February At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records 18 political violence events in Cabo Delgado in February, resulting in 20 reported fatalities

• Reported fatalities were highest in Meluco district, with eight reported fatalities, where insurgents ambushed several civilian vehicles

• Other events took place in Montepuez, Muidumbe, Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, Ancuabe, and Palma

Vital Trends

• Insurgent clashes with security forces subside

• Over 11,000 displaced in Montepuez

• Insurgents remain active in Mocímboa  da Praia district

In This Report

• Security Council report on Islamic State and al-Qaeda

• Is the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado happening? 

• Rwanda and Jordan enhance cooperation

• TotalEnergies and its contractors prepare for Afungi return

February Situation Summary

The 20 reported fatalities in February were lower than the 79 fatalities in January, but involved a more significant proportion of civilians than the previous month. The number of political violence events recorded by ACLED in February, 18, decreased from the 21 events in January.

The difference is accounted for by the reduction in insurgent battles against Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS), international forces, and community militias known as Local Forces. In February, ACLED recorded just six battles, with eight reported fatalities, compared to 16 in January, reaching 77 reported fatalities.

Notable events in February included violent events in Montepuez and Mocímboa  da Praia districts. Two attacks in Montepuez district led to the displacement of over 11,000 people. On 4 February 2023, Islamist militias burned houses and stores in Namoro near Nairoto, Montepuez district. Though no casualties were reported after the attack, fear of further attacks resulted in over 3,300 people fleeing that week in Montepuez district, recorded by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). An attack on an FDS base at Nairoto on 12 February resulted in five reported fatalities among soldiers and the further displacement of 5,000 people that week in Montepuez, according to IOM. A further 2,793 were recorded as being displaced the subsequent week.

In Mocímboa  da Praia district, two clashes were recorded between Rwandan forces and insurgents on 22 and 27 February, as well as the kidnapping of civilians on 5 February. Despite this continued insurgent activity in this strategic area, the visit of TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné to Pemba, Mocímboa  da Praia, and Palma raised expectations that the company will restart its natural gas project. 

Security Council Report on Islamic State and al-Qaeda

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

The most recent report on Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations (UN) was published last month. Covering the six months to 19 December 2022, it offers a strategic assessment of these organizations and their affiliates. For Mozambique, the report is an opportunity to consider what we know about the insurgency in terms of strength in numbers and weaponry, financing, and the relationship with IS centrally, as well as with other affiliates.

The report notes the success of the regional military intervention in “disrupting leadership, command structures, and bases” of the insurgents. In terms of personnel, it reports that “regional Member States” –Mozambique, Southern African Development Community (SADC) members, and Rwanda most likely – estimate that insurgent numbers have been reduced to just 280 “adult male fighters” from an initial 2,500 “fighters.”

Military intervention has led to a decline in the number of fighters in the field currently. The figure of 2,500 refers to pre-intervention numbers. Last July, the Monitoring Team reported a force size of between 200 and 400 “active fighters.” However, not all involved in the insurgency are fighters, nor are they all adult males. Boys, often kidnapped, are involved in fighting on the insurgents’ side, something acknowledged by the Monitoring Team last year. Women and girls have a variety of roles. Work by João Feijo has shown that in combat, they have had the roles of as informers or spotters, as well as support roles in maintaining camp, foraging, and cooking. If those in support roles in villages and towns are included, as well as fighters who may return, the number of those involved in the insurgency would need to be revised upwards.

The most recent Monitoring Team report includes small arms used by the insurgents, ranging from small machine guns to rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In addition, the report gives two sources for the group’s arsenal – raids on police armories and importation by sea and road.

Member states pointing to raids on police armories is surprising. In the second half of 2022, ACLED data indicates 19 incidents in which insurgents have clashed with security forces and seized weapons and/or ammunition. Over that period, there have been no recorded raids on police armories. Rather, insurgents typically seize arms and ammunition in raids on military or police outposts, or in clashes in the field. Three such incidents involved clashes with joint Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) patrols.

