Cabo Ligado Weekly: 1-21 May 2023

May 24

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-May 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 19 May 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

Total number of political violence events: 1,631
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,671
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,002

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Since the last Cabo Ligado Weekly published on 3 May, violence has continued to escalate in Muidumbe district, spilling over occasionally into northern and central Macomia, with insurgents also returning to Meluco and Nangade. On the coastline, however, insurgent groups have remained largely peaceful. On 3 May, insurgents appealed to fishermen in Pangane, Macomia district, urging them to distance themselves from the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS), Carta de Moçambique reported. As is consistent with the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy the insurgents have pursued on the coast since February, they emphasized that they do not wish to use violence but warned civilians against cooperating with the FDS.

Some people in coastal communities in Macomia are said to be living peacefully with the insurgents, a local source told Cabo Ligado, adding that a significant deployment of FDS soldiers has been recently transported to Mucojo to cut off insurgent movements. Consequently, many displaced people who had returned to Macomia are leaving again for fear of government forces suspecting them of collaborating with the enemy.

In Muidumbe, FDS and Local Forces engaged suspected insurgents in Mandela village on 3 May, killing six, according to the Lusa news agency, although Cabo Ligado could not independently confirm the incident.

Two days later, on the other side of the Messalo river, two Local Force fighters were wounded by insurgents near Litandacua. The fighters were taken to Muidumbe, where they received traditional medicine.

On 11 May, approximately 10 kilometers to the north by Lake Nguri, near Miangalewa in Muidumbe district, insurgents beheaded a man who was picking bananas with another man. The other was released with a warning to inform the local community about the presence of the insurgents. The killing was reported in Islamic State’s (IS) al-Naba newsletter on 18 May.

IEDs and unexploded ordnance remain a hazard to security forces and civilians alike. The Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) near Mandava village in Muidumbe activated some kind of hidden explosive, possibly a mine, killing one soldier and injuring others. In nearby Matambalale village on 19 May, an individual accidentally struck a grenade while clearing his field with a machete, causing it to explode and resulting in his death.

On the evening of 14 May, further south in Macomia, a group of approximately 20 insurgents launched a brief assault on a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) base located within the district headquarters but withdrew when SAMIM forces retaliated. The purpose of the raid was possibly to probe the defenses. Insurgents tend to target FDS bases, rather than SAMIM. Since the arrival of international forces in July 2021, it has also been unusual for the insurgents to attack the heavily guarded district headquarters. The base, known as Mihluri, is occupied by SAMIM’s South African contingent, and has been active since May last year.

The vast majority of incidents in recent months have taken place in Muidumbe, Macomia, and Mocímboa da Praia, but it appears some bands of insurgents have now expanded into Meluco. Groups of four to five insurgents were reportedly circulating around the Matandane area, and on 12 May, five gold diggers in the village were accosted and told to cut off their dreadlocks as they were not religiously appropriate, a local source told Cabo Ligado. Five days later, a local named by the source as a longtime insurgent collaborator was taken to the woods by Local Forces and is believed to have been killed.

Insurgents also returned to Nangade, after abandoning the district at the end of March. On 15 May, a group of insurgents were observed passing through Ntotwe village towards the forests between Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, and Palma. Four days later, insurgents captured 12 civilians from Nkonga village but released them later that day after warning them not to collaborate with the military and encouraging them to clean up at the mosque. The insurgents also seized food supplies, including bananas and oranges, before retreating into the bush towards Mocímboa da Praia.

Civilians were not only subject to insurgent violence in this period. On 10 May, in Marere village, Mocímboa da Praia district, soldiers in the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) shot and killed a fisherman, mistaking him for an insurgent. The victim was on his way home to fetch a fishing tool when he encountered the Rwandan forces searching for insurgents who had visited Marere earlier that week. The RDF is usually not associated with violence against civilians, but this is not the first such incident. On 30 June 2022, in Mocímboa da Praia, Rwandan forces killed one civilian and wounded another as they were trying to cross the town at night under curfew without informing the authorities.

Weekly Focus: SADC’s Regional Challenges

With the mandate for SAMIM due for renewal in July, SADC faces challenges in maintaining the mission. Funding is an issue, with Africa Intelligence reporting last week that the mission is facing a funding shortfall. This comes just as SADC authorized on 8 May the deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from the SADC Standby Force. Within Cabo Delgado, the insurgents present quite a different threat than that faced when SAMIM initially deployed in July 2021. But a bigger issue facing states in SADC, as well as in the East African Community (EAC), is the role of Rwanda in both DRC and Mozambique.

