May At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records 23 organized political violence events in May, resulting in 49 fatalities

• Most of the fatalities occurred in Palma district, where ongoing insurgent incursions in and around Palma town and subsequent clashes with government forces resulted in 25 fatalities

• Other events took place in Ibo, Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Nangade districts

Vital Trends

• Government offensives in Nangade and western Mocimboa da Praia district have produced indeterminate results as of yet, but do show the government’s interest in using newly-acquired capabilities to gain an advantage

• IDPs in Palma district continued to brave major threats to escape the district, including an increase in insurgent attacks on ships in transit from Palma to Pemba

• Tensions increased between IDP populations and host communities in May, as bureaucratic hurdles have hindered aid distribution and land apportionment

In This Report

• Evaluation of reports that significant insurgent recruitment is taking place inside IDP resettlement centers

• Analysis of the challenges posed by natural disaster response in Cabo Delgado now that displacement is such a widespread issue

• Context for Rwanda’s late entrance into international discussions about intervention in Cabo Delgado

• The latest on Mozambique’s negotiations to secure external support for its counterinsurgency effort

May Situation Summary

As the Cabo Delgado conflict pressed on in May, perhaps the most notable development was what did not take place. Many assumed that the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Extraordinary Double Troika meeting that finally took place on 27 May would result in clear movement towards a regional military intervention in Cabo Delgado. Instead, no clear decision was made at the meeting, and negotiations over foreign involvement in the conflict have dragged on. 

On the development side of international engagement, however, there was significant movement. At the end of April, the World Bank announced that it had signed a $100 million grant to Mozambique’s Northern Integrated Development Agency, and that it would open $700 million in other funds for Mozambique to access to support development projects in the northern provinces. That largesse has not been matched, however, in the field of humanitarian assistance, where appeals to support crucial food aid and other programs remain underfunded. 

In hopes of securing the aid that is being distributed currently and evading ongoing violence, displaced civilians are undertaking extreme risks to leave Palma. This includes traveling by boat south to Pemba, risking being waylaid by insurgents along the way. There were at least four incidents of coastal hijacking by insurgents along that route in May. Civilians have also tried walking north to Tanzania, or west to Nangade. Both are dangerous in different ways. The western route takes civilians through territory contested by insurgents and government forces, while the northern route is subject to insurgent attacks with only harsh deportation by Tanzanian authorities awaiting civilians on the other side of the border. In total, by the end of May, over 64,000 people had fled Palma and arrived elsewhere since the 24 March attack on the town. 

For displaced people already in the south of the province, overcrowding and land disputes with host communities are becoming an issue. This was confirmed by a parliamentary commission which praised local officials for their handling of the disputes thus far. Yet, as the government continues to avoid making any systematic efforts to ensure that displaced people will be able to return to their homes in the future, concern is growing that what appears to be temporary resettlement may actually be permanent. Among the displaced, this is fueling theories that the conflict exists largely as an excuse to deprive them of land they have long lived on, farmed, and fished from. Among host communities, it presages a future in which land competition is much fiercer, spurring them to act against displaced people now to secure an upper hand in that competition. 

Recruitment Within IDP Resettlement Centers

Concerns about insurgent infiltration among displaced populations in Cabo Delgado have grown considerably since the 24 March attack on Palma. Displaced people fleeing Palma by boat expressed concern that insurgents had traveled with them, leading the government to institute draconian security measures as they docked at Paquitequete beach in Pemba City. There were cases in which government forces kept boats carrying IDPs waiting to dock for up to 11 hours while conducting security checks that largely consisted of inspecting passengers’ luggage. Suspicions of insurgent infiltration were also noted in Quitunda, where the government made it difficult to evacuate people held there for fear of the presence of insurgents among the population.

Since then, the authorities have started to ask for greater vigilance from the population in monitoring potential insurgent activity, especially in places with a greater influx of displaced people such as IDP centers. Reports of insurgent activity in IDP centers are infrequent, and rarely verified. In May, Cabo Ligado reported an incident in which a woman working on her farm near a resettlement center in Metuge district claimed to have seen insurgents in the area, which led to the massive flight of displaced people from the center. The claim turned out to be false, but the fear driving the response to it was real. Some volunteers working in IDP centers reported cases where people suspected of being insurgents caused unrest. The individuals concerned were reported to the authorities, but little was done in terms of investigating these cases. The close quarters of the resettlement centers increases reporting of perceived insurgent activity, as there is little privacy and any suspicious behavior can be seen by many.

