May At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED recorded 44 organized political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in May, resulting in 74 reported fatalities

• Reported fatalities were highest in Macomia district, where insurgents carried out attacks on civilians and clashed with state forces and communal militias

• Other events took place in Nangade, Mocímboa da Praia, Meluco, Palma, Quissanga, Pemba, and Muidumbe districts in Cabo Delgado

Vital Trends

• Islamic State introduces its Mozambique Province

• Violence spreads to the province’s southern districts

• President Nyusi strikes a realistic tone on counterterror efforts

In This Report

• Origins and consequences of the local forces in Cabo Delgado

• Islamic State control of insurgency messaging

• Women and girls in the Cabo Delgado Conflict 

• Cat and mouse: the evolution of the insurgency in face of intervention

May Situation Summary

ACLED recorded almost three times as many organized political violence events in May compared to April. This uptick in violence was accompanied by the designation of Mozambique Province by Islamic State (IS) on 9 May. IS went on to claim six incidents over the course of the month. While events in April were concentrated in Nangade and Macomia districts, May saw incidents in Nangade, Muidumbe, Palma, and Mocímboa da Praia in the north. To the south, incidents involving insurgents were recorded in Meluco, Macomia, and Quissanga districts. 

The increase in actions by insurgents in southern districts may be the result of ongoing operations being conducted in Catupa forest in Macomia district, east of the N380 artery that connects the provincial capital of Pemba to the province’s northern districts. The N380 was ceremonially re-opened in the first week of the month. Before the month’s end, there were multiple reports of  improvised explosive devices being found on the road between Macomia town and Awasse in Mocímboa da Praia

The spread of events indicates that there are a number of active cells in operation in the province. Evidence provided by women at the end of the month indicates a number of bases in Nangade, while at least one cell is active in Palma, south of Afungi peninsula. Events in Meculo and Macomia suggest at least two cells, one of which has at least 25 members judging by an IS photo report. 

These developments came as police chief Bernardino Rafael declared in Macomia mid-month that counterterrorism operations had been completed “70%.” The greater part of the violence in Macomia was to come in the second half of May. 

Given the upsurge of violence, and its spread south, President Nyusi’s somewhat more measured view of the conflict was appropriate. Speaking at the Frelimo Central Committee meeting near the end of the month, he cautioned against any triumphalism. Whether or not his remarks were a rebuke of his police chief, they reflected developments in the province in May. 

Origins and Consequences of the Local Forces in Cabo Delgado

By Corinna Jentzsch, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

A couple of years after the beginning of the war in Cabo Delgado, communities began to mobilize to protect themselves and form militias – or self-defense forces, known as “forças locais,” or local forces. This issue has seen more attention in recent months, as politicians and civil society members have discussed the legal status of such forces to respond to the Islamist insurgents. The most prominent local forces in Cabo Delgado to date are those formed by veterans of Mozambique’s independence struggle in the Makonde area, in particular Mueda and Muidumbe, and parts of Nangade and Macomia districts, who have also mobilized other family members including youths. These veteran militias are linked to the Associação dos Combatentes de Luta de Libertação Nacional (ACLLN), Frelimo’s veteran association headed by Fernando Faustino. There are also reports of other such initiatives elsewhere in Cabo Delgado. Not all local forces are so closely affiliated with Frelimo, though they all necessarily collaborate in some form or another with the state through the Defense and Security Forces (FDS). Overall, the weekly newspaper Savana estimated in February that they have more than 4,000 members between 25-70 years of age, but others speak of just over 500. Analysts usually see this mobilization as a reaction to the inefficiency and violence of the state armed forces in trying to confront the insurgents. We know from other civil wars, in Africa and beyond, that such militias can achieve some stability gains in the short run; however, they also militarize society and may contribute to political instability and human rights violations in the long run.

From research on militias in conflict studies, we know that militias have several general advantages that can contribute to their initial success against insurgents. Since they mostly operate in the localities in which they are mobilized, they have good local knowledge of the situation and geography, essential for armies to succeed in counterinsurgency. In Cabo Delgado, for example, Savana reported in February 2022 that the local forces helped Rwandan forces in the very beginning of their deployment and served as guides. Militias also serve as force multipliers in situations in which the state armed forces are thinly stretched, as they are in Mozambique. And lastly, since they operate in their own communities, militias can deploy rapidly to respond to threats and might be more disciplined and motivated to do so.

