Cabo Ligado Weekly: 14-20 November 2022
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-November 2022
Figures updated as of 18 November 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,513
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,422
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,963
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
Insurgents carried out a number of high-profile attacks last week, targeting a Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) convoy in Nangade and a senior Palma police officer in Muidumbe, while other groups continued their offensive in the southwest of Cabo Delgado, through Balama district.
Balama was hit for the first time on Saturday 12 November when insurgents decapitated one person in the village of Muripa, just to the north of the district border with Namuno. The next day, they fell on Mualia village on the N14 road connecting Balama town to Montepuez, killing two others. The day after that, they traveled 10 km north, skirting around the perimeter of the Syrah Resource graphite mine, and attacked Marica, beheading two more civilians. Islamic State (IS) later acknowledged responsibility for all three attacks on social media.
In Muidumbe district, suspected insurgents assassinated the chief of operations for the Palma police as well as his wife, nephew, and a Mozambican NGO worker in a roadside ambush as they were driving through the village of Xitaxi on 20 November. The vehicle was attacked and set on fire. Photos of the charred remains of two of the bodies have circulated on social media. The NGO Solidarités International said in a 22 November statement that one of their staff members traveling privately from Pemba towards Palma was amongst the victims.
That same afternoon, a white pickup truck was fired on as it drove down the same stretch of the N380 road in Muidumbe, but the driver and passenger managed to escape mostly unharmed, according to a security consultant. Pictures seen by Cabo Ligado show the vehicle riddled with bullet holes. The road constitutes the main artery connecting Macomia, Mueda, and Mocímboa da Praia districts.
The village of Muambula in southern Muidumbe was attacked twice last week. On 14 November, insurgents arrived disguised as ordinary civilians, hiding automatic weapons under their clothes, a local source reported. As they realized they were arousing suspicion, they opened fire around the area of the high school and market. They then looted the village and loaded the goods into a stolen car and proceeded southwards to Namacule where they burned a handful of buildings. The NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System, which monitors fires with satellite observations, detected a heat signature directly over a built-up area of Namacule on 14 November. IS claimed it clashed with Mozambican soldiers and local militia at Muambula and beheaded a person, publishing gruesome images on social media of a man being decapitated alive. Insurgents reportedly entered the village again on 17 November, causing residents to flee. A source said one person was beheaded.
In Nangade on 15 November, insurgents executed another successful ambush on a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) convoy. The convoy consisted of TPDF and Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) vehicles. The TPDF was forced to leave behind three vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. The convoy was moving from Nangade district headquarters to their base at Mandimba when it came under fire from rocket-propelled grenades near the village of Mungano. IS social media channels posted photos of two burning trucks and insurgents clambering over a captured camouflaged Toyota pickup with a mounted machine gun.
An aerial photograph of the aftermath of the attack showing the two burning trucks, thought to have been taken from a helicopter evacuating TPDF wounded soldiers, has also circulated online and was republished in IS propaganda. Five soldiers were injured and three insurgents were killed in the clash, one local source reported.
Notably, the insurgents returned to Mbau in the south of Mocímboa da Praia district last week, where FADM and Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) uncovered extensive stockpiles of insurgent weapons and ammunition in October. On 16 November, several fishermen were captured in the area by insurgents and at least two were beheaded. One was reportedly released and told to spread the word that the insurgents were near.
The next day, on 17 November, Nguida village in northwestern Macomia district was attacked yet again, having been hit previously on 10 November and 8 October. On this occasion, IS claimed to have killed five soldiers and wounded others. This claim has not yet been verified, but several soldiers were reported missing.
Weekly Focus: Al Naba Highlights Mozambique
The 17 November edition of Al Naba, IS’s weekly newsletter dedicated three pages to Mozambique. Two of these focused on the usual review of incidents in the past week and included an infographic presenting a summary of actions undertaken in Cabo Delgado between 9 and 14 November. The final feature was the editorial. This reflected on the significance of the insurgency to IS broadly, its impact on investment projects in Cabo Delgado, expansion southwards, and the national and international military response.
The figures presented in the infographic are not exaggerated. Al Naba claims nine incidents for the six days covered. ACLED has recorded 11 verified incidents, including the nine claimed by IS. For these incidents, ACLED has recorded at least 18 reported fatalities, compared to the 20 claimed in Al Naba. The infographic also refers to the “thousands displaced” that week, which is also not an exaggeration, and the number of houses burned. This is consistent with past IS reporting and tells us that targeting of civilians and forced displacement are key tactics that will be persisted with. Given the insurgents’ inability to control territory, this is not surprising.
Mozambique has featured three times in Al Naba editorials. In July 2020, the focus was on unspecified sufferings of Mozambican Muslims at the hands of the “Communist gang,” as Frelimo was described, and the likelihood of either western or regional intervention to secure natural gas projects. The editorial in August 2021 was issued just one month after the deployment of Rwandan and SAMIM troops. Then still part of IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP), Al Naba compared the intervention of the “African alliance” with failed interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It also highlighted the lack of cohesion between the Rwandan and SADC intervention forces.
Last week’s editorial is confident in tone, and comprehensive in the issues covered. It opens by presenting the insurgents in Cabo Delgado as exemplary. It writes of “non-Arab Muslims … competing for victory ... while the Arabic-speaking Muslims fail.” African jihadis, it claims, represent “a new generation of faith.”
The writer centers the economic impact of the insurgency more than previous editorials. Previously, the natural gas projects were presented as just the interest of “Crusader” countries prompting international intervention. This time, the suspension of projects, both natural gas and mining as the conflict has spread south, is celebrated. Its global impact too is highlighted, presenting the conflict as a threat to “global trade.”
