Cabo Ligado Monthly: April 2024
April At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records 26 insurgency-related political violence events in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces in April, resulting in at least 44 fatalities,
Of these events, 15 were incidents targeting civilians, resulting in 22 reported fatalities.
Vital Trends
After Eid el-Fitr, ISM activity drove a return to pre-Ramadan levels of political violence in April
ISM targeted civilians in 12 events concentrated in southern Cabo Delgado province, and the north of Nampula province
Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces targeted civilians in three out of the 13 political events involving them
In This Report
Expectations for the FDS as SAMIM withdraw
Local perceptions of SAMIM withdrawal
Insights from the latest National Designated List update
April Situation Summary
Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) was active in April from Palma in the north of Cabo Delgado province to Erati and Memba districts in Nampula province to the south. This expanded geographic range came in the same month as Botswana and South Africa began to withdraw their troops serving with the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).
The push south began in Quissanga district at the start of the month and culminated three weeks later in Nampula province. ISM met no resistance until Nampula, illustrating the scale of the threat the group presents as SAMIM withdraws.
In Macomia district, the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) undertook aerial operations against ISM positions between Quiterajo and Mucojo on the coast. During the operations, a light aircraft came down, killing the South African pilot and an accompanying PRM officer. It is unclear what caused the plane to come down. Though Islamic State claimed to have downed a “helicopter,” a crash is more likely. The deceased pilot had worked with the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) in 2020 when it had a contract with PRM. DAG claimed that the operation last month had “nothing to do with us,” and that he was operating independently. The incident suggests that such support is still seen as an option by the PRM at least.
Expectations for the FDS as SAMIM Withdraw
By Fernando Lima, Zitamar News
The ongoing withdrawal of SAMIM troops will necessitate a greater reliance on the Defense and Security Forces (FDS). Within the FDS, the Local Force is being given increasing prominence politically by the ruling party Frelimo, as well as on the front line. The Quick Reaction Force, which recently saw action in Nampula and Chiure province, has also been highlighted by Minister for National Defense Cristovão Chume.
The meeting of Frelimo's Central Committee on 4 April did not, as expected, choose the party's next presidential candidate; instead, among the agenda topics, the 250 attendees received a detailed briefing on the situation of the war in Cabo Delgado, according to a source at the meeting. Along with the explanations provided by the Chume, the government brought in an old guerrilla commander to explain the role of the Local Force militia in the fight against the insurgent groups, according to a source at the meeting. “We have been trained as guerrillas, they have been trained as guerrillas. We know this type of warfare. Give us more weapons and ammunition, and we will finish them off,” he told the audience.
The Local Force’s limited ammunition supply was illustrated a few days later when a Local Force detachment clashed with ISM on 7 April near Chai, Macomia district, not far from the N380 road that runs through the northern part of the province. According to a local source, having killed at least 10 ISM fighters out of an estimated 50, the Local Force had to withdraw due to running out of ammunition.
When ISM moved across the Megaruma river to Chiúre district in the south, a Local Force contingent was dispatched from Mueda to protect the district capital, Chiúre town. They clashed with ISM at Nanoa, just seven kilometers north of Chiure district headquarters. Their presence is thought by local administrative authorities to have prevented another district capital from falling to the insurgents, after a two-week occupation of Quissanga in March, at the peak of the rainy season. In Mueda, local businesses and the municipality were asked to provide transport for the militia. One of their commanders also told Cabo Ligado that they are expecting to receive some of the trucks provided by the European Union mission to SAMIM, which are now being passed on to Mozambique.
For the government, the Local Forces are a key element in the fight against the insurgency once SAMIM leaves. And they have proven to be fierce fighters, even beyond the Mueda plateau, where most combatants first joined the force to protect their villages. The Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) cooperated extensively with the Local Force in 2021-2022, taking advantage of the Local Forces’ local knowledge of both language and of the dense forest areas along the Messalo river in Macomia district.
By the end of last month, another component of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) was called into action in Nampula, after an insurgent incursion across the Lurio river in Erati district. According to Cabo Ligado sources, a QRF (quick reaction force) was dispatched there to fight alongside the RSF. In a war where the performance of the FDS is often questioned, this joint force managed to push back the insurgents to Cabo Delgado. Minister Chume made a point of visiting their barracks, and praising the operational capabilities shown in action.
Local Perceptions of SAMIM Withdrawal
By Tomás Queface, Zitamar News
The withdrawal of SAMIM troops from Cabo Delgado continues to provoke mixed feelings in Mozambique, with different perspectives stemming from SAMIM's role in the conflict and its actions on the ground. While there is some consensus among analysts that the withdrawal of SAMIM troops will leave serious gaps in the counter-insurgency effort, some local sources view this with a certain indifference.
According to some, Mozambique may find it difficult to combat the insurgents and provide security in northern Mozambique alone. Others support this, arguing that, whatever the challenges faced by SAMIM, their presence has been instrumental in reducing the insurgency's capacity and that their absence will be felt.
