• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,430

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,233

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,858

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

The last four weeks have seen insurgents push south through southern Cabo Delgado and into Nampula province, carrying out an unprecedented campaign of attacks there — while continuing to carry out attacks in central and northern districts of Cabo Delgado. The push south has also been notable for displacing thousands of people; and for the emergence of cracks in Islamic State (IS) communications. Claims of attacks put out by the Nashir News Agency have been delayed by up to 10 days in some cases, while discrepancies in the number of incidents are emerging between Nashir News Agency claims and reports in the weekly Al Naba newspaper.  

In late August, insurgents returned to Muidumbe district, which had been largely spared in the preceding months. Attacks on civilians were concentrated in the village of Mandela and surrounding villages in the south of the district. On 21 August, insurgents destroyed much of the village of Mandela. There were no reported deaths, but residents were forced to flee to nearby villages and Mueda district headquarters, 40 km north. Insurgents attacked again on 26 August in the village of Muambula, 15 km north of Mandela. A group of men reportedly stormed the village around noon, beheaded one man, looted goods, and destroyed several houses. Residents fled to the villages of Miteda, Matambalale, and the neighboring district’s capital, Mueda.  IS claimed responsibility for the Mandela attack four days later and reported that they had successfully raided an army garrison and stolen ammunition. Insurgents had previously attacked Mandela on 10 August, while an exchange of gunfire with Local Forces was reported in the area on 16 August . The concentration of activity suggests an insurgent encampment in the area. If so, it has likely been established by insurgents displaced from bases in Catupa forest in Macomia district, approximately 50 km to the southeast. 

The impact of attacks - and fear of attacks - on displacement in the district is clear as hundreds head for larger settlements in the district - Miteda, Matambalale, and on further to Mueda. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded the movement of almost 900 displaced individuals out of the district between 24 and 30 August. 

As insurgent groups continued their movements within and between districts, Meluco district also saw insurgent violence on 23 August, when three soldiers of the Mozambican security forces (FDS) were killed in a battle around the village of Minhanha. There are also unconfirmed reports of kidnappings during the incident. Fleeing residents from Minhanha and neighboring Sachassa villages arrived in Meluco district headquarters, 30 km south, and reported that at least two civilians had been beheaded in Minhanha. Four days later, IS claimed to have killed three people in the attack. 

In Nangade district, the reporting period was characterized by continued insurgent attacks on civilians and a number of clashes with the armed forces. Limited food aid – the last distribution was in May, according to Carta de Moçambique – means that those displaced from villages have been returning to manage their fields in the face of considerable risk. On 12 or 13 August (sources differ), six women working in fields were kidnapped by insurgents at Mungano village, approximately 15 km from Nangade town, westwards towards Mandimba. People are now abandoning Mungano and the neighboring villages of Chacamba Boda and Rovuma, Cabo Ligado is told. The movement of insurgents in the north of the district has also affected fishing and cashew nut production. On 26 August, according to two sources, the fisher settlements of Miungu I and Miungu II on Ntamba lagoon, just five kilometers north of Nangade town, were attacked. Though there were no fatalities, processed fish and other goods were stolen. In follow-up operations Local Forces and police border patrol, allegedly shot and injured a local woman in her cassava field.

Further south, insurgents also attacked civilians around Namuembe and Ntamba towns. Four women were kidnapped in Nambedo village near Ntamba on 19 August. The insurgents clashed with Local Forces according to one source, but no further details were available. In Namuembe, a local source reports that three women and a man were captured by insurgents on 24 August, and the man was beheaded before his companions were released. Local Forces clashed with the group in follow-up operations, according to a local source.  

A particularly notable event was an attack on a post of the police’s elite Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) in Litingina, 18 km south of Nangade town on 19 August. Cabo Ligado partner Mediafax reported that there were no fatalities, but that UIR abandoned the post, allowing the attackers to seize remaining ammunition and armaments. IS issued a claim 10 days later, though a photo report issued on 31 August did not show any of the seized materiel, suggesting that little was taken. A local source claimed that the attack had been in preparation for days, with children selling oranges and peanuts to the police used to gather intelligence. The use of children and vendors as lookouts is not unprecedented in the conflict, and suggests that the insurgents, though brutal, can at least incentivize members of the community to support them. Though lack of responsiveness by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is a common complaint in Nangade, on this occasion SAMIM troops arrived within 30 minutes, according to one source. Mediafax cited one source saying that a Lesotho Defence Force vehicle was damaged in the clash.