 If insurgents are to expand their areas of control, as well as consolidate areas in their possession, they need to increase their capacity and group size through recruitment. With most villages attacked by insurgents deserted or unpopulated, IDP centers appear at first glance to be enticing sites for recruitment as they host large numbers of vulnerable people. However, there is a huge gender imbalance at the IDP centers that would make these places unappealing to insurgents. According to an IOM report, of the more than 60,000 people displaced by the Palma attack who are in shelters, 31% are women, 41% are children and only 26% are men. Although there is a growing tendency to recruit children, insurgents recruit mostly young adults, mainly males.

Women in resettlement centers have their own views on the origins of this gender imbalance, according to a recent study published by the Mozambican think tank the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR). Some women in resettlement centers whose husbands are not with them believe that they were either killed, detained, or linked to the insurgency. There are two main reasons why men stay behind when their wives move to resettlement centers. The first is that they are afraid of being mistaken for insurgents by the authorities. Several individuals have been detained and tortured by the authorities, and later found not guilty for lack of evidence. Others simply never reappeared. The second reason is the fear of falling into the hands of the insurgent group. Insurgents have often captured civilians fleeing violence both on land and at sea. With the journey so treacherous for men who are ripe for recruitment, some families prefer to just send women and children to IDP centers.

Some suggest that a number of women in resettlement centers secretly have relatives in the insurgency. Behaviors like talking frequently on the phone or spending money profligately drive suspicions of insurgent connections. If there is recruitment in resettlement centers, it is likely done by family members or insurgent contacts among the IDPs.

Instead of focusing on resettlement centers, insurgents continue to recruit in places they attack. Most recruitments remain forced because captured civilians know that if they do not join the insurgency, they might be killed. During a recent attack on Pangane, insurgents captured several 15- to 16-year-old children. However, many others went voluntarily. The insurgents have mechanisms for turning those recruits into fighters -- former insurgent captives have reported that the group is carrying on military training in their camps. In the future, insurgents will require more manpower. With people fleeing towns and villages, they will probably look into recruitment at resettlement centers. However, recruitment there will not be easy due to the growing level of vigilance in the centers.

Disaster Response in the Displacement Era

When Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in Cabo Delgado on 25 April 2019, it was the strongest tropical storm to hit Mozambique in recorded history. The storm ripped through the coastal areas of the province, killing 45 people -- mostly in Macomia district -- and damaging or destroying 50,000 homes. Over 20,000 were displaced by the storm, which at the time represented a major increase in overall displacement in the province.

Contemporaneous publications by aid and donor agencies barely mention the Cabo Delgado conflict as a complicating factor in responding to the cyclone. In one representative report put together by Oxfam, Save The Children, and Care International in the aftermath of the storm, insecurity was highlighted as a complicating factor in providing aid to those affected, but any actual analysis of the conflict was considered “outside the scope” of the study. Aid and donor agencies did, however, highlight many of the problems that would come to be major issues as the conflict drove displacement to previously unimaginable heights in the subsequent two years. The same report, for example, presages the current tensions between displaced people and host communities by flagging that “greater consultation with people in transit sites is required over resettlement plans” and “neighbouring communities should be included in constructive dialogue to mitigate conflict related to sudden population increases.”

Today, with the conflict having displaced well over 730,000 people, the thought of a natural disaster response in Cabo Delgado in which the conflict is not a core concern seems incredibly far away. Mercifully, the 2020 and 2021 cyclone seasons have not produced anything on the scale of Cyclone Kenneth. As climate change increases the intensity and frequency of storms, however, it is only a matter of time before another major weather event hits Cabo Delgado. Indeed, the province dodged a bullet in April when Tropical Cyclone Jobo seemed headed for landfall there before swerving north and hitting Tanzania instead. 

As aid agencies begin their preparations for the 2022 cyclone season, it is worth reflecting on the challenges they face confronting natural disasters in Cabo Delgado in the current era of mass displacement. For one thing, shelter for displaced people is not resilient to seasonal rain, much less major storms. Reports from resettlement centers in Metuge district during the rainy season showed people in makeshift shelters struggling with the mud brought on by the precipitation. Most shelter assistance consists of tarpaulins, sleeping mats, and mosquito nets -- crucial equipment to be sure, but nothing in which to survive a cyclone. 

