Cabo Ligado Monthly: August 2023
August At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records six political violence events in Cabo Delgado in August, resulting in at least 22 reported fatalities
One event, a battle between insurgents and Mozambican forces, accounted for 12 of those fatalities
Political violence events were concentrated in Macomia district, where ACLED records four events, and in neighboring areas of Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe districts
Vital Trends
Insurgency leader Bonomade Machude Omar killed
Low rate of violent incidents continues
Evidence of fighters moving westwards
In This Report
Nangade update: violence, return, and natural resources
Return on the rise, but communities vulnerable
Ibn Omar is dead. What comes next?
August Situation Summary
The Chief of General Staff of the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), Joaquim Mangrasse, announced on 25 August the death of insurgency leader Bonomade Machude Omar, also known as Ibn Omar. He is believed to have been killed in an ambush he led against a FADM convoy on 22 August near Quiterajo in Macomia district.
His killing is a significant development, removing the insurgency’s most adept military operator. His killing came two weeks after a FADM base in the Catupa forest, also in Macomia district, was overrun on 8 August. In a statement, Islamic State (IS) claimed the death of seven Mozambican soldiers, and the seizure of weaponry in that incident.
The 22 August ambush was a gamble that did not pay off for Omar. In the convoy was a counterpart, the head of the army, Major General Tiago Nampelo. The insurgents likely had intelligence that he was in one of the vehicles.
It is not yet clear how this has affected the leadership of the insurgency. The group has not relied on one leader, and since intervention in July 2021, has, for the most part, operated in a devolved manner across the province’s northern districts.
In recent months, the group has been concentrated in Macomia district, in the Catupa forest, and along a roughly 40-kilometer stretch of coast between Quiterajo and Pangane villages. However, in August, some members moved westwards, along the Messalo river, in the direction of Mueda district in the province’s northwest. On 20 August, the village of Homba in Mueda was abandoned after receiving reports that insurgents were nearby, according to Lusa.
Nangade Update: Violence, Return, and Natural Resources
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
ACLED records just seven political violence events in Nangade district so far this year. Of these, four have involved Islamist insurgents, the most recent being in May. This relative stability is an opportunity to consider what ‘normalization’ means in the current context, in terms of violence and security provision, and business and economic development. For many, violence is not absent from their lives. Economically, low levels of political violence may present an opportunity to capture significant rents, but may also highlight fault lines in the district.
Despite low levels of political violence, people in Nangade have not yet returned in significant numbers to their villages of origin. According to the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) most recent survey, conducted in August 2023, there were 71,307 internally displaced people (IDPs) in the district. This is a significant reduction from June 2022’s high of over 116,000, but represents no significant change from February 2023, when 70,286 were recorded.
Just over 10,000 returnees were recorded in August, all within Nangade. The great majority of IDPs in Nangade, are from Nangade. Reluctance to return stems from fear of attacks from IS Mozambique. This is not unfounded. The insurgents’ approach to communities in Macomia – trade and some preaching, but always backed by a threat – has not been seen in Nangade. In three of the four recorded events involving insurgents in Nangade, they were targeting civilians.
IDPs are nevertheless trying to establish themselves in their places of origin. A humanitarian assessment conducted in August notes that since June, IDPs have been returning to their places of origin to clear land, maintain houses, and harvest crops. The assumption of an insurgent presence discourages further return.
The low level of permanent return within the district indicates that people sense a very real threat. This is shared by intervention forces within the district, which include Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) troops, and the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) bilateral deployment. For the TPDF, this concern is also expressed on the Tanzanian side of the border, where a strong military presence is still maintained. The TPDF conducts firing exercises on the Tanzanian side to signal an aggressive presence. This creates anxiety in rural communities on both sides of the border, who are never sure if it indicates an actual engagement, or exercises. The most recent experience of such exercises was in Matchedje in Niassa province, where villagers fled their homes at the end of August having heard gunfire on the Tanzanian side of the Mkenda bridge that links the province, according to a local source.
The absence of political violence does not, of course, equate to an absence of violence in people’s lives. Last month’s humanitarian assessment also highlighted the violence faced by women from either their partners in the home, or from men in the host community encountered outside the home.
