Cabo Ligado Weekly: 19-25 September 2022
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-September 2022
Figures updated as of 23 September 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,452
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,296
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,892
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
There were incidents across eight districts of Cabo Delgado province last week, once again illustrating the fluidity and unpredictability of insurgent attacks. For the most part, civilians were the victims. Nangade district remains unstable in the wake of clashes between insurgents and security forces last week, while Metuge and Quissanga districts in the south of the province witnessed attacks against civilians, likely perpetrated by insurgents moving back north after recent incursions into Nampula province.
In Nangade district, sources indicate there is continued movement of insurgents following last week’s clashes between insurgents, and Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). On the morning of 19 September, a group entered Ngangolo, a 25 km drive south from Nangade town and which continues on to Mueda district headquarters. Sources agree that they targeted a passenger vehicle – an open truck, or bus. One source says that one woman was killed, the vehicle set on fire, and passengers' goods stolen. Others say the bus was commandeered with its passengers and moved towards Mueda. A local source says that traffic between Nangade and Mueda towns was consequently disrupted. Ngangolo was last attacked in June this year, an attack which saw insurgents temporarily closing the road.
On 23 September, insurgents attacked a police Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) outpost at Namuembe, approximately 30 km south of Nangade town. One of three sources for the attack said that the UIR troops – “platoon size” – abandoned their position. Prior to last week’s attack, FDS in Namuembe were most recently attacked on 7 August, when UIR once more withdrew. UIR officers were also reported as having abandoned their post in the face of an attack in Litingina on 19 August, and before that following an attack on 9 July on their position at Pundanhar across the district border in Palma. The ease with which insurgents operate in this part of Nangade indicates that rumored bases in the area of Nkonga are yet to be rooted out.
To the west, in neighboring Mueda district, the village of Omba was attacked on 23 September, according to multiple local sources. Omba is in the southwest of Mueda close to the borders with the districts of Meluco and Muidumbe. It is not known if there were casualties, though one source reports that houses were burned. The incident is said to have caused panic in neighboring settlements in Mueda, Muidumbe, and Meluco districts.
President Filipe Nyusi himself said that on the following day, FDS were engaged in fighting with insurgents “in the Omba area in Nangade district.”
Low level incidents of violence against civilians have continued in Muidumbe district. Last week, two civilians were killed in two separate incidents close to the villages of Mandava and Mandela in the south of the district, according to Carta de Mocambique.
There have been reports of two incidents in Mocímboa da Praia district, though neither could be verified. The reports indicate likely low level activity. The Islamic State (IS) issued a claim, and a photo report, on 26 September of an attack in the village of Ntotwe on 25 September in which they claimed one man was beheaded. Local sources also reported an attack on Mitope village on 25 September in which two people were allegedly kidnapped. Rwanda Defence Force troops were reportedly dispatched to the village later but found nothing. Neither report could be confirmed. Both locations are within 35 km of Mocímboa da Praia town; a continued insurgent presence in these areas would militate against claims of normalization and sustainable security. Mitope has suffered attacks twice before this year, in July and August.
Further south, near the provincial capital of Pemba, two attacks took place in Metuge district. On 19 September, between two and four men – sources differ – were beheaded in fields at the village of Pulo, less than 20 km by car west of Metuge town on the coast, and just 26 km from Pemba town. Carta reports that up to 15 insurgents were involved in the incident. The attack prompted people to flee Pulo for the district headquarters.
Five days later, on 24 September, multiple sources reported an attack on Muissi village in Metuge district, approximately 30 km north of Metuge district headquarters. A group of insurgents arrived at the village in the afternoon, beheading up to five people. The following day, in neighboring Quissanga district, insurgents entered the village of Natuco approximately 10 km north of Muissi. Residents fled to the bush and there were no reported casualties. This may not reflect all activity in this short corridor. There have also been unconfirmed reports of a subsequent attack by a group at Nampipi village, close to Muissi and on the same day. The attacks seem to confirm President Filipe Nyusi’s claim that insurgents are being chased from Nampula northwards to Quissanga. Nyusi was speaking at a commemoration to mark Armed Forces day on 25 September.
The movement of fighters north from Nampula to Quissanga is also reflected in the very few incidents in the southern districts of Chiure and Ancuabe. In Chiure last week, there was one report of six people being beheaded in a remote area, but the location was not reported and could not be determined. In Ancuabe district, there was one confirmed arrest on 22 September in Ntutupue village, where a man said to be reconnoitering for the insurgents was captured and handed over to the military.
