September At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records 28 organized political violence events in September, resulting in 85 fatalities

• Offensive actions claimed by international interveners in the Cabo Delgado conflict resulted in the two events with the highest number of reported fatalities for the month

• Events took place in Macomia, Meluco, Mocimboa da Praia, Nangade, and Quissanga districts

Vital Trends

• Clashes between foreign interveners from the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) and the Southern African Development Community Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and Cabo Delgado insurgents accounted for over 30 reported fatalities

• Insurgent violence in Quissanga district picked up, with seven events accounting for 31 reported fatalities

• Fighting between insurgents and pro-government forces in southern Mocimboa da Praia district continues to go underreported, meaning true fatality counts were likely higher than reported in September

In This Report

• Analysis of Rwanda’s approach to child deradicalization and the potential for exporting that model to Mozambique and Tanzania

• Accounts of the inducements and challenges shaping decisions by displaced civilians about when to return to their homes

• Analysis of the military challenges around civilian protection as displaced people return to the conflict zone

• Examination of SAMIM’s public relations approach as it has built up its capacity in Cabo Delgado

September Situation Summary

In September 2021, the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado worsened even as many displaced civilians began to glimpse the possibility of a return to something like normalcy due to security gains. As flagged by a Famine Early Warning Systems Network report, the province faces crisis levels of food insecurity through at least January 2022. International aid organizations do not have enough resources to adequately provide food aid for displaced populations. As is discussed extensively in this report, many civilians have begun moving back to their homes in the conflict zone, in many cases out of a need to secure independent sources of food. 

In the short term, however, food aid distributions have been cut back to once every two months. The latest major disbursement took place in September. The aid was welcome, but the disbursement process was bedeviled by many of the same problems that have plagued food aid in Cabo Delgado since the start of the displacement crisis. The distribution lists that govern who receives food aid are subject to widespread corruption, despite ongoing efforts to make them more fair. Women in particular report being discriminated against in the distribution process, saying in one focus group that unmarried younger women and elderly women are often left off distribution lists.

On the military front, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were used in the conflict in September. On 12 September, an anti-vehicle landmine detonated under an RDF vehicle in southern Mocimboa da Praia district, damaging the vehicle. In the days that followed, joint Mozambican-Rwandan forces discovered other IEDs in the area, but none of them detonated. Since then, however, no further reports of IEDs have emerged. Analysts largely agree that a robust insurgent IED production and placement program would be a major advantage to the insurgency in the conflict, but no such program appears in place at this time. 

In the conflict more broadly, international interveners from SAMIM and the RDF continued to rack up victories as fighting continued on both sides of the Messalo River. The Rwandan government in particular has reveled in the success of its security forces, holding numerous presentations for Rwandan and international press. Rwandan President Paul Kagame visited Cabo Delgado in late September to review his troops, meet with his Mozambican counterpart, and present his view of the future of the Rwandan intervention. Kagame declined to estimate the duration of the Rwandan deployment during his visit, and indeed expanded the number of troops deployed soon after he departed. He did reiterate, however, that he was not acting on France’s behalf in Cabo Delgado, saying that Rwandan troops were not there “to secure projects” like the TotalEnergies liquified natural gas investments.  

Perhaps the French energy company took Kagame’s words to heart, because it issued a document to shareholders later in September estimating that gas production would not begin in Mozambique until 2026. If that estimate holds, the massive economic gains the Mozambican government hoped to reap from improved security and resulting gas exploitation may not come to fruition.

Child Soldier Reintegration: The Rwandan Model

New images of children involved in the Cabo Delgado insurgency have emerged in recent weeks. This places a spotlight on how intervening forces, governments, and local communities will respond to the needs of such children as they return to their communities, as many still remain at risk of recruitment. UNICEF has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Mozambique’s Ministry of Defence on protecting children caught up in the conflict, and supporting their reintegration into society.  The recently published videos confirm the involvement of children in the insurgency, their training in handling of weapons, and their exposure to Islamist ideology as described in Observatorio do Meio Rural’s report on social organization of the insurgency.

Reintegration of children involved in violent extremism is not just an issue for Mozambique. In 2019, Mtwara’s then-Regional Police Commander Blasius Chatanda was concerned about Tanzanian children being recruited into Cabo Delgado’s insurgency. Speaking about a particular group of children returned to Tanzania by Mozambican authorities, he bemoaned that “[i]n the absence of rehabilitation centres where they could be de-radicalized, we are just sending them back to the same conditions that radicalized them.” The children did indeed later return to Mozambique. 

