Cabo Ligado Monthly: January 2022
January At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records 44 organized political violence events in January, resulting in 74 fatalities
Recorded fatalities were highest in Nangade district, where insurgents repeatedly carried out attacks on civilians and clashed with Mozambican state forces, local militias, and troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)
Other events took place in Ibo, Macomia, Meluco, Mocimboa da Praia, and Mueda districts in Cabo Delgado
Vital Trends
Meluco district was the site of repeated insurgent attacks in January, as insurgents targeted the road connecting Macomia town with Pemba
Fighting also continued in Macomia district itself, with insurgents conducting raids along the N380 both north and south of Macomia town
The insurgency appeared to withdraw from Niassa province, concentrating its efforts in the north of Nangade district
In This Report
Analysis the international criticism the Tanzanian government has faced over its response to the conflict in northern Mozambique
Discussion of the struggles the Mozambican government has faced as it contemplates bringing displaced civilians back to Mocimboa da Praia district
Three trends to watch for in the conflict in 2022
An update on SADC’s attempts to secure funding for its intervention in Mozambique
January Situation Summary
The insurgency in Northern Mozambique contracted geographically in January, but lost little of its capacity for violence. At the end of December, it seemed as though the story of the conflict heading into 2022 was the insurgency’s westward expansion into Niassa province, where it conducted a series of attacks and faced little resistance from security forces. In January, however, those attacks ceased, and not as a result of any apparent military victory on the part of pro-government forces. Instead, insurgents appeared to have made a strategic decision not to pursue the conflict in Niassa and instead pursue an offensive in northern Cabo Delgado. As a result of their activity in Cabo Delgado’s northern Nangade district, there were more conflict-related fatalities there than in any other district in January.
In addition to ramping up violence in the northern reaches of the conflict zone, the insurgency expanded south in January. After a long period of targeting northern and eastern Macomia district, insurgents at the end of December and into January began raids in southern Macomia district, and soon moved into Meluco district, which sits to Macomia’s southwest. The raids initially targeted villages along the N380, the road that connects Pemba to Mueda through Macomia town. Soon, however, raiding parties began moving west through Meluco district, forcing thousands of civilians to flee and leading Mozambican security forces to block off the main westward escape route in an apparent attempt to keep insurgents from moving into Montepuez district. The expansion into Meluco is an opportunity for insurgents to gather more supplies and force pro-government forces to spread themselves thinner, but it also increases the group’s capacity to threaten the N380 and, by extension, Macomia town itself.
That poses a problem for the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), which has a base in Macomia town. Yet SAMIM commanders do not appear overly concerned about their local supply lines in Macomia district. Instead, the concern that preoccupies the regional force is the extent to which regional politics and funding concerns will allow it to continue into the future. SAMIM’s mandate was extended in January, as is covered in detail in the final section of this report. Yet member states are already saying publicly that they cannot continue to fund the mission indefinitely, and it is unclear how prepared outside funders are to step in and fill in the gaps. With SAMIM troops forming such a large proportion of the pro-government coalition in Cabo Delgado, the locus of the counterinsurgency effort there may now be the negotiations to keep the force in the field on a long-term basis.
Tanzania Weathers Diplomatic Criticism
By Peter Bofin
Tanzania has had a difficult month diplomatically. On 26 January, Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, Director General of European Union (EU) Military Staff appeared before the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence to be questioned on progress with the EU Training Mission to Mozambique. He expressed his worry about “the Tanzanian attitude,” and said that Tanzanian officials were too focused “on how they should protect themselves from the situation” in northern Mozambique, rather than being part of the solution. Five days later, a Kigali news outlet published a piece comparing SAMIM unfavorably to the Rwanda Defence Force. It specifically accused Tanzania of being unable to control movement across the border, and that the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) detachment in Nangade was unpopular with the “Muslim community” in Nangade. Subsequently removed from the news outlet’s site, the text remains online. On 28 January, President Samia Suluhu Hassan met with President Filipe Nyusi in Pemba. Speaking to the press, Nyusi spoke of “terrorists” crossing the common border, and the need for a dedicated approach. President Samia spoke blandly of having discussed “developmental and peace and security affairs.”
