April At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records three political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in April, resulting in six reported fatalities

• ACLED records 53 political violence events in Cabo Delgado province from 1 January to 28 April 2023, resulting in 109 reported fatalities

• All events in April took place in Muidumbe district, where Local Forces and Mozambican military forces clashed with Islamist militia

• From 1 January to 28 April 2023, reported fatalities were highest in Muidumbe district, where insurgents clashed with Mozambican military forces and Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces

• Other events took place in Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Meluco, Mueda, Montepuez, Nangade, and Palma

Vital Trends

• Sustained decrease in political violence events

• Concentration of political violence events in Muidumbe district

• Non-violent presence of insurgents in coastal Macomia over the period

• Possible change in insurgency leadership

In This Report

• Four months in numbers

• Will municipal elections be good for Mocímboa da Praia?

• Targeting insurgency leadership

• Peace in Nangade?

January to April: Situation Summary

The first four months of the year have seen a sustained decrease in political violence events recorded by ACLED in Cabo Delgado province. The frequency of events had been expected to increase with the end of the rains, and the completion of Ramadan. Though both periods have now passed, there has been no intensification of the conflict. Conflict remains concentrated in the center of the province, particularly in Muidumbe district. This represents some success, particularly the continued absence of conflict in Nangade district.

There are also signs that suggest complacency may be misplaced. Insurgents’ technical expertise in the preparation of IEDs has improved, with devices deployed successfully on two occasions in March in Muidumbe district. They also show astuteness in their varying approaches to communities. In Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia districts, they have tried to build relations with communities, through trade and, at times, cash distribution.  

This has led to a series of encounters with Rwandan forces in Mocímboa da Praia over the past four months. In coastal Macomia, they have been able to move more freely, visiting villages to purchase supplies over the period. In both districts, the insurgents appear to have access to cash for this. The villages they visit are home to recent returnees, though in neither district have they sought to drive them out. This is in contrast to Muidumbe district, where the return of displaced people to Miangalewa village was sabotaged by an attack in April. If they can maintain a presence in Mocímboa da Praia, they present a threat to the October municipal elections.

This tactical variation reflects a sophisticated leadership, which is mostly still intact, has access to finance, and appears to be digging in. Experience in Nangade indicates that it takes a significant investment of security assets, including international intervention forces, to uproot active cells. 

Four Months in Numbers

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

For Cabo Delgado, the first four months of 2023 were marked by a decline in the number of political violence events, and fatalities recorded by ACLED over the period. They are also starkly different from the corresponding period last year in frequency, location, and targeting by insurgents, highlighting that military intervention has been able to contain and push back the insurgency. Yet, the insurgents continued tactical acumen, and their use of IEDs indicates that a very real threat remains. The increasing centrality of Local Forces to the response highlights the importance of their reform and integration into the military.

January to April 2023 saw 53 political violence events recorded, and 109 fatalities; 75% of those events, and 90% of the fatalities, took place in January and February. As well as declining over the period, events were more geographically concentrated in Muidumbe district, and territory in neighboring districts of Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, and Meluco. Indeed in April, just three political violence events were recorded in the province, all of them in Muidumbe. The banks of the Messalo river, which runs through this territory, have been the insurgents’ sanctuary of choice for some years. The only exceptions to this were in February, when insurgents were involved in four clashes in Montepuez district, and when one suspected insurgent was killed in Ancuabe district in the south.

As well as a decline over the past four months, there has been a striking decrease in activity compared to the same period last year, which saw 122 recorded political violence events, and 283 reported fatalities over the same period. Insurgent activity was more widespread too at that time, spread across nine districts, including Ibo and Quissanga districts on the coast, and Nangade district to the north. Up to the end of April this year, just two political violence events involving insurgents were recorded in Nangade. For this period in 2022, approximately as many political violence events involving insurgents (51) were recorded in Nangade as were recorded for the whole province for the corresponding period in 2023.

