• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,222

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,923

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,694

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Situation Summary

Minister of Defense Cristóvão Chume claimed last week that the situation in Cabo Delgado is “much more stable” than it had been in recent months and years — and indeed, the last week has been remarkable for how few violent incidents have been reported. 

The most significant incident occurred on 22 April in the Chipingo locality of Mueda district, where insurgents were intercepted on their way to Muiha in Nangade district, by a combined force of Mozambican and Rwandan troops. The number of casualties is not known but a source reports that the insurgent group was eliminated entirely, while the security forces sustained no losses. According to this source, 14 bodies were found along with a grave containing an indeterminate number of bodies.

The same source reports that another insurgent group was on its way to provide assistance but turned back to its encampment in Naitawi where one insurgent was injured by a local resident with a machete. Security forces are in pursuit and the insurgents allegedly appear malnourished. This may be the same group that made its way from Chibau, just south of Nangade town, to Muiha between 14 and 18 April. 

On 20 April, a separate group of insurgents was observed entering the village of Nhica do Rovuma near the border of Tanzania in Palma district at around 6 pm, but no further details are known.

The paucity of incidents is noteworthy considering that this time of year usually sees an uptick in insurgent activity. In April 2020, the private military contractor Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) was deployed by the Mozambican government after insurgents organized themselves into attack groups in the north, center, and south of Cabo Delgado and began carrying out coordinated operations. At the end of March 2021, insurgents launched an invasion of Palma, occupying the town for several days, killing dozens and displacing an estimated 40,000 people.

In recent weeks, however, insurgents seem to have lost momentum after the raid on Matemo island in March. Security forces, on the other hand, have gone on the offensive, with Rwandan troops conducting multiple operations outside their usual area of operations. In addition to their pursuit of insurgents across Nangade and Mueda last week, the Rwandan Defence Force is continuing to carry out a significant joint operation with Mozambican and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops in Macomia district. After a spate of violent attacks in Macomia in February and March, which saw the decapitation of several Mozambican security force members, insurgents in the district have gone quiet. Islamic State social media has not claimed responsibility for any attacks in Cabo Delgado since 19 March, during the invasion of Matemo. 

There is some speculation that the lack of activity may be due to the late rains, which are still ongoing, and that it is the middle of Ramadan. While it is premature to draw firm conclusions about the future trajectory of the insurgency, the security forces’ recent operations have borne some success in cutting off the insurgents’ supply routes and undermining their offensive capability. 

Weekly Focus: President Nyusi’s Diplomatic Balancing Act

Recent and continuing operations by Rwandan forces in Macomia district indicate that an imperfect but mutually supportive accommodation is being reached between Rwandan and SADC forces in how they support Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS) in the province. The efforts reflect agreement to “enhance cooperation in operations,” as well as in intelligence sharing and support to return. Such joint operations are the outcome of the turbulent international relations that have developed around the project. External powers seeking to influence events will need to be mindful of the complex set of international relations that President Filipe Nyusi must manage, and how he chooses to manage them. 

President Nyusi has not slowed down in his efforts to balance bilateral support, and multilateral intervention, placing emphasis on relations in southern and eastern Africa. On 27 April, he will arrive in Kampala to reciprocate President Yoweri Museveni’s 2018 visit. Earlier in April, he hosted Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Malawi’s President Lazarus Chakwera, while also finding time to visit Botswana to meet with President Mokgweetsi Masisi. In March, he was in Pretoria with President Cyril Ramaphosa. In February, he was in Kigali to see President Paul Kagame, and in Addis Ababa for the Africa Union summit. In January, he hosted President Samia Suluhu Hassan of Tanzania. He has been also busy outside the region in the same period, with visits to the European Union headquarters in Brussels in February, and Jordan for the Aqaba Process meeting in March. 

Regional states’ interests in Cabo Delgado differ. All recognize the regional security threat the insurgency has presented, the essential rationale for SADC support to Mozambique. Yet even the states that perceive an immediate threat to themselves differ considerably in their response, thereby shaping Mozambique’s engagement. Tanzania wishes to see the conflict, and the kinetic response to it, contained within Mozambique. South Africa’s more interventionist approach reflects its significant economic interests in the country, and its leading role within SADC. Managing the SADC intervention demands bilateral engagement with South Africa. This may particularly be the case when South Africa moves ahead of allies, such as when it extended its own troop mandate for the SADC intervention last week for 12 months, while mandates have thus far been agreed multilaterally for periods of no more than three months. Tanzania on the other hand, the second largest troop contributor to the SADC mission, seeks less high level engagement, preferring bilateral security cooperation with Mozambique. 

The nature of the conflict – with Islamist characteristics, and networked into the Great Lakes – has both necessitated President Nyusi’s engagement in East Africa, and provided the opening for Rwanda to project power into southern Africa. Experience in the Great Lakes suggests it is not unusual for security cooperation to take the form of balancing interests through parallel initiatives. 

Last week’s “Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of Congo,” held in Nairobi, is an example of that. This brought together Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, all of whom are East African Community (EAC) members, for a meeting that was not under EAC auspices. It directed the deployment of a “regional force” in DRC to deal with armed groups not open to offers of talks. This was done despite the host of the conclave, Kenya, being a troop contributor to the UN mission in DRC, and despite Uganda undertaking its own unilateral intervention against Allied Democratic Forces in eastern DRC, Operation Shujaa. 