The Mozambican militias seem to have brought some peace to local communities, and enjoy local support as a consequence. But they have also attracted national support. Minister of Defense Cristóvão Chume emphasized the local forces’ positive effect on civilian protection when defending the government’s reliance on them last February, celebrating the spontaneous, liberating, and in a way innocent manner in which the forces had organized themselves. President Nyusi repeated this unconditional support in April and defended the local forces against critics by emphasizing how well they know the terrain and protect civilians, not harm them. This is a very different attitude than that taken during the civil war in the 1980s that saw the emergence of a traditional militia, the Naparama, in Zambézia and Nampula provinces, of which the government was very suspicious. Frelimo had abolished traditional elites after independence during the socialist restructuring of the country, and it was not sure whether the Naparama would challenge or support the government.

However, we also know that militia mobilization and operations can negatively affect the stability and levels of violence in civil wars. Distributing weapons to civilians creates an additional party to the conflict, which might make a peace settlement more difficult, increase levels of violence through retaliatory attacks by the insurgents or violence perpetrated by militias themselves, and militarize society, with lasting consequences beyond the war’s end. All these challenges contribute to lengthening civil wars in which militias operate. After Mozambique’s civil war ended, for example, the Naparama militias that had been active during the war but left out of the 1992 peace agreement repeatedly mobilized to receive recognition and veterans’ pensions, creating instability in the central region. The main question is therefore how to hold militias accountable for their actions — during and after the war — by, for example, integrating them into the existing security apparatus and providing training in human rights.

This question has dominated the debate over the past months about the role the local forces should play in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado. Government representatives were confronted with questions about the militias’ legal status, after reports surfaced that the groups abused their powers. It is important to note that the government has not only expressed its appreciation for what the local forces have achieved, but it has actively supported and recognized the militias, a government position towards militias that is not always taken in civil wars, as denying collaboration with militias can help governments to deny responsibility for their actions. While the origin of the local forces appears to be in local initiatives, the Frelimo government has supported the local forces since 2020 with uniforms and weapons, though they do not receive a salary. They also received an official endorsement by the government in February 2022 when President Nyusi awarded 230 militiamen Medals of Merit for Military Bravery on Heroes’ Day. There is also news of Uganda supporting the local forces. What remains unclear, however, is to what extent these militias might become political forces, and how much control the government and armed forces have over them, now and in the future. For example, commentators have been concerned whether the veterans’ militia may be perceived as Frelimo’s militia and essentially turn into an armed wing of the party that would create instability in the upcoming local elections.

While defending the important role of the local forces earlier this year, in an interview with Chatham House, Minister Chume indirectly responded to many of these and other concerns. He acknowledged that little is known about the local forces when stating that he wanted to collect more information about those groups. He made clear that he sought to ensure that the militias do not operate without a legal basis, and that the militia operations would only last until the armed forces are capable of responding to threats “across the entire national territory,” indicating that the timeframe of the militias’ operation is supposed to be limited. He also tried to foresee potential resistance on the part of the militias in ending their operations, by potentially offering them other jobs as rangers in national parks.

What will come of these plans is difficult to foresee. Legalizing militias is also a contested solution, as observers have warned that the government risks recognizing an armed force with insurgents in its midst. Ensuring a limited window of operation is important, but some militia advantages such as local knowledge are difficult for state armed forces and external intervention forces to replace. 

Islamic State Control of Insurgency Messaging

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

Reviewing what we know of IS communications management, and patterns of communication by IS and the insurgents themselves over the past three years, gives useful perspective on IS’s role in Mozambique. We see that communications seem to follow known IS protocols, controlling messaging from the insurgency. Effective control over this aspect of the insurgency suggests that other support mechanisms are in place, even if there is no direct evidence of “command and control” of operations. The recent concentration of operations in southern Cabo Delgado, and the timely nature of IS statements from there indicate that the insurgency has been incorporated to some degree into the IS structures.

In May, IS released seven incident reports on actions in Cabo Delgado on its social media channels. The first of these was a report on 9 May of an attack on Quiterajo in Macomia district, that introduced Mozambique Province as a distinct unit from Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The following day, a photo report of the same incident was released with three photos of weapons and ammunition they claimed to have seized. In the first week of June, they released a photo report drawn from actions at mostly unspecified locations, though including one in Meculo district. The following day, a claim for the attack on Nanduli village in Ancuabe district that day came out, followed on 6 June by a photo report of the incident.