People coming from IDP centers to harvest cassava represent the district’s mostly peasant community. More valuable natural resources are cashew and timber, not controlled by the poorest in the community. Both are attracting renewed interest, and for both, Tanzania represents a significant market. In 2019, according to the Cabo Delgado provincial government, over half of the district’s cashew crop was exported illegally to Tanzania. With harvesting expected next month, Tanzania may well present the closest market.
Interest in commercial timber harvesting has already returned. According to a local source, one firm has already returned to the district. In the last week of August, the firm was, according to a local source, prevented by Local Forces from returning to the Nkonga area, where it had operations prior to the conflict. The reason given was concerns about a possible insurgent presence: Nkonga was long an insurgent stronghold.
Research from prior to the conflict shows that timber, too, has a well-developed market on the other side of the river, and well-developed systems for avoiding border checks, and questions of origin. Investigations by MediaFax’s sister newspaper Savana in 2020 also revealed the political connections in illegal timber exports from Cabo Delgado, this time to China.
It may be significant that it was Local Forces that stepped in to prevent the return of commercial logging to Nkonga. The trade is valuable, and the most powerful conflict actors in the province now control access to the resource and, as with cashew, its movement out of the district.
Return on the Rise, but Communities Vulnerable
By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado
The Mozambican government has celebrated the massive return of people to their areas of origin in Cabo Delgado, pointing to the efforts of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) to restore security in northern Mozambique. These population movements were confirmed by the IOM, which recorded over 540,000 returns in Cabo Delgado province by August 2023. According to the Mozambique National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, at least 409,000 people have already returned to their homes. The return is also noticeable in the provinces of Niassa and Nampula. However, the government's argument that security has improved is not sufficient to explain the significant return of the population. It overlooks some key questions about the situation of conflict-affected populations.
The government's premise that security has been restored in Cabo Delgado has some validity. Incidents of violence against civilians in Cabo Delgado have decreased significantly since the last quarter of 2022, accounting for just 38% of political violence events in the province in 2023. In the early years of the conflict, the rate was as high as 80%. In the past months, clashes have been concentrated in the forests of Macomia, and insurgent incursions have been confined mainly to the coastal areas of Macomia and south of Mocímboa da Praia. Some insurgent movements have been observed in Nangade, Meluco, and Mueda, which may be linked to ongoing FDS operations against insurgent bases in Macomia. These recent developments, marked by a sharp reduction in violent incidents, have partly contributed to the return of the population.
However, the story of the return cannot be told without an analysis of the situation the IDPs are facing in the reception centers in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula provinces. The first and most serious challenge is the dire food situation of the IDPs. Since April, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been providing food assistance to displaced people with reduced rations, but between July and August, for example, the WFP was only able to reach around 418,000 people, leaving the rest to fend for themselves. According to Cabo Ligado sources, displaced people in the villages of Nangumi and Metoro in Ancuabe, who are dependent on humanitarian aid, claim to have received none since the last distribution in May and June.
In addition to hunger, there are other socio-environmental and psychological problems. A study published in August 2023 by the non-governmental organization Oasis Mozambique based on research in the districts of Pemba and Metuge found that the displaced faced serious sanitation problems (such as lack of latrines), in addition to lack of means of subsistence, and psychological violence in the host sites. Thousands of displaced people have been forced to leave their places of refuge in search of livelihoods in their areas of origin as a result.
But there are also serious problems in the areas of origin. According to an inter-agency report, the areas of return lack almost everything, from water and sanitation to shelter and emergency assistance. The reconstruction process is limited to the rehabilitation of some government infrastructure, such as the National Security Institute and the courts. Most of the key infrastructure is not functioning. This is the case with health infrastructure, where, according to the national authorities themselves, most health units in the districts of Macomia, Muidumbe, Quissanga, Palma, and Mocímboa da Praia are still closed due to the level of destruction. Patients are being treated at improvised sites.
Support for returnees is also scarce, both in the areas of return and in the reception centers. In Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, the WFP has resumed distribution of humanitarian aid, but not nearly enough. Without support to rebuild their livelihoods, the 400,000 or so people who have already returned are extremely vulnerable. The same goes for the more than 800,000 people still displaced in Mozambique's three northern provinces.