More recently, Tanzania’s Inspector General of Police (IGP) Simon Sirro returned from Kigali on 10 September and told the media of rehabilitation centers in Rwanda, “for children who have been damaged and exhibit signs of extremism,” and of his hope to get approval to develop something similar. He urged people to report to the police if family members or neighbors exhibited signs of being involved in crime or terrorism. He reassured people that “it is not necessary for us to press charges. We can sit with them and reform them.” 

IGP Sirro was referring to Rwanda’s National Rehabilitation Service, established in 2017 to manage the country’s network of Transit Centres and Rehabilitation Centres. These are mandated to provide counselling and training to people over ten years of age who exhibit “deviant acts or behaviors.” With Rwanda’s leading role in military intervention in Cabo Delgado, and its stated commitment to advising Mozambican security services, it is worth understanding the basic mechanisms of Rwanda’s approach to rehabilitation, as well as the criticism it has received. The likelihood that such approaches may be taken up either in southern Tanzania or northern Mozambique can then be assessed.  

Transit and rehabilitation centers have operated for at least fifteen years in Rwanda, and have not previously been associated with approaches to violent extremism, or terrorism. Under 2017 legislation clarifying their activities, they remain as essentially detention centers aimed at correcting “deviancy.” Involvement in extremist or terrorist groups is not specifically mentioned in legislation or policy governing these centers. Deviancy is described as “prostitution, drug use, begging, vagrancy, informal street vending, or any other deviant behavior that is harmful to the public.” Anyone can report someone to Rwanda National Police for such behavior. The police are in turn empowered to take such people to a Transit Center. From the Transit Center, they may be moved on to a Rehabilitation Center for training and rehabilitation; such a move is decided by a screening committee of public officials. 

Rwanda’s Transit Centers and Rehabilitation Centers have been consistently identified as sites of alleged human rights abuses, both prior to and after the 2017 legislation. The US State Department’s 2020 human rights review highlighted issues in Transit Centers, noting that detainees could be held for “weeks or months at a time” with no charge, and that there was no screening for potential victims of human trafficking. In 2020, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern over allegations of mistreatment of children in detention centers. Human Rights Watch has documented numerous abuses in a number of reports on the system, most recently in September 2021, but also on at least four other occasions since 2006. These include detention without judicial oversight, beatings during arrest and by other detainees while in detention, and severe overcrowding. 

Despite the attraction that the rehabilitation approach taken by Rwanda holds for Tanzania’s police, it is unlikely to be taken up as a response to dealing with children in Tanzania who have been involved in the insurgency. Tanzania already has a nascent Community Rehabilitation Programme that involves civil society, security, and the bureaucracy of the justice sector, and builds on approaches rooted in the Convention of the Rights of the Child. 

The risk of such an approach being applied is much greater in Mozambique. Rwanda National Police -- a key agency in that country’s approach to ‘delinquency’ -- are on the ground in Cabo Delgado, where children make up a significant, if unknowable, number of insurgents. The Ministry of Defence’s recognition of the importance of reintegration -- as evidenced by its MoU with UNICEF -- will mean little unless security forces in the short term have clear guidance on how to deal with both children and adults involved in the conflict. In the medium to long term, the security sector reform that Rwanda says it is committed to instituting in Mozambique will need to be complemented with building the basic local bureaucracy required for accountable demobilization, and re-integration of insurgents. Rwanda’s rehabilitation model may not be the best fit. 

Challenges and Opportunities for Returnees in Cabo Delgado

Areas of Cabo Delgado affected by the armed conflict are now experiencing a gradual return of their inhabitants, particularly in Palma, Macomia, and Quissanga. In Palma district,  some of the displaced people who were trapped for months in the resettlement village of Quitunda after the 24 March insurgent attack have returned to the town of Palma and surrounding villages. In the main town of Macomia, there are signs of a return to normalcy, with passenger carriers making frequent trips from Pemba to Macomia. Sources in Macomia say that in addition to the reopening of access roads, as well as various government services, at least two hotels have reopened. After appeals from the chief of the Mozambican police, many displaced people from Quissanga have started returning home. In Muidumbe district, an increasing number of displaced persons are heading to the villages of Matabalane and Mitede to inspect their homes and make preparations for their return. Displaced people who are in centers for internally displaced people in southern Cabo Delgado -- particularly in Pemba, Montepuez, and Ancuabe districts -- have made efforts to process the necessary documentation to return home and have put their names on lists to be transported to their hometowns and villages.

