Cabo Ligado Weekly: 2-8 August
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-July 2021
Figures updated as of 30 July 2021.
Total number of organized political violence events: 951
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,218
Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,471
Please note: ACLED’s real-time data updates are paused through the end of August 2021. Data for the period of 31 July to 3 September will be released on 6 September, at which point real-time data publication will resume. All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
The most substantial development in Cabo Delgado last week was the retaking of Mocimboa da Praia town by Rwandan and Mozambican troops, which was announced on 8 August. The battle for Mocimboa da Praia and its implications will be explored extensively in this week’s incident focus section below.
There were, however, other confirmed incidents that took place last week, most of which were part of the broader government offensive in Mocimboa da Praia district. On 3 August, Mozambican helicopter gunships fired on a suspected insurgent patrol near Quelimane village, in northern Mocimboa da Praia district on the road between Mocimboa da Praia and Palma. No casualty report is available.
The same day, government helicopters also fired on a suspected insurgent patrol near the mouth of the Messalo River, which forms the southern border of Mocimboa da Praia district. No casualty report from that engagement is available either.
Ground troops working in joint Rwandan-Mozambican units were also reported operating along the N380 corridor and further south in Mocimboa da Praia district on 3 August. Engagements were reported at Awasse, Chinda, Mbau, and Mocimboa da Praia town, but no details about these clashes have been reported.
The Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique, which has adopted the acronym SAMIM, took its first acknowledged casualty on 3 August. A soldier from Botswana was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Pemba. There is no indication that insurgents played any role in his death.
The Islamic State (IS) also issued another claim of an attack in Cabo Delgado last week, saying that its fighters clashed with Mozambican troops near Awasse on 26 July, killing an unspecified number of Mozambican soldiers. In time and location, if not in other details, the claim lines up with a reported skirmish between Rwandan troops and insurgent fighters at Awasse on 26 July. The Rwandan government claimed to have killed five insurgents and suffered no casualties in the fighting.
Incident Focus: Mocimboa da Praia
The events that led up to the 8 August announcement that Mozambican and Rwandan forces were in full control of Mocimboa da Praia town for the first time since August 2020 are still not fully known. Neither the Rwandan nor Mozambican ministries of defense have given a full account of the offensive that resulted in retaking the town, and Mozambican reporters were not able to track the advance firsthand.
The best indications from sources close to the Mozambican military indicate that most of the fighting for the town took place on 2 and 3 August. On 1 August, Rwandan and Mozambican troops moving overland on the N380 reportedly moved into the western end of Mocimboa da Praia town, encountering some insurgent resistance there. On the afternoon of 2 August, Mozambican interceptor ships were seen leaving Pemba carrying Rwandan and Mozambican troops north to Mocimboa da Praia. That night, those troops came ashore on the eastern edge of Mocimboa da Praia and entered a significant battle with insurgents. Mozambican helicopters were deployed to support the amphibious assault. After a brief pause overnight, the attack resumed in the late morning of 3 August, and there was heavy fighting throughout the town over the course of the day. By 4 August, joint Mozambican-Rwandan operations in the town had reverted to a smaller scale, attempting to consolidate control building by building. Between 4 and 8 August, there were periodic small insurgent counterattacks in the Mocimboa da Praia area, but joint forces continued to expand their area of control. No casualty estimates are available for any of these clashes.
Even with the details of the fighting so hard to come by, it does appear that insurgents did not fight nearly as hard to keep Mocimboa da Praia as they did to take it. The insurgent assault on Mocimboa da Praia last August involved sustained attacks with masses of fighters, while its defense of the town seems to have involved mostly small groups which retreated in the face of attacks from the joint force rather than stand and fight. Even the Rwandan military, when asked on 5 August after most of the fighting for Mocimboa da Praia had passed, estimated that it had killed just 70 insurgents in all of its operations in Cabo Delgado, when a full stand by insurgent forces would likely have produced more casualties at Mocimboa da Praia alone. There is also no indication that joint forces have recovered any of the many civilians abducted in the initial insurgent occupation of the town. Such insurgent presence as there was in the town before this offensive appears to have evacuated. Therefore, while the retaking of Mocimboa da Praia is an important strategic and symbolic victory for the Mozambican government, it is unclear if it constitutes a major reduction in the insurgency’s capacity for violence.
The government’s victory at Mocimboa da Praia does clarify some things, however. The first is that the arrival of Rwandan troops has led to a shift in the balance of power in Cabo Delgado. Mozambican forces alone were unable to break through the N380 corridor despite repeated attempts, but Rwandan support has allowed them to do so relatively quickly. The retaking of Mocimboa da Praia now creates strategic possibilities for the government even as it robs the insurgency of one of its great propaganda victories. With the road between Mueda and Mocimboa da Praia now open for military traffic, government forces can focus on opening the road north from Mocimboa da Praia to Palma, allowing movement of government assets between areas that had been previously cut off. Mocimboa da Praia can also act as a jumping off point for operations in the south of the district, near the Messalo River, where there are said to be more populous insurgent bases.