On importation by sea, the Monitoring Team reports Member States saying that deliveries are made off the coast of Cabo Delgado “using floating plastic bags with markers” and buoys that can transmit their location. How this works in practice is not clear from the report. Two security consultants interviewed doubt that such shipments would be possible as they would require quite sophisticated logistics to get shipments from sea to land, and onwards to camps inland – an exercise fraught with risk. For road, the report is less specific, saying they are smuggled in fuel trucks “crossing porous borders throughout the region.” Again, this would require complex logistics and entail high risk. On balance, the insurgency is likely reliant on arms that have been seized during successful attacks or purchased locally from sources within the FDS.

The insurgency’s emerging IED capability is important as it illustrates levels of external support in ways not seen with small arms. If such capability, at a low level now, is institutionalized within the insurgency, it would greatly heighten its impact, allowing it to target the better equipped international intervention forces, restrict their movement, and thereby improve their own mobility.  

The report notes that IED capability has been built with external assistance, which developed capacity within insurgent bases for manufacturing basic devices. The earliest deployments of IED recorded by ACLED were on 21 August 2021 against a SAMIM patrol in Muidumbe, and later against an armed Rwandan column moving through southern Mocímboa  da Praia on 12 September. ACLED records a further three similar incidents. It is understood that other IEDs have been discovered, and there may be unreported incidents. The Monitoring Team noted in February 2021 the provision of “trainers, tactical strategists and financial support” facilitated by regional IS networks in September 2020 and earlier. Using the 21 August case as an index case, we can assume that technical assistance to develop IEDs was received in the first half of 2021 or even earlier. 

Data and intelligence on weaponry and IED development provide insight into relationships with other affiliates and IS centrally. Reliance on locally procured arms suggests that there is unlikely to be much financial support coming through IS internally. IS Somalia is known to act as a funding hub, and the Monitoring Team, in its most recent report, states that it has an income of up to $100,000 monthly “through extortion of the shipping industry and illicit taxation.” Evidence suggests that a significant part of this does not reach Mozambique.

IED development suggests an active regional network, possibly reliant on technical support from beyond the region. The introduction of IEDs in Cabo Delgado in 2021 came in the same year that their use by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF – the core of the IS Central Africa Province) increased exponentially. ACLED data shows two such incidents attributed to ADF in 2020, compared to 12 in 2021. It should not be assumed that such capacity has come to Mozambique from Iraq or Syria. Current intelligence indicates that an IED specialist from southern Africa is currently in Cabo Delgado. Given the more advanced IED capabilities of the ADF, as outlined in the report, such assistance could also come from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This picture of complex regional networks acting under the IS umbrella providing support to the insurgency in Mozambique reflects the report’s statement that regional Member States see no signs of command and control from IS central in Mozambique. Further, the complexity of regional networks also illustrates the challenges which confront Mozambique and its allies in tackling these resilient regional networks.

Rwanda and Jordan Enhance Cooperation – and the Prize is Mozambique

By Marisa Lourenço, Independent Analyst 

When Jordan’s Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ayman Abudullah al-Safadi – who also serves as foreign affairs minister – touched down at Rwanda’s Kigali International Airport on 21 February to begin a three-day working visit, it marked the fourth time in just 14 months that officials from the two countries had met. Three of these visits have been on Rwandan soil.

Historically, Jordan’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been limited. However, the kingdom shares a common aim with Rwanda – projecting influence in the region through countering Islamist extremism. The communiqué from this latest visit underlines this, stating officials “confirmed commitment to continue cooperation in the fight against terrorism, whether through direct communication or under the umbrella of the Aqaba process.” Jordan’s preferred method is information sharing and defense agreements; Rwanda’s is boots on the ground.

The Aqaba process, established in 2015, is the brainchild of Jordan’s head of state, King Abdullah II, with the aim of “countering terrorism in a holistic way.” The kingdom has carried out operations on the ground – in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen – but its fight has broader aims. These include “enhancing security and military coordination and cooperation …. [and] facilitating the exchange of expertise and information among regional and international stakeholders.”

Under this umbrella, in 2017, Jordan donated military hardware to Nigeria and provided training to support the fight against Boko Haram. Nigeria promised to assist the kingdom in greater cooperation with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, all facing Islamist extremism within their borders. The year before, delegates from Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia – countries similarly affected by Islamist extremism – attended the Aqaba process.

In March 2022, Jordan broadened its focus in SSA, inviting delegates from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Tanzania. According to the kingdom, despite global efforts to counter Islamist extremist groups, they had “expanded and intensified their activities in parts of Africa.”