The willingness to return is a result of several factors. First, civilians are considering returning to their home areas as Cabo Delgado has become increasingly secure since the arrival of foreign troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). The efforts of the joint Rwandan, SAMIM, and Mozambican forces have neutralized and reduced the insurgents' actions on the various fronts. Second, the situation in the resettlement centers is deplorable. According to the Red Cross, several IDP centers lack basic provisions such as clean drinking water and adequate sanitation, which tends to lead to diseases such as cholera and diarrhea. The absence of jobs as well as the lack of access to adequate food are other aspects that force displaced people to return home. Due to lack of funding, the World Food Programme is facing difficulties in providing the necessary daily rations to displaced people, currently meeting only 39% of their caloric needs.  

The lack of a basic standard of living is not only felt in resettlement centers. In Nangade district, displaced people who have returned from the areas liberated by the joint forces of Mozambique, SAMIM, and Rwanda live in precarious housing, without access to clean water and health services. When people become ill, they resort to traditional medicines or unlicensed traders that sell medicines. Recent returnees in this part of Cabo Delgado claim that they are not used to living in IDP centers, hence their decision to return. While the inhabitants of Nangade district are returning to their villages, the civil servants of these districts largely remain displaced, unable to assist in rebuilding Nangade district governance. Some teachers are considering returning only on the eve of the school year. However, the destruction of several schools during the course of the conflict could delay the resumption of the school year. 

The displaced people who have returned to Macomia district  have found most of their homes destroyed, burned, and/or looted. Among the displaced people are those who were sheltering in IDP centers and those who had hidden in the bush. Those who sheltered in the bush say that they have been sleeping in their homes since the arrival of the foreign troops. The presence of foreign troops in Macomia raises civilian confidence in the security situation and has improved the relationship between the troops and civilians. 

Despite the advances in security, many civilians in Macomia have returned on their own and without express permission from the authorities. Some have engaged in agriculture in anticipation of the rainy season, while others have turned to fishing to sustain themselves. There is little other work available. Several reports of insurgent attacks on locals going fishing along the coast have been reported throughout the conflict. However, in recent weeks, fishermen have felt encouraged to resume fishing in light of the improving situation.

At the beginning of October, electricity returned to the village of Palma after about a year. The restoration of electricity and security improvements are stimulating the return of local merchants and the private companies that used to provide services for the French multinational TotalEnergies. Palma town and the surrounding area already have access to health care, but school classes have still not resumed. During September, humanitarian support arrived for the first time after the attack in March. Locals reported to Cabo Ligado that they received at least 10 kg of rice and a liter of cooking oil in food aid. The support is important, but the needs are still greater. Palma residents are calling for banking agencies and mobile financial services to resume work so they can receive and transfer money. 

In Cabo Delgado, the return home of displaced people can help reduce the pressure on essential services and infrastructure in areas where displaced people have gathered. Yet Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi has cautioned against a rush of civilians back into the conflict zone. According to Nyusi, the return of the population will take place after recapturing areas and ensuring they are cleared of insurgents, as well as after building the necessary infrastructure, a process that may take some time. The position of the Mozambican president is in line with the United Nations' call for caution around the issue, due to the lack of essential infrastructure and humanitarian access, as well as uncertainty about the likelihood of insurgent activity. The UN's uncertainty is shared by displaced people sheltering in Ancuabe who say they are fearful following an attack that took place in September in the village of Lindi, in the neighboring district of Quissanga. The most aggravating factor for the displaced is the fact that there has been no reinforcement of defense and security forces in this part of the province. 

These dynamics in Cabo Delgado pose challenges for both the government and aid agencies, which will have to review their strategies to support the people in the province. The government recently announced a plan estimated to cost around $300 million for the reconstruction of the areas affected by the conflict The idea is to create conditions for the rapid return of the displaced within six months. However, the government has no funds for its implementation. Thus, the displaced will have to remain in IDP centers for some time to come, which will increase the pressure on humanitarian aid organizations to provide an adequate standard of living in those facilities. 

Civilian Protection Challenges

As noted above, for many displaced civilians in Cabo Delgado, the race to return is on. Poor conditions in resettlement camps, combined with the pressing need to offset reductions in food aid with local agricultural production, are leading displaced people to attempt to move back to their communities in the conflict zone before the rainy season begins in earnest. According to one recent estimate, some 30,000 people have returned to their homes in Palma town alone in recent weeks, coming both from nearby Quitunda and as far away as Pemba. 

