June At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records nine political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in June, resulting in at least 18 reported fatalities 

• Only one battle event between insurgents and state forces was recorded in June, in Macomia district, which resulted in several reported fatalities 

• Political violence events were concentrated in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia. Three civilian targeting incidents involving state forces were recorded in Mocímboa da Praia district, resulting in two reported fatalities

Vital Trends

• Levels of political violence remain low

• Violence targeting civilians by state actors features

• SAMIM and state forces step up patrols in coastal Macomia

In This Report

• Face-off in Macomia comes to an end

• Security posture in Mocímboa da Praia

• Journalists return to Cabo Delgado

• UN notes IS connections between Mozambique and DRC

June Situation Summary

June was notable for continuing low levels of political violence, and continued targeting of civilians by the Defense and Security Forces (FDS). However, the month was most notable for a clash in Macomia district that started on 30 June and continued to the following day, leaving a total of 13 troops of the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) killed. 

This is the first incident of political violence on the coastal strip of Macomia district since March this year, and the first armed clash in the area between state forces and insurgents this year. This calm has been despite the continued presence of insurgents along the coastal strip, and increased patrolling by both FDS and troops of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). 

State forces continued to target civilians, in acts symptomatic of indiscipline, rather than as part of any counter-insurgency operations. On 9 June, a teacher was killed by the FDS in Mocímboa da Praia town. On 11 June, members of the FADM, the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR), and the Naparama militia met in Ancuabe district to assess UIR conduct in the district, which has been the source of complaints. Furthermore, MediaFax reported that on 19 June, three members of the FDS attempted to rape a woman in Mocímboa da Praia town.

Face-Off in Macomia Comes to an End

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

The face-off in coastal Macomia came to an end on 30 June, when a patrol of the FADM was ambushed while approaching an insurgent base. In the fighting that ensued, up to 10 FADM troops were killed. Islamic State (IS) claimed in its al-Naba weekly newsletter of 13 July to have captured and subsequently killed three more. In its statements, IS stated that the detachment consisted of troops from the FADM, the Rwanda Security Forces (RSF), and the SAMIM.  However, no evidence of the involvement of SAMIM or RSF was presented by IS, something that has been confirmed by various sources.

On land, Macomia district is primarily reliant on FADM outposts with patrolling support from the South African contingent of SAMIM based in the district headquarters, almost 50 kilometers from Pangane on the coast. Local Forces – communal militias supported by the state – have traditionally been weak in the district. Meanwhile, the coast remains unguarded, allowing for movement and support to the insurgents’ logistics from that side. The conflict in Macomia is now shaped by this combination of FDS weakness, SAMIM and RSF reluctance, and the limited presence of Local Forces, combined with the deep roots that the insurgents have in Macomia. 

ACLED data reflect the relative levels of engagement by the various forces. Since the beginning of the year, ACLED has recorded 12 battle events with the insurgents in Macomia district. Of these, 10 have involved the FDS, and just two have involved SAMIM forces. The solitary incident involving Local Forces recorded by ACLED in 2023 is of Local Forces detonating a booby trap in February, likely laid by the FADM. Understanding the relative strength, and patterns of behavior of this conflict’s actors will give some insight into risks to be faced in the province in the coming months. 

The insurgents' choice of coastal Macomia as a stronghold came in the wake of heightened operations by both state forces, and intervention forces, particularly SAMIM, since September 2022. These included Operation Kichwa Chake, pursued by SAMIM in Nangade, particularly in the final quarter of 2022, and Operation Vulcão IV, led by FADM and officially launched in January 2023. These operations prompted the insurgents to move their center of gravity to Macomia, and in particular to the coastal strip between the villages of Pangane and Quiterajo.  

The move to the coast also reflects the roots that the insurgency has in communities there. The backgrounds of two of the insurgency’s leaders from the area, Muamudo Saha and Mussa Daniel, give some insight into this. Saha’s background has been documented by Sérgio Chichava of the Institute for Economic and Social Studies in Maputo. The son of a religious leader in the village of Rueia, in Mucojo, he was drawn to the more fundamentalist teachings of the self-described Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) sect. Respected in the area as a religious leader, he became a social and religious activist. In 2015, he came to national attention, for calling for the banning of alcohol in his community. After his second detention related to radical preaching in 2017, he is thought to have moved to Mocímboa da Praia, and taken up arms. 

