at Chipingo. By the end of April, multiple sources had reported that Rwandan troops were active in Nangade district.
This is not the first time for Rwandan forces to operate beyond Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. From October 2021 and January 2022, they took part in “Operation Buffalo” in conjunction with SAMIM and Mozambican forces. But they had yet to be as stretched as they are now, across five districts.
The situation faced by RDF recalls the saying that when the blanket is too short to cover your feet, you end up uncovering your head. Minor recent incidents suggest that the 2,500 strong Rwandan contingent may be too small to work beyond the districts in which they were first strategically positioned – Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. Groups of insurgents twice in April came out of hiding seeking supplies in the two districts, suggesting that small groups remain active there. The first incident was at Quifuque island on 8 April, where a group coerced boatmen carrying supplies to the island to return to the mainland in Mocímboa da Praia and sell them their produce. The following day in Palma district, a group disturbed a fishermen’s camp, causing them to flee, and taking their supplies. A more serious incident went on to happen in Olumbe in May, giving further credence to this view.
The increased Rwandan activity highlights the differences between how they undertake their role compared to SAMIM. However, stretching Rwandan forces may see the overall intervention developing weaknesses.
A Rwandan military source has suggested that occasional RDF interventions occurred under political pressure caused by frustration from the Mozambican government, related to the frustration with the performance of SAMIM. Despite the last SADC summit reinforcing its commitment to SAMIM, the contingents behave as “peacekeepers,” rather than engaging proactively as the Mozambican government might like.
SAMIM and Rwanda’s contrasting operational postures could also be explained by differences at political level on the Cabo Delgado conflict. The strong relationship between Mozambique, Rwanda, and France leads to the assumption that RDF’s efficacy will result in rewards for Rwanda in contracts related to the LNG project. In this regard, some see competition with Tanzania as shaping actions on the ground and speculate that a successful intervention will benefit Mozambique’s LNG project, to the detriment of Tanzania’s own.
The incidents in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia too must be seen in the context of the LNG project’s status, where a quiet restart is taking shape, and where the Mozambican government is determined to encourage displaced people to return to their areas of origin. The police recently announced it had escorted a group of 1,500 civilians to Awasse, a strategic crossroads between the districts of Muidumbe and Mocímboa da Praia. Some spontaneous movement of people is being registered in Macomia, Quissanga, and Palma. Mozambican diplomats were recently taken to visit Awasse, while Frelimo Secretary-General Roque Silva has announced the rebuilding of all party premises in Muidumbe and Quissanga districts.
These initiatives show how eagerly the authorities are pushing for the normalization of life in Cabo Delgado after the first positive results registered on the military front. However, those efforts are being hindered by delays in the approval of a development strategy that should bring significant support from donors for people’s return and the reconstruction of state infrastructure.
The Mozambican government’s enthusiasm meets a much more cautious approach from TotalEnergies, which is clearly cooling expectations on the lifting of the force majeure status declared in April 2021, after the attack on Palma. Once again, there are contradictory reports in Afungi and Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado. The government’s return policy has been supported by TotalEnergies, which has provided containers for use as government offices in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, an initiative to encourage public servants to return to their duties. More directly project related, businesses are being contacted in Pemba for housing rentals and the delivery of services, while convoys of heavy equipment have been noticed on their way to the Afungi Peninsula. Whether this year or next, both the government and TotalEnergies expect the project to go ahead.