• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,243

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,990

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,705

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Situation Summary

Insurgents intensified their attacks in Macomia district last week, reportedly beheading more than half a dozen people across multiple incidents, despite a wave of surrenders within their own ranks precipitated by the ongoing food crisis.

On 20 May, local sources reported that insurgents beheaded between two and six people in the area between the villages of Nova Zambézia and Nkoe, approximately 20 km north of Macomia district headquarters. This attack was claimed by Islamic State (IS) in a 23 May statement, which claimed that four Mozambican soldiers were killed. They then made their way to Nguida village, about 15 km to the west, where the next day, insurgents reportedly killed several more people, according to local sources. An IS statement on 24 May claimed that three people were killed in the attack.

Later that day, the insurgents moved 7 km southwest to Chicomo village, where several buildings were set on fire. This was confirmed by NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System, which detected a number of fires within the village on the night of 21 May. IS claimed the attack, saying that they had killed one person. 

According to a local source, security forces left Macomia district headquarters for Nguida on the morning of 22 May. Locals estimate at least seven died in the attacks of the previous two days. It is thought the insurgents may be trying to make their way to the Minhanha zone of Meluco district.

Groups of insurgents have also been active across other districts of Cabo Delgado, though their main goal seems to be to procure food rather than to kill. Security consultant reports claim small squads of insurgents launched food raids on 17 May on Quifuque island in Palma, with no reported casualties, and Maganu village near Chicuaia Velha, in Nangade, possibly killing one person in the process, though this has not been corroborated by Cabo Ligado sources.

A local source reported that Olumbe village in Palma district was attacked for the second time in two weeks on 21 May. This information allegedly came from fleeing residents of the village, who claimed insurgents burnt down numerous houses. It is still unclear if there were any casualties in the attack on the village on 6 May. 

While there are armed groups that are evidently still determined to maintain their campaign of violence, the ongoing food crisis has triggered a collapse in morale within some ranks of the insurgency. On 16 May, a 12-year old girl from Mocímboa da Praia who had been kidnapped by the insurgents turned herself in to the authorities in Macomia. A local source related her testimony of her experience with the insurgency to Cabo Ligado, describing severe hunger as insurgents are forced to live off a meager diet of crushed plants and honey. She and other captive girls were sent to work in the fields and took the opportunity to surrender. According to the girl, the insurgents are reportedly active around Muidumbe, Macomia, and along the Messalo river. 

On the same day, a local source in Nangade reported another captured woman had been released, and that she claimed that many insurgents are now asking to be rescued by the authorities. There have also been reports of surrenders, though not all could be verified. According to Carta, and a security consultant, on 15 May, a group of insurgents approached the village of Namuine in Nangade, and announced that they wished to surrender. Security forces are said to have arrived and taken up to 40 insurgents into custody. Most were reportedly young and inexperienced fighters. According to the same consultant, this was followed by the surrender of 19 more the following day. Another source claims that a further nine men surrendered to Tanzanian troops in Nangade district on 17 May. Three were said to be local, and six from Tanzania. 

There were also surrenders in Macomia district, where 40 insurgents are said to have laid down their arms to the government security forces on 17 May. Earlier, they had passed on their intention to surrender to a local peasant, explaining that they were giving up because they had no reinforcements or food.

Weekly Focus: Return in Northern Macomia

The series of attacks last week in Macomia district, at sites west of the N380 road, complicate life for people in Macomia. The road is open to traffic, allowing people and goods to move from Pemba as far as Chai and beyond. Local Forces, despite problems in the past, have received credit locally for securing villages in the north of the district. Rwandan forces camped at Chai have been proactive in encouraging people to return to villages across the area, and in providing the security to allow that to happen. This has been partly successful. Their arrival in mid-April brought tangible changes in transport and markets, and people’s peace of mind. Whether this can be built on or not will depend on the success of ongoing operations to the east of the N380 in Catupa forest, and whether last week’s aggressors were making their way out of Macomia, or signaling their continued presence.