By pursuing two very different approaches in Muidumbe, and on the coast, the insurgents demonstrated some tactical acumen. The puzzle is to understand why there has been no significant military response to their presence. Rwandan forces have taken some action in Mocímboa da Praia, but over the past four months, insurgents have been able to move relatively freely in coastal Macomia district. They have also taken a markedly different approach to returnees, seeking to do business with them, rather than drive them away as in Miangelewa. This approach presents the authorities with a dilemma. Keen to encourage return, the state does not wish to see disruption that could affect the municipal elections in Mocímboa da Praia, or, perhaps more importantly TotalEnergies’ decision-making on resuming its liquefied natural gas project. This may explain the lack of intervention by both the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM), and the South African contingent of SAMIM based in Macomia district headquarters.

As well as frequency and location, targeting by the insurgents has also seen a significant shift. The first four months of 2023 saw insurgents target civilians 17 times, 35% of all political violence events in which insurgents were involved. These accounted for 14 of the 109 total reported fatalities. For the same period last year, insurgents targeted civilians 68 times, equivalent to nearly 60% of events in which insurgents were involved. These events accounted for 124 of the 283 total reported fatalities for that period.

While clashes have been fewer and limited in geographic scope, the group remains tactically astute, and is developing some technical capacity. An example of the first is the attack on Miangelewa on 15 April. This targeted a community of approximately 500 returnees who had arrived in the previous two weeks, and whose return had been underwritten by Frelimo. Immediately, the returnees fled. In Meluco district, attacks on the N380 road successfully disrupted commercial and other traffic. Displacement of civilians and economic disruption through attacks on main transport routes have been cited by Islamic State (IS) as central to their approach.

Insurgents’ increasing technical capacity is seen in the use in recent months of more sophisticated IEDs than they have used before. The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) contingent of the SAMIM was hit twice by such devices in the Mandava area of Muidumbe district on 9 March and 24 March. According to security sources, these devices are considerably more sophisticated than have been used in the past, suggesting outside technical assistance.

While insurgents’ offensives so far this year have been concentrated in and around Muidumbe district, they presented quite differently in coastal areas of the province, particularly Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. In March and April alone, ACLED recorded non-violent incidents during which insurgents entered communities, presented themselves peacefully, and in most cases, bought supplies. When sources indicated their numbers, they were never less than 30.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that the group is currently cash-rich. On two occasions, sources told of insurgents offering money to the elderly. This was allegedly in January in Calugo in Mocímboa da Praia district, and in Pangane in Macomia in March. Movements in this area are likely centered on a new base established in the abandoned town of Namurussia, inland from Calugo village in coastal Macomia.

In February, the group distributed money at the village of Nicocue in Montepuez district, after destroying a commuter bus. One source said this was to attract recruits. Larger sums may be used to purchase supplies, and may be locally generated. In April, three were arrested on a supposed supplies trip to Mocímboa da Praia, using funds generated through a small business in Mueda.

In terms of other armed actors in the conflict, the most significant development was the Council of Ministers passing a decree-law in April for the regulation of the local militias, and their incorporation into the FADM. Their importance to the security response is borne out by the numbers. Over the past four months, ACLED data show that they directly clashed with insurgents 11 times, just one time less than the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), three more than SAMIM and Rwandan forces combined. In the same period last year, they directly clashed with insurgents just 16 times, while overall events were much higher.

Regularization of Local Forces has been a policy priority since at least April 2022. Their prominence in clashes in the past four months indicates just how important it will be to get that right, if state and intervention forces are to continue to contain the insurgency. In footage taken 11 days before the Miangelewa attack, Local Forces seen accompanying returnees were a mixture of uniformed Local Forces, and the less regulated Naparama militia in their distinctive red bandanas. Ensuring the incorporation of this popular militia into Local Forces and, ultimately, the FADM will be critical to maintaining progress.

Will Municipal Elections Be Good for Mocímboa da Praia?

By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado

Less than two years after its recapture by the joint forces of Rwanda and Mozambique, Mocímboa da Praia is now preparing for the town’s October municipal elections. Since 20 April, voter registration brigades have been mobilized to register the 76,000 potential voters. The decision to include Mocímboa da Praia in the next elections was made by the Council of Ministers after it ignored the appeal by the main opposition party, Renamo, and the electoral management bodies to exclude it from the electoral process. The concerns of Renamo and the electoral bodies over the state of insecurity in Mocímboa da Praia are valid. A sustained insurgent presence in the district, and the militarization of the town, may both negatively affect the elections. There are also questions over the political stance of Local Forces. It remains to be seen whether the investment in the process will be worth it.  