Even for the majority of displaced people who are living in private homes, a storm would rapidly exacerbate many of the problems they are already facing. A May needs assessment by Solidarités International found that “in Mueda and Nangade District [two of the most important transit points and destinations for displaced people] water access in terms of quantity and quality is scarce.” Water concerns grow much worse after flooding, when previously clean water sources pick up new pollutants and the threat of water-borne diseases increases. Aid workers repeatedly highlighted the threat of renewed cholera outbreaks in the wake of any future storm in Cabo Delgado. 

Most crucially, aid organizations still lack the financial and human resources to effectively plan for the next natural disaster in Cabo Delgado. With international financial support uncertain and aid groups still struggling to get their staff into Mozambique in the face of apparent government intransigence over visas, humanitarian workers face real concerns about their ability to develop responses nimble enough to provide major natural disaster response in a conflict environment. There does seem to have been a slight thaw on the visa front toward the end of May, with at least one major international humanitarian group reporting limited visa approvals for staff trying to enter Mozambique, but the pace is still worryingly slow. 

There are some silver linings to planning disaster response under the current situation, however. First, because such a high proportion of the coastal population is now living on the edges of the conflict zone, many more people are near a major paved road than would be in normal times. That facilitates evacuation, allowing people a better chance to get out of the path of a storm. It also improves access for aid provision after the storm. Cyclone Kenneth cut off 14 roads and caused five bridges to collapse in east central Cabo Delgado. By limiting the access problems caused by the province’s weak transportation infrastructure, mass movement outside of the conflict zone will make it easier to reach more people with vital aid.

Second, natural disasters provide an opportunity for organizing an inclusive response. One aid official involved in planning for next year’s cyclone season said that his organization was focusing on recruiting volunteer teams that draw half from displaced populations and half from host communities. These kinds of collective efforts both utilize the under-appreciated skills of displaced people and build social ties between displaced and host communities that will be crucial for addressing conflict between the two.

Rwanda Enters the Scene

Rwanda’s entry into the constellation of interests over Cabo Delgado in late April was, in retrospect, perhaps not unexpected. The involvement of individuals and armed groups from the Great Lakes region has been documented nearly since the start of the conflict, giving Rwanda legitimate interest in the conflict. Yet Rwanda’s connection to Cabo Delgado goes back at least 45 years, when a 19-year-old Fred Rwigyema was one of 28 men, led by Yoweri Museveni, who spent two years in Montepuez district being trained by Frelimo. Museveni went on to lead Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA), and eventually Uganda itself to this day. Major General Rwigyema rose in the ranks of the NRA before leading the nascent Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) first incursion into Rwanda in 1990, only to be killed on the second day. His successor atop the RPF, Paul Kagame, has led Rwanda since 2000.  

May 2021 saw the return of Rwanda to Cabo Delgado, with a reconnaissance party reportedly traveling to the province in the wake of President Filipe Nyusi’s meeting with President Kagame 28 April. At the meeting, Nyusi is understood to have made a bilateral request for military assistance in putting down the insurgency. Since then, Rwanda has been busy diplomatically, seeking to reassert its influence in Southern Africa. The final result of these efforts will depend on how Rwanda balances its ambitions against the sometimes competing interests of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) main players and the interests of western powers. Thus far, Rwanda’s focus is on Tanzania, South Africa, and Mozambique. 

Parallel to the Rwandan reconnaissance mission to Cabo Delgado, in the second week of May, Rwanda’s Chief of Defence Staff General Jean Bosco Kazura and Inspector General of Police (IGP) Dan Munyuza spent five days in Tanzania for talks with counterparts General Venance Mabeyo and IGP Simon Sirro. Publicly, counterterrorism collaboration topped the agenda. In a video statement released on social media, IGP Sirro noted that  recruits from Rwanda as well as Tanzania are joining the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. IGP Munyuza committed to “take on the terrorists and defeat them” and to continue collaboration into the future. 

Both states share a similarly harsh military doctrine when confronted by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG). The 2010 ‘Mapping Report’ of abuses by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights presented evidence of alleged war crimes by Rwandan forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the First and Second Congo Wars of 1996 and 1998. Ironically, Rwanda’s incursion in 1998 prompted SADC intervention. The challenge in Tanzania from NSAGs has been less acute, but the security forces reaction has been just as severe. The emergence in Pwani Region’s Kibiti District of a NSAG of extremist ideology, and with ties to both Cabo Delgado and North Kivu in DRC, prompted a crackdown by Tanzania’s security forces, in which hundreds of people were allegedly killed or disappeared. Most recently, at a graduation ceremony for cadets of the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF), it was driven home to them that the key challenge they face is terrorism, both in the south of the country and embedded in communities in other areas of Tanzania. The graduation speaker, Major General Paul Simuli, warned the cadets not to be tempted to join any terrorist group, since even powerful insurgent groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had been soundly defeated. Simuli’s warning is particularly dark, as the Sri Lankan security forces’ campaign against the LTTE involved unlawful killings and detention, disappearances, torture, and systematic rape, as determined by a United Nations investigation in 2015. 