In the first week of May, the N380 was ceremonially opened to traffic, with youth performing stunts on roller skates to entertain an enthusiastic crowd. Since then, minibuses have been plying between Pemba and Macomia, while beyond Macomia trucks continue as far as Awasse and on to Mueda, though traffic can be sparse, and a military escort is required for that section. Both minibuses and trucks carry people and goods. In this way products get to the market in Chai from Macomia. As well as basics such as rice, sugar, and soap, flashlights are popular, particularly with those still displaced. Basic agricultural production continues, even by those locally displaced.

The road was reopened soon after the arrival of Rwandan forces in the district in mid-April, and their deployment in Chai town. In the first quarter of 2022, incidents of political violence involving Islamist militia were recorded in Chai and neighbouring villages. Since then, and prior to last week, there had been just one incident, perpetrated by Local Forces. Since the deployment, there are tentative signs of people returning to their homes, which they had reluctantly abandoned to stay at their machambas, or farmland, fearing attacks. A source tells Cabo Ligado that Litandacua, about 8 km west of Chai, and Xitoio, 8 km southwest beyond Litandacua have seen most of their population return. Chai itself, and Litamanda, 3 km north on the N380, have just a few residents currently.

This tentative confidence comes, locals say, from two sources: the approach taken by Rwandan forces, and the perception, until last week at least, of a diminished threat. Rwandan forces have approached the displaced, and assured them of their safety. Those who have returned are accompanied by Rwandan troops when they go to work their machambas. Language helps, as the Rwandan troops speak Swahili, East Africa’s lingua franca, widely spoken in Cabo Delgado, but not by many in the Mozambican forces. Perception of a reduced threat comes from witnessing the return of hostages and others from insurgency bases. 

A humanitarian source says that food needs in the area are being met locally, despite incomplete return. Some displaced people continue farming, while Chai still serves as a marketplace for people from Quinto Congresso, Litandacua, and other neighboring villages, according to our first source. As well as local production and markets, fish is available in lagoons.  

Last week’s attacks may present a significant challenge to what had been viewed locally as Rwanda’s success. Macomia town was briefly occupied by the insurgents on 28 May 2020, while sites north and south of the town have consistently been targeted by insurgents. If last week’s attacks mark a return to targeting sites around the town, military forces may be further stretched.

Government Response

A new law on the Prevention, Suppression, and Combating of Terrorism and Related Actions was passed in the Assembly of the Republic on 19 May. It is set to replace the 2018 legislation if assented to by President Filipe Nyusi. Concerns about media coverage and its implications for the public debate and accountability around “terrorism” were spotlighted by media outlets, civil society organizations, and researchers. They drew attention to attempts to limit freedom of expression and press freedom in Mozambique that appeared in Article 19 of the bill’s initial version. 

The key issues at the center of the controversy lie in the first two paragraphs of article 20. Prior to its latest version, these paragraphs were in Article 19. The first paragraph initially stated that "he who, by any means, discloses classified information under this Law, shall be punished by imprisonment from 12 to 16 years." This clearly included journalists, among others, and not just the state officials responsible for "safeguarding the state secret." In the version passed in parliament, article 20(1) now only sanctions public officials. This narrowing of the scope of the law can be attributed to pressure from media organizations. 

Article 20(2) of the law states that "whoever, being a Mozambican, foreigner or stateless person, residing or staying in Mozambique, makes or reproduces publicly statements related to terrorist acts, which he/she knows to be false or grossly distorted, with the intention of creating panic, disturbance, insecurity and public disorder, shall be punished with 2 to 8 years of imprisonment." This is a reduction in the penalty from the eight to 12 years in the previous version. 

Although there is acknowledgment of the need to create legal mechanisms to address the threat of “terrorism,” article 20(2) is still regarded as widening space for the restriction of press freedoms and freedom of speech, and considered to be a step backward in the efforts to consolidate fundamental and democratic rights. According to the Mozambique chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, it is still susceptible to multiple interpretations, and can be used as a tool to limit the exercise of the right to information and freedom of the press and expression.