From January to April 2023, the insurgents have maintained a consistent presence in the district. Over this period, seven events of political violence were recorded in Mocímboa da Praia, with clashes between pro-government forces and insurgents in the villages of Mitose, Malinde, and Calugo. These events resulted in 29 reported fatalities. Insurgent presence was also confirmed in the villages of Marere, Limala, Calugo, and Mbau, and peacefully reached the villages of Chiculua, Maculo, and Nazimoja, south of Mocímboa da Praia, in their new strategy to win ‘hearts and minds.’ This presents a significant challenge for the municipal elections. If insurgents can maintain a presence in rural areas of the district, and in coastal areas of neighboring Macomia district, over the coming six months, they could present a real threat to holding peaceful elections. Attacks at that time would potentially undermine the return of displaced people to the district, as well as state legitimacy.

The militarization of the town of Mocímboa da Praia is yet another important aspect to be considered. Several forces are deployed in the town of  Mocímboa da Praia, including Rwandan military and police forces, the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, FADM, and Local Forces. The presence of different forces there may influence the vote, since both the population and the opposition parties may fear reprisal in case of the defeat of Frelimo.

There are particularly sensitive concerns over the composition of Local Forces. Recently, people in Mocímboa da Praia have been questioning the absence of Mwani people in their ranks. Local Forces, which have been instrumental in counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado, are perceived as being predominantly made up of Makonde ethnic group. Furthermore, the Mwani are believed to make up the bulk of the insurgents' members. Mwani and Makua communities on the coast, are also considered to be broadly supportive of the opposition party Renamo, while Frelimo itself has its roots on the Makonde plateau inland. These concerns and suspicions reinforce the mutual distrust between the different ethnic groups in the town.

Frelimo is the political party most interested in the elections in Mocímboa da Praia. It wants to replicate its victory in the 2018 municipal elections, when it claimed 58% of the vote against Renamo’s 39% in Mocímboa da Praia. Moreover, it aims to use these elections as a mechanism to restore the legitimacy of the state. Since the previous elections, the image of Frelimo has been tarnished in the eyes of sections of the local population. During the campaign for the 2019 general elections, several people chanted in a Renamo rally in Mocímboa da Praia “Frelimo brought al-Shabaab,” allegedly to prevent the population from enjoying the benefits of natural resources. 

Importantly, the government intends to use the elections to reinforce the idea of national unity – one of Frelimo’s principles. In this, it may find its principles undermined by the reality of Local Forces’ composition on the ground. This unity can only be achieved by restoring state authority. Currently, the authority of the state is also being replaced by foreign entities, in this case, TotalEnergies and Rwandan forces, in terms of providing public investment and security.

It is worth asking to what extent the elections and the voter registration process itself are relevant to the residents of Mocímboa da Praia. The first major benefit is the voting cards, which are accepted as a valid form of identification by most public institutions. Voter registration thus represents a quick and low-cost alternative to obtaining a document, especially for returnees. However, local sources in Mocímboa da Praia report that the shortage of registration centers may be a barrier to accessing this document. A large number of registered voters does not necessarily translate to high voter turnout. Demand for identification for access to public services and for movement throughout the district likely drives registration. Whether the investment would be better made in those same public services such as water or health remains a question. With a weakened state, most of the services are being provided by foreign entities, from the corporate sector to humanitarian organizations.

It remains to be seen if the October elections will address the issues behind the insurgency in Mocímboa da Praia. Elections provide an opportunity for citizens to define their priorities. However, it is questionable whether Frelimo would be interested in using the elections to better understand the demands of the population, and of the insurgents in particular. To do so, Frelimo would have to be more tolerant and open to considering socio-economic factors as central to its conflict resolution strategy. Since the beginning of the conflict, Frelimo has strongly denied socio-economic factors as the driving force behind the insurgency, rather describing the conflict as being driven by international jihadism.

The municipal elections of 2023 and the general elections of 2024 may represent an excellent opportunity to renew the social contract between the state and the people. Likewise, the authorities can capitalize on this moment to listen to the grievances of the population, seeking to establish channels and mechanisms for dialogue between the various political and social actors in order to put an end to the insurgency. However, elections can further undermine the conflict resolution process if they only serve the interest of restoring state authority, without taking into account the factors inherent to the insurgency, and the risk of the insurgents targeting the process. 