The opportunity to return home, provided by recent successful offensives carried out by pro-government forces, is a welcome boon to displaced civilians struggling to survive in overcrowded resettlement camps and host communities. For Mozambican forces and their allies in the RDF and SAMIM, however, the returns pose a challenge that they may not be prepared to take on. 

The single greatest strategic shift in the Cabo Delgado conflict in 2020 was the mass abandonment of the conflict zone by civilians. The displacement was a shock to the province overall, causing widespread misery due to inadequate food, shelter, and public health facilities to accommodate fleeing people. It also shifted the character of the conflict. Prior to widespread displacement, insurgents had relied on civilians as a consistent source of supplies and recruits, whether through coercion, negotiation, or persuasion. With civilians gone, and the economic networks to sustain them gone as well, insurgents began to find it very difficult to maintain their levels of supply. 

The sudden return of large numbers of civilians to the conflict zone, therefore, represents a potential lifeline for the insurgency at a time when the group is under unprecedented military pressure. To prevent the insurgency from revitalizing itself by preying on newly returned civilians, pro-government forces must find ways to prevent insurgents from being able to access civilians in areas where insurgents have long operated. At this point, pro-government forces face limitations that will make it difficult for them to provide high levels of civilian protection.

The biggest challenge to providing effective civilian protection is overall pro-government force levels. Even with the recent announcement that Rwandan forces have doubled their deployment to a contingent of around 2,000 and SAMIM maintaining its commitment of roughly 750 troops, total foreign troop presence in Cabo Delgado remains limited. Estimates of Mozambican ground force levels in Cabo Delgado vary, but even at full deployment, it would amount to about 10,000 troops. The true number is certainly significantly lower -- one well informed source estimated it at less than 4,000. Even if we use the most optimistic possible number, therefore, force estimates put about 13,000 troops in the pro-government coalition. By comparison, recent estimates suggest that some 850,000 civilians have been displaced from Cabo Delgado.

Estimates for proper civilian to soldier ratios in counterinsurgency are hard to come by. One popular heuristic, calling for one soldier for every 20 civilians that need protecting, is the subject of significant controversy among scholars and practitioners. Yet, in a situation like in Cabo Delgado, where civilian communities are spread out and difficult to access and insurgents can move easily overland, estimating on the high end appears prudent. If we apply the 1:20 heuristic, a high 13,000 troop estimate of current pro-government forces could protect 260,000 civilians – about 30% of the total number of displaced people. If we use the more realistic estimate of 7,000 troops, then the protectable population dwindles to 140,000.

The situation gets even more concerning looking at the specifics of civilian protection in Cabo Delgado in the near future. The RDF, which is offering the greatest number of foreign troops, are primarily deployed in Palma and Mocimboa da Praia districts, where the civilian protection challenge is easiest. In Palma, civilians are largely returning to coastal areas with easy road access, and many of them are returning to Palma town itself. It is therefore relatively easy for pro-government forces in Palma to patrol areas where most civilians are living. In Mocimboa da Praia district, so few civilians are there currently that RDF and Mozambican forces can exercise significant control over who returns to the district and where they settle. 

In Macomia and Nangade districts, however, the less-resourced SAMIM forces are the main foreign contingent. Civilians in these districts are less concentrated, making it difficult for pro-government forces to deploy widely enough to protect them all. The problem is compounded by the fact that successful RDF offensives in Mocimboa da Praia district have pushed more insurgents into Macomia and Nangade, where they threatened civilians throughout August and September. 

To make up for their numerical deficiencies, pro-government forces will likely attempt to exert increased control over returning civilians in order to make sure that the insurgency remains on the back foot. Though repressive measures against returning civilians may be militarily expedient in the short term, they threaten the perceived legitimacy that RDF and SAMIM forces now enjoy. Navigating the challenge of providing civilian security with insufficient forces while maintaining legitimacy will be the core task of pro-government forces in the next six months of the conflict.

SAMIM Steps Up to the Plate

After being overshadowed by the Rwandan blitzkrieg in August, SAMIM got into its stride through September, capturing three insurgent bases and reportedly killing 20 insurgents since late August. As it has gotten up to speed operationally, it has also made a clear effort to match -- and perhaps compete with -- RDF public relations operations.