In response to SAMIM’s withdrawal, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi has pledged to rely on bilateral security agreements to combat the insurgency and compensate for SAMIM's absence, relying on the Rwandan and Tanzanian forces in Cabo Delgado as part of this approach. On the ground, the various forces are now trying to adapt to a new phase of the conflict and prevent insurgents from occupying areas previously controlled by SAMIM.
However, SAMIM's activities have been criticized by communities throughout its presence in Cabo Delgado, particularly in the Macomia district, one of its areas of responsibility. The insurgents moved with relative ease and had a somewhat consolidated presence on the southern banks of the Messalo River, along the coast of Macomia, and in the Catupa forest despite the presence of SAMIM forces. It is unclear whether the decision not to engage with the insurgents in these areas came from the Mozambican authorities or from a lack of initiative on the part of SAMIM itself. Whatever the case, it has had an impact on people's perception of SAMIM, which is seen as less decisive and aggressive than the Rwandans in the areas where it operates.
One source in the town of Macomia told us SAMIM's reputation has been defined by its inability to respond to a series of rebel incursions into the district. SAMIM's reputation is based on its actual response to the insurgent threat rather than its physical presence. The same source claims that instead of remaining in their bases, SAMIM could have carried out offensive operations similar to those of Rwanda in the districts of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia. There is also a feeling that the departure of the SAMIM may not have any impact simply because their presence was not felt.
Similarly, another source argued that in terms of combat readiness, SAMIM didn't take part in many operations against insurgents. Of the 230 political violence events recorded by ACLED in Macomia district between July 2021 and April 2024, SAMIM was involved in only 25, 22 of which were clashes with the insurgents.
Regarding the vacuum left by the SAMIM forces in Macomia district, there is a possibility that they will be replaced by Rwandan contingents. Rwanda recently announced that it would send more troops to Cabo Delgado, but it is not clear whether they will replace or add to the existing contingent. However, sources contacted by Cabo Ligado in Macomia believe that SAMIM should eventually be replaced by Mozambican troops. If that happens, efforts should be made to improve relations and cooperation between the FDS and the population, which have been hampered by cases of human rights abuses, extortion, suspicions, and alleged killings of civilians in Mucojo by elements of the FDS.
Insights from the latest National Designated List Update
By Peter Bofin, ACLED
On 17 April, the Attorney General added 16 people to the National Designated List on the basis that they have been “involved in or associated with acts of terrorism.” The Attorney General has this power under legislation passed in July 2022 and August 2023. The 16 people added in April join the 41 individuals listed in July 2023. The Attorney General can also add entities to the list, as well as individuals and entities listed by other national or international authorities. As with the July 2023 list, the 16 listed in April are not significant players in the insurgency. Nevertheless, the details give insight into ISM’s management, recruitment, financing, and leadership, as well as some perspective on judicial processes.
At least eight of the cases relate to Mbau and Limala in southern Mocímboa da Praia district. Background details given in those cases claim that those listed were under the command of Sheikh Muamudo Ibraimo Dade, a commander in Limala village, anda Tanzanian, Abu Fassaro, who led a camp in Muera. This is the first time these names have emerged for members of the leadership. Neither Fassaro nor Sheikh Muamudo are mentioned in the July 2023 or April 2024 lists. Another figure, Sheikh Hassane, is also mentioned as a camp leader in Mbau. According to a leaked SAMIM intelligence document, one Sheikh Hassane was dead by August 2023. It is unlikely that Sheikh Muamudo and Abu Fassaro would have been mentioned in the cases listed if they were still alive.
Abu Fassaro’s camp is mentioned as a training camp, so the data likely refers to the years prior to the arrival of SAMIM and forces from Rwanda, for which the Mbau area was one of their first targets. Men, women, and children lived in the camps. One of the accused, a woman, was in Sheikh Muamudo’s camp for some time and seemingly had a child there. Supporting a settled population requires supply chains, and the list gives some insight into this. A nephew and cousin of Sheikh Muamudo are listed, charged in March 2024 with offenses related to purchasing and transporting food and medicine, and supplying mobile phone air time for Sheikh Muamudo for distribution. This was likely purchased and transported in relatively small amounts. As recently as March 2023, motorcycle taxi drivers in Mocimboa da Praia town were suspected of supplying insurgents with goods from the town.
Though charged this year, Muamudo’s relatives may have been arrested long before. Though their case was opened in 2023, no date is given for their arrest. This could have been years before. Another figure on the list, who was in Sheikh Muamudo’s camp, was arrested in November 2021 and waited until 2023 for a case to be opened against him. He made his first court appearance in January 2024, according to the list. For most of the cases, the date or even month of arrest is not given
Such long-term detention is a barrier to justice and may also be a security risk. One other individual listed was held in Mieze prison, where “he tried to recruit other convicts,” according to the details of his case.
Zitamar News reports that the purpose of the list is to demonstrate that Mozambique is taking action on terrorist financing so it may be removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s ‘grey list.’ The cases on the list are not evidence of serious action in that regard. As well as Sheikh Muamudo’s relatives, one other supplier is listed and described as having 180,500 meticals worth of food for supply to the insurgents. Another fished at sea for ISM, while others were sent to scavenge cassava from peasants’ fields. These are not financiers but low-level operatives in the group's supply chains.