September At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records 14 political violence events in Cabo Delgado in September,  resulting in at least 22 reported fatalities, with events occurring in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts

• In nine of these incidents, civilians were targeted, resulting in at least 13 fatalities

• Four IED incidents were recorded during the month

Vital Trends

• Continued use of IEDs by Islamic State Mozambique

• Significant targeting of civilians and related displacement

• Municipal election campaigning proceeds freely

In This Report

• The new IED war

• Conflict and stabilization in the Mocímboa da Praia elections

• Return to targeting of civilians

September Situation Summary

As in August, political violence events were concentrated in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts in September. However, at 14, there were over twice as many political violence events in the month compared to the previous month, which had six. September also saw the start of campaigning for the 11 October municipal elections in Mocímboa da Praia. Despite concerns, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) did not attempt to directly undermine campaigning. 

ISM attacks and threats of further violence led to the displacement of thousands of civilians in September. The killing of at least 11 civilians by ISM in Naquitengue in Mocímboa da Praia province on 14 September prompted over 2,000 people to flee from the village and surrounding areas to Mocímboa da Praia town. Later in the month, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded the displacement of over 4,700 people from four other villages in the south of Mocímboa da Praia over fear of attacks. In Macomia district, IOM recorded almost 900 people fleeing Pangange village southwards by boat, arriving in Quirimba and Matemo islands, and Quissanga district headquarters. A further 560 people fled attacks and feared attacks in Muidumbe district, making their way to Muidumbe district headquarters. 

The influx of displaced people into Mocímboa da Praia town does not appear to have disrupted campaigning, voting, and vote counting for the 11 October municipal elections. Though civilian displacement is a stated tactic of ISM, it is unclear whether ISM drove increased displacement in September with the aim of disrupting the elections. Aside from this, ISM did not actively attempt to interfere with campaigning.

There were four IED incidents in the month - two in each of southern Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia districts. ISM’s use of IEDs is increasing, a tactic that likely reflects its decreasing numbers of fighters as much as its increased technical and tactical sophistication.

The New IED War

By Tom Gould, Cabo Ligado

September may come to mark a profound shift in the character of the conflict in Cabo Delgado province as insurgents launched an unprecedented campaign of IED attacks on military patrols in Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia districts. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for six IED attacks between 11 September and 1 October, although only two have been confirmed so far. Still, this represents a significant uptick in incidents which have only been an occasional feature of the fighting so far.

The IED attacks have largely targeted two main roads: one between Mbau and Limala in Mocímboa da Praia, and the other between Quiterajo and Mucojo in Macomia. These roads are vital arteries for the security forces. The former provides access to the Rwandan Security Forces (RSF) base at Mbau, while the other is necessary for movement along the coast, where insurgent activity has been concentrated for several months. Both routes are shrouded by forests, allowing insurgents to plant explosives and withdraw undetected. 

Cabo Ligado understands that security forces believe there may be up to four bomb makers currently operating in Cabo Delgado. This would explain the growing prevalence of IEDs as well as their increased sophistication. Insurgents have used IEDs on occasion throughout the conflict, but they were usually primitive, cobbled together with poor components. In July this year, insurgents appeared to successfully use a remote-detonated explosive for the first time, destroying a Mozambican armored personnel carrier. Most of the recent IEDs seem to be pressure-activated but insurgents have demonstrated they possess a new breadth of expertise.

IEDs represent a decidedly new strategy for the insurgency, which has typically favored small arms assaults on military and civilian targets. They allow insurgents to minimize casualties on their own side while inflicting chaos on the other and preventing them from effectively responding to incidents. The invisible but ever-present threat of driving over a hidden bomb is already taking a psychological toll on Mozambican troops who have had no training in this kind of warfare, a local source told Cabo Ligado. 

Insurgents have usually shied away from direct confrontations with the better-trained and heavily-armed RSF and Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), but IEDs have evened the odds. International troops have been the main targets of roadside bombs this month, putting them more on the frontline than they have been since the offensive to recapture Mocímboa da Praia in August 2021. 