Reporting on the conflict in Cabo Delgado has always been a challenge for Mozambican journalists. On 3 May, Reporters Without Borders had already considered Mozambique a difficult country to practice journalism because of increasingly difficult access to information and growing authoritarianism, placing the country 116 out of 180 in the world press freedom ranking. The blockage of the media in Cabo Delgado has contributed to the significant drop of Mozambique in this ranking in recent years. The "anti-terrorism" law approved by the Mozambican parliament may worsen the country's position even more. The law now goes to the office of the Mozambican president, who can still annul or delay its promulgation.

Earlier in the week, on 12 May, parliament passed anti-money laundering legislation. This requires non-profit organizations to publish financial reports and details of the source of their funds. The most recent review of Mozambique’s compliance with the Financial Action Task Force’s recommendations on anti-money laundering and “terrorist” financing noted that Mozambique has yet to take steps to understand actual money laundering and “terrorist” financing risks in the non-profit sector. It is unclear how these new broad-brush requirements will address that. 

On his most recent visit to Cabo Delgado, the General Commander of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), Bernardino Rafael, said he was confident that the insurgency in northern Mozambique was on its last legs. Rafael's statements, in the view of the Head of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), Mpho Moloma of Botswana, are hasty. In a lecture at Eduardo Mondlane University, Molomo called for caution indicating that “we cannot say that we have already overcome terrorism.” At the same event, Molomo expressed SAMIM's concerns about the psychosocial impact of the conflict, highlighting the ongoing trauma experienced by women and children in internally displaced people (IDP) centers. 

In another lecture at Joaquim Chissano University, Molomo suggested that security efforts will not be enough to bring back stability in the region until social development issues are resolved. “We are stabilizing the situation, we cannot say that we have defeated terrorism,” he told his listeners, reminding them that they are still in Catupa forest. Referring to the abundance of resources in Cabo Delgado province, he said that "when we look at the geographical location of Mozambique, we see that in economic and development terms the province is still below the desired level.”

South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Naledi Pandor, also reflected on SADC’s response to the conflict at a public lecture at the University of Cape Town on 17 May. She stressed that the insurgency “threatens the security and stability of the entire region,” and regretted that Mozambique had been slow to accept intervention. “By the time we realized it had become a problem,” she said, “it had become huge.” She also recalled her West African colleagues asking her “why are you dilly-dallying?” Pandor, an African National Congress (ANC) heavy weight, has been consistently critical of how Mozambique has handled the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. 

The provincial government of Cabo Delgado announced that at least 350 of the 900 state employees have returned to their posts in Muidumbe. According to the Secretary of State of Cabo Delgado, António Supeia, the return of the employees is a result of the improved security situation and the restoration of some basic services. Muidumbe has recorded no incidents of political violence in recent weeks. Despite this apparent improvement, both the population and civil servants maintain reservations about the risks of the insurgent threat. As a means of bringing civil servants back to the conflict-affected districts, local authorities have resorted to threatening to impose disciplinary measures on employees who do not comply with superior orders.  

The Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR) released a new report on 19 May reflecting on the challenges faced by IDPs deciding whether to return to their communities of origin. The situation in camps and host communities continues to present multiple challenges, the report concludes. Conditions in some areas have improved, but this is by no means uniform. Major vulnerabilities remain in play, especially with respect to accessing food, prompting IDPs to adapt with an array of survival strategies. Host communities continue to struggle with burgeoning pressure on and competition for local resources. Many are keen to see the IDPs return.

OMR research shows the bulk of IDP respondents are also keen to return to home districts by the end of 2022. The uncertain security situation has prompted a more staggered return for many,  initially to district headquarters. This has generated its own challenges, especially in the absence of a functioning administration, services, and much needed assistance to rebuild homesteads and with food production.

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