SAMIM public relations are not as slick as the RDF roadshow, but have issued regular press statements providing some detail on operational progress.  On 2 September, the mission’s opening presser confirmed the mission was fully operational, although not up to its full complement of 2,916 troops as allowed for in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed on 2 July. The media release set out SAMIM’s mandate (drawn from the SOFA), confirming it was for an initial three months (that was extended in early October) with a focus on the following six areas:

(a) support the Republic of Mozambique to combat acts of terrorism and violent extremist by neutralizing the threat and restoring security in order to create secure environment; 

(b) support the Republic of Mozambique to strengthen peace and maintain security through implementation of courses of action recommended by the Organ Troika Summit Plus Mozambique held on 27 May 2021; 

(c) support Mozambique to restore law and order in affected areas of Cabo Delgado Province; 

(d) support the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) by providing Air and Maritime support in order to enhance FADM operational capabilities; 

(e) provide logistics training to enhance the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) capability to combat terrorism; and 

(f) provide support to the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, in collaboration with humanitarian agencies in the Republic of Mozambique, to continue providing humanitarian relief to the population affected by the terrorist activities, including the internally displaced persons.

Unsurprisingly, there has been no official confirmation of the number of SAMIM personnel deployed to Cabo Delgado. Analysts estimate about a third of the maximum 2,916 envisaged in the SOFA. This includes personnel attached to air and naval assets. As SAMIM have confirmed, the bulk of the existing ground force component is made up of Special Forces from Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania.  This accords with “Phase 2” of the “Intelligence Recommendations” contained in the April Technical Assessment Mission undertaken by SADC. 

The 2 September statement also provided details of SAMIM’s major operation in which an insurgent camp at Muera, south of Mbau in southern Mocimboa da Praia, was captured on 28 August. One insurgent was captured and an array of equipment from drones to generators and satellite dishes was recovered. 

On 14 September, SAMIM issued their second press statement. While not providing any operational details, SAMIM claimed their operations had “brought calm and stability” to Mueda, Macomia, and Nangade districts, allowing for economic activities to resume. The statement claimed that that “SAMIM forces opened roads from Pemba to Macomia, Awasse, Mueda and Nangade restoring public confidence (and) that the risk of attack is low due to consistent patrols by SAMIM forces and the Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique (FADM).” Securing and opening up major road arteries across affected districts has been a key strategic objective for the international forces. While the districts falling under SAMIM have not been cleared of insurgents -- and attacks continue to be recorded -- these key roads remain for the moment relatively secure. 

On 18 September, SAMIM issued their third press statement, announcing the capture and dismantling of the insurgents’ Sheikh Ibrahim base in the Messalo river valley, south of the river, on 14 September. The base, SAMIM claims, had been used as a training facility. Insurgents had left behind training manuals and videos, as well as heavy ordnance and communications equipment, suggesting the base was vacated without much preparation. Three elderly women were also found at the base, suggesting that they would have slowed down the militants’ retreat. It is likely the insurgents left with other, more mobile, hostages.

On 26 September, SAMIM released their fourth press statement, providing detail on a deadly offensive on a base south of Chitama in Nangade district. The base, according to SAMIM, was led by Sheikh Dr Njile North. It was razed to the ground, leaving 17 insurgents dead. One SAMIM member, a Tanzanian soldier, was killed and three others were injured. SAMIM also killed another insurgent the next day during follow up operations south of the Messalo river in Macomia.

The SAMIM acknowledgement of casualties is unprecedented, something the Mozambican forces have systematically avoided since the conflict began. It appears to have prompted the Rwandans to acknowledge their own losses, as the following day Rwandan media announced their own casualties since deployment. SAMIM has also acknowledged they were facing a “well-prepared” group of insurgents, but that SAMIM special forces were up to the task of flushing them out. This would inevitably take some time as insurgent forces dispersed in the face of unprecedented offensives against them.

By late September, there was considerable speculation that SAMIM operations might not be extended. Financing remains a huge challenge, with Personnel Contributing Countries (PCCs) carrying the bulk of the cost. SAMIM’s Deputy Force Commander, Brigadier Dumisani Nzinge, appealed through the media for continued support for the mission, pointing to successes that had helped calm down the situation. 

Nzinge also emphasized the success of dealing with continuing security challenges would be enhanced by  trilateral intelligence coordination between SAMIM, the RDF, and FADM. Mozambique has insisted it maintain point responsibility in this role, which has presented certain challenges. SADC’s extraordinary Troika summit in Pretoria on 5 October has extended the timeframe for SAMIM engagement. There has also been some progress on trilateral intelligence cooperation. These issues will be explored in more depth in the October Cabo Ligado monthly.