Cabo Ligado Monthly: May 2023
May At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records 19 political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in May, resulting in at least 19 reported fatalities
Two battle events, in Nangade and Muidumbe districts, accounted for 14 reported fatalities
Political violence events were concentrated in Macomia and Muidumbe districts, where seven and five such events were recorded, respectively. Other events took place in Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, Meluco, and Ancuabe districts
Vital Trends
Insurgents reappear in Nangade district
Clashes continue in Muidumbe and Macomia districts
TotalEnergies release human rights and humanitarian assessment
In This Report
Conflict in TotalEnergies assessment of humanitarian and human rights issues
A new horizon for the people of Palma?
IESE Barometer reveals fear and anxiety in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa
Waiting for gas
May Situation Summary
May saw a notable increase in both recorded political violence events and reported fatalities in Cabo Delgado province. There were nearly five times as many recorded political violence events in May (19) as in April (four). Reported fatalities too rose, from 11 to 19. The return of insurgents to Nangade, their continuing freedom of movement in coastal areas of Macomia, and another IED incident remain causes of concern. However, sustained return in some areas, and a decrease in overall displacement figures are positive developments.
Clashes remained concentrated in the lowlands in southern Muidumbe district, and in villages across the Messalo river in the north of Macomia district. As Defense and Security Forces (FDS) actions seem to be concentrated in that area, there was evidence of insurgents moving eastwards, likely to their base suspected to be at Namurussia in Macomia, thought to have been established earlier in the year.
People who had returned to their villages in east and southeast Nangade district moved back to the district headquarters following the return of insurgents to the district last month. Later in the month, the Rapid Intervention Unit killed five insurgents in an ambush near Ngangolo, including one alleged leader, Issa Wachio.
May also saw the province’s third IED incident this year involving the insurgents, with all three occurring in Muidumbe district. The use of IEDs in the less populous lowlands of Muidumbe district limits their impact.
May also saw just six cases of violence against civilians in Cabo Delgado. Two of these involved Mozambican state forces, and one attack by Rwandan forces was also recorded. Of the two involving the insurgents, there was one killing in Muidumbe district, and the detention for a few hours of a dozen people in Nangade district. The number of incidents involving state forces reflects an emerging trend with the potential to undermine state-building in relatively secure areas. One of the incidents involving Mozambican state forces and the attack by Rwandan soldiers were in the strategically important district of Mocímboa da Praia.
Conflict in TotalEnergies Assessment of Humanitarian and Human Rights Issues
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
Jean-Christophe Rufin’s ‘Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocímboa area’ gives some clues to TotalEnergies’ view of the security situation in the province, and how the firm relates to that. However, they are just clues, as the report pays little overt attention to security issues and their impact on the population. Just four pages are devoted to “conflict factors” and “current security and humanitarian situation.” In contrast, 15 pages are devoted to a review of project work in the community funded by the firm, and another 15 to examining outstanding resettlement issues. Understanding the firm’s current posture in the province, as it may be influenced by the report, is hard to gauge. The terms of reference can only be guessed at, while there is a lack of clarity over how the report fits into the firm’s existing statutory requirements regarding business and human rights.
Rufin’s mission was initially described as being “an independent mission to assess the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado province,” and to “evaluate the actions taken by Mozambique LNG and … propose any additional actions to be implemented, if required.” In truth, the mission focused on Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts, with some, if little, attention paid to Mueda. This reflects the remarks of TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné after a meeting with President Filipe Nyusi in Maputo in February 2022. At the time, he said that “[w]hen you see that life is back to normal, with state services and population, then the project can start over.” In his reported remarks, he was referring specifically to Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Mueda districts.
The inclusion of Mueda is puzzling. Between Palma and Mueda districts lies Nangade district, for which ACLED has recorded 155 incidents of violence targeting civilians since October 2017. For Mueda, by contrast, just 12 such incidents have been recorded. The road back to normality is clearly longer in Nangade than in Mueda. Why conditions in Mueda district, far from the project site, and not Nangade, are so critical to TotalEnergies is not explained.