Tanzania has not demonstrated any desire to formally intervene in the Cabo Delgado conflict, but is keen to see it brought under control. A Rwandan force would address its interests, and likely do so in a way to which Tanzania would be sympathetic. However, for this to happen, some sort of SADC approval will be necessary, and South Africa’s agreement will be needed to underpin it. 

South Africa’s relations with Rwanda had stalled with the expulsion of Rwandan diplomats Claude Nikobisanzwe and Didier Rutembesa from Pretoria following the murder of Patrick Karegeya, former head of military intelligence in Rwanda and later founder of the opposition Rwanda National Congress. In subsequent years, Mozambique became the fulcrum of the Rwandan state’s activity in Southern Africa, and one of its most important posts. The appointment of Claude Nikobisanzwe as Rwanda’s first High Commissioner in Maputo in 2018 came after two years as Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Kigali. 

The arrest of Rwandan dissident exiled journalist Cassien Ntamuhanga on 23 May at Isla Inhaca, Maputo raises fears that Maputo may finally be giving in to Kigali’s pressure to hand over dissidents based in Mozambique. Mozambican NGO Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento sees Ntamuhanga’s arrest and suspected detention at the Rwandan High Commission as the culmination of President Paul Kagame’s efforts to get Mozambique to deal with Rwandan dissidents, efforts that stretch back to 2016 at least. 

At the heart of Rwanda’s manoeuvring, however, is South Africa. This led to Foreign Minister Vincent Biruta’s meetings in Pretoria on 4 June with Naledi Pandor, his South African counterpart, and earlier that day with Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan in Dar es Salaam. While public statements were cordial, South Africa stressed the importance of respecting “territorial integrity and national sovereignty.” South Africa’s sovereignty concerns regarding Rwanda are current. In February this year, a leader of the Rwandan National Congress, Seif Bamboriki, was shot dead in unclear circumstances in Cape Town. 

The Extraordinary SADC Summit scheduled for 23 June should be the venue to finalize this rush of diplomacy. While Tanzania has a shared interest in dealing with terrorist networks within its territory, it will be wary of giving carte blanche to Rwanda in Cabo Delgado. South Africa’s concerns are more deeply held. Recent experience suggests that there may be no conclusive outcome from the summit. 

International Update

European Union (EU) preparations to support Mozambique progressed in May. EU defense ministers met on 6 May and were briefed by EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, who is pushing for an EU Training Mission (EUTM) deployment before the end of the year. The EUTMs are essentially technical and training missions, but include soldiers to protect the trainers. The mission would, according to Borrell, resemble the Mali EUTM, which has about 150 personnel deployed. There are some expectations that the mission might act as a pilot under the new European Peace Facility for providing Mozambique’s government with military equipment. Borell told the press on 28 May that a fact finding mission was already on the ground in Mozambique “assessing the possibility and modalities of this mission.”  

Mozambique’s Defence Minister Jaime Neto was in Portugal on 10 May and signed a 5-year bilateral security agreement that will see a further 60 Portuguese special force operators deployed to conduct additional training with Mozambican security forces in the coming months. Sixty trainers were deployed in April. 

In mid-May, Nyusi was in Paris for a bilateral visit and also attended the Africa Economies Financing summit that brought together 15 African and European leaders, as well as chiefs of international financial institutions to discuss options for managing debt challenges in Africa. On 17 May, he met with President Macron and Total’s chief Jean Pouyanne with a view to convincing both that he can re-establish security in Cabo Delgado. After the Palma debacle, a convincing security plan that persuades Total and the French has become an urgent priority for Maputo, which is understandably keen to get the company’s liquified natural gas project back on track. Total have undertaken to return when the situation is calm. Reaching agreement on what that will now look like and how security will be strengthened is now central. The predictions of a so-called “Iraqification” model (i.e. privileging security of key strategic interests above wider security needs of the population) appear to be unfolding.  