IS’s media channels made their first claim for an incident in Mozambique on 4 June 2019. The report of a clash claiming to have repelled a security forces action against them also appeared in IS’s Al Naba weekly edition of 6 June 2019 in a round-up of incidents in the ISCAP. Al Naba’s first mention of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) wing of ISCAP had come seven weeks earlier. These were the clearest markers of IS’s ‘official’ presence in East Africa.

In the three years since, up to 5 June 2022, IS made over 100 claims for incidents in Cabo Delgado. This is just a fraction of the more than 1,120 incidents of organized political violence in the province since that time. Though the number of claims is low overall, the flow of claims has been consistent over time. There has been the occasional hiatus, and at times particular claims have been delayed. Overall, the rate at which claims are made is increasing, and there are no significant disputes over their accuracy.

In August 2018, the Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) of the US Military Academy published analysis of internal IS documents seized by US forces in Afghanistan in 2016 and 2017. Taken together, they set out communications guidelines to be followed by the provinces. These state that IS Central Media Bureau controls public communications by provinces, set out workflows for developing online content, and set standards to be followed in the production of online content.

From the documents reviewed by CTC, IS wants to control communications from its provinces. “Exterior publishing (via the internet),” according to one document, “is the responsibility of the Central Media exclusively.” Provincial media bureaus are urged to send material to Amaq News Agency, “providing it with details about main events that take place within the Wilayat.” Secure chat apps, such as Telegram or WhatsApp were the medium for managing submission and approval, or otherwise, of materials. Strict quality measures were to guide those producing materials for publication.  

Establishing and maintaining workflows is challenging for any organization operating transnationally, but IS seems to have had some success in Mozambique. Firstly, the flow of incident reports has been consistent. There has only been one significant hiatus when none appeared for almost three months up to 13 July 2021. From that point, contemporaneous claims resumed, along with some retrospective, and mostly accurate, claims for the hiatus period. Secondly, external communications are well controlled by IS Central Media, with very little unapproved material being released. Apart from a flurry of battlefield clips, propaganda released in May 2020, and clips taken during the assault on Kitaya in Tanzania in October 2020, images from the insurgents – usually still, and little video – have come through IS. Consistent quality has been maintained across photo reports, and the very small amount of video that has been spliced into ISCAP videos in the past. The most recent example was the ISCAP pledge video in March this year, recognizing Abu Al Hasan Al Hashimi Al Qurashi as IS’s leader.

Knowledge of media operations within Mozambique is limited. In August 2021, the US State Department designated Bonomade Machude Omar as a “terrorist,” describing him as leading the “Military and External Affairs Departments for ISIS-Mozambique,” and being the lead facilitator and communications conduit for the group.” The existence of a communications function is corroborated by testimony of women interviewed by the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR) in the second half of 2020. One said that “they have those people responsible for communication, they record everything. They recorded us.” She went on to say that they “made a point of recording the people who were captured. But they didn't post anywhere.” They were told “these movies are very important, because we can use them later.” IS’s quality control measures may prevent much of the footage from getting out. Those that appeared in 2020 certainly would not have met earlier standards laid out in the material seized in Afghanistan. In recent weeks, these systems have worked well. The attack on Nanduli village on the afternoon of Sunday 5 June was reported in IS Telegram channels by 10:27 pm that night. A photoset of pictures from the attack was published after a further 24 hours.

Such effective communication and support is unlikely to be limited to publishing, particularly given Omar’s other alleged area of responsibility, military affairs. This combination of responsibilities – military affairs and external communications – has been reflected in the distribution of claims in the past eight months. Over 60% of incidents claimed by IS in the eight months to the end of May relate to the southern districts of Macomia, Meluco, and Ancuabe. This reflects the increasingly southern trajectory of the insurgency in the face of relatively effective operations by Rwandan armed forces in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts. What form other supports take at this point is not known, but unconfirmed reports of continued movement of fighters from DRC suggest training support at least. 

Women and Girls in the Cabo Delgado Conflict

By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado

The Conflict in Cabo Delgado poses particular risks to thousands of women and girls in northern Mozambique. Women and girls face risks from insurgents in the first instance – risks of death and injury, sexual assault, and abduction. Some also have functional roles within the insurgency, whether voluntary or coerced. Women and girls who manage to escape fighting and capture face heightened risks of gender-based violence (GBV), early marriage, and abuse at the hands of local authorities.  