Tanzania is the only other SADC member, alongside Mozambique, directly affected by insurgent actions, so a focus on its posture towards the conflict is to be expected. It has long been known that networks in Tanzania provide vital logistical support to the insurgency, and that Tanzania has been an important source of recruits. Testing the claims, however, that Tanzania is indeed guilty of indifference is more difficult.
ACLED data confirm that movement across the border for insurgents remains an issue despite the deployment of SAMIM troops in northern Mozambique, and a long-standing state security presence on the Tanzanian side. Since August 2021, ACLED has recorded five violent clashes in Tanzanian border villages involving small armed groups crossing from Mozambique. Two wards have been hit twice in that period. Such raids are usually for provisions, and likely guided by Tanzanian members of the insurgency with detailed local knowledge of cross-border routes, and border communities. In at least one case, a raiding party was led by an insurgent originally from that village. Movement into Mozambique from Tanzania also continues, illustrated by arrests in December.
Those civilians that manage to cross the river into Tanzania fleeing clashes are still refouled across Unity Bridge to Negomano, and the very basic facilities provided there by the Mozambican military. Despite criticisms, this continues, most recently on 8 January when approximately 400 people crossed the river, fleeing an attack at Alberto Chipande village in Mueda district.
Whether these represent all clashes and crossings in that period, or just those that have come to light is difficult to assess. Certainly, there has been an effective media blackout in Tanzania on security issues along the border since 2017, if not before. Discussion of the conflict in Tanzania’s media is minimal, while civil society, and political activists also avoid the issue.
Access to the border remains restricted for the diplomatic community, though it has slowly improved since March last year. Diplomatic access to government decision-makers in Dar es Salaam too is restricted, with operations directed by the security forces at the highest level rather than traditional interlocutors. But this is not evidence of lack of engagement. Security channels are prominent in international engagement on the issue, whether through bilateral engagements with Mozambique and Rwanda, or through support to TPDF’s presence in Mozambique. The channels through which the Tanzanian government engages domestically and internationally are typically closed to other powers.
Consequently, the state dominates discourse on the conflict, and thereby great store is put on public pronouncements aimed at international audiences. Of these there are few, and they are usually guarded, such as President Samia’s remarks in Pemba in January. But when a domestic audience is targeted, it is not unusual to see specific issues of recruitment for armed groups happening in border communities raised by the security forces. Examples can be found in footage of the police chief addressing villagers near the border, the Chief of Defence Forces addressing the press, or an officer addressing newly qualified cadets. It may therefore be understandable that international audiences see indifference, while selected national audiences may see concern.
Even if it is not evidence of indifference, this approach may support Vice Admiral Bléjean’s contention that Tanzania’s priority is its own security. Yet, as insurgent documents seized by SAMIM demonstrate, Tanzanian security is under threat. Stated insurgent objectives include free passage over the border; control of the banks of Ruvuma river; and the creation of permanent settlements in Tanzanian territory. While attacks have continued in Tanzania, they have mostly been for provisions, and not wholly offensive such as the October 2020 attack on Kitaya. Movement across the border continues at some level, but the lack of sustained offensives suggests it is not out of control.
The extent to which the insurgency controls the banks of the Ruvuma river remains unclear. Maputo’s Savana newspaper reports that small armed groups have been able to move with relative ease through Nangade district, through areas allocated to the TPDF and the Lesotho Defence Force. Savana reports residents’ complaints that SAMIM troops spend their time in their bases, arrive after attacks, and return quickly.