Mussa Daniel’s story is similar, according to sources in Macomia. He is originally from Ilala, also known as Cobre, and the scene of the 30 June killings of FADM troops. Like Saha, his radicalization occurred in mosques, and with individuals in the ASWJ network. He is said to have been radicalized at a mosque in nearby Cogolo – also not far from the current insurgent base at Namurussia. Like Saha, he is thought to have joined the insurgency early, and is said to have been involved in an attack on Ilala itself in September 2018. Sources say he has been prominent in recent engagements by insurgents in villages in the area, acting as a “guide and counselor.”

One might expect this sustained presence in the area, built on local knowledge and networks, might trigger a significant response from the friendly forces of the RSF and SAMIM, as well as from Mozambican state forces. But beyond recent ‘atmospheric’ patrolling by SAMIM, and more aggressive patrolling by FADM, this has not been the case. 

FADM was previously involved in intensive operations on the coastal strip between Quiterajo and Pangane in early June 2021, just prior to international intervention. RSF troops are no strangers to the area either, even if Macomia is outside their Area of Responsibility. Their forces patrolled villages between Quiterajo and Pangane for a time in April 2022. This followed operations to clear an insurgent base in the Catupa forest further inland.

However, evidence from local sources indicates that movement to and from the coast continues relatively unhindered. Routes across northern Macomia district, and into southern Mocímboa da Praia district maintain a connection with insurgent forces in Muidumbe, and threaten the coast road between Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia. These connections, as well as freedom of movement along the coast, mean that insurgents gathered in coastal villages are not isolated. 

The government of Mozambique is understood to prefer SAMIM to remain in Cabo Delgado province for no more than one year, and that before any withdrawal begins, it should make one more push against the insurgents. If that is to transpire, then it will be in Macomia, focused on the land between the villages of Quiterajo and Pangane. To be successful, operations will need to close the land and sea routes used by the insurgents to get to and from the coast.

Security posture in Mocímboa da Praia

By Armando Nhantumbo, MediaFax

Anyone who knew Mocímboa da Praia before 5 October 2017 can easily see today how the insurgency has led to the militarization of the district. In a scenario that is repeated in other districts of Cabo Delgado, several branches of security forces now patrol what was once a sanctuary of the insurgency.

In Mocímboa da Praia, five branches of security forces operate. These are the FADM, the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), the UIR, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), and Local Forces. If, before the insurgency, you could only see, in the streets of Mocímboa da Praia, mainly PRM agents, today it is security forces of all kinds that take care of the district, particularly its headquarters town.

At the beginning of the insurgency, in Cabo Delgado, the Mozambican government classified the attacks as criminal acts committed by criminals. As an internal security issue, responding to the attacks  was the responsibility of the PRM, including the elite and paramilitary UIR. However, with the intensification of attacks, the government began to classify the events in Cabo Delgado, in April 2020, as an “external aggression perpetrated by terrorists,” meaning, theoretically, that the matter passed from the PRM to the FADM. By January 2021, the command of FDS operations was transferred to General Eugénio Mussa of the FADM. 

Alongside this, a third domestic force was emerging – the Local Forces. ACLED records their first involvement in Cabo Delgado in 2018, and becoming a prominent actor in 2021. With the recovery of districts once affected by the war, Local Forces have begun to include combatants from the respective districts. But dominance by people of Makonde origin, from inland, has created resentment among the Mwanis of the coast, in a province where ethnic differences are even considered by some studies as part of the explanations for the ongoing conflict.

The arrival in the province in June 2021 of the RSF quickly secured Mocímboa da Praia and Palma districts. The RSF continues to maintain a dominant presence in these two Areas of Responsibility. 

It is these forces that are currently involved, each on their own side, although some operations are carried out jointly, in peacekeeping, protection, and in some situations, aggressive operations, in Mocímboa da Praia. 

The RSF, made up of the Rwanda National Police and the RDF, are the main protagonists. Better equipped than their hosts, effective, and able to engage with communities, they are popular. Sources consistently say they feel safer with Rwandan than Mozambican troops, especially the FADM. “Actually, we are staying here, thanks to them. When we saw Rwandans on patrol, we felt safe,” is the sentiment of a local trader.

These are not new data. Since their arrival in 2021, Rwandans have adopted an approach of ‘winning minds and hearts’ of the population, going against the hostile way in which Mozambican troops have been relating to civilians, which included abuses and violations of human rights. June alone saw two killings in Mocímboa da Praia town by the FDS. Local sources say that when this happens, they complain to the Rwandans, rather than Mozambican authorities.

The RSF controls the most strategic places in Mocímboa da Praia district, such as the town itself, and the Administrative Post of Mbau, once a sanctuary for the insurgents. In Mbau alone, where insurgent movements have been recently reported, the Rwandans have around 400 troops.