The report is notable for the absence of accurate data related to the conflict, and consequently, its impact is misrepresented. The report’s first paragraph mistakenly places the insurgents’ initial assault in October 2017 in Palma, not Mocímboa da Praia. The 1 January 2021 assault on the resettlement village of Quitunda, which sits just outside the project site, is not mentioned, though it led to the suspension of construction work and the evacuation of staff and contractors.
Data for more recent times, when the rate of incidents has subsided significantly, understates levels of political violence. The report states that “attacks on roads and villages (mainly for food) were again carried out in February [2023] by small armed groups.” In the context of the report, this statement points to a continuing threat in the province. Yet though the threat has considerably receded, the report misrepresents political violence in the province that month. For February 2023, ACLED records 19 political violence events in Cabo Delgado, including one in Palma district, and three in Mocímboa da Praia district. Two of the three incidents in Mocímboa da Praia were clashes between insurgents and Rwandan forces. The incident in Palma district was a clash between insurgents and Local Forces. It is hard to determine how many of the 19 incidents were supply raids by the insurgents. There were, however, at least two incidents of insurgents buying food from villagers, in the district.
While the conflict has significantly subsided, there have been significant changes amongst conflict actors since the international intervention in 2021. Local Forces and FDS remain the most significant actors. For the first five months of 2023, ACLED data show that Local Forces directly clashed with insurgents 12 times. The FDS was involved in 20 clashes in that period, with a spike in May. Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and Rwandan forces were involved in 11 clashes over the five-month period. The Rwandan presence in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia will remain significant, yet how the firm's relationship with those forces is managed is not addressed in the report.
The report identifies the relationship with Mozambique Defense Armed Forces’ Joint Task Force (JTF) as a significant risk for TotalEnergies, stating that any “permanent link” with the JTF could make the firm a party to the conflict under international law. However, there are other obligations to manage its relationship with security actors. The firm currently manages human rights risks related to security through its obligations under France’s Loi de Vigilance, or Vigilance Law of 2017, which is based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. TotalEnergies reports on its obligations under this in some detail. The firm also has a commitment to upholding the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPHSR). Under the latter, the firm has considerable engagement with the FDS. Again, this is reported on regularly.
A curiosity of the Rufin report is that it is presented without any reference to the firm’s obligations, and ongoing actions under these frameworks. In Mozambique, they have been considerable. In 2022 alone, the firm trained 2,515 members of the FDS and 42 private security company personnel in VPHSR. Many of these were from the JTF. As the firm reviews its relationship with the JTF, it may need to consider how it structures its relationship with Rwanda’s security forces, and the increasingly important Local Forces.
A New Horizon for the People of Palma?
By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado
Jean-Christophe Rufin's report on Mozambique liquified natural gas (LNG) project's involvement in humanitarian and human rights issues explores a series of sensitive issues that have damaged relations between local communities, the government, and the companies involved in the LNG project on the Afungi peninsula, Palma district, since 2013.
In particular, issues inherited from Anadarko's management of Mozambique LNG have driven a series of conflicts within the populations affected by the LNG project. The contested award of land use rights known as DUAT, to Anadarko, the mismanagement of compensation and slow progress on resettlement, and consents obtained in problematic ways have made for a stressful decade for the people of the Palma district. The March 2021 attack on the town further delayed a conclusion to the difficult and problematic process of resettlement.
Many of the issues stem from the allegedly illegal award by the Mozambican government of the DUAT for an area of 7,000 hectares on the Afungi peninsula, in favor of Anadarko, without the consent of the communities. Legally, the transfer of the DUAT from the communities, held by them on the basis of customary laws, should have been a long and complex process, requiring community consultations, studies, and the issuing of an environmental license. But the government bypassed the customary laws and allocated the site in 2015 to Rovuma Basin LNG Land (RBLL), a special purpose company established by Anadarko and Mozambique’s national oil company, Empresa Moçambicana de Hidrocarbonetos. An independent audit by civil society organizations that year concluded that this process was illegal.
