• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,220

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,922

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,694

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Situation Summary

Violence continued in Nangade district last week, as insurgents are alleged to have kidnapped 10 civilians and beheaded a militia member. On 14 April, seven insurgents were spotted moving through the villages of Mbuide and Chibau, passing less than 5 km south of the district headquarters, according to a source in Nangade. The next day, the body of a local militia member was discovered in Chicuaia Velha, 8 km west of Chibau village. Voice of America (VOA) reported that at least 10 people, including women and children, were abducted by the group in the Chibau area. According to the broadcaster, the insurgents entered Chicuaia Velha after beheading a militia member and then proceeded to Chibau. There, the insurgents looted various products and rounded up a group of young boys, girls, and adults, although according to online newspaper Carta de Moçambique, the hostages have already been released.

What is thought to be the same group was seen on 18 April in the vicinity of Muiha village, near the Tanzanian border. There is speculation that they are either looking for an opportunity to cross into Tanzania via the Rovuma river, which is currently too high to ford, or waiting for reinforcements. According to a local source, there are seven of them, three of whom are armed.

On 19 April, Carta de Moçambique reported that a suspected collaborator in the local militia was beaten by a mob of residents in Nangade town and left with serious injuries. The suspect was allegedly found talking on the phone with an insurgent who was part of the force that attacked the garrison at Mandimba last week, where up to three soldiers were killed. The man is now reportedly in the custody of the authorities.

Insurgent activity on the coastline of Cabo Delgado continues to frustrate security forces, while insurgents, on two occasions at least, have employed less violent means than usual. On Friday 8 April, insurgents arrived at Quifuque island, located between Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. The insurgents are said to have arrived on the island at the same time as two boats laden with various goods from Palma, which the insurgents insisted on buying. They then went with the traders to the Nsangue area on the coast of Mocímboa da Praia district, and exchanged money for goods, before allowing the traders to return to Quifuque. The following day, fishermen from Palma were disturbed at their beach camp near Nantelemule by insurgents who wanted to buy what they had. In fear, the fishermen fled. A source reports that a force of Mozambican and Rwandan troops went in pursuit of the insurgent group. 

Although there have so far been no reported casualties, these incidents have further exposed the vulnerability of coastal communities to insurgent violence and coercion, and indicate that insurgents still have some freedom of movement. It is unclear if these two less threatening approaches suggest that they simply feel more free to engage with communities, or are simply more desperate. In either case, insurgents haggling with fishermen is a stark contrast to the continuing violence in Nangade. Either way, security forces are paying closer attention to counterinsurgency operations on the coast.

Further south, Matemo island remains under curfew since a major incursion last month. As of 11 April, boats were still not allowed to leave the island and fishing was almost entirely prohibited. Some boats can slip out secretly, but all access towards Mucojo in Macomia district on the mainland is blocked. Locals report that large numbers of Rwandan troops have been patrolling the areas around Chai, Quiterajo, and Mucojo every day for the last two weeks. In Macomia town, a nighttime curfew has been imposed on residents. 

Meanwhile, the South African Navy confirmed that, as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), it has deployed the frigate SAS Spioenkop to patrol waters in Cabo Delgado. The SAS Spioenkop is supported by vessels from the Tanzanian and Mozambican armed forces, as well by a South African Air Force Oryx helicopter. 

Weekly Focus: South African Defence Force Expand on SAMIM Extension

After a last-minute postponement of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC’s Organ Troika that had been scheduled to meet on 4 April, the leaders of the Troika chaired by South Africa, representatives of countries supporting SAMIM, and Mozambican President Nyusi met virtually on 12 April to discuss progress with the mission and endorse its further operational extension. Curiously, the outgoing chair of the Troika, Botswana, was not present. No explanation was provided.

The summit communiqué confirmed, as had been expected, that SAMIM would transition from a “rapid deployment capability” (referred to as “Scenario 6”) to a “multidimensional force” (“Scenario 5”). This envisages an expanded deployment that would take on greater peacekeeping responsibilities as Internally Displaced People (IDPs) return and the government re-establishes essential services and the pillars of state. There is no timetable for IDP returns and this shift to Scenario 5 is likely to unfold slowly over coming months. The current extension, although not stipulated in the communiqué, is for three months.

The communiqué remained silent on developments around possible external funding for the mission, instead urging member states to keep up their contributions. South Africa continues to carry the bulk of that budget and it is unclear for how long it and other countries can continue to carry that financial load. Given that ongoing insecurity and current conditions on the ground make an expedited return of IDPs unlikely, a SAMIM presence will be necessary for the foreseeable future.

The following day, on 13 April, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) commander-in-chief, Lt. General Rudzani Maphwanya held a press briefing in Pretoria focused on the SANDF deployment in Mozambique, codenamed Operation Vikela. Maphwanya, who was appointed to lead SANDF in June 2021, only weeks before the initial deployment, struck a positive tone about the importance of relations with the media. Compared with Rwandan counterparts, SAMIM has had a patchy relationship with the media, sporadically issuing press statements, but generally keeping the media at arm’s length. As such, the SANDF briefing — the first since the start of SAMIM — was a welcome development.