As one of the largest contributors to SAMIM, Tanzania can expect increased scrutiny if mooted external funding for operations emerges. This will come from funders, but also from governments, press, and civil society in fellow SADC countries, if not within Tanzania. As we have seen in January, such criticism can be more direct than the country may be comfortable with, and may require public communications that strategically engage with the wide range of interests with eyes on security in northern Mozambique, and southern Tanzania.
Complexities in the Return of the Population to Mocímboa da Praia
By Tomás Queface
The recapture of the main town of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2021 was one of the major landmarks of the foreign military intervention in Cabo Delgado. The Mozambican defense forces, assisted by Rwandan forces, conducted operations that culminated with the recapture of the Diaca-Awasse area, the district capital, and the strategic port of Mocímboa da Praia, which had been in the hands of insurgents for over a year. Since then, the Mozambican authorities have worked to restore destroyed infrastructure and re-establish security as preconditions for the return of the population. However, the Governor of Cabo Delgado, Valige Tauabo, recently acknowledged that the return of the population is a rather complex process.
The complexities mentioned by Tauabo refer to the fact that, when government forces regained control of Mocimboa da Praia, the district lacked electricity, water supply, and telecommunication infrastructure, as well as a health system, education services, and other government services. Government efforts to re-establish these services started in September 2021 with the reconstruction of about 45 kilometers of electricity line, from the Awasse substation to Mocímboa da Praia, which led to the return of electricity in October. In the same way, the mobile phone network was re-established, both in Mocímboa da Praia and in the town of Palma. Later, roads were restored and public infrastructure rebuilt in the main town of Mocímboa da Praia. Despite these efforts, the 63,000 inhabitants who lived in Mocímboa da Praia before the insurgents' attacks have not yet been allowed to return back to their areas, because the re-establishment of security and infrastructure as well as basic services continue to represent huge challenges for the government.
Security is one of the fundamental pre-conditions for the population to return to Mocímboa da Praia. Reports of clashes between insurgents and the joint forces of Mozambique and Rwanda are scarce, mainly due to a media blackout. However, there are signs that insurgent hotspots remain in Mocimboa da Praia district. On 30 January, Mozambique’s police chief announced that Mozambican and Rwandan forces killed an insurgent leader, Tuahil Muhidim, in Naquitengue, in southern Mocimboa da Praia district. Muhidim was responsible for directing attacks on the main town of Mocímboa da Praia during the insurgent assault on the district capital. Also during January, the joint forces carried out a "cleaning operation" in which about 3,000 homes were searched. As a result of the search, several uniforms of the Mozambican armed defense forces were found. For the Mozambican authorities, this is a clear sign of the presence of insurgents in the area. The Minister of Defence has therefore asked those displaced to wait for authorization from the military to return to their areas of origin.
So far, there is no concrete plan on the ground to return people from Mocimboa da Praia district to their areas of origin. Some people are already returning voluntarily to western Mocímboa da Praia, particularly to the villages of Diaca, Nanili, Mitope and Namandaia. Current estimates point to about 4,200 people living in the village of Diaca, 3,900 in Nanili, 1,600 in Mitope and 1,300 in Namandaia, mostly women and children. But the number of people in these villages fluctuates due to the entry and exit of people, as in the case of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing from attacks in the villages of Macomia, who sometimes find refuge in Mocímboa da Praia. Due to the increasing number of civilians in Diaca and Nanili, the government was forced to restore some basic services in these villages. Two schools started operating in Mocímboa da Praia, one in Naniil and another one in Diaca. Health services are also provided in infrastructure that survived the attacks, tents or under trees.
The restoration of electricity in the district of Mocímboa da Praia had no impact on the residents of Diaca and Nanil. There was a re-establishment of the power transmission line, but there was no re-establishment of power services to households by the public company Eletricidade de Moçambique. As a result, families are unable to have electricity in their homes. With regard to road traffic, from Mueda to the administrative post of Diaca, traffic is open to the public, with public transport running with some frequency. But from Diaca to Awasse and onwards, circulation is limited both by security forces and because the remaining areas are not habitable, with the exception of Palma district. In terms of rebuilding government infrastructure, in Diaca, Nanili and the main town of Mocímboa da Praia, most of the government buildings are destroyed and there are no signs of rehabilitation. The reconstruction of the justice buildings in Mocímboa da Praia is expected to start this year, according to the Chief Justice, Adelino Muchanga, but that is dependent on the improvement of security in the area.