Moreover, neither RBLL nor Anadarko justified at the time the need for such an extensive area of land, which would have provided a buffer zone around the project – suggesting that Anadarko did not intend to establish any relationship with the population surrounding the project.
One question raised by Rufin is why part of the significant area of the DUAT not to be used for the LNG plant is not now allocated to the local communities, either for the relocation of their housing or even for the development of agriculture.
The allocation of the DUAT to Anadarko led to another issue identified by the Rufin report. The 733 households to be relocated from the extensive DUAT through the resettlement process had no land to establish their new homes and farms. Instead, they were placed in other communities, generating inter-community conflicts, and thereby pitting resettled people against their hosts. For example, those being resettled were given houses of modern construction; this contrasted with the precarious material of the houses of the host communities. Rufin suggests the creation of the same housing conditions for both populations, something that is in line with the demands of the communities at the time of the public consultations.
Anadarko and the government also failed to identify alternative agricultural land for the resettled communities, turning instead to the village of Senga to secure about 150 hectares which were already used for cultivation to compensate for the farms of the resettled people. However, this is a short-term solution, since as the population grows, the pressure on the existing land will increase. TotalEnergies and the government will have to find a long-term solution to this.
Rufin also addressed the problematic way in which the government and Anadarko obtained consent from the local communities. For example, some families were allegedly coerced into signing documents proving that an inventory of their property had been made, under the threat of not receiving compensation. In fact, in many cases, such inventories were never carried out. Rufin also agreed with some civil society organizations that community consultations had been conducted with a lack of transparency and access to information, and a lack of clarity about the procedures involved in the process, rendering the community consultations mere administrative and bureaucratic formalities. When communities are not properly informed and lack adequate knowledge, they are not in a position to express their concerns and priorities in an informed manner.
The negotiation phase between the government and the company on one side, and the communities on the other, was a long and difficult process that lasted about six years until the resettlement of the populations finally began in 2019. Of the 733 families, around 161 were resettled, but the process was suspended after Total's ‘force majeure,’ leaving some 572 families still to be resettled. As the inventory process had already been done, the populations were not allowed to build or change the conditions of their houses and were not even allowed to work on their farms, generating a state of uncertainty among them. Also lacking in clarity are the populations who used to live in coastal areas in the DUAT area. The population of Milamba, whose main activity is fishing, was displaced inland, along with their boats, instead of being relocated to other coastal areas.
Rufin's report on the issue of resettlement and compensation for communities seems to reflect the pressing concerns of the people affected by the Mozambique LNG project, and overlaps with issues raised by civil society organizations throughout the resettlement process. Having mapped out the underlying problems, the key issue now will be how TotalEnergies addresses these challenges.
Rufin's recommendations already point some ways forward, although some of them are vague. Updating of consent, inventories, prompt payment of compensation, and compensation of land for agriculture all deserve more attention. The fishing populations that used to reside in the coastal area of Milamba have already been resettled to areas far from the coast. TotalEnergies will have to find a sustainable mechanism for these communities, which have historically been entirely dependent on fishing.
Some of the issues raised by Rufin in his report are a direct criticism of the way the government has handled the process, where business interests have taken precedence over communities. TotalEnergies’ approach in Palma will also be dictated by the company’s economic interests. But criticism of the resettlement and compensation process led by Anadarko and the government of Mozambique may give TotalEnergies more room and autonomy in leading its development strategy. The success of this strategy will depend on how it responds to Rufin's recommendations.
IESE Barometer Reveals Fear and Anxiety in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa
By Armando Nhamtumbo, MediaFax
Institute for Social and Economic Studies’ (IESE) Barometer of Social Cohesion is a survey into social cohesion in the districts of Angoche and Moma, in Nampula province, Chimbunila and Cuamba, in Niassa, and Chiure and Montepuez, in Cabo Delgado. In each of the districts, more than 600 citizens were interviewed, men and women, with young people representing half of the respondents. The survey was undertaken in 2022, and results are to be published shortly.