On 29 August, insurgents launched a concerted drive south from Ancuabe, winding their way down the Metoro road, across the Megaruma river into Chiure, and east across the Lúrio river into Nampula. The first attack took place in the village of Nacuale in Ancuabe district, where up to 70 houses were burned, forcing residents to hide in the bush. IS acknowledged the attack in its official weekly newspaper Al-Naba of 8 September, though not through its Nashir News Agency Telegram channels. A video shared on social media shows the aftermath of the attack, with dozens of buildings burned out and reduced to ash. According to local sources, some residents were found by insurgents and tested on their knowledge of the Quran. Those that passed the test were released while the others were abducted. On 31 August and 1 September 11 bodies, some decapitated, were found near Metoro.

On 31 August, the insurgents struck 30 km south of Nacuale at the village of Megaruma A - also in Ancuabe district - on the north bank of the Megaruma river, which divides Ancuabe and Chiure districts. There, insurgents beheaded two men and a woman working in the fields near the Metoro road.

Later that day, insurgents crossed the Megaruma into Chiure and proceeded to attack the village of Micolene, where they beheaded a man who sold nipa, a local alcoholic spirit. Three people were also captured and, according to Al-Naba, three vehicles were burned. A few hours later, in the early hours of 1 September, insurgents marched 5 km south and attacked the village of Muamula, burning cars and houses.

On 2 September, insurgents crossed the Lúrio river into Nampula, marking the first incursion beyond Cabo Delgado since an attack on Lúrio village in Nampula on 17 June. On that occasion, insurgents launched a quick raid across the river, possibly to gather recruits, and immediately withdrew back to Cabo Delgado. This time around, insurgents have mounted a sustained series of attacks, pushing several kilometers into Nampula territory. 

First, insurgents attacked the village of Kutua in Eráti district on 2 September, burning several buildings, including the local health center, huts, and tents. Images of Kutua that are circulating widely show the charred remains of several buildings. IS claimed to have killed one person and burned the local church, although this has not been substantiated. Notably, Mozambican authorities acknowledged the attack almost immediately, unlike the previous attack on Lúrio village, which police claimed never happened. 

On 6 September, insurgents shot and killed a nun in an attack on a Catholic mission in Chipene village, approximately 15km from the Lúrio river. The Concordia Mission Centre posted on Facebook that Sister Maria De Coppi was murdered just before insurgents set fire to the mission’s residential quarters, church, and health center. The two priests in charge of the mission managed to escape with the other nuns. IS claimed to have killed as many as four people in the attack but only the death of Sister Maria de Coppi has been confirmed so far. However, President Filipe Nyusi said on 7 September that six people had been killed in attacks in Eráti and Memba.

The attack was condemned in a statement issued 8 September by a group of Muslim organisations from across the country, led by the Islamic Council of Mozambique. They called on the government to take “urgent measures to put a stop to this evil once and for all.”

On 8 September, the village of Naheco in Memba district was also attacked. The following day, Pinnacle News reported that three people were beheaded after the attackers made a speech to locals. IS later claimed to have killed four people, burned 120 houses, and destroyed two churches in the village. IS claimed to have also destroyed a church and killed a monk in another village in Memba, which it called Ntataulu. No independent corroboration of this has emerged.

Things may not have gone all the insurgents’ way in Nampula province, however. A security consultant report stated that government forces managed to ambush an insurgent group near the village of Juma in Memba district on 10 September, killing eight insurgents. While the group is believed to be retreating to Cabo Delgado, the insurgents have been actively recruiting as far south as Mogincual district, over 180 km south of Cabo Delgado. Speaking on 7 September, President Nyusi said that FDS has arrested a recruiter there, who himself had been recruited by Sheikh Suale, an insurgency leader claimed to have been killed in combat. According to Nyusi, the recruiter had 16 others under his control. 

Back in northern Cabo Delgado, insurgents attacked the village of Chibabedi, also known as Tuliane, in Nangade district on 11 September, killing the traditional leader of the community, according to Carta de Moçambique. Some reports say the victim was beheaded. Cabo Ligado sources add that three houses were burned, in the small village 3km north of Ntole, where displaced people from other villages in Nangade are accommodated.

One security source reported  a group of 20 to 30 insurgents was seen on 2 September near Ninga village in Mueda district, heading north west to Negamano. The same source reported three days later an increased presence of government forces in the area.  The movement of insurgents into northwestern Mueda raises prospects of further attacks in Niassa, which generated a wave of displacement in that province in November and December 2021.

