Cabo Ligado Update: 14-27 October 2024
Situation Summary
Islamic State Mozambique conducted multiple, mostly small-scale attacks across three districts of central and northern Cabo Delgado province. In total, Islamic State (IS) issued claims for six attacks undertaken in the reporting period.
In Mocímboa da Praia district, IS issued a claim for the killing of one soldier in a clash with Mozambican and Rwandan forces in the village of Limala, approximately 30 km south of Mocímboa da Praia town, but this has not been reported by other sources. This was followed by a rash of attacks on several villages along the N380 highway leading to Mocímboa da Praia town. First, Awasse was hit on 23 October, where insurgents killed at least two men and one woman, reportedly at a bar where they were drinking alcohol in the evening, according to local sources. IS claimed to have killed five. The next day, insurgents killed one person in the nearby village of Mumu. An IS statement said they burned 12 houses and wounded one person. That day, insurgents also attacked the village of Mitope, just north of Awasse, but there were no reported fatalities. It is possible that insurgents were operating from bases to the north in the forests of Nangade district, around the villages of Nkonga, Chitama, and Quinto Congresso, where they have been sighted sporadically since July.
Insurgents then launched attacks along the Messalo river, separating Muidumbe and Macomia districts. IS claimed to have burned seven houses in the village of Nkoe in Macomia, a few kilometers south of the Messalo, on 25 October. The following day, insurgents beheaded one man in the village of Mandela in Muidumbe, just north of the Messalo, a local source told Cabo Ligado, but Lusa news agency reported three beheaded bodies were found outside Mandela.
The day after that, the Local Force repelled an insurgent incursion into the village of Homba in Muidumbe, just over 20 km to the west of Mandela. A local source claimed that one person was killed in the fields just outside Homba.
Almost three months after security forces launched their offensive on the Macomia coast, intermittent fighting is still ongoing there. IS issued a claim on 14 October for two IED attacks on Mozambican and Rwandan patrols on the road between the villages of Manica and Napala just outside the town of Mucojo. They claimed damage to one vehicle and several injuries. This has not been corroborated by other sources, but Integrity Magazine reported that Mozambican and Rwandan forces were engaged in operations in the forests in that area for five days beginning on the day of the attack.
IS claimed the killing of several Mozambican and Rwandan troops on 26 October in an ambush around the village of Nagulue just north of Mucojo using machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and IEDs. This has also not yet been confirmed by other sources.
Additionally, there has beensignificant social unrest across the province since the 9 October election. At least four districts in Cabo Delgado were affected by post-election unrest. One person was killed in protests in Montepuez, where a general strike paralyzed activities, alongside Pemba and Mocímboa da Praia. In Balama district, it has also come to light that disgruntled locals have been blockading the Syrah Resources graphite mine since late September.
ZumboFM reported that police shot dead one man and wounded several others on 25 October in the city of Montepuez in demonstrations against the general election results, which gave victory to the ruling party Frelimo, and its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo. Two protesters were also shot in the legs, according to Integrity. Police also used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protests against the election results in Pemba on 21 October, the day of a general strike called by opposition presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane. Further demonstrations occurred on 24 October. On 26 October, Podemos supporters vandalized public buildings in Namuno district headquarters as part of nationwide protests. The following day, a peaceful demonstration was held at Machoca, also in Namuno district. In Mocímboa da Praia town, the general strike was observed on 21 October, but there were no demonstrations in the streets.
Meanwhile, Zitamar News reported that at least 300 people have been camping outside the Syrah graphite mine in Balama since 29 September, blocking the entrance in protest against insufficient compensation for the project's requisition of their farmland. The demonstration was ongoing at the time of publication, according to Syrah Resources in an update to investors on 30 October.
Focus: a consequential election
The National Elections Commission (CNE) on 24 October announced a landslide election victory for Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo in the presidential poll and an overwhelming majority for the party in the National Assembly. Between the election day of 9 October, and 25 October, ACLED records election-related disorder and developments in all of Mozambique’s 11 provinces, resulting in at least 13 fatalities. This is likely to continue into November, as the Constitutional Council considers electoral cases brought before it and opposition parties, led by Podemos presidential candidate Mondlane, continue to mobilize popular protests.