Peace in Nangade?

By Tom Gould, Cabo Ligado

For much of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, Nangade has been one of the most hostile districts for security forces, but since February this year, it has enjoyed a tenuous peace, reporting no incidents of insurgent violence. One of the last confirmed sightings of the insurgents was on 25 March, when a group of fighters was spotted around Namatil, where they later surrendered, according to a local source. The rest, Cabo Ligado’s source claims, have joined insurgents in Muidumbe district. This respite has encouraged many displaced civilians to return to their homes and rebuild their lives in recent weeks. But despite promising signs of normalization, the specter of conflict still looms large.

Although, for the moment at least, the insurgents appear to have left Nangade, the effects of the conflict will scar the landscape for some time. Out of Nangade’s 51 villages, only six were untouched by attacks, according to local sources. Each village used to have its own school, but now just 15 are still operating. Furthermore, banks were forced to close in many of the areas affected by fighting, including Nangade district headquarters, making it extremely difficult for both the local population and soldiers to access cash. The nearest available banking services are in Mueda, about 90 kilometers from Nangade town, but lingering security concerns deter people from making the trip.

Nonetheless, these challenges have not prevented returning civilians from attempting to revive a sense of normalcy. People are once again working the fields around villages such as Quinto Congresso, Chitama Mmuna, Ngongo, Muangaza, and even Nkonga, near which the insurgents had once established one of their principal bases in the province. Civilians regularly find abandoned weapons, which they report to the authorities. Security forces are conducting their own searches for insurgent arms caches, and at the end of April, a team discovered a stockpile of seven assault rifles and a machine gun with ammunition for both, as well as 16 mortar tubes with eight 60-millimeter shells. Less than two weeks earlier, the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) found another similarly sized arms cache while on patrol in Nangade.

There are currently three forces providing security in the district: the FDS, the SAMIM, represented by the LDF and the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), and a ‘Bilateral Force’ of TPDF operating independently of SAMIM. The Bilateral Force based in Mandimba is generally regarded positively, despite earlier complaints that the TPDF was failing to pursue the insurgents. It seems that the TPDF has tried to address these concerns and is now taking a more proactive role in patrols with other forces. With a strong TPDF presence on the Tanzanian side of the border, the Bilateral Force at least can operate in a joined-up manner with colleagues in Tanzania. However, elements of the FDS, especially the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR), still have a reputation for violence against civilians and are widely distrusted, according to Cabo Ligado’s local source. Two abductions by UIR, in January and February this year, may justify such distrust. 

Local Forces are also active in Nangade. Most are former soldiers and veterans of the war of independence, or children of soldiers and veterans. Some of the better-educated fighters have received further training from police in Maputo, but their role is largely to act as guides for the professional security forces. 

While the military presence in the district remains substantial, SAMIM has considered a greater focus on community issues, as indicated by its official switch from Scenario Six to Scenario Five last September. This would entail a greater focus on community, policing, and correctional issues. SAMIM deputy head of mission visited Nangade in February with this in mind. However, it is not clear that progress is being made. Cabo Ligado’s source says that there has been no SAMIM police deployment yet in the town, despite Tanzania’s announcement of such a deployment in January. 

Insurgents have concentrated largely in Muidumbe district to the south, especially in the area surrounding the Messalo river. Nonetheless, security along Nangade’s northern border with Tanzania has not yet been relaxed, and traders can only use the Unity Bridge at Negomano to cross legitimately. There is a plan to open the Chacamba border post near Mandimba, but there is no indication as to when this will happen. Informal crossings across the Rovuma river from Nangade are still used for business and medical purposes, but they are illegal. 

Cabo Ligado’s source credits the coalition of forces in Nangade for working together to realize this “semi-peace.” Security forces can rightfully claim a significant victory in driving insurgents out of the district, but this victory is far from complete. Recent attacks in the Muidumbe lowlands around the villages of Mandava and Miangalewa prove that the remaining insurgents are still a lethal force that could, at any time, return north. To maintain the peace, the forces will likely need to remain in place for some time. 