Weekly Focus: Mozambican Military Thinking on the Conflict

Mozambique’s Higher Institute for Defense Studies (ISEDEF) held its first Scientific Conference on Defense and Security from 22 to 26 August, in Maputo. Recordings are available on ISEDEF’s Facebook page. Presenters and participants were, for the most part, drawn from the FDS. In his opening remarks at the conference, Minister for Defense Cristovão Chume set out three key questions for participants. Firstly, how did a group of youths become “one of the most radicalized and most aggressive [armed groups] operating on our continent”? Secondly, how could they spread so quickly across Cabo Delgado? And finally, how did they manage to become part of an international network, operating regionally, and beyond the continent?

Minister Chume suggested that these questions had not been addressed heretofore. “Timidly, the national academy started a discussion of the causes, without managing to pass to the national community the objective reason for this phenomenon”, he remarked at the opening of the conference. His perhaps unfair remarks – much has been written and published about the conflict – set the bar high for the conference. And the conference did not entirely disappoint. While most papers presented at the conference were not based on original field research, they gave rare insight into thoughts within military circles on the causes of the conflict and how they may be addressed. Two distinct themes could be discerned. Firstly, there was a recognition that combat training and support are not adequate for the type of war being fought in Cabo Delgado, recognizing that support is needed to better engage with communities. Secondly, there was a recognition of the importance of internal factors in causing the conflict, including a weak state, poor public services, and imperfectly managed investments.

A former commander of ISEDEF, Major General Samuel Luluva, presented concerns about the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces’ (FADM) lack of understanding of communities where “the enemy is hardly distinguishable from the civilian population.” In supporting this, he suggested that communities in Cabo Delgado are so “uncharacteristic” that they demand “in addition to skills of a military nature”, knowledge of “beliefs, customs, taboos, culture, and others.” He further suggested that the influence of cultural norms, history, and even “imagined memory” must be understood, and that otherwise, forces would be seen as “alien and undesirable by the local population”.

A presentation from the Ministry of National Defense also showed the importance attached to understanding communities, but in the context of psychological operations against insurgent efforts to engender a new, if false, “religious conscience” as they target “young people living in poverty.” There was an acknowledgment that this is undertaken partly through online social networks used for both propaganda, as well as to demoralize troops in the field. A specific presentation on the use of information communication technology to combat “terrorism” in Cabo Delgado presented a purely theoretical understanding of the use of social networks by insurgents.

Specific recommendations to counter the alienation of communities from the state were presented by Dr Hama Thay, a general in the FADM Reserve and prominent Frelimo veteran. His analysis highlighted internal factors in Cabo Delgado, all centered around the weakness of the state. He noted that economic development in Cabo Delgado has “serious insufficiencies” that may be at the origin of the conflict. Referring to work by the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR) and the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), Thay pointed to the absence of the state, a weak security apparatus, wealth inequality, and poorly managed resettlement schemes associated with large investments as contributing to the conflict. His presentation also echoed Luluva’s concern about a lack of understanding of Cabo Delgado’s communities. Militarily, this led him to recommend that special forces troops speak at least two of the Maconde, Mwani, Macua, and Swahili languages. Beyond the conflict, he highlighted the lack of opportunities presented to youth by large-scale investments. After linking the removal of small-scale gemstone miners from Namanhumbir in 2017 to the onset of the insurgency, he recommended the official recognition of small-scale miners and the establishment of formal marketing channels for them.

The ISEDEF conference indicates that within state circles there is a willingness to reflect on history, public policy, and their role in the conflict. Such critical reflections may provide an opening for powers such as the European Union (EU) to engage with the state, with €15 million earmarked for SAMIM, and possibly a further €20 million for Rwandan forces and ongoing support to FADM.

Research on these issues continues in the country and the region. The ‘national academy’, as Minister Chume has styled this dynamic community, will this month gather at the IESE conference on Conflict, Violence and Development, where these debates will continue. Registration is open.

Government Response

On 22 August, President Nyusi stirred controversy after saying he had received information that some owners of petrol stations in Sofala were involved in funding the insurgency in Mozambique, and that some suspects were on the run after authorities went searching for them. Nyusi called for more action from the energy ministry and tax authorities to address the issue.

Following the claim, a report from TV Sucesso, which was then followed in a report on Carta de Moçambique, implied that there is a connection between Tanzanian company Lake Oil and Nyusi's statement. The reports said that Lake Oil "abruptly" shut its filling stations in the city of Beira, Sofala province, and that its owner fled Mozambique. Lake Oil issued a statement denying that its owner’s travels had anything to do with this issue, and the company appears to be operating normally, according to our local sources. 

Eleven days after Nyusi's statement, the Sofala state secretary Stela Pinto said that "there are indications" that some foreign owners of petrol stations in the province fled the country recently. Pinto said that authorities were already looking into the reasons why the owners left Mozambique and warned against making "generalizations", saying that Nyusi's comments referred to only a few players and not the whole industry.