IESE defines social cohesion as the level of trust in the government on the part of the people. It also encompasses people’s willingness to participate collectively towards a shared vision of sustainable peace and common goals of development.
The instrument analyzes six dimensions, namely inclusion, security and protection, trust in others, trust in institutions, representation, and civic engagement. Findings from the security and protection dimension show most clearly how the insurgency, concentrated in Cabo Delgado, is a source of fear and anxiety across northern Mozambique.
In Nampula province, south of Cabo Delgado, the survey was carried out in Angoche, a district on the coast, and Moma district, approximately 100 kilometers south of Angoche on the coast. For Angoche, Barometer findings indicate that the violence in Cabo Delgado has hit people’s feelings of security and protection. They are particularly concerned about the recruitment of local youths to the ranks of ‘al-Shabaab,’ as the insurgents are known locally.
One issue raised is that of a local sheik, called Ismaila, who enticed young men with the promise of studying Islam abroad, but who is thought to have never left Mozambique. Some of the youths have disappeared and never been heard of again, while Sheik Ismaila himself has also since disappeared. Although it has no record of insurgent attacks, Angoche has been one of the recruitment sites for the insurgents, targeting young fishermen who traditionally migrate to fish around the islands off the coast of Cabo Delgado.
The district of Moma has also been a recruitment site for the insurgents, the Barometer finds. Here too, one of the forms exploited by the insurgents is the migration of artisanal fishermen, mostly young people, who go to the coastal area of Cabo Delgado, because the quantity and quality of fish caught in Moma is said to have decreased in recent years.
The conflict in Cabo Delgado has also made the population of Moma more distrustful of displaced people. Presenting oneself locally as coming from the areas affected by the insurgency raises suspicions and, in some cases, can be grounds for being reported to the authorities, the Barometer finds.
In Niassa province, survey work for the Barometer was carried out in Chimbunila district. Lying on the shore of Lake Nyasa, it is over 500 km west of Pemba in Cabo Delgado. Niassa province has been mostly free of insurgent attacks since an outbreak of such violence in Mecula district, in particular, in the final months of 2021. Though Mecula lies over 200 km to the east, residents of Chimbunila district also reported fear of violence. Chimbunila has no record of jihadist attacks, but residents are just as frightened by the episodes of violence in Cabo Delgado, particularly since they spread to Niassa.
In the province of Cabo Delgado itself, the southern districts of Chiure and Montepuez have their particularities. Chiure was one of the first to register episodes of violence linked to the current conflict, with the authorities ordering, in 2016, the destruction of a mosque belonging to members of an Islamic sect that did not recognize the authority of the state and opposed the celebration of national public holidays. But it was the beheading of citizens in Katapua in 2022, which aggravated the feeling of insecurity, and generated a new wave of displaced people.
For its part, Montepuez district has been a significant center of displaced people from the war, again generating anxiety and fear. “When we see other brothers fleeing and suffering from the war, our insecurity increases,” said one of the respondents.
In Montepuez, the generalized feeling of insecurity is aggravated by the experiences already lived about the violence perpetrated by the insurgents. The study notes the impact of the attack on Nairoto in Montepuez when up to about 100 insurgents attacked and occupied, for a few hours, a joint FDS post at the headquarters of the Administrative Post of Nairoto, killing five soldiers and taking weapons and uniforms belonging to the military. This greatly increased the feeling of insecurity in the district, leading to the displacement of thousands and forcing Nairoto Resources, a company with a gold mine 15 km from the headquarters of Nairoto, to cease operations and evacuate the area.
The Barometer study, to be published soon, illustrates the deep human impact of the conflict on people seemingly far from danger, but close enough to experience deep anxiety.
Waiting for Gas
By Fernando Lima, Cabo Ligado
While Jean-Christophe Rufin’s report on the situation in Cabo Delgado recommends a strong commitment to turning around the social conditions of the people surrounding the gas projects on the Afungi peninsula of Cabo Delgado, much of his recommendations focus on resolving outstanding land rights issues. The other main focus of the report is TotalEnergies’ spending on community and economic development projects.