Maphwanya presented a positive picture of SAMIM’s intervention, which now has eight troop contributing countries (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia). No mention was made of Zimbabwe’s actual or prospective contribution. He listed a number of generic milestones, such as recapturing villages, dislodging insurgents, seizing war materials, and facilitating IDP resettlement resulting in SAMIM bringing “relative stability and security.” He gave particular attention to “Operation Buffalo,” a combined mission focused in Macomia district involving SAMIM, Rwandan, and Mozambican forces that was carried out between October 2021 and January 2022. Maphwanya confirmed several insurgent bases were destroyed in the operation, with 31 insurgents killed and 26 abductees released over this period. He listed the captured materials, including weapons, vehicles, and other materials, and insisted that SAMIM was continuing to degrade insurgent capacities.

The SANDF chief emphasized the importance of winning the hearts and minds of local people, that SAMIM forces had conducted some limited humanitarian assistance, and that in some areas people had successfully returned home. He would not be drawn on persistent allegations of delayed responses from some SAMIM forces to insurgent attacks in Macomia and Nangade districts.

Chief of Joint Operations, Maj. General Siphiwe Sangweni, described the mandate shift from  Scenario 6 to what he called “Scenario 5 with a robust mandate,” or the retention of offensive capacity. He noted that this would include a traditional peacekeeping role, but also various civilian-orientated activities relating to policing, humanitarian, social and economic development amongst others. This does not constitute a de-escalation, but rather is a transitional phase, he stressed. General Maphwanya emphasized the importance of proper governance, and that the Mozambican authorities must focus on rebuilding infrastructure, the pillars of state, and resuscitation of services to ensure a lasting peace.

On numbers, Sangweni said that the SANDF component would increase from the current 500-plus personnel on the ground, but would not say how large the deployment would ultimately be. The current authorization allows up to 1,495 personnel. South African defense experts estimate that about 1,200 will eventually be deployed in this phase, with a core component from 2 South African Infantry (2 SAI) Battalion. With other SANDF units, they will comprise “Combat Team Alpha,” put together specifically for Operation Vikela in Mozambique. This provides an array of competencies, including a medical support unit, air medical evacuation, and a counter-Improvised Explosive Devices team.

Curiously, General Maphwanya denied that there was direct funding of “terrorist” activity in Mozambique coming from South Africa. This appears to contradict the recent US designations of individuals in South Africa that are alleged to be involved in such financing. It also raises questions about what is really known in South Africa about such financial links. A recent “South African National Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment” report suggests South Africa has become increasingly vulnerable to “terrorism” financing and must urgently ramp up its counterterrorism capacity in this arena. Mozambique’s National Risk Assessment, discussed in the next section, also identified South Africa as a potential source of “terrorist” financing for Mozambique.

Maphwanya would not be drawn on operational issues, sidestepping questions for example about the impact of SAMIM’s limited available air assets and whether South African attack helicopters would be deployed. He did not provide detail on what access the forces had to satellite imagery, but confirmed that there was some level of drone and mobile phone surveillance in play. Responding to questions about current funding restrictions to SANDF, he noted that the government and president were aware of this and that SANDF continued to lobby for additional resources, but had to provide a measure of service with the resources at its disposal.

Notwithstanding the successes of SAMIM to date, Maphwanya said it was difficult to say to what extent insurgent capacity had been degraded. Noting that operations had evidently disrupted the leadership, some of whom had been killed, he said it is unclear where the bulk of insurgents were at this point. 

Positively, he mentioned the Intelligence Fusion Centre that has been established by SAMIM, along with the Mozambican and Rwandan forces. The center is responsible for processing captured insurgents and those released from captivity, as well as processing intelligence recovered from electronic devices or hard copy. The need for improved coordination between Mozambique, intervening forces, and other interests at all levels has been identified in a recent report by the South African think tank, the Institute for Security Studies.  

Government Response

Mozambique's Minister of Public Works, Housing and Water Resources, Carlos Mesquita, visited last week the Marocane IDP center, one of the largest resettlement camps for those displaced by the conflict in northern Mozambique. The center is home to at least 5,000 people, out of a total of 950 families, many of whom fled the last attack on the village of Palma in March 2021. The Marocane center is located in Nanjua, Ancuabe district, about 150 km from the capital of Cabo Delgado, Pemba. During his visit, the Minister praised the conditions at the site and said that it is a model IDP camp that should be replicated throughout the country. According to the Minister, the Marocane center has the necessary facilities to provide a normal life for the displaced, including a hospital, school, and other social services.

The government has been making efforts to make Marocane a reference for the management of displaced people. In January this year, the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), in partnership with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), provided 5,000 zinc sheets for about 125,000 displaced families. The sheets will enable the displaced people to roof their houses. The authorities have advised the displaced people to build their own houses made from bamboo stakes, and promised that the government will help them with the roofing material. 