Relying on IEDs is likely borne out of necessity. A United Nations Security Council report estimated in February 2023 that there were around 280 adult male fighters left in the field, down from around 2,500 prior to the intervention of RSF and SAMIM in July 2022. ACLED data show that monthly instances of political violence declined to an all-time low of just three in April this year and have hardly recovered since. Clearly, the insurgency’s offensive capability has been thoroughly eroded in the last two years and it no longer has the resources to commit soldiers to battle as it used to. 

This presents a fundamental challenge to the sustainability of the insurgency, which has sourced most of its weaponry from the looted arsenals of the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS). Without the manpower to assault FDS positions, the insurgents will struggle to resupply. IEDs enable the insurgency to keep up the fight without putting its men in the line of fire. 

The nature of IEDs means the insurgents may not necessarily be present to verify if they were deployed successfully. IS claims of damaging or destroying armored personnel carriers should therefore be treated with skepticism. Few pictures of wrecked vehicles have emerged this month, although the IS newspaper al-Naba argues that is because they are deliberately recovered as fast as possible so they cannot be used in insurgent propaganda. Nonetheless, IS social media has proved to be one of the most reliable sources of information on attacks in Cabo Delgado and each claim probably indicates at least an attempt to deploy an IED. 

Deprived of resources and recruits, insurgent leaders may have realized that they cannot keep fighting the same kind of small arms war, at least not while they are up against the superior firepower of RSF and SAMIM. If this month’s events are indicative of a new trend, it may be that the insurgency is betting on biding its time, bleeding security forces of troops, equipment, and morale from the safety of the bush, until it recovers its strength to strike decisively once again. 

Conflict and Stabilization in the Mocímboa da Praia Elections

By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado

Since the first multi-party elections in 1994, the electoral process in Mozambique has been characterized by conflict both before and after the vote. These conflicts, mostly pitting historic foes Frelimo and Renamo against each other, often lead to political, social, and security upheaval. When electoral conflict is intertwined with ethnic and religious issues, the situation has the potential to create scenarios of greater instability.

The local election in the town of Mocímboa da Praia, one of seven municipalities in Cabo Delgado, on 11 October posed a high risk of instability, with the potential to exacerbate insecurity, raising the level of tension and heightening political, ethnic, and religious divisions. But the successful staging of the election could, conversely, also be an opportunity to consolidate the stabilization of the area. 

Campaigning for the municipal elections in Mozambique's 65 municipalities, including Mocímboa da Praia, began on 26 September. According to the National Electoral Commission (CNE), some 30,438 voters registered to vote in Mocímboa. The election campaign kicked off in an atmosphere of heightened tensions and insecurity, with violence occurring in some villages in the south of the district, particularly in the administrative post of Mbau, where ACLED recorded four incidents of political violence involving various security forces in September. A wave of displacement towards the town of Mocímboa da Praia followed the killing of civilians in the village of Naquitengue and the insurgent incursions into Marere and Limala. Two weeks later, General Commander of Police Bernardino Rafael assured people that security would be strengthened for the elections.  

The climate of insecurity did not prevent political parties from campaigning, however. Four parties contested the elections: Frelimo, which is fighting to retain control of the city; opposition parties Renamo and MDM; and a local citizens' group, Amigos e Simpatizantes da Mocímboa da Praia-UMODJA.

The opposing parties built their election campaigns around different themes. While Frelimo focused on restoring the local economic base, the opposition parties sought to exploit the cracks in the conflict. UMODJA, led by Paulo Weng, focused its campaign on the conflict, criticizing the local government for failing to support the population even after the first attack, which destroyed many families and forced many to leave. Weng's criticisms are a reminder of how Mocímboa da Praia is still reeling from the destruction of militant attacks and occupation and the slow process of reconstruction. Renamo, as in the 2019 presidential elections, linked Frelimo to the rebel group, blaming Frelimo for having brought “Al Shabab”. Renamo’s supporters argued that the armed attacks in Cabo Delgado had been caused by a combination of government brutality, inaction, and corruption. They also blamed the government for creating the insurgency to maintain their hold on power and prevent the population from sharing in the province's resources.

Renamo's discourse is based on the historical antagonistic relations within the population of Mocímboa da Praia, formed along ethnic and religious lines. The ethnic Mwani population has felt excluded from politics and economic opportunities, which explains their tendency to vote for Renamo. The Makondes, on the other hand, are an important source of support for Frelimo, and justify their access to power — including current president Filipe Nyusi, who is a Makonde — on the basis of their involvement in the anti-colonial war. The conflict between the two sides reached a nadir with a disputed by-election for the office of council president in 2005. The result, which gave victory to the Frelimo candidate, was widely rejected by Renamo supporters, leading to days of rioting. 

