Cabo Ligado Monthly: October 2023
October At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records 11 political violence events in Cabo Delgado in October, resulting in at least seven reported fatalities, with events occurring in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Chiure districts
Nationwide, ACLED records nine fatalities in demonstrations or riots related to the municipal elections, one of which occurred in Chiure district in Cabo Delgado province.
Three IED explosions were recorded in Cabo Delgado
Vital Trends
Low levels of political violence in the province
Sporadic movement of ISM fighters to the south of the province
Continued targeting of civilians by ISM
In This Report
Security challenges in Nangade district
Health and food security prospects in Cabo Delgado
Insurgents’ southern thrust
October Situation Summary
October was a quiet month for the conflict in Cabo Delgado, in terms of political violence related to both the insurgency and the municipal elections held on 11 October. ACLED recorded 11 political violence events across the province, resulting in seven fatalities. One of those fatalities occurred in unrest following the 11 October municipal elections.
Fighters with Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) were involved in six instances of civilian targeting, including abductions in four incidents. One abduction event occurred in Pangane on Macomia’s coast, marking the most recent in a series of kidnappings in the village that began on 20 September this year, following previous efforts by insurgents to build relations with coastal communities. ISM also killed three civilians across two separate incidents in Litandacua in northern Macomia district, and near Chinda, west of Mocímboa da Praia town.
Chinda was the site of the only clash this month, on 18 October, when Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) disturbed an ISM raid on the village. There were no casualties. The month was more notable for the movement of insurgents towards Quissanga district in the south of the province. This movement is likely in response to Operation Golpe Duro, being undertaken in Macomia by the Defence Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), RSF, and the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).
ISM also continues to deploy IEDs in southern Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia districts, with three such events recorded.
Separately, one person was killed in Chiure town on 12 October when police opened fire on Renamo supporters who had taken to the streets to claim victory in the previous day’s municipal election. The deceased was one of at least nine fatalities in post-election violence across the country.
Security Challenges in Nangade District
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
Cabo Delgado is seeing a reconfiguration of state security forces that will impact Nangade district in particular. The Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) bilateral deployment in Nangade is to reduce numbers in November, with a view to an ultimate withdrawal. In December, SAMIM forces are to reduce numbers with a view to withdrawing in July next year. Given ISM’s previous strength in the district and its role as a bridge to support networks in East Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ISM’s response to these changes in the district may be a bellwether for stability in the wider province.
The intervention by state forces and their international partners has been successful in Nangade district. In the first 10 months of the year, ACLED records just seven political violence events in Nangade, of which just four have involved ISM. None of these events occurred in October. Getting to that point was the result of combined operations of SAMIM, Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS), and the bilateral TPDF deployment at Mandimba in the northwest of the district in the final quarter of 2022. In neighboring Palma, only one such event has been recorded in that time. The district has been effectively controlled by RSF since they first intervened in July 2021.
However, there are indications that the security environment is not yet settled. The first indication of lingering concerns is the behavior of internally displaced people (IDPs) in centers in Nangade district headquarters and in the south of the district, most of whom are from the district. According to an assessment carried out in September 2023, only “a few” IDPs have returned to their homes for some days to clear land and farm, but fear remaining “due to the fear of security and safety noting the regular movements of NSAGs [non-state armed groups] in the rural areas.” According to a humanitarian source, this remains an issue in the district. Yet confirmed movements by ISM are rare. This situation is in contrast to districts such as Macomia or Mocímboa da Praia, where sightings are not unusual and news of them travels fast.
The second indication comes from unconfirmed reports of people smuggling across the border with Tanzania, which has been the favored route connecting the insurgency to Tanzania, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In October, ACLED received a report of the arrest of up to 30 Burundians in Chacamba Boda village in Nangade district. The village is just eight kilometers from the border with Tanzania. Around the same time, a voice note appeared on social media telling of the arrest of an individual in Mueda for people smuggling. The speaker, a motorcycle taxi driver, spoke of a network taking people from DRC and Burundi “to the bush.” Again, the arrest could not be confirmed.
