Cabo Ligado Weekly: 1-7 August 2022

August 9, 2022 Cabo Ligado

Total number of organized political violence events: 1,372
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,178
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,808

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Insurgent attacks last week took place across five different districts: Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, Meluco, and Muidumbe. Two of those attacks were directed at Mozambican security force outposts. This eagerness to directly confront security forces, following an intense period of attacks on civilian targets, indicates a need to resupply weapons and munitions.

On 7 August, Islamic State (IS) social media published a statement claiming responsibility for an attack on a security forces base at Namuembe, about 30 km south of Nangade district headquarters. In the statement, IS claimed to have injured several Mozambican soldiers before seizing weapons and ammunition and withdrawing into the forest. IS also published a photo of five insurgents posing in front of the alleged spoils of Namuembe, which include rifles, light machine guns, ammunition, explosives, and military clothing. A security consultant reported that two members of the police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) were killed in the assault. Another security source confirmed the incident, and added that UIR officers stationed there withdrew in face of the attack.

In Meluco, insurgents launched a similar raid on a security forces garrison at Namituco, just over 30 km from Meluco district headquarters. According to an IS statement, insurgents injured several soldiers, burned the barracks and looted ammunition. Another security source reported an attack on a Mozambican Defense Armed Forces (FADM) base in Meluco but could not provide any additional details. A security consultant claimed one member of the government security forces was injured in the attack, the barracks at Namituco was destroyed and a large amount of equipment was stolen.

However, insurgents have also sustained their attacks on civilian communities. On 2 August, an armed group beheaded three people in the village of Litanduca, about 35 km north of Macomia district headquarters, according to Voice of America. IS later claimed responsibility for the attack, posting on social media that they had killed three people and burned a motorcycle in the village.

On 6 August, insurgents killed two civilians working in the fields near Nantika village in Muidumbe district, according to a security consultant report. Following the attack, residents fled to the villages of Malongha, Namacule, and Muambula, where displaced people had recently returned home.

In Mitope, approximately 35 km west of Mocímboa da Praia, insurgents attacked, killing at least one, burning several houses and looting food. An IS statement claimed that insurgents burned 15 homes.

The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) announced on 2 August that along with Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) it would be providing security for the residents of Chibau, about 10 km south of Nangade town, where insurgents have recently been sighted in the fields. This operation follows an insurgent attack on Nangade district headquarters on 26 July during which the LDF was criticized for acting indecisively.

More details have emerged of the attack on the convoy in Macomia last week, namely that security forces shot an innocent civilian during the pursuit of insurgents. According to a local source, the man was found hiding in the bush carrying luggage and was shot on sight by military personnel assuming he was an insurgent. A security consultant also reported that a member of the government security forces fatally shot a civilian in Nova Zambézia on 4 August in operations arising from the attack. .

In another case of mistaken identity, on 3 August the police arrested over 30 men carrying machetes in Balama district on suspicion of being insurgents. The next day, the District Administrator, Edson Lino, announced that the 39 men arrested were in fact workers for the MINT logging company and that all charges had been dropped.

Weekly Focus: OMR Study on Displacement

The Rural Environment Observatory (OMR), based in Maputo, released an important report last week based on a survey of those displaced by the conflict. The survey was conducted throughout 2021. The report usefully relates patterns of displacement to trends in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. The findings provide a valuable perspective on the conditions that the displaced face, and the socio-economic determinants of the conditions they find themselves in. The report highlights the historical experience of settlement and displacement in Mozambique’s north, and how that relates to political control and governance. Since the research was completed, the numbers of displaced have increased by over 34% to more than 900,000, with most of that increase in the south of the province. In this context, the report provides a valuable framework for understanding and responding to northern Mozambique’s continuing displacement crisis.

The report identifies three key phases of the conflict and the patterns of displacement to which they led: The period 2017 to 2019 saw displacement from coastal villages to inland villages and district centers, as well as the main urban centers of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma in the north, and Macomia and Pemba to the south. Attacks on Mocímboa da Praia and other district headquarters in 2020 saw further displacement southwards to Metuge district, and to Pemba and offshore islands, and westwards to Mueda. The attack on Palma in March 2021 precipitated further flows south to Chiure, Montepuez, and Pemba, as well as westwards to Nangade district headquarters and Mueda.

Perhaps more importantly, the report reveals some of the inequities of displacement. The safest places of refuge in the province’s southern districts are those that could most easily be reached by those with the greatest means. OMR identifies the families of those in employment, traders, and pensioners as a distinctive group whose members could move to well-serviced areas in the south in a relatively planned fashion, and had the means to establish new, if imperfect, lives. Swelling the numbers of displaced in the south are those who had the bare means to flee, but in an unplanned fashion in face of violence, or fear of imminent violence. The most vulnerable are those who due to limited means and weak social networks have been unable to move. They can be found in Nangade living in the periphery of the district headquarters, and around the smaller towns in northern Macomia. Without meaningful aid reaching them, they rely on subsistence agriculture, and hunting and gathering. OMR notes the targeting of these vulnerable rural communities, including returnees, by small groups of insurgents in the wake of international military intervention in the second half of 2021. It points out the contribution of delays in aid to returnees’ vulnerability.