The Nyusi administration also approved a new strategy against money laundering and “terrorism” financing in August, which brings Mozambique’s strategy in line with international standards, according to the government spokesperson, Deputy Justice Minister Filimão Suaze.

Following the insurgency's move into Nampula on 7 September, President Nyusi acknowledged attacks in the districts of Eráti and Memba, including the beheadings. According to Nyusi, state military forces were already "in combat" and authorities were monitoring the situation. Nyusi’s acknowledgment of the attacks contrasts with the June incursion into Nampula, which was denied by the authorities. Nyusi’s acceptance of these attacks may have been due to the impending arrival of the European Union’s (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, the following day. The administrator of Memba district in Nampula province, Juma Cadria, also confirmed that insurgents had recently attacked the area to steal food and supplies. Both Nyusi and Cadria claimed that the group is moving into Nampula to attempt to recruit more soldiers. José Manteigas, the spokesperson for the opposition party Renamo, accused the government of causing alarm by saying that the insurgency is spreading to other provinces without announcing "measures to put an end to recruitment and conflict in Cabo Delgado.”

Upon his arrival on 8 September, Borrell announced a €15m EU financial support package for SAMIM. The money will pay for camp fortifications and equipment such as storage containers, medical equipment, vehicles and boats, and technological devices. It comes in addition to a previous €1.9m package for peacebuilding already provided by the EU to SAMIM under the auspices of the African Union’s Early Response Mechanism (ERM), €89m provided to the Mozambican armed forces, and a training mission. The day after the announcement, Borrell also said that the EU would soon approve a €20m package to support Rwanda’s military in Mozambique, as reported by AIM. In early September, SAMIM presented an update s of activities under the ERM. These focused on capacity building of key stakeholders, enhancing social protection mechanisms, rebuilding law and order, and skills development of local communities. The update focused on numbers reached, rather than impact. How this peacebuilding support component of SAMIM’s mandate is now driven forward remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, humanitarian organizations in Cabo Delgado have warned that the conflict is at risk of "becoming a forgotten crisis". A coalition of NGOs spearheaded by Save the Children asked for more financial support to continue operations and voiced their hope that Mozambique’s recent admission to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member would be an opportunity to bring more attention to the country’s humanitarian needs. The NGOs pointed out that, by the end of June, Mozambique’s Humanitarian Response Plan, drawn up by the UN’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), had received only 19% of requested funding, a funding shortfall of more than $315m. 

The communiqué was released just a day after Carta de Moçambique reported that two displaced people from Mocímboa da Praia starved to death in camps in Nangade, Cabo Delgado. According to Carta, it has been four months since the displaced families in Nangade received any type of humanitarian assistance from Mozambican authorities and partner organizations. 

The calls for more support to the humanitarian sector comes as the number of displaced people has surged. Recent displacement figures from IOM showed increased movement of people throughout August. From 10-16 August, more than 13,000 people moved within the Ancuabe district alone. Higher displacement figures can be expected in Nampula given recent attacks along that province's border with Cabo Delgado. Eráti district administrator Manuel Manusso said that the number of displaced persons "is multiplying, we are in a crisis situation". According to Manusso, people are heading to the district's main village of Namapa. 

A welcome boost for the private sector in Cabo Delgado came in the announcement on 24 August that Mozambique’s National Social Security Institute (INSS) will write off fines for businesses affected by the insurgency. The move is said to benefit 2,400 companies and a total of MZN104m ($1.6m) will be forgiven. There was also another push from the government to revive private sector activity, seen in the launch of the Private Sector Relaunch Program (PRSP) in Pemba, on 19 August. The initiative, valued at MZN35m ($552,000), was announced by the deputy minister of industry and commerce, Ludovina Bernardo, and aims to finance a total of 135 small projects. 

Another positive development was the announcement by the World Food Programme in early September that additional funds from the USA would ensure that the WFP would be able to provide a full basket of support to 900,000 IDPs during the October - December period. Rations had been cut in half since April as a result of funding restrictions, compounding an already challenging food security situation.  

On 3 September, the director of Mozambique's immigration service (SENAMI), Fulgêncio Seda, said he wants stricter border controls in Cabo Delgado during a visit to the province's new immigration control post in Montepuez. "Those who are not legal will naturally be intercepted, taken to the appropriate places and repatriated if necessary", Fulgêncio said. 

New administrators were announced for the districts of Mocímboa da Praia and Nangade on 5 September, after months without political leadership, Integrity Magazine reported. Sérgio Domingos was appointed administrator for Mocímboa da Praia and Matias Constantino is now administrator for Nangade.

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