May At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records 31 insurgency-related political violence events in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces in May, resulting in at least 55 fatalities

• Of these events, 30 were incidents involving ISM, almost half of which targeted civilians

Vital Trends

• ISM attacked and occupied Macomia district headquarters for at least 24 hours

• Rwandan forces continued to clash with ISM in Nampula province 

• Rwanda deploys up to 2,000 extra troops to Cabo Delgado province

In This Report

• ISM licks its wounds after defeat at Mbau

• IS propaganda presents ISM leaders with a problem

• Is timber smuggling financing the insurgency? A look at the evidence

May Situation Summary

Political violence spread through northern Mozambique in May, with Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) active from Palma district in the north of Cabo Delgado province to Erati district in Nampula province to the south. The most significant event of the month was ISM’s invasion and occupation of Macomia town on 10 May. ISM attackers drove away Mozambican forces, looted the town, and returned to the coast with vehicles, food, and other looted goods. The attack took advantage of a gap between the withdrawal of Southern Africa Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) troops, who left the town in the days before the attack, and the arrival of Rwandan Security Forces (RSF) as their replacement. North of Macomia, Rwandan forces clashed with ISM in southern Mocimboa da Praia district. Further south, operations by the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) and the RSF continued at the start of the month, forcing ISM fighters out of Nampula’s Erati district and into Chiúre district in southern Cabo Delgado. 

ISM Licks Its Wounds After Defeat at Mbau

By Tom Gould, Zitamar News

May was a turbulent month for ISM. After scoring a victory against the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) with a surprise raid on Macomia town on 10 May, its fortunes quickly reversed. An attempted assault on Mbau on 29 May ended in disaster, with the RSF routing the insurgent fighters, killing at least a dozen fighters and possibly more than 50. The insurgency’s ranks are likely still quite thin, despite its renewed offensive energy this year, and these are losses that it cannot easily afford. 

ISM clearly had big ambitions for its Mbau attack, judging by the scale of its operation. As many as 150 insurgents may have been involved, according to a Rwandan spokesperson quoted by state broadcaster TVM. At dawn, this force launched simultaneous assaults on Mbau and the nearby village of Limala but ultimately was unable to overpower the RSF presence. By the end of the morning, President Filipe Nyusi had announced to reporters that the attack had been repelled and “dozens” of insurgents were dead.

The exact number of insurgent casualties at Mbau is yet to be firmly established. In the immediate aftermath of the battle, local sources told Cabo Ligado that at least a dozen were confirmed killed. Islamic State (IS) itself admitted via its newspaper Al-Naba that it had lost “about ten of the Mujahideen.’” However, other reports suggest the figure could be much larger. 

TVM reported a Rwandan spokesperson’s claim that Rwandan troops killed at least 70 of the 150 insurgents that attacked around Mbau, where the RSF maintains a significant forward operating base. Local sources have also corroborated this claim, reporting at least 50 insurgents dead.

This would be a catastrophic result for ISM. A report to the UN Security Council in February 2023 estimated that there were just 280 active male fighters in the insurgency, and while this figure may have changed, it is unlikely to be substantially higher. Insurgents have sustained a fairly consistent rate of activity since the start of the year, but in the weeks following the Mbau attack, they have hardly been seen. One exception was a raid on the village of Nacoba in Quissanga district on 11 June, in which insurgents looted a health center, perhaps suggesting they still had casualties that needed treatment.

It’s unclear why ISM would choose to target such a heavily militarized position as Mbau. It’s possible that they have been emboldened by their successes this year, flying the IS flag over two district capitals - Macomia and Quissanga - and striking as far south as Chiúre and even Nampula province. 

This setback may force the insurgents to adopt a less aggressive strategy, but it is far from fatal. They remain entrenched on the coast of Macomia district around Mucojo and in the Catupa forest, which they have held uninterrupted since February. Rwandan reinforcements are arriving to replace outgoing SAMIM forces, but it remains to be seen how proactive they will be beyond their traditional areas of operation in the districts of Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Ancuabe. For now, the front is quiet. Both sides may take some time to consider their next moves. 

IS Propaganda Presents ISM Leaders with a Problem

By Peter Bofin, ACLED

Muamudo Saha, thought to be the ISM commander at Mucojo, was a prominent figure during the occupation of Macomia last month. One source told Cabo Ligado that they had briefly seen him preaching outside the Movitel office in the center of town on the second day of occupation before moving away, fearing that he may be filmed by ISM. This was a reasonable concern - the IS media operations have for some weeks now been highlighting daw’ah, or preaching, activities undertaken in predominantly Muslim areas in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Quissanga districts. 

Images of those activities contrast with the images released from predominantly Christian communities in Chiúre and Ancuabe districts in April and May, which feature the destruction of churches and beheadings. ISM leaders will need to justify these actions in both public gatherings and in camps with fighters. An editorial in a recent issue of al-Naba, focusing on Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which operates in the Democratic Republic of Congo, gives some clues to the issues that Saha and other leaders may use to justify these actions. Al-Naba’s writer notes that atrocities committed against Christian communities in DRC are driven by two forces, strategic and ideological, that underpin the group’s resilience in unfriendly territory. Firstly, they demonstrate the failure of “Crusader forces” to protect Christian communities. Secondly, they point to the primacy of Islamist belief, stating that “every operation against the people of the infidels and their armies is a step forward in the path of empowerment.” Analysis of ISCAP ideology, published in a recent report published by the Hudson Institute, indicates that this hardline approach to operating in a predominantly Christian area can be traced to the initial affiliation of the Allied Democratic Forces, later ISCAP, with IS in 2017, and IS’s formal acceptance of the group in 2019. 