People smuggling is a well-established practice in East Africa’s borderlands, dominated by motorcycle riders, who can charge migrants hundreds of dollars to cross borders undetected, usually hoping to reach South Africa. According to a source in the province, the business was booming in the years before the conflict, with demand from migrants from Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, and Burundi in East Africa, as well as from migrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan. As elsewhere, this also facilitated the movement of recruits from across the region to fight in Cabo Delgado.
During the month, Mozambique’s National Migration Service (SENAMI) spoke of increasing cross-border traffic recorded by the seven operational SENAMI offices in Cabo Delgado. Returning to the pre-conflict migration pattern would mean a return to a considerable proportion of cross-border traffic not being monitored, allowing for easier access for the insurgency to support networks in Tanzania, Burundi, and DRC.
The planned withdrawal of SAMIM and the parallel TPDF deployment would see counter-insurgency operations in the hands of the different branches of the FDS and the Local Force. The former has not performed well for the duration of the conflict and often has a poor relationship with communities. Of the seven political violence events recorded in the district this year, three have been incidents of FDS targeting civilians. On the other hand, the Local Force is now well-established in the district. According to a local source, it is active in all villages and has a commander based in the district headquarters. Its local knowledge, however, does not fully compensate for its basic equipment. Nangade’s IDPs genuinely fear the conflict returning. Whether the FDS and the Local Force can prevent that on their own will become apparent next year.
Health and Food Security Prospects in Cabo Delgado
By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado
Recent Mozambican government forecasts for the country's 2023-2024 rainy season present a challenging scenario for people in northern Mozambique, especially in Cabo Delgado. The National Meteorological Institute predicts above-average rainfall in northern Mozambique for the current rainy season, which began in October and lasts until April 2024. This weather could worsen the public health situation in Cabo Delgado province. It could also contribute to a deterioration in food security for thousands of people with humanitarian agencies running out of funds to provide food aid.
President Filipe Nyusi warned on 4 October of the possibility of extreme natural phenomena, particularly the return of El Niño, which could cause temperatures to rise and rainfall to be higher than normal in northern Mozambique. The effects of El Niño were last seen in Mozambique in 2018-2019, causing intense rainfall across the country. In April 2019, another extreme weather event, Cyclone Kenneth, hit the coast of Cabo Delgado in April, causing more than 40 deaths, and partially or completely damaging more than 35,000 homes.
The authorities claim to be prepared for extreme weather events this rainy season. However, their capacity to mitigate the effects is limited. The National Institute for Disaster Management (INGD) in Cabo Delgado reports that its contingency plan for natural disasters is in need of just over US$1 million. Responding to the impact of the rains will be difficult without these funds.
One of the most significant impacts of the heavy rains has been the spread of cholera. The destruction of sanitation facilities has also contributed to the contamination of many sources of drinking water and food. The Council of Ministers suggests that the number of cases in the provinces of Nampula, Tete, Zambézia, and Cabo Delgado has increased in recent weeks, although no specific figures have been released. However, according to the National Directorate of Public Health, there have been around 2,200 new cases of cholera and six deaths in the past weeks, with the highest incidence in the province of Zambezia, in the central part of the country. Since 14 September 2022, there have been more than 36,000 cases of cholera and around 150 deaths.
In Cabo Delgado, cholera cases have already been recorded this year in the districts of Pemba, Montepuez, Mocímboa da Praia, Mueda, and Chiure. There is an increased risk of cholera outbreaks as people return to their areas of origin. Mocímboa da Praia is a case in point, where poor sanitation, limited health services, water mains, standpipes, and pumps have been vandalized, leading to water shortages and the easier spread of cholera. The government has sent public health brigades to four provinces, including Cabo Delgado, to monitor the cholera situation.