Targeting Insurgency Leadership

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

April saw unconfirmed reports of a change in the leadership structure of the insurgency. It also saw  the designation by the European Union on 24 April, of Abu Yasir Hassan, and Bonomade Machude Omar, widely known as Ibn Omar, as individuals subject to sanctions for terrorist activity, and of “ISIS-Mozambique” as an organization subject to such sanctions. This came over two years after the designation of “ISIS-Mozambique” as a terrorist organization by the United States government, and of Abu Yasir Hassan as its leader, and over 18 months after Bonomade Machude Omar was identified as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” In the time since the United States’ initial designations, there has been some success in pushing back, and containing the insurgency, but there are no indications that the leadership has been seriously impacted. Designations, while demonstrative of intent, may have little impact bearing in mind apparent leadership structure and practice, and support systems.

Such designations express confidence that the leadership has been identified. However, the only insurgent leader for whom there is consistently credible information in the public domain on his identity, likely role, and origins is Bonomade. He is known to have held a prominent position in the movement both pre-2017, and since the start of the conflict. Of other leaders, there has been no shortage of names presented. The Rural Environment Observatory presented profiles of four leaders in August 2021, including Bonomade and Maulana Ali Cassimo. The latter was also the subject of a profile by the Institute for Economic and Social Studies. 

The most recent detailed list of leaders was presented by the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) in October 2022. This lists a total of 18 leaders, or senior figures identified by SAMIM, active in September 2022, and spread over Nangade, Muidumbe, and Macomia districts. Ibn Omar is mentioned as being based in Muidumbe at the time. The name Abu Yasir Hassan does not appear. However, a name listed as one of his aliases by the EU, Sheikh Hassan, does appear on that list. The name Sheikh Hassan was not presented by the US as a known alias. Sources close to SAMIM say that the Sheikh Hassan identified by SAMIM was killed sometime between October 2022 and February 2023. 

Also dead is Mustafa al-Tanzani, whose martyrdom was announced by IS on 12 April. CDD listed a Mustafa as a leader in Macomia district in September 2023, but it is not known if they are the same person. A report circulating on social media from 20 April claimed that following his death, a new hierarchy was in place. It listed Ulanga, as a spiritual leader, Farido as chief commander, and Abu Suraka/Ibn Omar as chief of operations. Three base commanders were also listed: Abu Faizal in Nkonga, Sheikh Nguvu in the Mussuri base in Muidumbe, and Sheikh Mamudo as the Falluja base commander in Macomia. This report cannot be confirmed but is consistent with a known structure of base commanders operating in a flat command structure which may help explain the group’s resilience and tactical coherence.

Given his name, Ulanga is likely Tanzanian – the name is common in the country’s Morogoro region. Other leaders are thought to be Mozambican. This is to be expected, and does not preclude continued international support, even if limited. The most striking evidence of likely external support is enhanced IED capacity. IEDs that struck the BDF in Muidumbe district twice in March, are more sophisticated than those used in the past, and more consistent in their production. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations noted in its February 2023 report that IEDs in use from July to December 2023 had likely been developed with external technical assistance. The recent technical enhancements suggest this has continued. 

The sanctions announced by the US and the EU may have a limited impact. Both orders freeze the assets of the individuals and entities named, and prohibit US and EU citizens and entities from funding them. The measures themselves will have little if any impact given that funding comes from the region, and the two individuals are quite unlikely to have assets in the US or the EU. Actions taken by states in the region are likely to have a greater impact. 

Tanzania’s National Risk Assessment of last year, focusing on money laundering and terrorist financing, is instructive in this regard. Firstly, in order to become compliant with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) requirements, Tanzania has recently amended its Prevention of Terrorism Act to criminalize the financing of travel by “terrorists.” The report also notes the challenges in tackling financing when increasingly so much of it is through “self-funding from legitimate sources,” referring to mobile phone transactions, and bank transactions.

Tanzania’s heightened actions on terrorist financing arise from its ‘grey-listing’ by the FATF, or designation as a “jurisdiction under increased monitoring.” Mozambique, too, was on that list, and there are signs that it has kickstarted some reforms. 

How news of the sanctions was greeted in insurgent bases in Cabo Delgado is not known. IS’s al-Naba magazine dismissed them in an editorial in its 4 May edition, stating that “Mujahideen do not heed or pay attention to such decisions, because in the sky is their sustenance and what they are promised.“