Cabo Ligado Update: 30 October-12 November 2023

Nov 15

Written By Cabo Ligado

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By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, Oct. 2017-Nov. 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 10 November 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

Total number of political violence events: 1,704
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,789
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,050

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

During the last fortnight, the only confirmed violent incident involving insurgents took place on 10 November in the village of Novo Cabo Delgado in Macomia district. Insurgents attacked the village with machine guns, reportedly during an initiation ceremony, killing at least three civilians and burning 14 houses. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack via social media. The insurgents killed three civilians during the attack, and withdrew when confronted by Local Forces. When a Local Forces commander sought help from Mozambican security forces nearby, he found their position abandoned.

IS also claimed to have killed one man around the village of Litandacua, just five km from Novo Cabo Delgado, the next day. This has not been corroborated by other sources, but the International Organization of Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix reported a movement of 801 people from Novo Cabo Delgado and Litandacua between 10 and 12 November due to attack or fear of attack.

Insurgents remain on the coast of Macomia, but in reduced numbers compared to June and subsequent months when they started to establish a significant presence there. On 11 November, A small group entered the village of Ningaia near Mucojo, threatened to kill any “infidels” who came to the village, and instructed the population to leave, before stealing several mobile phones and disappearing.

However, most insurgent activity persisted in the form of movements in the southern districts of Quissanga and Meluco. In Quissanga on 1 November, around 20 armed men were seen passing between Bilibiza and Namadai on the way to Metuge district, one source told Cabo Ligado. On the same day, insurgents reportedly entered the village of Cagembe around 10 km to the north, interacted peacefully with locals, and likely stayed the night. However, another source claimed that hunters laying animal traps outside Cagembe that day were shot at by Mozambican forces. Given that insurgents often wear military uniform, it is possible they were insurgents confused for government soldiers.

There were also reports on 1 November that a small group of around 15 insurgents had crossed the N380 road in Meluco and were seen in the village of Imbada. It is likely the group was a scouting party, considering its size. No other sightings of the group were reported after 1 November, suggesting they either turned back or are camping in the bush. Around 70 km to the south, a suspected insurgent was captured on his own in Silva Macua in Ancuabe district on 1 November.

These southern movements may be reconnaissance missions. It is also possible, given IS's lack of success in the south and their persistent efforts to establish a stronghold on the coast, that insurgents are running from something rather than towards something. Intermittent operations by Rwandan Security Forces, Southern African Development Community (SAMIM), and Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) in Macomia’s Catupa forest, known as Operation Golpe Duro, are ongoing, as security forces believe an insurgent base could still be in place there, sources claim.

Focus: Social Cohesion in Chiure and Montepuez

Maputo’s Institute for Economic and Social Studies (IESE) has released study findings from its Social Cohesion Barometer project. The study examines social cohesion in six districts of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa provinces. Reports of the first round of study findings in five of those districts were released in the past fortnight, based on research undertaken in February and March 2022. Two of those cover Chiure and Montepuez districts in southern Cabo Delgado. Though undertaken on the periphery of the conflict, the surveys have insights of interest to those understanding dynamics within communities in northern Mozambique.

In both Chiure and Montepuez, the data suggest that large sections of the population don’t think that the government treats people equally on the basis of ethnicity, religion, origin, or party affiliation. In Chiure, 38% perceived persistent discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, 45% on the basis of religion, 43% on ‘origin’, and 40% on party affiliation. In Montepuez, the figures were 34% for ethnicity, and religion, 33% for origin, and 37% for party affiliation.

For Chiure, IESE suggests that these figures indicate “relatively high tension in ethnic, religious, and party terms.” IESE’s analysis focuses on discrimination on the basis of party, quoting one study participant who complained that “our bosses are from the same party, but whoever is from another party receives nothing.” For Montepuez, a different interpretation is given. Perception of discrimination based on these four factors “is more frustration and dissatisfaction with the government than a judgment about possible discriminatory practices.” This discrepancy in interpretation of similar figures, significant in a context of armed conflict, is not explained.

Some of these issues spilled over into people’s perception of access to opportunities. In Chiure, 90% of respondents perceived there to never be equal opportunity to government funds, while regarding access to public employment, 74% perceived there to never be equal opportunity. For Montepuez, the equivalent findings were 82% and 66%. Again, in the context of the insurgency, these are significant figures.

The Social Cohesion Barometer is a useful addition to our knowledge of northern Mozambique. As well as the issues noted above, it looks at confidence in services, political leaders, relations within the community, and levels of community organization. At times however, categorization and analysis hinder understanding. The issue of trust in the police is possibly misrepresented by the report. The text tells us that of services who generate the least trust, the police is at 56%. This is one, possibly misguided, interpretation of the data. For trust in the police in Chiure, those who trust a lot (confia muito) and trust somewhat (confia bastante) is 44%. Findings indicate that 38% “do not trust” the police, or “trust very little.” The figure of 56% for lack of trust in the police is misleading. This is arrived at by assigning the who “who trust a little,” 18% to the 38%. Why the figure has been assigned in this way is not explained.

Round-Up

Humanitarian needs remain acute

As the year draws to an end, attention turns to the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Cabo Delgado for 2024. The HRP for northern Mozambique for 2023 estimated a need for 513 million US dollars targeting 1.6 million people in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa provinces. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), just 35% of this has been funded.

A two-page briefing published in the last week of October details which sectors have been prioritized in light of the shortfall. Entitled ‘The Cost of Inaction’, it is clearly an effort to attract greater levels of funding. Thus far this year, the best funded sectors of the 2023 HRP have been health (66% of needs), shelter (54% of needs), water and sanitation (50% of needs), and nutrition (41% of needs). Surprisingly, just 14% of the education sector’s funding requirements have been met.

As the rate of political violence events in Mozambique falls, and in light of other crises such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, there is a real fear in the humanitarian community that another significant funding shortfall will ensue next year.

As well as headline conflicts like Ukraine and Gaza, attention must also be paid to the rest of Mozambique. The latest Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) Food Security Outlook for Mozambique covers October 2023 to May 2024. The report is sobering reading. It is a reminder that across Cabo Delgado in the first half of 2024, it is food aid that will prevent most communities graduating from ‘Stressed’ to ‘Crisis’ levels of need. Yet needs are acute across the country. In southern and central regions, FEWSNET warns that very poor households will be hard hit by rising food prices, and predicted poor harvests.

Mozambican army suffers food shortage

Suppliers to the Mozambican army have reportedly halted food deliveries due to unpaid bills, Integrity Magazine reported. The Ministry of National Defense is responsible for army finances, and suppliers have claimed to have not been paid since last year. Food shortages are forcing soldiers to rely on supplies from home, contributing to instability within the army.

Integrity Magazine suggests that the shortages are a deliberate attempt to sabotage operations, with some interpreting that to mean an attempt by elements opposed to Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Joaquim Mangrasse. He is understood to have met opposition to his attempts to reform practices within FADM. However, it may just be the result of FADM’s poor logistical systems. This was graphically illustrated in the past week. A video clip circulating in social media groups shows a roadblock on the N001 in Manica, set up by troops whose bus had broken down two days before and who were tired of waiting for relief. Whether the FADM food shortage is due to sabotage, or just poor logistical management, it is worrying with SAMIM set to reduce numbers next month, with a view to pulling out in July 2024.

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