Speculation ahead of the summit suggested that Nyusi would accept the support of the French military, even the possibility of a direct deployment, which is most unlikely. France has repeated its offer to help, but what that means in practical terms is unclear. Nyusi has stressed the importance of a formalized agreement between the countries before any deployment can happen; evidently no such agreement is yet in place. A recent rapprochement between France and Rwanda, coupled with Nyusi’s 28 April visit to Kigali and a visit to Cabo Delgado by Rwandan security officers, fuelled speculation that France might even underwrite a Rwandese security intervention. Macron made it clear in his subsequent visits to South Africa on 27-28 May (preceded by a visit to Kigali) that any French support would require both a request from Mozambique and SADC approval. Macron explicitly suggested that French support could involve naval operations based out of French territory in the Indian Ocean. In Paris, Nyusi also met with Portugal’s prime minister, Antonio Costa, who currently holds the EU presidency. Costa reportedly opened the door to developing support for Mozambique for the different branches of the military.

Nyusi also met with South African president Cyril Ramaphosa on 17 May in France and discussed Cabo Delgado. On 21 May, South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor, who was also in Paris, announced the delayed SADC Troika meeting would be convened the week of 24 May. She reportedly urged SADC to take military action and wants Mozambique to accept the regional body’s intervention recommendations. This hawkish posture reflects profound frustrations with the ongoing delays in reaching agreement, but has not endeared Pretoria to Maputo. Nevertheless, Mozambique needs to keep Pretoria onside, even if the regional hegemon’s capacity to provide material support is itself constrained. 

Meanwhile, developments in Mozambique are slowly nudging the domestic discussion into a more open conversation about regional and international support. Frelimo’s Political Commission officially met on 5 May, the first time since Nyusi’s re-election in October 2019. In its closing statement, no mention was made of Cabo Delgado and only an oblique reference was made to fighting terrorism. The meeting paved the way for a Frelimo Central Committee meeting on 22-23 May, also the first since Nyusi’s re-election victory. Nyusi used the meeting to profile the security situation in Cabo Delgado and repeated a message he had made earlier in the month that Mozambique needed international partners to address the insurgent threat. 

At the Central Committee meeting, Nyusi confirmed that the SADC Double Troika would convene the following week, and it did so on 27 May. Yet any hopes of settling on a regional approach to the Cabo Delgado conflict were again dashed, reflecting the lack of resolution over a clear plan of action. The meeting agreed to convene a further discussion within the month, this time with the full meeting of heads of state and government. An initial meeting date for 20 June was subsequently extended to 23 June. This coincides with a SADC Business Forum being held in Maputo. It will be the first time regional leaders have met as a full collective since Mozambique took over as SADC chair, and only two months ahead of it passing on the baton to Malawi. Cabo Delgado will not be the only item on the agenda, which is likely to make the entire affair more palatable for its hosts. 

Botswanan President Mokgweetsi Masisi outlined to the media in late May several challenges facing the regional block, acknowledging that Cabo Delgado “was under intense attack from insurgents.” He said the block does not know who the insurgent leadership is and what they want, assertions contested by several local activists and analysts who claim the authorities know very well key elements of the insurgent leadership -- at least the local elements -- and also point to an array of messages, demands and objectives delivered through the course of the conflict to date.  Masisi reiterated SADC’s commitment to assist on the military, as well as humanitarian, front. Regrettably, the May summit chose not to amplify concerns about the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado and the growing challenges faced by both domestic and international actors to address it. How the region will help out in this regard is also unclear.

It is common wisdom that Maputo needs help to bolster its capacity to fight the insurgents. The question is whether this will move beyond training, supplies, and logistical support towards the thorny issue of boots on the ground, as recommended by SADC’s Technical Assessment mission. It is by no means a straightforward question. Some analysts and practitioners point to the poor record of multinational interventions, and argue Mozambique’s reticence and desire to pursue bilateral options is understandable. It may still be possible to develop a framework of bilateral support options that operate under a SADC mandate and satisfy all parties.  

Details on how SADC support would be financed also remain unavailable. Several countries have volunteered financial support, including Saudi Arabia, which announced its commitment during its interactions at the Paris Summit. Saudi Arabia has reportedly spent $121 million to fight terrorism in Africa,  but no details on what it would dedicate to the Mozambique project have been forthcoming. As Joseph Hanlon remarked in a recent newsletter, there is a certain irony to this given Saudi Arabia’s role in the genesis of radicalization in Cabo Delgado.