The return of the population to Mocímboa da Praia may be far off, considering that the conditions determined by the government for its authorization are not yet met. But the pressure that the IDPs face in the resettlement centers is greater. The lack of food, land conflicts between the displaced and native populations, and other issues are creating a psychological strain on the IDPs, who see no other alternative but to voluntarily return to their villages of origin.
Trends to Track in 2022
By Sam Ratner
As we look ahead to 2022, three trends from the previous year stand out as being particularly important for understanding the medium-term future of the conflict in northern Mozambique. Each represents a thread that analysts should be tracking, as they will play major roles in determining how the conflict will unfold going forward.
The Struggle to Feed IDPs
As addressed in detail elsewhere in this report, despite its military successes in the latter half of 2021, the Mozambican government has failed to accomplish much in the way of returning civilians displaced by the conflict to their home communities. There had been hope that many people would be able to return and begin growing crops in order to take the burden of preventing widespread hunger off of an overstretched international food aid program. Indeed, even as the vast majority of displaced civilians remained in resettlement camps and in host communities rather than returning home, the Mozambican government embarked on a plan to provide many of them with agricultural inputs in the hopes that they would begin cultivation around their temporary residences. Now that Cabo Delgado is fully in the midst of the rainy season, the season for planting is over and the demand for food aid will remain high at least until the rains end, in April.
Thankfully, international humanitarian groups say that they will be able to provide full rations to IDPs through March, thereby averting what could have been a major hunger crisis through the lean season. By April, however, the danger of a “pipeline break” in food rations returns, due to the uncertain humanitarian funding situation. If significant IDP returns are not possible by then, the Mozambican government will likely face two major problems simultaneously: the renewed threat of hunger, and the question of the long-term disposition of agricultural land on the outskirts of the conflict zone. Tensions between host communities without enough land and other resources to go around, IDPs being forced to choose where to live going forward if they cannot return to their homes, and a food aid distribution apparatus beset by funding problems at the top and corruption concerns on the ground could become the major story of the conflict in 2022.
Cycles of Violence Around SAMIM Extensions
Since pro-government forces regained control of Mocimboa da Praia, insurgents have avoided offering battle to Rwandan troops – the combat capacity of the Rwanda Defence Force appears to be too high for them to contend with. SAMIM, however, covers a wider territory in Cabo Delgado with fewer troops and more supply concerns, making troops from the regional force more vulnerable to insurgent action. What’s more, the mission itself is vulnerable – as detailed elsewhere in this report, it must contend with coalition politics and funding struggles in a way that the Rwandan deployment does not. Insurgent offensives in recent months have focused almost exclusively on areas of SAMIM responsibility, and violence in those zones picked up in the run-up to the most recent discussion about extending the SAMIM mandate, in January.
That trend, of insurgents targeting SAMIM areas in a cycle that peaks around extension discussions, is likely to continue. Insurgents are not unaware of the regional politics at play, and they understand how massively it would change the state of play if SAMIM were to exit Cabo Delgado. On the ground, it would return the conflict in Nangade, Macomia, Muidumbe, and Quissanga districts to being between insurgents and Mozambican forces – a fight insurgents have good reason to believe they can win. What’s more, it would spread pro-government forces even thinner at a time when IDPs are trying to return to the conflict zone, allowing for much greater predation of civilians than insurgents are currently able to accomplish. In the political realm, a withdrawal would allow the insurgency to claim that it had defeated SADC, and that its will to affect the politics of Cabo Delgado is greater than its opponents’ will to prevent them from doing so. If SADC cannot come up with clear benchmarks that it seeks to achieve before a SAMIM withdrawal, it risks being caught up in a quagmire in which leaving is unacceptable but the insurgency is driving the cost of staying ever upward.