The impact of El Niño on agricultural production is another concern. Local agriculture and fishing provide food for most of Cabo Delgado's population. Heavy rains could cause pests to spread and agricultural land to be destroyed, drastically reducing food availability, in a context where food insecurity is already affecting around 850,000 people. At the time of cyclone Kenneth, 31,300 hectares of agricultural land were flooded by heavy rains, resulting in the loss of tonnes of various food products.
The rainy season could thus exacerbate hunger in Cabo Delgado. With aid dwindling by the day, extreme weather events could push people further into chronic malnutrition and food insecurity. With the distribution of food aid and response to health emergencies already limited by the conflict, extreme weather could also make the distribution of food aid harder with the possible damage of main roads in the province. The government is drawing up an ambitious national plan to mitigate the effects of extreme events, with a budget of more than US$203 million, due to be considered by Mozambique's Council of Ministers soon. However, it is not clear where the funds will come from and whether they will be available to mitigate the effects of the current rainy season.
The Insurgency’s Southern Thrust
By Tom Gould, Cabo Ligado
The latter half of October saw the southern movement of insurgents from Macomia district into Quissanga district, where insurgents had not set foot for over a year. Insurgents have acted largely peacefully, and their purpose so far is not yet clear, but there are three plausible explanations. First, ongoing security forces operations in Macomia district’s Catupa forest may have forced insurgents south in search of safety. Secondly, the southern movement could be a reconnaissance mission to scout terrain for a future base of operations. Lastly, they may have been moving south in order to then move westwards across the N380 and back north to the Messalo river.
After several days of concentrated activity around southern Macomia district, where some insurgents told locals they were on their way to Metuge district, the first confirmed insurgent sighting in Quissanga was reported on 20 October. On that day, around 20 insurgents were observed in the woods outside Cagembe village, prompting some villagers to flee to Pemba. Over the next few days, insurgents were spotted in villages across the northern breadth of the district, in the villages of Bilibiza, Nivico, Manica, and Linde. Insurgents made repeated visits to Cagembe, suggesting an encampment may be nearby.
Some insurgents carried bladed weapons and appeared to be starving, one source told Cabo Ligado. The insurgents, however, reassured the locals that they meant no harm, emulating the conciliatory approach they adopted toward coastal communities in Macomia. Security forces reinforced Quissanga and Metuge in response to these movements, but no insurgent offensive actions have been reported. There were, however, unconfirmed reports that a boat carrying around 40 insurgents attempted to land somewhere north of Pemba on 25 October but aborted due to the concentration of security forces.
Moving south puts insurgents closer to the provincial capital Pemba and the N1/N14 highway, which links it to the mining concessions in Ancuabe, Montepuez, and Balama districts. In the past, it has only taken a small number of insurgents threatening these concessions for operations to be suspended, causing serious economic disruption. In February this year, around 30 insurgents clashed with security forces in Nairoto, Montepuez, killing five, prompting Gemfields to evacuate staff from one of its gold mining projects. The week before, Islamic State had boasted of “striking the economy of the Mozambican government” in its publication, Al-Naba. This could be a realistic motive behind the southern push. In any case, it demonstrates the insurgency’s enduring ability to evade containment and appear anywhere in the province at any moment, despite the efforts of security forces.
It is also possible that this southern movement has been forced on insurgents by ongoing, intermittent operations, known as Operation Golpe Duro, by security forces in the Catupa forest of Macomia, where security sources believe at least one insurgent base could still be active. The appearance of insurgents in Quissanga could, therefore, reflect some success by Mozambican and Southern African Development Community troops. Previous experience suggests that the insurgents do not have the networks to maintain a presence in the southern districts, making their southern movement likely a means of avoiding Golpe Duro and looping back to their traditional strongholds along the Messalo river. This presents a risk to Muidumbe district in particular, as well as the western and southern areas of Mocímboa da Praia district. This presents a real threat to residents of those areas.