According to Africa Intelligence, an internal SAMIM document indicates that by 26 April, the mission was facing a 34 million US dollar shortfall, and that SADC had recently dipped into its reserves for US$5m to cover costs. Funding for SAMIM has always been a balance between the secretariat, assessed contributions from member states, and funding of deployment by contributing countries. SADC covers costs such as mission allowances, medical costs, insurance, and food. Other deployment costs are to be covered by the contributing countries through their defense budgets. Understanding contributing country allocations depends on the level of budgetary transparency in each state. The South African Treasury’s Budget Review for 2023/24 shows that 850m rand has been allocated for the SAMIM mission. At the other end of the transparency scale, Tanzania’s defense budget is presented in just three broad headings: National Service, Ministry, and Headquarters.

While this mix of funding will allow for a continued SAMIM presence, it is not clear that it will allow for its military presence to be upgraded, even with European Union support. A SADC team will assess the situation, and is expected to arrive on 20 June, according to Africa Intelligence. Since SAMIM’s initial deployment, the conflict has shifted considerably. The reduction in insurgent numbers is counter-balanced to an extent by increased technical capacity. In recent months, the insurgents’ new IED capacity has been a direct threat to the Botswana contingent of SAMIM, which was hit twice by such devices in Muidumbe district in March.

The authorization of a SADC deployment to DRC is a reminder of the multiple alliances and interests which states in the region are navigating. While the statement announcing the authorization condemned all armed groups operating in DRC, it named only M23, allegedly a long-standing proxy of Rwanda. If deployed, such a force would rub shoulders with the existing EAC Regional Force (EACRF). That force was first deployed in November 2022, but has had an unsteady relationship with the DRC authorities, who hoped it would take on M23, leading to the departure of its initial commander in April. Tanzania and DRC are members of both the SADC and the EAC. While DRC relations with Rwanda are poor, Tanzania, too, harbors suspicions over Rwanda’s expansionist foreign policy. This is thought to have informed the country’s deployment of forces in Cabo Delgado operating outside the SAMIM mandate in October 2022. It remains to be seen if troops will actually be deployed. If so, they would join the EACRF, and the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), to which both Tanzania and South Africa contribute troops. Established in 2013, FIB played a leading role in defeating M23 at that time, leading to its retreat to Rwanda and Uganda.

Weekly Round-Up

TotalEnergies publishes Rufin report

TotalEnergies released its long-awaited report by Jean-Christophe Rufin on the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado on 23 May, along with an action plan formulated by Mozambique liquefied natural gas (LNG) partners based on the report's recommendations. According to the report, the conflict in Cabo Delgado has deep-rooted causes predating the gas projects, involving multiple factors such as lack of social services, poor infrastructure, and the criminalization of artisanal mining.

The report highlighted an improved humanitarian situation in northern Cabo Delgado, particularly with the return of displaced populations to Palma and, to a lesser extent, Mocímboa da Praia. To support local socio-economic development, the Mozambique LNG consortium will establish a US$200m foundation and address shortcomings in the resettlement of displaced individuals. Rufin acknowledged positive changes in the security situation in northern Cabo Delgado in 2022, but suggested reevaluating the relationship between Mozambique LNG and the FDS in light of these developments. TotalEnergies said it has started talking with the Mozambican authorities in this regard.

Plexus Cotton withdrawal threatens 50,000 farmers in Cabo Delgado

United Kingdom-based Plexus Cotton is closing its operations in northern Mozambique, potentially leaving around 50,000 farmers without a buyer for their cotton. This, in turn, puts the livelihoods of their dependents at risk, amounting to around 250,000 people. Plexus was the only licensed buyer of cotton in Cabo Delgado and one of the largest cotton producers in Mozambique. The company has struggled financially since at least 2020 when workers went on strike demanding payment for three months of wages in arrears. CEO Nick Earlam told Zitamar News that the company’s prospects were made unsustainable by Covid-19 restrictions, the conflict in northern Mozambique, and bureaucratic hurdles. The loss of income for so many farmers poses a possible radicalization risk against the background of the IS-affiliated insurgency in the province.

Japan offers funds for counterinsurgency

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited Maputo at the start of May, emphasizing cooperation on energy projects. After a closed-door meeting with Minister for National Defense Cristóvão Chume, Kishida also announced an offer to provide financial help for the counterinsurgency. “Japan will financially support the fight against terrorism,” Kishida told a press conference in Maputo. “Security is crucial for the operation of Japanese companies in northern Mozambique,” he added. Mitsui is one of TotalEnergies’ partners on the Mozambique LNG project, alongside various other interests in energy projects elsewhere in Mozambique. Moving to fund counterinsurgency operations in Mozambique would be a shift in Japan’s pacifist stance.

US provides US$2m to upgrade key Cabo Delgado road

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) announced a US$2m grant to help the Mozambique government improve the R698 road, which runs from Mocímboa da Praia inland to Mueda and from there, south to Montepuez and on into Nampula province. USAID said the road serves as a travel and transport corridor for communities affected by natural disasters and the violence in the northern region of Mozambique, and that the works will improve the R698 road to provide a safe alternative secondary access route between the southern and northern districts of Cabo Delgado – supporting access to goods, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict recovery.

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