The challenge for IS in Mozambique is different. ISCAP operates in predominantly Christian areas of DRC, has roots in Uganda, and is reliant on fighters from across the region. In contrast, the ISM group arose organically from networks of Islamist preachers within Mozambique but with international connections. One of these leaders is Saha. Now thought to be a senior commander in Mucojo, he became well known across Macomia district in the years before the conflict, where he campaigned against the sale of alcohol and tobacco. This is a campaign that ISM has recently revived in Macomia under his leadership. 

Beyond predominantly Muslim areas, IS communications have this year stressed the targeting of Christians and their institutions. However, ACLED data does not indicate disproportionate targeting of civilians in areas thought to be predominantly Christian. IS photo reports in April and May highlighted the targeting of Christians in Ancuabe and Chiúre districts in southern Cabo Delgado and Erati district in northern Nampula province. However, ACLED records almost half of civilian targeting in April and May 2024 to be taking place in Palma, Mocimboa da Praia, Meluco, and Macomia districts, where Muslims are more populous and not further south. 

Security sources, though, predict that ISM will continue with attacks against civilians in southern Cabo Delgado. In this way, they can stretch Mozambican state forces and thus create conditions for high-profile attacks on patrols or outposts. This sets a challenge to the new Rwandan forces, and their willingness to respond quickly to ISM movements. They demonstrated this in Nampula district at the end of April, but it remains to be seen if they are willing to maintain this across Cabo Delgado’s southern districts. However, IS propaganda that highlights sectarian presents ISM leaders with a conundrum. Graduating from this stage of the insurgency to either sustained control of territory or a return to civilian life will involve some form of negotiation. Images of Christian communities under attack will not help that.

Is Timber Smuggling Financing the Insurgency? A Look at the Evidence

By Tom Bowker, Zitamar News

Are illicit timber exports funding the insurgency in Cabo Delgado? According to the Mozambican government’s National Evaluation of the Risks of Financing of Terrorism, “the fact that the trafficking of timber and other forestry products happens in zones under terrorist threat suggests that this activity has been a source of income for the terrorists.” The report, dated December 2023 but only made public this year, added that “it is estimated that timber trafficking in Cabo Delgado brings in around 125 million meticais per month to the smugglers.” This figure, about US$2 million dollars, came, however, with an important caveat that “there is no record of [smuggling’s] direct links to terrorism.”

While illicit timber trade is a major problem in Cabo Delgado and Mozambique more broadly, evidence of it financing the insurgency is extremely sparse. Yet claims to the contrary persist. In May, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) also claimed in a report that the insurgency is funded by up to $2 million US dollars per month from this illicit trade of natural resources. The figure has been in circulation for some years, with little evidence to back it up. 

The figure of $2m a month seems to date back to a 2019 report published by the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE). This was based on research carried out between November 2017 and February 2018 — between one and three months after the insurgency started in October 2017.

The IESE report stated that early funding for the insurgent group came from “an illicit local economy with links to clandestine networks trafficking in timber, charcoal, rubies, and ivory, among other products.”

As an estimate of how much could come in this way, the study cites unnamed sources who estimated that 50,000 “planks”, likely meaning logs, left Cabo Delgado each month and would be sold in Tanzania for 2,500 meticais each. This was the basis for the figure for total revenue of 125 million meticais per month. The report went on to say that only “an insignificant portion” of income from illicit trade stayed in the hands of the insurgency’s local leaders in Cabo Delgado.

Subsequent research has not managed to tie the timber trade to the insurgency. Henry Tugendhat and Sérgio Chichava (the latter also of IESE) in 2021 refer to the IESE figure but quote a local expert on Mozambique’s timber trade as saying, “We were unable to link Chinese traders directly with al-Shabaab,” though the expert said, “We know that the timber harvested in areas controlled by the militants was sent to China and Vietnam”.

In 2022, the Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crime said that logging is taking place in areas under insurgent control, but emphasized: “There are no reports suggesting that al-Shabaab has been either involved in the logging trade directly or ‘taxing’ the trade systematically as a means of funding.”

The $2m per month estimate is also now six years old, during which time the insurgency has evolved significantly. However, it is still presented as reliable in the Mozambique government report and was most recently used in a report from the EIA in May 2024.

The EIA’s claims go beyond illicit timber. “The insurgents are known to have engaged in or taxed illicit trade in drugs, rubies, ivory, and timber, to finance their activities.” But the sources cited for this assertion are the Global Initiative report mentioned above, which said the opposite; and the Mozambique government’s National Evaluation, which also found no direct connection.

Six and a half years on since the violence began, evidence for the illicit timber trade funding the insurgency is as weak as ever. But there is no doubt that the trade exists and contributes to the poverty and inequality that plague Cabo Delgado. A better understanding of those issues, and measures to combat them, will be as important, if not more important, to ending the conflict in Cabo Delgado as the so far fruitless attempts to follow the money.