Further details emerged concerning clashes in Nangade the previous week. A 23 September statement from SAMIM announced that one soldier from the Lesotho Defence Force died of gunshot wounds suffered in the 16 September ambush at Quinto Congresso in Nangade district. A further seven troops were injured, according to the statement. An IS statement on 19 September had claimed that 19 soldiers from FDS and SAMIM had been killed in the ambush. While sharply discordant with the SAMIM statement in terms of fatalities, the IS statement of 19 September was clearly wrong in at least one respect – it located the incident in Macomia district, not Nangade. Quinto Congresso in Macomia has however been the site of much insurgent activity in recent months.
Weekly Focus: New Research Identifies Sophisticated Insurgent Strategy
The Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE) held its sixth conference in Maputo between 19 and 21 September, where academics and researchers gathered to share their perspectives on the ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado.
On the conference’s opening day, Bill Kondracki, representing political risk analyst firm Cordillera Applications Group, presented new research examining the insurgents’ strategy behind the Palma attack in March 2021. Based on open source intelligence, including ACLED data, Kondracki asserted that the decision to attack Palma was motivated by unsuccessful attempts to close the N380 and N381 roads, which led insurgents to choose a more vulnerable target. Palma was selected because insurgents had previously gathered intelligence on the town’s layout during previous operations in the area and it was deemed unlikely that it would be reinforced from Afungi. The timing of the attack can be largely attributed to the contraction of the wet season over the last 60 years. Consequently, the end of March, which was typically deluged with rain, presented a weather window viable for an offensive operation.
Kondracki presented new evidence of insurgent infiltration prior to the attack. Using commercially available mobile phone data containing location information, Cordillera found a number of data points appearing the day before the attack outside the BIM bank, which sits along one of the routes through which insurgents invaded the town. Although this could have been coincidence, Cordillera assesses that this more likely points to a reconnaissance operation.
Cordillera’s research also found a surprising level of strategic sophistication behind the attack itself. Kondracki noted that the main event was preceded by ‘shaping operations’ involving attacks around Palma to close off roads 742 and 775 leading into the town, and south of Palma to divert security forces away from the main assault. This assault saw the insurgents organize themselves into separate task forces supported by logistics elements including doctors and mechanics, reflecting a remarkable level of tactical coordination.
Kondracki concluded that despite the intervention of the SADC and Rwanda, “we have not seen clear evidence that Al Shabaab has been degraded in a significant way that would prevent them from doing a similar attack like they did on Palma.” Although such an operation may be more difficult to execute, he observed, the stakes are much higher so the consequences of another attack on the scale of Palma would be much more significant. Cordillera’s analysis suggests that insurgents may attempt to seize another town just to prove that they still possess this capability. “A pure military solution to this conflict is currently not likely, at least until this capability goes away,” Kondracki affirmed. Such a development is unlikely in the short to medium term where a concentration of insurgent forces would generate a major response from Mozambican and international forces. In time, though, territorial control, including villages and towns, is likely to resurface as a core operational objective.
The pattern of recent offensives seems to support Cordillera’s conclusion that the insurgency retains sophisticated strategic capabilities. In July, insurgent groups across Cabo Delgado undertook an apparently concerted policy of simultaneously attacking remote villages across Macomia, Nangade, Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe, forcing security forces to spread themselves across a wide front from the north to the south of the province. We saw this pattern also in late August and September.
Similarly, the southern offensive into Nampula at the beginning of September coincided with an intensification of attacks in Macomia and Nangade, suggesting another coordinated attempt to misdirect security forces. As Kondracki argues, until this capability is eliminated, counterinsurgency operations are unlikely to see lasting success.
Government Response
Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan arrived in Maputo on 20 September for a three-day visit last week, which culminated in her attending the first day of Mozambican ruling party Frelimo’s congress in the southern city of Matola. The visit was an opportunity to demonstrate the historically strong relationships between Tanzania and Mozambique as fraternal liberation movements. Frelimo was founded in Dar es Salaam 60 years ago, and relied on Tanzanian support during the liberation war.
The visit was also an opportunity to demonstrate greater willingness to cooperate internationally on security issues. President Samia and Mozambican President Nyusi signed, on 21 September, agreements on defense cooperation, and search and rescue. The day before, Tanzania’s parliament ratified the 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The protocol deals primarily with regional and international cooperation issues.