At intermediate points, there are Mozambican forces, among them men from the FADM, PRM, and UIR. Local Forces maintain a presence. Their presence in the villages is more pronounced than in the district headquarters, according to a local source. 

In general, Mocímboa da Praia, particularly the district headquarters, is not under great pressure from the insurgents, although they are present in the south of the district. One of the biggest concerns of the local authorities is the alleged involvement of young motorcycle taxi drivers in providing logistics to the insurgents – Mocímboa da Praia is one of the districts in the north of Mozambique where motorcycles are the main means of transport. 

With the gradual return of the population, the sector has grown. Local authorities suspect that motorcycle taxi drivers are collaborating with the insurgents to deliver food and other supplies. A local source commented that it could be difficult to end this problem, as some of these young people have family ties with the insurgents. He also noted that a significant number of the young people involved in the conflict in its early days came from the district. 

In the short to medium term, the security enjoyed by people in Mocímboa da Praia is dependent on the presence of the RSF. However, in the longer term, progress with security sector reform, and security in the wider province will be critical. For the former, current salary cuts and delays in salary payments for the FADM do not augur well. Better discipline, and hence improved relations with communities, will not be achieved without clarity on this. The possible withdrawal of SAMIM from the rest of the province in 12 months’ time will place considerable strain on all branches of the FDS, potentially threatening Mocímboa da Praia’s security. 

Journalists Return to Cabo Delgado 

By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado

In the last week of June, Mozambique's Ministry of National Defense extended an unusual invitation to a group of national and international journalists for a day trip to two conflict-affected districts in Cabo Delgado – Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. It was during the government's counter-offensive in 2021 to retake the town of Palma, which fell to the insurgents on 24 March, that a significant group of journalists was last taken to the northern theater of operations. But two years later, the government that had so severely restricted media coverage of the conflict in Cabo Delgado is reopening the province's doors to the press. What is the significance of this move on the part of the government? And what can be said about the current media reporting on the conflict in northern Mozambique?

"Is there still war in Cabo Delgado?" is a common question in Maputo and other provincial capitals when President Filipe Nyusi announces the killing, capture, or surrender, of insurgents in clashes with the FDS. This is because the conflict in Cabo Delgado continues to be under-reported in the national press. The government’s reluctance to provide information on the conflict has been questioned by the Mozambican academic Elísio Macamo. He asks why the government, and the Ministry of National Defense in particular, do not hold regular press conferences to inform and explain to Mozambicans what is happening in the province. Making such information available, says Macamo, would allow a wider debate to take place.

Another issue hampering the work of journalists in Cabo Delgado is the lack of protection and security for journalists in conflict-affected areas. Their personal and individual security is almost non-existent, apart from the fact that they are not welcomed by the authorities. This includes a lack of protection from abuse by the FDS, as well as the insurgents. 

Moreover, President Nyusi's statements in 2021, when he accused the media of effectively acting on behalf of “enemies or terrorists,” still have an impact on the journalism profession. The idea that journalists should align themselves with the government's narrative is echoed in the notion that journalists should not broadcast news that goes against national unity. In this respect, there is a degree of difference between the official press and the private press. While the state press, particularly Rádio e Televisão de Moçambique, has been at the forefront of the government agenda in its coverage, the private media have not. This has limited the spread of the government's propaganda.  

Embarking on a trip with more than 40 journalists, including many from the private media, essentially aimed to fill this gap. The aim was primarily the dissemination of the government's narrative and perspective on the conflict. On a guided visit by the Ministry of National Defense, the journalists first arrived in the village of Palma. They then went to the village of Mute in Palma and on to Mocímboa da Praia district headquarters. The journalists were able to witness the significant return of the displaced population and the revival of the local economy. This is what the government calls stability, which, according to Minister of National Defense Cristóvão Chume, is measured by the number of people living there. Throughout the various stops, Chume interacted with people who were able to confirm the return to normality, at least in the more secure areas. The visit ended with a press conference. Chume addressed various issues relating to the conflict, including the agreement between the Government of Mozambique with TotalEnergies on the Joint Task Force.

By also inviting foreign media to Cabo Delgado, the government wanted to reassure foreign investors that security conditions allow the resumption of natural gas projects, which have been suspended since Total declared ‘force majeure’ in 2021. However, the security situation in the two districts is a mixed one. In Palma, there has been no political violence since February. The situation is contrary in Mocímboa da Praia, where in June, insurgents were seen moving freely in the south of the district, particularly in the villages of Kalugo and Limala. 