The prospects for the displaced in both the host areas and their areas of origin are not good. The security situation may have improved, but the reduction in humanitarian aid and the slow pace of reconstruction are preventing them from fully rebuilding their lives and securing their livelihoods. The narrative of return helps the government to reinforce the idea that it is winning on the battlefield, but the lack of planning to receive the displaced in their areas of origin could increase exposure to violence, exploitation, and health problems.
Ibn Omar Is Dead. What Comes Next?
By Fernando Lima, Cabo Ligado
It took three weeks, but as expected, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado has reacted brutally to the death of Ibn Omar, the military commander of IS Mozambique. In the late afternoon of Thursday, 14 September, a group of insurgents showed up at Naquitengue village, not far from the Messalo river, and surrounded a number of villagers who were later on grouped on religious grounds: Christians and Muslims, a division that most often, in Cabo Delgado, follows ethnic boundaries.
According to an IS publication, 11 Christians were killed and their houses destroyed. Unconfirmed reports mentioned some of the victims were beheaded. As the FADM’s Chief of General Staff, Mangrasse, commented on 25 August, the death of Ibn Omar is not the end of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Later, Defense Minister Cristóvão Chume said he was not surprised by the attack, having expected this kind of reaction.
Nevertheless, hopes are high in Mozambique that the removal of Ibn Omar will mark a watershed in the conflict.
From an operational perspective, however, the decentralized way in which the insurgents operate means that the absence of Ibn Omar will not stop other guerrilla leaders from taking over and commanding attacks in targeted areas.
A recent SAMIM internal document identified a number of commanders for different regions in Cabo Delgado. Last year, during the offensive in southern Cabo Delgado, locals and security experts identified an individual known as ‘Farido,’ also from Mocímboa da Praia, as the commander in charge of that offensive, during a period when Ibn Omar was abroad receiving training and Islamic teaching.
The government also announced the killing of senior insurgency members Abu Kital and Ali Mahando in August, in operations around the Catupa forest base in Macomia. But a new name has also emerged as a leading commander, that goes by the name of ‘Quadrado.’ Both Farido and Quadrado were mentioned as base commanders by researchers who spoke with Cabo Ligado, having interviewed people who had been forced to live in those hideouts.
The killings of Omar, Kital, and Mahando have all come during an offensive known as ‘Golpe Duro,’ or ‘Hard Punch,’ involving Mozambican and SAMIM, mainly South African, troops. The offensive has been focused on the Macomia coastal area between Mucojo and Quiterajo, one of the main ideological heartlands for the insurgency after Mocímboa da Praia.
The Hard Punch code name could have been chosen in response to criticisms in a June SADC report, seen by Cabo Ligado, in which the Mozambican delegation mentioned a lack of offensive actions against the insurgency, as opposed to peacekeeping operations. In practical terms, this has meant all the offensive work remained in the hands of the Rwandan Defence Force, and in the increasing operational capacity being shown by Mozambican special forces.
The cautious way in which Mangrasse announced Omar’s death, is notable — pointing to an ongoing investigation to determine a definitive verdict. But a few days later, President Filipe Nyusi, clearly addressing the doubts surrounding the death of the insurgency commander, told a public audience, Ibn Omar will never be seen alive again.
In reports coming from Pangane, a village in the coastal area of Macomia, the insurgents, in their regular contacts with the local population, also acknowledge the death of Ibn Omar. Large numbers of insurgents continue to show up at the village to fetch supplies and pay generous prices, well above the usual. They also continue to insist on the need for regular religious prayers and total abstinence from alcoholic beverages.
Weeks of military operations along the coast of Macomia have forced the insurgency to move westwards, along the Messalo river and across the N380 road. The movement suggests that Muidumbe district could be the next potential target, along with the area of Mbau, still part of Mocímboa da Praia district, where the Naquitengue attack took place. There is a symbolism there since these were areas occupied for a long time, until the clean-up operation by Rwandan forces in 2021.
However, as emphasized by President Nyusi and Mangrasse, the insurgency is losing operational capacity. The end of Ramadan and the rainy season did not show any renewed fighting capacity, despite the large number of new recruits identified in hideouts in the surroundings of the Catupa forest, and in frequent appearances at the fishing spots along the Macomia coast. The death of Ibn Omar is a real blow for the insurgency. But it is unlikely to be fatal.