The operation also makes clear that Rwanda is now playing a lead role in both fighting the insurgency on the ground and in crafting the counterinsurgent narrative in the media. Rwandan media and propagandists have been brought to Cabo Delgado to cover their country’s troops, and Rwandan public affairs officials have furnished them with levels of detail and access that has not been matched by the Mozambican security forces at any time in the conflict. The shift toward Rwanda as the center of attention in the counterinsurgency effort is even reflected in IS publications. An article in Al Naba last week about IS operations in Mozambique and DR Congo mentioned Rwandan intervention in Mozambique for the first time, breaking the group’s earlier policy of studiously ignoring Rwandan troops in print. The article alleged that there were shadowy deals behind the Rwandan deployment, but offered no evidence.
Less certain, however, is the next move for the thousands of civilians who were displaced from Mocimboa da Praia when insurgents first took the town. Speaking to some displaced Mocimboa da Praia residents currently living in Nampula province, Cabo Ligado sources found three general responses to news that the town is back in government hands. The first response reported was optimism -- some believe that they will be able to return to their homes in the coming months now that fighting in the area is over. The second response reported was suspicion -- drawing from the widespread belief that the purpose of the conflict is to displace people from coastal land. Some believe that, even if the violence ends in Mocimboa da Praia, the government will still not allow them back in the area. The third response reported was pessimism -- based on the experience of some other areas of Cabo Delgado. Some are skeptical of the government’s ability to hold Mocimboa da Praia in the long run and do not want to return only to be subject to more insurgent violence in the future. If the Mozambican government does want civilians to return to Mocimboa da Praia, it will have to address the concerns of those in the second and third groups.
Government Response
Pressure for displaced civilians to be allowed to return to their homes in the north may increase if challenges for those trying to make lives in southern Cabo Delgado host communities continue to mount. In Montepuez, Namuno, and Balama districts, the prices displaced people are being asked to pay for food has recently jumped, in some cases by nearly 50%. Staples like rice and maize flour have become prohibitively expensive, leaving some displaced families to go hungry.
In areas that were recently under insurgent control, however, the humanitarian news last week was largely positive. Health care access continues to expand slowly but surely in Macomia district, and a COVID-19 vaccination center was opened in Macomia town last week. Teachers and military veterans are now able to receive the vaccine there. In Awasse, Mocimboa da Praia district, the director of Mozambique’s national electrical utility appeared with Mozambican police chief Bernardino Rafael on 3 August to promise that the electrical substation in the town will be rebuilt, which will greatly improve electrical service to northern Cabo Delgado.
There are now fewer than 100 civilians left in Palma town, as most civilians in the area have either fled or sheltered in Quitunda, per instructions from Mozambican and Rwandan troops. It is not clear why those who remain in Palma have chosen to do so. They do, however, report that they have strong enough communication with security forces in the area that they are not concerned about being mistakenly targeted as members of the insurgency, which had been a concern with Rwandan troops entering the conflict.
On the international front, the United States added a second individual to its list of people sanctioned for their involvement in what the US government calls “ISIS-Mozambique.” On 6 August, the State Department announced that Bonomade Machude Omar -- known in the conflict primarily as Ibn Omar -- has been named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for his role in the insurgency. According to the designation, Omar is the insurgency’s “senior commander and lead coordinator for all attacks conducted by the group in northern Mozambique, as well as the lead facilitator and communications conduit for the group.” The designation alleges that Omar was on the front lines of the attack on Palma and is responsible for attacks in northern Cabo Delgado and southern Mtwara region, Tanzania.
As SAMIM finally stands up as a combat force in Cabo Delgado (which will be covered thoroughly in next week’s Cabo Ligado weekly), Tanzanian forces appear to have stepped up domestic operations in tandem with the regional intervention. Every village within 40 kilometers of Mtwara town has established village checkpoints within the last two weeks to check identity papers, and security force patrols in the area are checking the papers of everyone they come across. On 3 August, Tanzanian police announced that they had undertaken operations in Kibiti district with the explicit goal of interdicting insurgents who had been pushed back into Tanzania by Mozambican-Rwandan operations in Cabo Delgado. The next day, the chief of Tanzanian police told reporters that his officers are questioning anyone coming across the border from Mozambique to ensure that they are not involved in the insurgency.
Details about whether and how Rwanda and SAMIM are coordinating their activities in Cabo Delgado are hard to come by, but last week Zimbabwean defense minister Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri traveled to Kigali at the invitation of her Rwandan counterpart, where they discussed Cabo Delgado extensively. Zimbabwe has committed to sending just over 300 military trainers to Mozambique as part of the SAMIM force.
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