Avoiding the corridors of international bureaucracy and taking a seemingly more difficult course create problems of coordination, and can make scenarios difficult to predict. It can be particularly difficult for outside powers to read. On the other hand, it may allow Mozambique to avoid the overbearing pressures that may come from great power intervention. 

In Cabo Delgado, these pressures are considerable given the scale of the potential investment in liquefied natural gas (LNG), and the range of interested actors that brings. President Nyusi finds himself dependent on foreign military intervention. Rwanda has thus far been the most effective. Ensuring continued Rwandan impact without undermining SADC’s legitimacy will see continued shuttle diplomacy across the region. 

Government Response

The conflict in Cabo Delgado is entering a more stable phase, according to the government. This stabilization is defined by three fundamental aspects: First, the restoration of government authority, both political and military, in order to bring back the security and legitimacy of the state in areas affected by the conflict. Second, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and capacity building of state institutions, so that government institutions are fully functional again. Third, ensuring the gradual return of civilian populations. These aspects were evident over the past week in Cabo Delgado. 

Minister of Defense Cristóvão Chume, during a meeting with his Malawian counterpart, Harry Mkandawire, on 19 April, described the situation in Cabo Delgado as "more stable," compared to the previous periods of conflict. For Chume, this stabilization is thanks to the fact that the FDS are in control of the areas that previously served as insurgent bases. He also noted that the pro-government forces are on the offensive, carrying out cleaning operations in several areas of Nangade and Macomia districts, which in recent weeks were targets of numerous insurgent attacks. The insurgent threat is no longer the primary concern of Chume, who said that the big challenge is to ensure stability in the areas affected by the conflict to allow the return of the displaced populations. The meeting between the two ministers of defense was followed by an official visit of the president of Malawi to Mozambique, which took place between 21 and 24 April. Several bilateral agreements on economy, peace, and security were signed between President Nyusi and President Chakwera. In the area of security, Malawi reaffirmed its commitment to support Mozambique in the fight against “terrorism.” Currently Malawi does not contribute troops to the SADC Mission in Mozambique, and according to the Malawian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Nancy Tembo, Malawi has no intention of sending troops to Cabo Delgado, limiting itself to other unspecified support mechanisms. 

Government efforts are underway to rehabilitate state infrastructure. According to the Chairman of the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), Armindo Ngunga, speaking in a webinar organized by the Institute of Security Studies on 21 April on “Reconstructing Cabo Delgado,” work to rehabilitate infrastructure affected by insurgency is underway, particularly in Macomia district where the security situation has improved substantially. Ngunga said that government facilities such as the Civil Registry Office, the District Planning and Infrastructure Service of Macomia, and residences for civil servants have already been rehabilitated. Although government facilities lack work material and equipment, the government of Macomia is gradually moving from the city of Pemba, where it functions, to Macomia town. Civil servants currently in Pemba are expected to be transferred to their posts in Macomia soon. At least 10 primary level schools and one secondary school are working. The reconstruction of these buildings has benefited from the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) through its stabilization program for Northern Mozambique, which focuses on conflict-affected areas in Cabo Delgado. The objective of the program is "to support rebuilding trust, restoring public services and reviving the local economy." The UNDP also supported the rehabilitation of the District Police Command in Quissanga, where insurgents posed for a famous photograph after an attack on the town in 2020. 

In Mocímboa da Praia, work to rehabilitate public infrastructure has not yet begun. Civil servants who have returned to the district appealed for the restoration of essential services such as health, banking, commerce, and the improvement of the conditions of the temporary shelter sites. This appeal was made on 22 April at a meeting between the provincial Secretary of State, António Supeia, and about 120 civil servants assigned to the administrative post of Diaca.

Not very different from Mocímboa da Praia, is the district of Quissanga, which despite enjoying a significant security apparatus, faces serious problems in the supply of drinking water and the absence of health services since the main hospital was partially destroyed. Education too is far from fully recovered. Classes are taking place in only two villages in the whole district.

In Muidumbe, at a meeting held on 21 April in Miteda, between the head of the administrative post and the local population, the authorities appealed to the civilians to not circulate at night. On the same occasion, he urged the population to inform their families to return home. 

The authorities in Niassa concluded the process of transferring displaced families who had been displaced to the main town of Mecula on 22 April. These are people from the village of Naulala, which in November 2021 was the target of insurgent attacks. Local sources said that the village of Naulala has received military reinforcements that will provide security in the area. 

Cabo Delgado came up during the visit of the Minister of Economy and Finance, Max Tonela, to Washington DC for the 2022 Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG) last week. He reported that there he had discussed mechanisms to support the efforts of the Mozambican government in responding to the effects of armed attacks in Cabo Delgado. The WBG is one of the partners of the Mozambican government that has been supporting the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan. The IMF last month announced a $470 million credit facility for Mozambique that awaits board approval. 

While reaffirming the government’s intention to create a sovereign wealth fund, Tonela also mentioned plans to establish a trust fund to “improve the capacity of our defense forces to deal with this new reality of restoring security in Cabo Delgado.” This is a model that has been used elsewhere. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace Trust Fund in Mauritania supports the Mauritanian National Army. The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, focused on stemming migration, includes support to “national security and justice systems, as well as law enforcement.”

The Council of the European Union announced in a statement that it would increase its assistance to Mozambique's armed forces under the European Peace Facility (EPF) with an additional €45 million, bringing total support under the EPF to €89 million. According to the statement, the assistance aims "to strengthen EU support for capacity building and the deployment of the units of the Mozambican Armed Forces trained by the EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique).”

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