The vulnerability in which displaced women and girls find themselves extends to places that might be seen as potentially safe such as centers for internally displaced people (IDP). However, the reality is that displacement increases the risk and chances of women and girls suffering from GBV particularly in IDP centers and host sites. A UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) study in 2021 concluded that about 98% of GBV-related incidents were reported by displaced women and girls. Worryingly, despite an earlier assessment conducted by the London School of Health and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) indicating that adolescent girls in Cabo Delgado were at particular risk of GBV, only 11% of those seeking support in the wake of GBV were adolescent girls. 

The LSHTM assessment revealed that women are also at risk in the humanitarian structures put in place to protect them, where they have suffered verbal abuse and sexual exploitation. They also ran the risk of not being included in food distribution lists if they did not agree to demands for sex by community leaders and officials in charge of aid distribution. Victims of GBV and sexual exploitation rarely report cases to the authorities due to threats and harassment. Those women who reported abuse by aid workers saw their names excluded from lists of food assistance or other forms of support. 

Services to assist women and girls in regard to sexual and reproductive health services and psychological assistance remain scarce in accommodation centers. Even in places where such services are available, the numbers of women and girls accessing them remain low. UNHCR reported in early June that only 7% of GBV victims sought assistance. This situation is further aggravated by the lack of legal mechanisms to address allegations of GBV in both displacement centers and crimes perpetrated by actors in the conflict. 

The worsening humanitarian situation and displacement have also contributed to an increase in early marriages in Cabo Delgado. According to the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the province has one of the highest rates of early marriage in Mozambique. Save the Children recently reported that in the first three months of 2022, there were at least 108 marriages involving displaced children in the districts of Pemba, Metuge, Chiure, and Montepuez. These numbers may significantly underestimate the reality, but they reflect the gravity of the situation, especially in a province that has about half a million displaced children. Mozambique has tough laws against early unions, but patchy enforcement means they are not enough to stop the growing trend in Cabo Delgado, which has been compounded by a number of factors including family breakdown due to displacement, and the inability of families to provide for basic needs. 

Within the insurgency itself, shortages of food and an apparent strategic restructuring have led to large numbers of women captives being released — who have gone on to provide valuable insights into the conflict, and life inside the insurgency. 

A study on how the conflict has affected women was published by the OMR in May 2021. The women interviewed revealed the level of victimization they had suffered from the insurgents, as had been documented before. However, the report also provided evidence of their abuse by security forces, as well as the active role played by a small number of women working with the insurgency. 

In the first five months of this year, waves of escapes and surrenders were noted, particularly in Macomia and Nangade districts. It is unclear whether the escapes and surrenders were motivated by extreme hunger in the bush, or are part of an insurgency strategy. Two women appeared in Nangade on 31 May and shared their views on various aspects within the insurgency, including the living conditions and internal dynamics of the group, and the struggles faced by the insurgents in the face of advancing government forces, among other aspects. A similar account was shared by a 12-year-old teenager who described extreme hunger and low morale in the insurgency, stating that several leaders have abandoned the ranks and left the country. The accounts provide valuable insights despite the difficulty in corroborating them. 

With no end to the conflict in sight, the prevalence of violence in Cabo Delgado will exacerbate the different forms of violence against the most vulnerable groups, including sexual, physical, and psychological violence. Women, girls, and children already face a range of difficulties in accessing food, health care, shelter, education, and livelihoods. Without an adequate response to GBV, the increase in teenage pregnancy, and early marriage, the vulnerability of these groups will continue to deteriorate. 

Cat and Mouse: The Evolution of the Insurgency in Face of Intervention

By Piers Pigou, Cabo Ligado

The arrival of Rwandan forces in July 2021, and in the following month of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), in support of Mozambique’s FDS has had a profound impact on the insurgency. Prior to the intervention, the most affected districts were Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Nangade, and Palma. Insurgents operated without serious resistance from FDS, who were operating alone following the decision in early April 2021 not to renew contracts with the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), a decision which acutely compromised air surveillance and related aerial attack abilities. While the attack on Palma town on 24 March 2021 showed insurgency in its ascendancy, it also prompted major blowback as Maputo, somewhat reluctantly, turned to Rwanda and the region for support.

Early Rwandan operations in Muidumbe, Mocímboa da Praia, and Palma reportedly inflicted major casualties on insurgent forces. This prompted them to minimize direct confrontation with the security forces, decamping from larger bases splitting into smaller groups and relocating into other areas, particularly western Palma and neighboring Nangade districts.