The hosting of the 2022 process overlapped with a working visit by Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi to Jordan. It also overlapped with a working visit by Rwandan President Paul Kagame – who then met with all that year’s Aqaba delegates.

Rwanda’s involvement in counter-terrorism operations in SSA also spans the last decade. Since 2014, it has dispatched personnel from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) to the Central African Republic (CAR). In July 2021, Kigali deployed 1,000 troops to Cabo Delgado province. This has since grown to 2,500 members. 

But its involvement in the two countries is different. While part of its mandate in CAR is based on a bilateral agreement of defense between the two countries, the other part falls under the auspices of the African Union or United Nations, which have organized various peacekeeping missions in the country. In Mozambique, Rwanda also operates under a bilateral agreement alongside the multilateral SAMIM deployment. The Rwandan government claims it finances the RDF’s mission there itself, save for its share of the 20 million Euro (US$21.22m) given by the EU end of 2022.

Rwanda says it is in Mozambique in the name of regional security – a sentiment similar to that echoed by Jordan as it broadens its Aqaba process in SSA. Nyusi, meanwhile, has praised Rwanda’s involvement, calling it part of an “African solution.”

In September 2022, Benin requested support from Rwanda to counter a growing jihadist problem amid wider turbulence in the Sahel region. It made it clear this would take the form of aid and expertise instead of troops on the ground.

Why is Mozambique so important to Jordan and Rwanda? The energy-scarce kingdom imports 96% of its electricity needs in the form of oil and gas from neighboring countries. The development of Mozambique’s vast hydrocarbon reserves is therefore to its benefit if it can secure a share of its offtake for its own LNG import terminal plans. For Rwanda, there is a commercial angle. Not only does the holding company of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) have businesses in Cabo Delgado, but the government has also sought permission from Mozambique to allow Rwandan intelligence to track dissidents in exile in the southern African nation.

To gain and maintain a foothold in Mozambique, Jordan and Rwanda need each other. The kingdom could simply strengthen ties with Nyusi, leaving Kagame out of the equation. But Mozambique has general elections in 2024, and while a likely Frelimo victory promises broad policy continuity, particularly with Nyusi as party president until 2027, the end of his two-term limit as head of state introduces uncertainty. Kagame, meanwhile, could be in power until 2034. This setup guarantees policy continuity, and that it is in the form of authoritarian rule is hardly something to alarm a monarchy. Rwanda, unlike Mozambique, also has stronger bilateral ties in SSA, on which Jordan will want to capitalize.

Defense agreements between Jordan and Rwanda will likely support the RDF’s continued deployment in Cabo Delgado, considering their military cooperation agreements go back to 2021. It will not be lost on the Jordanian authorities that the RDF has focused on stabilizing the most economically important districts of the province: Palma, where TotalEnergies’ Afungi site is located, and Mocímboa da Praia, which provides port access for gas projects. Rwanda, for its part, would be glad to receive such support. One of the poorest countries in Africa, it cannot fund this foreign mission for long without significant support.

Nyusi will not stand in the way of these military and economic partnerships with Jordan and Rwanda. Mozambique’s potential to be a major gas exporter is vital to its economic fortunes, and foreign involvement – from project expertise to security agreements – is necessary to make this a reality. Nyusi is also strategic enough to capitalize on SSA becoming an ever-larger battleground for foreign power rivalry. For all the Cold War rhetoric repeated ad nauseam in relation to Mozambique, its government plays to all sides for its own benefit. It is unlikely to change this stance anytime soon.

Is the Reconstruction of Cabo Delgado Happening?

By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado

There are indications that parts of Cabo Delgado are moving positively towards stability from a security point of view. Last month the President of the Swiss Confederation, Alain Berset, and TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné visited Mueda and met with President Filipe Nyusi in Pemba, along with trips to both Palma and Mocímboa  da Praia. Later in the month, the Minister of National Defence, Cristovão Chume, went to Muidumbe. In Nangade, a SAMIM delegation visited to focus on civil affairs. These high-level visits to districts heavily affected by the conflict follow a sustained return of Internally Displaced People (IDPs)to Mocímboa  da Praia, Palma, and Quissanga, the resumption of rehabilitation works in the port of Mocímboa da Praia, and the prospects of restarting the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Afungi. Despite these positive developments, the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado has far to go.

The Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan (PRCD), which the Mozambican parliament approved on 27 September 2021, aims to restore the infrastructure and basic services destroyed by the armed attacks raging in Cabo Delgado since 2017. The three-year plan from 2021 to 2024 is budgeted at approximately 300 million US dollars to rebuild public infrastructure, provide humanitarian aid, and contribute socio-economic support to families. According to this plan, around a third of this amount would be spent in the first year on issues such as restoring public administration, health facilities, schools, electricity, water supply, sanitation, telecommunications, access roads, and jobs for young people, amongst others.

The Mozambican government did not manage to allocate all the funds foreseen for the PRCD. This was acknowledged by the Prime Minister during his visit to Cabo Delgado in November 2022. The government's role has, to an extent, been partially replaced by private entities and cooperation institutions, both national and international, with their own programs.

A growing number of actors and partners have funded projects and programs aimed at the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado. On 28 February, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released €19m (US$20.17m) for its two-year project, "Immediate Stabilization and Recovery of Cabo Delgado," as part of PRCD with funding from the European Union and the Netherlands. In August 2022, UNDP also trained 50 police officers from Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Nangade, Mueda, Quissanga, and Macomia in human rights and ethics, along with rehabilitation of the Quissanga district command. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM ) funded the construction of police posts in the province. TotalEnergies and UNDP provided containers that enable the functioning of state services in Mocímboa da Praia. Medecins Sans Frontieres has installed mobile health brigades to provide health services to local people. 

Despite multiple interventions, it is increasingly evident on the ground that this support is not following a concerted, robust, and comprehensive effort toward a more effective and impactful reconstruction of Cabo Delgado. A recent report by the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR) found that most of the infrastructure in Mocímboa  da Praia has been destroyed, notably the public buildings and installations necessary for service provision . In particular, the report states that the returning population faces an enormous lack of education, health services, and support for economic activities, exemplifying the current state fragility. When it comes to access to water in the district of Mocímboa  da Praia, for instance, of the 120 boreholes that were available in the pre-conflict period, only 36 are operational, significantly reducing access to water. The situation is no better in the health sector as most of the health facilities were completely destroyed and equipment either damaged or vandalized. The inability to provide social services is aggravated by the slow return of public servants to the districts affected by the violence. 

This challenging reconstruction scenario was acknowledged in a meeting on 16 February 2023 between the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and partners to assess development in Cabo Delgado. Since the approval of the PRCD, MEF noted the lack of progress, that most of the infrastructure is waiting to be rehabilitated, the lack of basic conditions for the population in areas of return, and a lack of employment opportunities or income generation for the majority youth population. According to MEF, the mobilization of resources to fund the actions of PRCD is urgent. To focus efforts, actions across Palma, Mocímboa  da Praia, Muidumbe, Nangade, Macomia, and Quissanga districts were identified and prioritized. 

Perhaps highlighting how ADIN has not performed its lead role in reconstruction, at the same MEF meeting, international partners asked for the establishment of a Platform for the Coordination of actions in Cabo Delgado and Northern Mozambique. ADIN’s role now appears to have been superseded by such ad hoc mechanisms centered on MEF. 

In Cabo Delgado, approaches to reconstruction prioritize physical reconstruction, with a focus on restoring economic infrastructure and basic services to enable the safe return of populations. However, there are fundamental issues that are still not being addressed, one of them being the issue of ethnic disputes within communities in Cabo Delgado, highlighted in OMR’s recent report. Currently, no policies are in place to encourage the inclusion of communities in decision-making regarding public policies and in the reconstruction process itself. The lack of involvement and participation of civil society in relation to reconstruction is also noteworthy. Further, the current policy framework lacks clarity about the creation of institutions that will respond to the crises and the psychological traumas of the populations. These gaps can jeopardize the already complicated implementation of the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado.

TotalEnergies and Its Contractors Prepare for Afungi Return

By Fernando Lima, Cabo Ligado

With the status of the report commissioned by TotalEnergies into the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado still unknown, signs are nevertheless emerging that TotalEnergies is preparing to restart work on the Mozambique LNG project on the Afungi peninsula, in Palma district, in the second half of this year.