Jean-Christophe Rufin believes such projects should make a difference across the whole province. For the time being, TotalEnergies is supporting a panoply of economic activities in the districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, where the gas projects will have their greatest impact. Rufin recommends greater coordination of these projects, which are currently run through partnerships with non-governmental organizations, the military, and at least one overseas company.
According to TotalEnergies, dozens of small farms are being supported in villages across Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, mainly to produce vegetables. The idea, according to Simão Muhorro of TE’s resettlement team, is to produce for the communities and introduce a more diversified diet. Probably the most lucrative project supported by the firm is two farms at Olumbe and Mute. These, according to Rufin, are operated by South African firm SEBO which has the catering project site and supplies food for the JTF located at the site. Sheinila Santos, a 32-year-old nutritionist, is a fan of such projects. Aside from products familiar to the peasant communities, such as tomato and onions, she is introducing eggplant and okra, new products to diversify the population’s diet. She brought in broiler chickens to be developed on a commercial basis. They produce eggs on a regular basis while the chicks are ready for the abattoir after a month. An industrial abattoir is planned to deal with the increasing chicken meat production.
Water is a chronic problem in Cabo Delgado, so the farms which are not close to rivers have boreholes and pumps powered by solar panels. Water feeds the vegetables through a hydroponic drip system. Some projects are directed by agrarian specialists paid by TotalEnergies working with the local communities. Others are developed by third parties in charge of the projects, such as SEBO, funded by the firm. João Ferreira dos Santos (JFS), a major cotton concern in Mozambique, brought in its technicians to develop cotton and peanuts on an experimental basis. Samuel Junior, an agronomist from Maputo, and Pedro João, an agrarian technician from Balama, work for Kapaz (meaning ‘capable’), a small company connected to JFS.
In the village of Mute, the agriculture project includes aquaculture to develop protein via tilapia fish. The project is implemented by the civic service of the Mozambican army, clearly a ‘hearts and minds’ project to improve the tarnished image of the military. Similarly, the ABC Primary School in the small town of Olumbe, one of the most affected places by violence, has been rebuilt by the Ministry of Defence, financed by TotalEnergies.
The Mozambican civil society organization Fundação MASC, in Mocímboa da Praia, provides seeds and hoes for the returnees to start their own agriculture plots. They bought small refrigerated trucks to take fish from Mocímboa da Praia to more distant places, such as Muidumbe and Mueda in the interior, as happened in the past. The idea is to support merchants in the fishing business. TotalEnergies is doing the same in Palma, having brought in refrigerators for fish, and having assured the fishermen they will buy anything that they cannot sell to the local population. Even under ‘force majeure,’ there are around 1,100 men and women working and living in the fenced camps of Afungi, and they need to be fed, preferably with locally produced goods.
Quitunda, the resettlement village, is growing – mainly to accommodate the population of Quitupo, the only remaining village on the land granted for the project site. This is another recommendation of the Rufin report being implemented. WBHO, a South African contractor, is building 132 new houses with the support of Radar Scape, a Rwandan company. Two weeks ago, a group of Quitopo villagers were given the keys to the first 52 houses.
Between Afungi, Olumbe, and Mocímboa da Praia, there is a new sand road along the coast. A Portuguese-owned firm based in Nacala, AJFS Moçambique, was contracted for the 68 km stretch, having previously completed major works for the coal terminal built for Brazilian mining giant Vale. The road is an alternative to the tarred N762 road between Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. It improves security and provides a reliable link for the population living closer to the shore.
This has led to considerable spending by TotalEnergies, though Rufin criticizes it for being poorly coordinated. According to the action plan arising from his report, all these projects will continue to be operated under the Pamoja Tunaweza umbrella, but with greater coordination. The firm plans to make a high appointment to manage this work, and coordinate spending with international and state agencies.
With all these projects moving, TotalEnergies continues to hold firm regarding a restart of work on the gas front. In Paris, CEO Patrick Pouyanné insists he is not in a hurry, and is focused on keeping sub-contractors’ costs at pre-force majeure levels.