Decline of Relations Between FDS and Civilians
One small silver lining to the horrifying displacement crisis that the conflict has brought to northern Mozambique is that civilians who have left the conflict zone are much less likely to interact with frontline Mozambican security force units than they were when they were in their homes. It may be difficult for outside observers to remember, given the substantial military progress made by Mozambican government forces and their foreign allies in recent months, but when Mozambican forces were interacting with civilians in the conflict zone regularly, their human rights record was atrocious.
In 2022, it is likely that more civilians will return to the conflict zone, either as part of sanctioned returns for IDPs or in an attempt to escape bad conditions in resettlement areas. An important trend to watch will be the extent to which Mozambican military and police forces (and, now, government-backed local militias) can rein in human rights abuses against those returnees. Success would be both a positive development on the merits and an indication of growing professionalism among Mozambican forces. Failure, however, creates an even greater risk for the Mozambican government than it did before. Along with further harming an already traumatized civilian population, and further alienating them from government forces, public abuses would pose a major reputational risk for the various international training efforts ongoing in Mozambique. Though the EU has no law against training units that engage in human rights abuses, for example, the EU Training Mission in Mozambique would face serious questions in the European Parliament if its graduates – who are expected to make up a significant proportion of the Mozambican military when all is said and done – were found to be abusing civilians. At a time when the long-term structures of foreign support for the Mozambican counterinsurgency effort are still being formed, the behavior of Mozambican forces toward their civilian compatriots will play an important role in determining future outcomes.
SAMIM Extension and Funding Constraints
By Piers Pigou
The Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, currently chaired by Malawi’s President, Lazarus Chakwera, met in Lilongwe on 12 January 2022 to consider a report from the Organ Troika that was tasked to assess progress with SAMIM, operational since July 2021. Only five of the 16 heads of state were in attendance.
As usual, the summit communiqué did not give much away, thanking troop contributing countries and others for providing support, generally praising member states’ efforts to tackle “terrorism,” and pointing out that the regional intervention was using its own resources to tackle the insurgent threat, proudly declaring it a “unique precedent on the African continent.”
The summit agreed to extend the mission’s deployment, but the communiqué did not specify for how long. A subsequent communiqué from the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) clarified that the extension was for three months, but several insiders and analysts indicate that the extension is expected to run for six months, with the hope that SAMIM will be able to shift its mandate during this period (on April 16) from “Scenario 6” (i.e., peace enforcement) to “Scenario 5” (i.e., development and peacebuilding). In the current circumstances, this appears unrealistic. SADC’s next Organ Troika summit is scheduled for 31 March, where further progress will be considered.
A detailed assessment of mission progress and needs put together by SAMIM in late 2021 identified an array of issues needing attention in terms of resourcing the mission. No mention was made of this in the summit communiqué, raising concerns in some quarters of a disconnect between realities on the ground and posturing by political leadership and that SAMIM was being expected to fulfill its counterinsurgency mandate on the cheap, and was essentially not fit for purpose. The few hundred troops that are in the field are thinly stretched over several affected districts and lack adequate air support. While they have made progress in several areas, they lack capacity to build adequate intelligence and to respond to ongoing attacks in affected districts.
SAMIM deployments to date are estimated at a third of the size recommended by the April 2021 Technical Assessment Mission. They have relied heavily on special forces components, without sufficient air and naval support or infantry assets. In the circumstances, they have done reasonably well, despite growing criticisms and comparisons with the relatively well-resourced Rwandan mission, from several pro-Kigali media sources.