The stakes rose on 18 October when gunmen, likely security forces, shot dead Podemos affiliates Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe in Maputo. Dias was Podemos candidate Mondlane’s lawyer and was working on an appeal to the Constitutional Council against the official results. Guambe was a Podemos party official.
Reports by official observers, civil society organizations, and news reports from election day all point to significant malpractice in the conduct of the election on 9 October and the subsequent count. For election day, there are indications in ACLED data of ballot-rigging in political violence events arising from suspicions of ballot stuffing in Maputo, removal of polling station staff and ballot boxes at Insaca in Niassa, and an attack on polling station staff in Sofala, when one allegedly had with 14 pre-marked ballot papers in favor of Frelimo.
Podemos’ presidential candidate Mondlane declared victory as early as 10 October, and on 16 October called for a general strike on 21 October, and again for 24 October. ACLED records demonstrations on those dates in Inhambane, Sofala, Zambezia, Nampula, Tete, Manica, Gaza, and Cabo Delgado Maputo provinces, as well as Maputo city. In central Maputo on 21 October, up to 500 people, including Mondlane, gathered near the scene of the killing of Dias and Guambe. One person was killed and at least 16 injured in a police operation to break up the demonstration.
The results themselves, even if questionable, represent a fundamental challenge to Mozambique’s political order, with Renamo being overtaken by the Podemos party in both the presidential poll and in seats in the National Assembly. The civil war settlement between Frelimo and Renamo, settled as recently as 2019 by the Maputo Accord, may no longer be relevant to voters. As this accord formed the basis for the structure and formation of the Defense and Security Forces, this represents a significant challenge to President-elect Chapo.
While Podemos-led demonstrations are an expression of popular dissatisfaction with Frelimo, Podemos’s displacement of Renamo indicates a wider dissatisfaction with Mozambique’s political order. Government actions, in particular the assassination of Dias and Guambe, suggest that Frelimo perceives a significant threat in Mondlane’s leadership. The ease with which Mondlane, a former senior Renamo member, has mobilized people outside Renamo structures, may suggest to them that the settlement on which Frelimo has depended may be weakening.
Round Up
CNE minority report questions official results
The results announced by the CNE accord a consequential victory to Frelimo in the polls for the presidency, the National Assembly, and the 11 provincial assemblies. The results are significant for varying but not contradictory reasons. They indicate a rebalancing of opposition parties, a cementing of Frelimo’s position. However, the CNE report also documents concerns about the electoral process.
Firstly, the results at all three levels put Renamo in a poor third place behind Podemos, upending opposition politics. Renamo had maintianed that position since the end of the civil war.
Secondly, with 195 seats in the 250-seat National Assembly, Frelimo maintained a greater than two-thirds majority required to pass amendments to the constitution. While the constitution limits the issues subject to amendment by the National Assembly rather than a referendum, it still allows for consequential changes to be passed in parliament, such as changes to electoral procedures. For instance, last year, inaugural district elections scheduled for 2024 were indefinitely postponed by means of a constitutional amendment. Normally, further amendments cannot be introduced for another five years. However, the constitution allows for “extraordinary amending powers” if approved by a majority of at least three-quarters of deputies, which Frelimo will have achieved if the results are upheld by the Constitutional Council, as is likely.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the official results were approved by just nine members of the 16-member electoral commission. The minority report, included in the results document, listed concerns about the integrity of the vote, echoing some of the issues raised by opposition activists and international observer groups including those from the European Union and the International Republican Institute of the US. The seven dissenting members of the CNE noted the deployment of Frelimo members as electoral officials. They also highlighted the use of pre-filled ballots, and the significant discrepancies between total votes cast in each of the polls, an indicator of ballot box stuffing.
Definitive election results are still weeks away
There is no formal deadline for the Constitutional Council to validate and announce the final results of the 9 October elections, which will only happen after electoral disputes have been dealt with by district and provincial courts. Once that process is complete, each of the seven judges on the Constitutional Council has three days to review the results, before they are sent on to the Attorney General for another three-day review. The validation process can therefore take up to 24 days.