Successful Rwandan offensives have forced a return to an earlier modus operandi of mobile small cell structures rather than operating from large established bases. Pacification of Muidumbe and Mocímboa da Praia districts did not guarantee full security. The symbolic retaking of Mocímboa da Praia port in August 2021 exemplifies this challenge, as the ever-delayed return of those displaced from the town indicates. In Muidumbe, southern Mocímboa da Praia and along the Messalo river, insurgents were forced from strongholds around Mbau south and southeast into Macomia and northwards into Nangade and Mueda district. From there, small groups of fighters pushed into Niassa province in November 2021, before heading back into Mueda and Nangade in January 2022. In the face of operations in Mbau, fighters were deployed to slow down the security forces advance, allowing the bulk of insurgents to move with hostages carrying what they could. Many of these are now believed to be in the Catupa forest, east of Chai in Macomia district.

In Palma district, now regarded as the most ‘normalized’ of the affected districts, the Rwandans pushed insurgents south and east to the coast, north to Tanzania and west towards the administrative area of Pundanhar. Only in February 2022 were they pushed out of Pundanhar, and into Nangade, resulting in a spike of subsequent attacks in that district.

A handful of recent attacks have been reported south of Palma in Olumbe and along the R762, although these appear to be focused on sourcing food. Despite the obvious presence of this cell, there have been no major instances in Palma in recent times.

The success of early Rwandan operations belie a weakness in overall coordination between them, SAMIM, and FDS. Insurgents moved from Mocímboa da Praia and Palma into areas that fall largely under Mozambican and SAMIM operational responsibility. Coordination challenges have been compounded by very difficult terrain, providing space for fighters to regroup in districts such as Macomia and Nangade. In Macomia, they have continued to attack communities across the district, from the western area of Macomia Sede to the coastal areas of Mucojo and Quiterajo. From there they have been able to launch attacks, including on Matemo island in March. The area around Chai has suffered ongoing attacks and raids, even after Rwandan forces were deployed in early April 2022. This reflects both the tenacity of the fighters in this area, but also the limited capacity of the joint security forces to provide relevant protection, an ongoing reality check given the vast area and challenging geography that has to be covered.

Assessing the impact of operations on the size and capacity of insurgent forces is difficult. Mozambican authorities have made impressive claims that are difficult to verify. There has been no disclosure on what has happened to captured insurgents, or on whether and how interrogations of insurgents and debriefings of captives have helped the joint forces to consolidate their strategy. In late November, SAMIM forces were estimating about 300 fighters were still active. It is feared that many fighters may have been instructed to cache weapons, stand down, and infiltrate back into civilian communities. This would compound an already complex security challenge.

Most functioning insurgent cell groups appear to be relatively small, and some now very poorly equipped; this appears to be the case especially in Nangade province which witnessed a rash of surrenders by fighters – most recently in May –  who were struggling to survive. Despite this, some other groups remain active in the district. However, in recent weeks, we have seen evidence of a larger, well-equipped group of up to 60 fighters in Meluco district, and involved in the ongoing push south. This is likely one of several groups operating in Meluco, Quissanga, Ancuabe, and Chiure districts. Elsewhere, Macomia and Nangade have reported regular incidents over the last six months or so, with an overall downtick during the Ramadan period. 

Questions remain about how many hostages are still being held by the insurgents. In recent months, insurgents have released a number of hostages, unable to provide for them. On other occasions, lax security has allowed hostages to escape. Some have been held for months, others for years. A handful of public testimonies have provided some insights into experiences in captivity and the evolving, and without exception, deteriorating conditions.

The recent push south by insurgent cells into the more densely populated south, which have already seen an influx of those displaced from further north, presents insurgents with a different set of opportunities, and challenges. Joint security force offensives in Catupa forest are believed to have contributed to the decision of some to head south, where there are greater opportunities for reprovisioning. Access to armaments will depend on locating and taking out more isolated security assets. Recent returnees testify to continued communication between groups to the north and south. In this regard, the insurgents have maintained much of the momentum, with the security forces largely in reactionary mode.

The push south also presents serious challenges and risks for the insurgents, operating outside their familiar operational zones and in areas where the population is likely to be more hostile.  Much depends on whether they are able to rely on support networks that can help with provisioning and most importantly intelligence to avert counter-attacks. It is unclear how these groups can sustain their current momentum, but much will depend on how the joint forces now move to tackle the current deteriorating security situation. Once again, Cabo Delgado faces a very uncertain future.