Improved communications and intelligence sharing between SAMIM, the Rwandans and Mozambican forces have reportedly strengthened the overall response capacity of the joint forces since October, but it is unclear exactly how, and to what extent Rwandan forces will expand operations on the ground beyond their focus. An undertaking to expand cooperation was made by Rwanda the day before the SADC summit, following a high-level meeting between Mozambican and Rwandan security and intelligence bosses in Kigali. This had the makings of a diplomatic faux pas, as SADC members were unaware of this development because Maputo failed to inform the regional body at relevant SADC meetings leading to the 12 January summit. It is unclear why Mozambique chose not to disclose its discussions with Rwanda, given that this would help inform SADC’s own decisions about deployment. Its failure to do so reinforces concerns about Mozambique’s capacity to work effectively with both external missions, frustrating efforts to build and consolidate counterinsurgency collaborations.
The public outcomes of the January SADC summit raised concerns that SAMIM’s resource deficits would not be addressed, but since then, there have been some positive developments in this direction. While some countries, such as Lesotho, have indicated they will struggle financially to maintain current commitments, others, including Namibia, have offered to expand contributions. Zambian and Malawian support is also expected; a cargo plane from the Zambian Air Force arrived in Pemba in late January. South Africa has also decided to ramp up its contribution to SAMIM, bringing on board the 2 South African Infantry Battalion and elements from the Parabats and 4 Special Forces regiment. No mention has been made of providing additional air and naval assets that will be essential for consolidating the mission’s potential.
These additional commitments are positive, but evidently inadequate as SADC seeks additional support for its mission. In the meantime, Rwandans have approached the EU in the hopes that it can provide support for Rwanda’s Mozambican deployment through its new peace facility. SADC has not done the same, despite encouragement from several quarters to do so. The European Peace Facility (EPF), introduced in 2021, replaces the African Peace Facility that had existed for 14 years. The EPF enables the EU to directly finance regional and national military initiatives without having to channel financing through the AU. SADC has traditionally kept the EU at arms-length with respect to key areas of its peace and security work; the politics of sovereignty continues to influence, and several heavy hitters in the regional body are believed to have opposed a direct request for EPF funding. Indeed, some SADC members would prefer an approach for UN funding, although this would require more lengthy and convoluted bureaucratic processes and would also necessitate a level of UN oversight that would likely ruffle feathers in some circles. SADC has applied for limited funds – believed to be about USD $2–3 million – through the AU to the EU’s Early Response Mechanism to bolster civil-military capacity within SAMIM.
The EU must carefully consider whether and how it might underwrite Rwandan operations in Mozambique. Consensus support will be required from all member states, which is by no means a given. The EU might also consider how it ties any additional support to its current training mission; for example, will EU trainers serve as advisors in the field with Mozambican forces, in addition to running training sessions well south of the conflict zone? The EU has also indicated in the past its desire to create synergies between its support for Mozambique’s counterinsurgency and SADC’s efforts to do the same, but has struggled to achieve much in that area. Given the EU’s support for building SADC’s mediation and dispute resolution architecture, it is unfortunate that it has not adopted a more innovative approach to funding for assistance in Mozambique.
On 31 January, the AU’s PSC discussed and adopted a communiqué on SAMIM’s deployment to Cabo Delgado – this was the first time the continental body had focused on the situation in northern Mozambique. The deployment was formally recognized within the framework of the African Standby Force, and SADC was “specifically commended” for its collective leadership putting in place the peace enforcement mechanism. The AU thanked Rwanda for its bilateral support to Maputo, which it described as being “in the spirit of African solutions to African problems,” but put the weight of its recommendations to the African Commission behind strengthening SAMIM. This includes the provision of equipment dedicated to African Standby Force operations that is currently stored in a logistics base in Cameroon, and for direct delivery to SAMIM forces in Mozambique of equipment being donated by China. No detail on what equipment China would provide has been made available. The AU’s PSC has called on the international community, including the UN and EU to support the SAMIM operation. In the meantime, SADC member states will continue to fund their own operations. A current price-tag of $29.5 million for the next three to six months has been projected and without external support, it is likely that South Africa will shoulder the bulk of this.