This is not the first time that the two countries have announced cooperation agreements, but details about what the agreements entail have been scarce. In January 2018, Mozambican and Tanzanian police forces signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aiming to fight terrorism, drugs trafficking, and other cross-border crimes. In November 2020, Mozambique and Tanzania again signed another MoU which reportedly established that they would share information and that Tanzania would deport to Mozambique 516 suspected insurgents it had in custody. In December 2020, it was announced that annual meetings between the governors of Cabo Delgado and Niassa and their counterparts in Mtwara and Ruvuma on the Tanzanian side would resume. Such meetings had last been held in 2016.
At rallies held in Pemba and Mocímboa da Praia on 20 September, President Nyusi encouraged people to forgive those who have fled the insurgency. In Pemba, he presented 64 people that he claimed were former insurgents, and in Pemba 22. “In Mocímboa da Praia, I introduced 42 people. Here in Pemba there are 22 people, but we also have it in Palma, we have it everywhere, this is what we want, to come back and join us," said the president. This is not the first time that he has suggested amnesty without revealing any details about the process that either insurgents or communities and local authorities are meant to follow.
As expected, Nyusi was re-elected to a third term as the leader of ruling party Frelimo at the 12th Frelimo congress in Matola on 23 September. He will therefore lead the party until 2027. His second, and last term as president per the constitution, will end in 2024. Even if he does not engineer a third term, as some speculate, he will remain an influential figure. How influential may depend on how many of his supporters are elected to the various party organs, for which elections take place this week.
Speaking to congress directly about the conflict, President Nyusi acknowledged that conflict resolution "goes beyond military action," according to state news Agency AIM. He added that this was the reason behind the launch of the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Program (PREDIN), which aims to promote economic development in the northern areas of Mozambique.
On Sunday 25 September, during an Armed Forces Day celebration in Maputo, Nampula's Governor Manuel Rodrigues said that the presence of the armed forces has allowed the return of displaced people to their homes after recent attacks in the districts of Eráti and Memba. "We are currently experiencing a moment of peace, thanks to the actions of the Defense and Security Forces that, in real time, chased the enemy,” said Rodrigues. As noted in our Situation Summary, it is clear that those being chased are still able to move considerable distances, and continue launching attacks.
The Governor of Cabo Delgado, Valige Tauabo, also praised the armed forces and echoed Rodrigues' words that displaced people are returning to districts in the province. "There is a mass return" of the displaced households, said Tauabo, adding that “this opens up a challenge for the government. In some villages, basic social services have not yet been re-established.”
While Mozambican authorities talk of stabilization, displaced people continue to complain about the precarious situation they encounter in the camps and shelter facilities. DW reported that "hundreds of displaced people" from Cabo Delgado, currently staying in Chimoio, Manica province, are asking authorities to provide them with decent housing, as they are still living in plastic tents. They are also asking for agricultural products such as pesticides. Daniel Andicene, Chimoio's administrator, said that government and cooperation partners hope to build 35 houses for displaced households by the end of the year. Problems remain with aid distribution. In Macomia town, there were complaints about management of beneficiary lists on 19 September, leading to police opening fire over the crowd to restore order in one neighborhood.
Earlier in the month, the government of South Korea announced that it will soon send a patrol vessel to Mozambique to protect the Coral Sul floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform in the deep waters of the Rovuma basin. State-owned Korea Gas Corporation has a 10% stake in the Area 4 project, and is one of the world’s largest importers of LNG.
In August, the World Food Program assisted 828,888 people in Mozambique, and said it plans to assist approximately 945,000 people with life-saving food assistance in northern Mozambique in the August/September cycle.
A recent United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assessment on infrastructure damage in Cabo Delgado, found that a third of the residential buildings surveyed are fully damaged. The report also found that 25% of the commercial facilities surveyed are fully damaged, noting that such statistics have an immediate impact on households’ incomes, and the supply of food and other necessary goods. The assessment was carried out in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, and Quissanga, and it will be extended to further areas once security allows. UNDP aims to support the government's efforts to stabilize the region, and has established three main goals: increased state presence to strengthen the social contract, improvement in the process of return of displaced households, and reinforced security in target districts through coordinated actions and respect for human rights.
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