It is not yet clear whether or not the government's plan is to keep the displaced permanently in Marocane, but the efforts so far suggest it may be. But despite Minister Mesquita's praise, several reports suggest that Marocane faces problems not unlike those in other IDP centers throughout Cabo Delgado and Nampula. One complaint is that there are only enough zinc sheets for around 4% of the displaced households, and many families continue to live in precarious conditions. Some families complain about the long distances they are forced to walk to get the bamboo used for building the houses. Some of them, especially women and the elderly, are not able to cut and transport the material. People who are not able to build their own houses themselves are forced to sell food aid to pay laborers to build their houses. Irregular distribution of food aid, insufficient quantities of food, as well as the diversion of donations, are other problems faced by displaced people in Marocane. Although there is a health center to attend to the displaced, there are complaints of lack of medicines, and no capacity for in-patient care or delivering babies on site.  

In the district of Chiure, south of Cabo Delgado, the Diocesan Caritas of Pemba, handed over 931 houses to IDPs living in Meculane, administrative post of Katapua. Similarly, the Diocese of Pemba delivered 570 houses in the resettlement center of Chimoio in the administrative post of Mirate, district of Montepuez. The delivery of the houses took place in April and was led by the bishop of the diocese of Pemba, Antonio Juliasse. The one-bedroom houses were built with local materials over a period of 13 months as part of the “Protect and Rebuild Chiure” project, funded by USAID.

International engagements saw formal reassurance over the future of SADC intervention. Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi made a three-day visit to Gaborone, Botswana, on 13 April. During his visit, he thanked his host, President Mokgweetsi Masisi, for his support for the counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado. Nyusi said that Botswana, with some 300 troops in Cabo Delgado, has been a key contributor on the battlefield, and that its involvement in the SADC mission has contributed to the return of peace and stability in conflict-affected areas. For his part, Mokgweetsi said that peace, security and stability in the region are his country's priorities, and that Botswana will continue to support the SADC intervention.

Tanzania also reaffirmed its commitment to stability in the region, and in Mozambique in particular, in the fight against “terrorism.” The assurances were given by Phaustine Kasike, Tanzania's High Commissioner in Mozambique speaking at an event to mark the 100th anniversary of  Julius Nyerere’s birth. He stated that this commitment is reflected in its contribution to SADC forces, and reaffirmed that Tanzania will support Mozambique in the fight against “terrorism” until the problem is solved.

Two reports which look at the insurgency in Mozambique from quite different perspectives have been published in recent weeks. The first is a National Risk Assessment (NRA) of money laundering and “terrorist” financing risk in Mozambique. Released on 31 March, it was conducted by Mozambique’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the Gabinete de Informação Financeira de Moçambique. This is Mozambique’s first NRA report, with interesting conclusions for understanding how the Mozambican government looks at and interprets the financing of “terrorism” in Cabo Delgado, and how this intertwines with the internal and external dynamics of the country. 

On one hand, it recognizes the growing threat of domestic/national “terrorist” financing from internal sources, stating that illicit activities such as poaching, drug trafficking, kidnappings, among others, constitute the main sources of internal financing. These sources, according to the document, are used to finance “terrorism” inside as well as outside the country. On the other hand, the document contends that instability in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as the porosity of the Mozambican borders, present a “terrorist” financing risk to Mozambique. The report cites Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in this regard. Mozambique itself is assessed as presenting such a risk to South Africa and Tanzania only. It should be noted that recent work by the Global Initiative Against Transnational and Organized Crime suggests that the insurgency in Cabo Delgado has actually disrupted illicit trade in northern Mozambique, rather than being a source of financing for it. 

Mozambique’s first NRA is necessarily broad brush. Conducting future sector and thematic assessments may help build up expertise in the sector to face what are very real risks. The process will also help tick boxes for ongoing donor support.

The second report is the US State Department’s 2021 human rights report for Mozambique, launched in Washington DC on 12 April. The report highlights the humanitarian and security situation in Cabo Delgado, noting human rights violations both by state forces and the insurgents, but also mentions a reduction in insurgent actions following intervention by Rwandan and SADC forces. The report gives prominence to abuses by the insurgents, including beheading, kidnapping, forced displacement, and the use of child soldiers. It also states that the attack on the town of Palma in March 2021 was behind a significant increase in displaced people, contributing significantly to the humanitarian crisis. On the part of the state, it reports involvement of different branches of Defense and Security Forces in arbitrary arrest and detention, and unlawful killings, while noting people’s perception that the presence of Rwandan troops reduced such abuses. 

The report also highlights pressures on media reporting the conflict, including arbitrary arrest of journalists, an issue highlighted in Cabo Ligado’s monthly report for March. In terms of fatalities, the report states that the average number of deaths caused by insurgents in Cabo Delgado halved between 2020 and 2021, from 60 to 30 deaths per month.

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