Cabo Ligado Weekly: 17-23 January

January 25, 2022 Cabo Ligado

Total number of organized political violence events: 1,141
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,687
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,598

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Insurgent violence in northern Mozambique was confined to Nangade district last week, as fighting in Macomia, Meluco, and Mecula districts abated for the time being. A report published on 19 January detailed the beating of a man in Mandimba, Nangade district, by residents of the village who did not recognize him. The man was carrying a machete and claimed to be a member of the Mozambican military. He has since been transferred to the custody of the Mozambican police.

On 20 January, insurgents attacked the villages of Ngalonga and Liche in Nangade district, clashing with local militias in both. Multiple sources reported that militia members were killed in the attacks, but the number of fatalities and their distribution between the two incidents is unclear. In Ngalonga, a joint force of Mozambican and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) troops eventually arrived, pushing the insurgents out of the village.

There was an attempted prison break in Mueda town on 22 January. An inmate, who was working in the prison’s fields, lept a wall and made a break for freedom. Prison guards shot in his direction, leading local militia to mobilize, believing that the town was under insurgent attack. Militia members found the escaped prisoner within half an hour of the escape. It is unclear if the escapee was incarcerated on charges of involvement in the insurgency or for unrelated crimes, but the response to the escape attempt is worth noting. It is indicative of the Mozambican government’s reliance on local militias that such militias would be the first responders in the case of an apparent insurgent attack on a strategically crucial location like Mueda town. Mueda is the headquarters for the Mozambican military in northern Mozambique, so the primacy of local militias in the security response there sheds light on the extent to which Mozambican military forces are deployed in the field.

On 23 January, insurgents attacked the village of Limualamuala, less than ten kilometers from Nangade town. The attackers surprised civilians, capturing and beheading three of them in their homes. Surviving civilians fled for Nangade town.

New information also came through last week regarding two earlier events in Nangade district. There was an earlier insurgent attack on Limualamuala on 15 January, in which insurgents killed six civilians and burned homes. The attack took place during initiation rites for young people in the village. Civilians had requested protection from Mozambican and SAMIM troops during the ceremony, but the troops left while the ceremony was in progress. The insurgent attack began shortly thereafter. Joint Mozambican-SAMIM forces quickly returned to the village, but by then the attack was over.

Also on 15 January, insurgents reportedly attacked the village of Unidade in Nangade district, killing an unspecified number of civilians and burning homes. There had been unconfirmed reports of an attack in Unidade three days earlier.

The Islamic State (IS) also issued a claim regarding the previously reported 15 January attack on Nova Zambezia in Macomia district. Independent reports agreed that three civilians were killed in the attack, but the IS claim asserted that the three were members of the local militia.

Details also emerged last week about Juma Saide Mussa, an insurgent leader captured by Mozambican government forces. Little is yet known about the circumstances of his capture, but details of his biography and participation in the insurgency have come to light. Mussa, who is originally from the coast of Macomia district, was forcibly recruited into the insurgency after being kidnapped following an attack on Pangane in late September 2020. An accomplished coastal trader, insurgents targeted Mussa for his seamanship, providing him with a captured boat and putting him in charge of some coastal transport operations. He quickly rose in the ranks of the insurgency, demonstrating the pathways available for advancement in the insurgency even for people who did not join the insurgency for ideological reasons.

Mozambican security forces also announced the capture of another insurgent leader, identified only at “Ali,” along with six other insurgents, in an operation near Litingina, Nangade district. It is not clear when the capture of the insurgents took place. According to security forces, Ali is Tanzanian by birth and led insurgent contingents in Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia districts at various times.

More information also emerged about the pro-government coalition’s response to ongoing insurgent violence in Mecula district, Niassa province. Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi made comments suggesting that Rwandan forces would be deployed in Mecula to combat westward expansion by the insurgency. Last week, however, the governor of Niassa province told Mecula residents that no Rwandan soldiers have been sent to Niassa, and promised that Mozambican forces would be capable of maintaining security in the province. The shift in rhetoric appears to be yet more evidence that the Rwandan deployment is not focused on security challenges beyond the Palma-Mocimboa da Praia-Mueda corridor. With the insurgents at this point effectively refusing to engage with Rwandan forces along that corridor, the conflict is increasingly becoming a three way fight, with insurgents on one side and Mozambican and SAMIM forces on the other.

Incident Focus: Report on Youth Vulnerability in Cabo Delgado

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, a South African think tank, and Mozambique’s Center for Democracy and Development last week released a report on the vulnerability of Cabo Delgado youth to insurgent recruitment. The report draws on two focus groups that researchers conducted with youth in Pemba and Montepuez, combining their responses with Afrobarometer survey data to draw a bleak picture of the drivers that might lead Cabo Delgado youth to join the insurgency.