The writer also notes the political impact, and how the narrative has moved from eliminating “terrorism” to “strategies of coexistence.” Without naming him, Al Naba is unmistakably referring to President Filipe Nyusi’s comments in August that “terrorism has no end and life must go on.” It takes his remarks as a victory of sorts, as his government tries to secure the projects despite ongoing insecurity. Less attention is paid to the intervention forces, just that they have failed and like the Defense and Security Forces and Local Forces, rely on external support.
The message of the infographic, that civilians are fair game, is repeated in the editorial. The message given two weeks ago in Macomia by hand, and in Al Naba online, that “displacement and terror” can only be avoided by Islam and tribute is repeated. It is also upfront that when fighters are few, “the beheading of one Christian in a village” is enough “to displace hundreds of Christians in neighboring villages.”
The editorial indicates the seriousness with which IS views its young affiliate. The attention paid to the economic impact of the conflict indicates that strategic investments in the province will continue to be targeted from time to time. But it is also clear that IS knows the greatest disruption comes from targeting people in rural areas, implanting the fear that still leaves almost one million people displaced.
Government Response
Mozambique continues to seek to strengthen bilateral ties with fellow SADC members. Bilateral structures remain critical in addressing security issues in the region, alongside SADC mechanisms. After signing cooperation agreements with Malawi in April and Tanzania in September, Mozambique's Minister of National Defense Cristóvão Chume met his Zambian counterpart, Lwiji Lufuma, for the 11th Session of the Mozambique-Zambia Permanent Joint Commission on Defense and Security, held in Zambia's capital Lusaka on 16 November. The two ministers signed an agreement to cooperate on information sharing and training in defense and security. According to a statement from Mozambique's Defense Ministry, Chume said that it is important that the two countries "improve their capacity to act in the face of all types of suspicious and transnational" activities.
Courting Zambia has a certain significance ahead of Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema taking the position of Chairperson of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation from 2023. More than gathering military support, Zambia also has geographical importance as it sits between Mozambique and the DRC, whose own branch of IS has been closely linked to that in Mozambique. Zambia is also the corridor of many illegal immigrants who enter Mozambique via Tete province, making border security one of the focus areas of the bilateral commission. Chume said on 15 November that the government is looking into possible links between “terrorism” and illegal immigration, and is in dialogue with certain countries of the region for a better understanding of the problem.
While Chume was meeting with Lufuma in Zambia, SADC Executive Secretary Elias Magosi visited Cabo Delgado from 14 to 16 November. This was his first visit to the region since the deployment of SAMIM. Magosi had a comprehensive tour of the province, visiting Mueda, Macomia, Nangade, and Pemba districts. In Macomia, he reportedly “witnessed first hand the SAMIM troops pursuing the terrorists who had attempted an attack, but retreated.” No other details of the incident were released.
On 14 November, the Mozambican Air Force received two new aircraft that should join the ongoing efforts to combat insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The Czech LET L-410 and Spanish CASACN295 aircraft, with capacities of 17 and 30 seats, respectively, are intended for military operations and cargo transport, according to the commander of the Mozambican Air Force, Cândido Tirano. The two aircraft were supplied by the South African firm, Paramount Group, according to Carta de Moçambique.
In February 2021, Mozambique contracted Paramount to provide air assets and armored vehicles as well as associated training through its newly established Advanced Training and Support Division with its Dubai-based partner Burnham Global. Information about the training program is scarce. It is believed that 15 Mozambican pilots were trained at the Paramount Technical Training Academy, reports Carta, adding that Burnham Global provided training in the operation of armored vehicles in Mozambique. Among the advantages of these new aircraft for government forces, said Tirando quoted by Notícias, is the ability to land on "unconventional runways and unprepared land," and both were "equipped to allow for greater deployment capability of special forces," including paratroopers.
On 16 November, the day the government went to the Mozambican parliament to answer deputies' questions about the situation of Cabo Delgado, Prime Minister Adriano Maleiane said that 1,569 civil servants have returned to their jobs, including local leaders in Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Muidumbe, Palma, and Quissanga districts. He added that the government is working to guarantee the return of public services and infrastructure in the districts once affected by “terrorism,” and that in Cabo Delgado there is "relative tranquility." The next day, the Minister of the Interior, Arsénia Massingue, said that the war in Cabo Delgado is under control, and the “terrorists” no longer have permanent bases or controlled areas — echoing the same claim made by Defense Minister Cristóvão Chume on 14 November. According to CanalMoz, she added that the insurgents are weakened and fleeing stealthily, attacking civilians for media propaganda.
However, while on one hand the government says the situation is getting under control, on the other, it seems to be disappointed with the pace of reconstruction in the insurgency-free zones. Maleiane acknowledged that the return of public services is proceeding at a slow pace and that the economy is still being boosted only by local traders. He said that the pace of the release of funds from the reconstruction program is not being followed with urgency on the ground. Despite these marks, Maleiane has assured that the government will continue to prioritize the reconstruction of the Mocímboa da Praia district as it has a strategic port and airport to boost the local economy and meet the logistics of the gas megaprojects. Mozambique's National Elections Commission supported Maleiane's statement on 16 November, saying that there are conditions for holding elections next year in that district. "It seems to us that there is a good percentage of the displaced people who have already returned to Mocímboa da Praia," said Alberto José Sabe of the electoral commission.
To help reconstruction efforts in Cabo Delgado, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will provide $66 million for efforts in Macomia, Quissanga, Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Ancuabe, and Nangade districts, said the UNDP's Deputy Regional Director for Africa, Noura Hamladji on 18 November. According to Hamladji, out of that amount, $50 million has already been mobilized with UNDP partners, but more funding will be needed to completely reconstruct and rehabilitate the infrastructure in these districts.
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