Since June 2022, attacks by small groups of insurgents in Ancuabe and Chiure districts have precipitated a new and distinct phase of displacement. Between 1 June and 21 July, almost 84,000 people were displaced in these two districts alone – districts which already host large numbers of displaced people. This amounts to almost 10% of all displaced since the start of the conflict. With attacks now centered in the south, where the displaced are concentrated, most of those now being displaced are going through the experience for the second, third, or even fourth time.

When surveyed by OMR last year on their plans for the future, a significant number of those surveyed indicated they were not expecting to return to their place of origin. This ranged from 30% in Montepuez, to 80% in Meconta in Nampula province. With displaced communities themselves now being attacked, those figures are unlikely to have improved in recent months. Indeed, this week, displaced people in Maringanha in Pemba, expressed concerns about return, according to a source. They spoke of the psychological trauma amongst the population and how it will likely be an obstacle to return. Zenaida Machado of Human Rights Watch last week expressed similar concerns about the lack of mental health support to displaced people who have experienced unspeakable traumas.

By concentrating on the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency, OMR highlights what it describes as the “incoherence of the intervention policies.” To this, it ascribes the attacks on those who, in the absence of adequate aid or land provision, returned in the second half of last year only to find themselves the targets of small groups of insurgents dispersed by intervention forces. By focusing on the socio-economic determinants of displacement, it usefully highlights the inequities that can emerge in the humanitarian response and the need to create space for them to be addressed.

Government Response

What constitutes an adequate security environment for the Afungi liquefied natural gas (LNG) project to go ahead emerged strongly last week as a source of frustration for President Filipe Nyusi and his government. TotalEnergies remains reluctant to move ahead with the project in the current security environment, while Nyusi and Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy Carols Zacarias highlight what they describe as an improved security environment. During a meeting with African business leaders last week, President Filipe Nyusi played down the security risks in Cabo Delgado, and in Palma in particular, saying that the situation has improved significantly and that businesses are resuming activities, telling the business leaders that “we have to keep in mind that attacks like this won't end” and that “life goes on.” Energy Minister Carlos Zacarias supported this view, and said the necessary conditions would be in place to allow TotalEnergies to resume operations by the end of this year.

However, Nyusi's take on the security situation seems to be at odds with the one from TotalEnergies. Speaking in February, TotalEnergies Chief Executive Officer Patrick Pouyanné strongly rejected the idea of operating in a security enclave. "We will not build a plant in a country where we'll be surrounded by soldiers," he told investors in February. However, the previous month in Maputo, he had stated that he hoped to see the project restart in 2022, if there was a marked improvement in the security environment. Despite hopes from Nyusi’s administration that operations would resume before 2022 ends, Total has not indicated that such an improved security environment has been achieved, and has indicated that this conversation will not start until 2023.

The dissonance between the government and Total's stance further confirms the idea that the administration favors an ‘enclave strategy’ and the resultant two-tiered security approach: the LNG project will benefit from harder security, while protection for civilians will be a secondary priority. During the event, Nyusi said that the possibility of having Total abandon its mega project "has never been raised" during his talks with Pouyanné. However, the Mozambican president added that, in case Total does not return to Cabo Delgado, the “gas will remain there” and other companies could be interested in it.

Other Mozambican authorities are also keen to promote the view that normality has resumed in Cabo Delgado. Several reports released during the last week highlighted the government's reconstruction plans for Mocímboa da Praia, the launch of training initiatives for youth to boost employment and reopening of health units in the area. Despite the appearances, there are clear signs the government is still concerned about the presence and spreading of insurgents. Last week, the Defense Minister, Cristóvão Chume, attended the inauguration of inspection boat Meponda on Lake Niassa, according to Notícias newspaper. The boat, which had been inactive for 10 years, was restored and armed in order to be used to increase surveillance in areas close to the border with Malawi and prevent insurgent activties spreading through Niassa province, said Chume. Fighters from Democratic Republic of Congo have been associated with the insurgency from the beginning. There has been speculation in Tanzania that their route has shifted westwards, via Malawi, in response to security operations within Tanzania.

Also last week, Cristóvão Chume met with his Tanzanian counterpart, Stergomena Lawrence Tax, on Friday during a four-day visit by the Tanzania's delegation. On the occasion, Chume denied previous rumors that Tanzania had refused to join the fight against the insurgency, claiming that the two countries are friends and have historical ties. Tanzania's defense minister rebutted allegations that leaders of the insurgent groups are from Tanzania, saying that they "have no nationality" and "do not respect borders." Minister Tax spent time in Pemba meeting with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) leaders, as well as Tanzanian officers and troops serving in Nangade district. Tax is familiar with the issues, having served as the SADC executive secretary from 2013 to August last year.

Civil society organization Center for Development and Democracy (CDD) has criticized the government's change in its Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy (ERDIN) – now presented as a development program rather than a strategy, PREDIN. CDD notes that, PREDIN (an unofficial draft can be found here) only acknowledges the role of widespread poverty, political and socio-economic exclusion, and inequality as “perceptions among youth” in the north of the country, instead of taking a more assertive approach, as it was submitted in the first draft. CDD also notes that it took the Mozambican government over six months to approve PREDIN, and that, from its first draft to the approved version in June, the program shifts the framing from internal socio-economic drivers to external causes, namely links with extremism in East Africa and other sorts of transnational organized crime.