Much of the quantitative data in the report serves to emphasize well-known challenges faced by Cabo Delgado youth. People of every generation in Cabo Delgado face disproportionate levels of poverty, a problem that has been dramatically exacerbated in recent years by the conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the destruction wrought by Cyclone Kenneth in 2019. In survey data, youth report widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s response to these challenges. Over half report that they believe the government is performing “somewhat badly” or “very badly” at improving life for poor people and addressing concerns from younger generations.

The focus groups, however, offered specific narratives connecting those challenges to insurgent recruitment. A participant in Pemba reported that insurgents (presumably before the outbreak of the conflict) offered financial support simply for participating in their religious education programs. Another complained that their pursuit of secular education brought no economic rewards – no jobs were available in their chosen field.

A participant in Montepuez succinctly explained the appeal of violent rebellion when state efforts to address challenges of equity and opportunity appear stalled or mired in corruption. When the provision of public services fails, undermining government legitimacy, the participant said, “Then, I can say that no, I can create my own movement and make my own justice because the government does not care about the public interest.” The lack of legitimacy also extended to security forces. As one participant asked, “If the government itself hires private military, that means that the government itself does not believe in its own military, so who am I to believe in it?” The same participant went on to say that this analysis applied not just to the use of mercenary groups by the Mozambican government, but also to interventions by Rwanda and SADC. In such a legitimacy gap, there are opportunities for imagining new forms of governance.

When the legitimacy gap is combined with a security gap, however, those possibilities can be quickly foreclosed. Youth report frequently being in danger from state security forces, a situation that makes the insurgency – the only armed alternative capable of defending itself from state coercion – seem like a way out. As one Pemba participant said, “Many times, there have been cases of extortion and threats by the military, which, in a way, makes some young people, in response, join the extremists.” As long as the insurgency retains its capacity to defend itself against state aggression and to coerce new recruits who might otherwise express their grievances in other ways, it will be difficult for other forms of resistance to government mismanagement to grow in Cabo Delgado. Until then, as the report makes clear, Cabo Delgado youth will remain in danger of both recruitment by the insurgency and targeting by government security forces.

Government Response

Public dissatisfaction among displaced people in northern Mozambique is growing as the rainy season begins in earnest. Displaced people in Nakaka, Montepuez district report not receiving any food aid for three months, while many in Ancuabe district are beginning to move south and west in search of better access to resources. In Mecufi district, south of Pemba, displaced families say that they have not received any food aid in five months and face starvation if they do not leave.

Many of these displaced civilians are beneficiaries of the government’s program to distribute agricultural inputs to displaced populations, but, they argue, the program is failing. As one Nakaka resident asked, “when the government appears, it only tells us to start cultivating, but how are we going to cultivate if we are hungry and without material for hoeing?” A recent report by the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR), a Mozambican think tank, highlights the many problems besetting displaced people attempting to take up farming in their new locations. Land pressure is one key challenge. According to OMR’s research, over 60% of displaced households in Montepuez, Chiure, and Meconta districts have access to less than a single hectare of land, not nearly enough to feed themselves. Another problem is tensions with host communities. Many host communities are asserting ownership of land that displaced people are attempting to farm, demanding rents that displaced people cannot afford to make.

As a result of these pressures, OMR reports, many displaced households are sending men back to their homes in the conflict zone to begin cultivation there, despite the security risks. This, from the government’s perspective, is a security disaster. Not only are these men risking violence and coercion from insurgents in order to feed their families, but even if they succeed in growing crops, the insurgents may then target their harvests, taking in much needed food supplies while still denying nourishment to displaced families outside the conflict zone. The report highlights once again the security case for expanding international food aid support in Cabo Delgado in order to reduce incentives for displaced men to take these kinds of risks.

The Mozambican government is attempting to address hunger in some areas. On 19 January, Cabo Delgado governor Valige Tauabo visited Ilha Mefunvo, off of Quissanga district, bringing with him rice and cooking oil as well as other supplies. He also urged displaced people on the island to take up agriculture there, offering them cowpea and corn seeds along with hoes and other agricultural implements.

The same day, SAMIM leaders visited their forces in Nangade, Macomia, and Mueda districts. There, they met with leaders of the Rwandan deployment in Cabo Delgado. There was no readout of their discussions, but an internal SAMIM progress report obtained by Cabo Ligado offers a suggestion as to what they hoped to achieve. The report highlights lack of information sharing with the Rwandan mission in Cabo Delgado as a major challenge for SAMIM. A Joint Operations Coordination Centre had been established in 2021, which was meant to address the problem of information sharing, but it appears there are still issues to be worked out.

Tanzania, meanwhile, announced last week the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with Uganda covering counterterrorism cooperation. The agreement, specifically directed at countering threats from IS-associated groups, comes following similar agreements between Tanzania and Rwanda and Mozambique, respectively.

Also on the international front, Namibia announced last week that, as it prepares to step into the leadership of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, it will deploy officers to SAMIM to better understand conditions on the ground in northern Mozambique. Namibia has already contributed just under $400,000 to the cost of SAMIM’s deployment.