The clearest sign yet was the comment by the Chief Executive Officer of Saipem Alessandro Puliti, the Italian engineering company which is the main contractor on the project, that TotalEnergies has asked it to be ready to restart in July. Developments on the ground in Mozambique confirm that that is the likely timetable.

In Maputo, human resources companies are contacting former TotalEnergies personnel to check their availability to return to the project site in Cabo Delgado. After TotalEnergies declared force majeure in April 2021, its headcount in the country was cut to a minimum. According to our sources, human resources and headhunting companies are now preparing a database of personnel who could be hired or rehired through 2023. Some former employees have been asked if they would be available by July.

One department which is already hard at work is the one concerned with resettlement. They have been particularly busy for the last six months, with getting people displaced by the conflict to leave Quitunda, the village built by the LNG project to house people resettled by the project, and return to their homes, largely in Mocímboa da Praia. The Rwandan military has directly supported this process. 

They are also working on improving conditions for those people from the villages surrounding the Afungi site. Consultec, a Mozambican engineering company, has been hired to improve access for people in villages such as Maganja, Quelimane, and Mondlane, Cabo Ligado learned on a visit to the area last December. One of the aims is to provide easy access to the coastal area where people can fish.

The Quitunda resettlement village, built next to the camp to receive 600 families from the concession area for the project, has been criticized for taking the fishing community away from the coast. These days, people in Quitunda are taken by bus to fish on the shores of Afungi, which is not a sustainable solution in the long term.

TotalEnergies argues that the location of the village was decided by the project’s previous operator, Anardarko, under great pressure from the Mozambican government. As TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné said at an investor presentation in February, “there have been some controversies about human rights around the project, not because of us. We inherited that from the Anadarko acquisition.”

The location of Quitunda next to the main camp is also considered a risk since the attack on Palma in March 2021, which brought thousands of displaced people to the camp gate, with fears that insurgents were mixed in with civilians.

The MASC Foundation, a Mozambican NGO originally set up as a re-granting organization for smaller projects in Mozambique, has won a number of contracts from TotalEnergies to work on resettlement activities. Local companies are subcontracted by MASC for engineering projects in the community, supplying ‘survival kits’ for resettled people, rehabilitating buildings in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, supporting small businesses, and a farming program for returnees in Mocímboa da Praia, MASC told us.

Getting set for July

Work on the gas project itself has yet to restart, but Saipem’s understanding that it will restart in July is not denied by TotalEnergies.

After CEO Pouyanné’s visit to the site of the project in early February, the World Bank's vice president for Eastern and Southern Africa, Victoria Kwakwa, toured the area with TotalEnergies executive Stephane Le Galles on 8 March, and gave a positive assessment of the return of life to the streets of Palma and Mocímboa  da Praia. The visit is seen as an explicit backing to TotalEnergies return. 

Le Galles told the press during the visit that, from the moment of restart, it would take four years to start LNG production — meaning LNG exports would only begin in “2027 at the best,” Bloomberg reported.

Saipem leads the engineering, construction, and procurement (EPC) contract alongside joint venturers McDermott International of the United States and Japan’s Chiyoda Engineering. Most of the staff on the Afungi project signed contracts with those companies instead of direct contracts with TotalEnergies.

Prior to Saipem’s comments last month, South African contractor WBHO announced it was awarded a contract to clear the site and to perform some structural work at the perimeter of the 88 hectare industrial site. In fact, WBHO never left Afungi and was working through 2022 on building the permanent military premises at the Afungi camp, as well as the security fence around the project area. 

TotalEnergies’ Le Galles told Bloomberg that there are four or five conditions that need to be met for the project to restart, including a positive assessment of the human rights conditions in Cabo Delgado. The company also wants to see government officials return to Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, improved security conditions, and for project contractors to stick to the prices they previously agreed.

The independent humanitarian report, prepared by French veteran humanitarian and diplomat Jean-Christophe Rufin, should be ready “in the next days,” TotalEnergies’ local vice president for socio-economic development, Laiila Chilemba, told Bloomberg. It remains to be seen if it will be made public or shared only with TotalEnergies and its consortium partners.