There are doubts about whether the recent opening up of Cabo Delgado to the press will be permanent and consistent. Firstly, the visit was organized by the government itself, not on the initiative of journalists. Secondly, the places through which the journalists were to pass were determined by the government authorities themselves. Another question is the extent to which the government's strategy of conveying a sense of stability in Cabo Delgado has been successful. 

Meanwhile, IS appears to have its propaganda machine in full swing. It recently published pictures of dead Mozambican soldiers and various equipment and ammunition seized as a result of the recent clashes in Macomia. If this media counter-offensive by the IS does not discredit the government's efforts to project stability, it at least casts doubt on the government's prospects in the face of the conflict.

UN Notes IS Connections Between Mozambique and DRC

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

The latest United Nations Group of Experts report on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was published on 13 June 2023. The UN has been publishing such reports on DRC since 2004. From a Mozambique perspective, the highlight of the latest report is the presentation of evidence on the connections between the insurgents in Cabo Delgado and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in DRC through IS-affiliated networks. This represents the first time for the Group of Experts on DRC to recognize this link explicitly. 

On relationships between IS affiliates in DRC and Mozambique, the report presents evidence of the management of IS finance networks in the region, stretching from Somalia to South Africa, and encompassing Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. Evidence of recent direct contacts between the ADF and leaders from Cabo Delgado complements previous UN reports’ documentation of well-developed networks by the ADF, and other DRC armed groups, with southern Africa, and running through Tanzania, Burundi, and elsewhere. 

On financing, the UN Group of Experts report presents similar evidence, if less detailed, to that presented by the Bridgeway Foundation in a report released earlier last month and reviewed in Cabo Ligado. Both discuss transfers from Somalia to South Africa for onward distribution in East Africa, between 2019 and 2020. The Group of Experts report, like Bridgeway, discusses transfers of up to 400,000 United States dollars from IS’s Karrar hub in northern Somalia to South Africa, and its onward transfer through a series of transactions to Kenya, for payments to Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. As with Bridgeway, the Group of Experts’ focus is on the movement of money to the ADF in Uganda, for which it manages to successfully trace US$60,000 to its final recipients.  

Evidence from both Bridgeway and the Group of Experts shows that at least up to 2021, Mozambique was tied into IS financing networks. These networks have taken some blows since. IS’s Bilal al-Sudani, who coordinated financial flows through Somalia, was killed by US forces in late January 2023. As early as August 2021, Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi Jimale, who reported to al-Sudani and managed transactions, according to the Group of Experts report, was convicted and jailed in Somalia. 

The report also outlines direct contacts between the two groups. It mentions the movement of fighters between the two theaters as early as 2017-18. The report’s novelty is that this is presented as a new finding, while it has been known to authorities in Tanzania for some years. Indeed, the Group of Experts itself presented evidence of ADF recruitment networks extending across Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania, and into South Africa as early as 2018, networks that almost certainly predated the UN investigation. Under the circumstances, it would be surprising if some element of mutual support between the DRC and Mozambican groups had not emerged. 

More surprisingly, the report alleges that meetings between the two groups were held in Kigoma region in northwest Tanzania in August 2021, and in South Kivu province of DRC in June 2022. It claims a further meeting in South Kivu in early 2023. This echoes a report from the Center for Investigative Journalism in Mozambique last year that claimed that insurgency leader Bonomade Machude Omar, aka Ibn Omar, attended a meeting in South Kivu in late June or early July 2022. The UN report does not mention Bonomade’s attendance that year, but claims that he and Sheikh Abu Yassir Hassan of Cabo Delgado attended the 2023 meeting. 

Reports of such meetings have been circulating amongst “researchers and diplomatic sources,” as cited in the UN report, for at least a year. On the Kigoma meeting, academic, diplomatic, and civil society sources in Tanzania have been unable to confirm such a meeting. However, analyst Ryan O’Farrell notes that the timing of the Kigoma meeting matches that of one Hytham al-Far, a Jordanian national who reached DRC through Tanzania in 2021. Evidence of his itinerary was presented in the Group of Experts’ June 2022 report.

It is worth remembering that the Group of Experts’ remit is wide. It covers the actions of all armed groups in DRC, both foreign and domestic, targeted sanctions, and connections between organized crime, armed groups, and natural resources exploitation. The plethora of interests around these issues can lead to a reluctance to cooperate by governments, including some in the region. This year, as every year, the Group of Experts “regrets the untimeliness and the low overall number of responses to its official requests for information from private sector actors and Member States and underlines that responses to such requests are essential to its investigations.” Unraveling transnational matters such as IS’s presence in east, central, and southern Africa when access to information is determined by competing national interests perhaps reflects the situation in the more intimate theater of Cabo Delgado, where many of the same interests are present.