This year, there have been no reports of electoral violence in Mocímboa da Praia. This could be an indicator that despite political, ideological, and ethnic differences, the population agrees on the need for stabilization in the area. And despite the amount of time it has taken for the town to be rebuilt, Frelimo was able to go into the election with positive stories to tell: the port and aerodrome of Mocímboa da Praia were both reopened by President Nyusi days before the poll, and there are strong indications that the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project will indeed restart. The absence of violence also reflects the strong security presence in the town and, in particular, the presence of the RSF, who are trusted locally. 

At the time of writing, the provincial election commission had declared a Frelimo victory in the town. Unlike elsewhere in the country, the result is unlikely to face a serious challenge. Continued Frelimo governance in the municipality will avoid conflict with the district administration appointed by the central government, but may contribute to a continued sense of exclusion among the Mwani.

Return to Targeting of Civilians

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

The IOM recorded over 8,000 newly displaced people in Cabo Delgado province last month. People were fleeing attacks, or the fear of attack, in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts. This comes in the wake of the killing of Bonomade Machude Omar in August, and in the days preceding the 11 October municipal elections. It also comes at a time when TotalEnergies is considering lifting force majeure on its LNG project. 

The two largest displacements occurred in Mbau Administrative Post in southern Mocímboa da Praia district.  Following the 14 September killings in Naquitengue village, over 2,000 people arrived in Mocímboa da Praia between 14 and 20 September. The route from Naquitengue to the district headquarters follows a sand track through mostly uninhabited bush for nearly 25 kilometers. The town’s new arrivals from Naquitengue were likely traumatized, after the killing of at least 11 of their neighbors. 

Many of those displaced by the Naquitengue attack were likely from other villages. Naquitengue is a small settlement, and as with all such incidents, news of the killings traveled fast; ACLED received initial reports of the incident early on the morning of 15 September. The news will have instilled fear in people across southern Mocímboa da Praia, as is the purpose of such attacks. As was stated in al-Naba in January, “the beheading of one Christian in a village became sufficient to displace hundreds of Christians in the neighboring villages.”

Later in the month, between 27 September and 2 October, IOM recorded 4,700 people fleeing on foot to the Mocímboa da Praia district headquarters from Calugo, Luxete, Marere, and Nazimoja villages of the Marere Administrative Post, fearing attack. These villages lie approximately 30 kms south of Mocímboa da Praia town. 

People had good reason to be fearful. Mbau saw considerable insurgent activity last month, and has seen a significant increase in insurgent activity compared to last year. In the past month, the area saw a number of IED incidents on the road running east from Mbau village, and a clash between insurgents and RSF at Limala, a village on that road on 26 September. That clash, and retreat of insurgents from it, likely prompted the wave of displacement that began on 27 September.

As it was in Mocímboa da Praia, so it was in Muidumbe district. IOM recorded 560 people as having fled to Muidumbe district headquarters due to “attack or fear of attack.” In Xitaxi, at least, it was again an attack against civilians that forced people to flee. The area has seen persistent movement of small groups of fighters in recent weeks. 

In Macomia, things were more complicated. Over 800 people fled Pangane village by boat, according to IOM, traveling over 40 kms southwards to Quissanga district, arriving in Quissanga district headquarters, and on Quirimba and Matemo islands. It is thought an attempt by insurgents to abduct people into their ranks sparked the exodus. 

Forced recruitment in Pangane, the killings in Naquitengue, and people’s flight in face of ISM attacks indicate that ISM’s so-called “hearts and minds” approach has lost any traction it may have had with communities. While devastating for affected communities, these events have less impact on wider developments than ISM may have hoped for. In Mocímboa da Praia municipality, campaigning for the October election passed off peacefully during September. TotalEnergies’ consideration of the lifting of force majeure is also unlikely to be influenced by events in poor communities. The risk for Cabo Delgado is that the remaining leadership may wish to intensify its targeting of civilians and enforced displacement in coming months.