Cabo Ligado Weekly: 20-26 June 2022
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-June 2022
Figures updated as of 24 June 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,317
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,094
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,769
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
The pattern of insurgent activity is increasingly characterized by hit-and-run raids on remote, vulnerable targets across multiple districts, most likely with the intention of stretching the security forces’ resources. Nevertheless, they are not seeking direct confrontation with the security forces. They are also not targeting high profile investments, despite the coverage given in Islamic State (IS) media of the Grafex mine incident of 8 June. Attacks were confirmed last week in Muidumbe, Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Ancuabe districts, and in Macomia which saw the most intense violence with four separate attacks.
Villages and settlements in parts of Macomia district have been in a state of instability for weeks, resulting from sustained actions by small groups of insurgents, and the intervention forces’ inability to remove them. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), which had been undertaking patrols in Chai and in nearby agricultural settlements have, according to local sources, for the most part withdrawn. On the afternoon of 21 June, insurgents ambushed a motorcycle taxi near Nkoe in Macomia, about 20 km north of Macomia district headquarters, and southwest of Chai, reportedly beheading the driver and kidnapping three women. They also left a message for the local population that more attacks were imminent, sparking panic and triggering a movement of people southward out of the district. IS later posted a statement claiming responsibility for capturing two people and burning the motorcycle.
Two days later, Nkoe was hit again when insurgents entered the village, set fire to several houses, and killed at least three people, according to a local source. Later that day, a statement appeared on IS social media claiming responsibility for burning houses and a church.
At around 7 pm that evening, approximately 20 km to the east, Nanjaba, on the eastern side of the N380 in Macomia was attacked. Several houses were set alight and two people are reported to be in a critical condition in hospital in Pemba. The district also suffered a third attack on the same day in Litandacua, about 35 km north of Macomia district headquarters, which caused much of the village to hide in the surrounding bush. IS released statements about both incidents, claiming to have burnt homes in Nanjaba and to have killed one Christian and injured another in Litandacua, as well as burning homes and a church.
Violence has continued in Ancuabe, where insurgents attacked the village of Mihecane on 23 June, beheading at least one civilian and setting fire to more homes. IS social media claims insurgents beheaded one person while a security consultant’s report alleges that up to three civilians were killed, including a pregnant woman, forcing dozens of civilians to flee.
On the Palma-Mocímboa da Praia road, which has seen an intermittent threat of vehicle ambushes since May, a minibus was held up by insurgents on 25 June, killing at least the driver and possibly up to two more. A security consultant reports that there was at least one fatality in the incident on the N762 road just outside the village of N’jama, about 10 km north of Mocímboa da Praia. Mozambican state broadcaster TVM, on the other hand, claims up to three were killed and another four injured. A further source states that the driver and a passenger were killed, and a teenage passenger abducted. The RDF reportedly deployed to the area and cleared the surrounding villages.
Local reports suggest Stoio village in Muidumbe was attacked on 21 June. Few details have emerged so far but sources claim that at least one person was killed and several people were kidnapped. Three days later, Quifuque island in Palma district was attacked and several displaced people’s homes were burnt down. The island was also raided for food and other supplies. Insurgents last appeared at Quifuque in May, suggesting that they continue to have freedom of movement on the sea. One security source notes that there are no effective marine patrols taking place currently. The South African Navy’s SAS Spioenkop frigate was withdrawn in May.
The Quifuque island attack, along with the ambush outside Mocímboa da Praia, may be a deliberate attempt to undermine efforts to return displaced people to their homes. The government officially began the process of returning the population of Mocímboa da Praia on 9 June, but the success of this program depends on the public having confidence that the area is now safe and secure. Cabo Ligado understands that this program has now been suspended. Displaced people have already expressed apprehension about the security situation and attacks such as these will only exacerbate their concerns.
Last week, IS social media published a series of photo reports of attacks from the previous week. On 20 June, several pictures were posted showing burning houses and at least a dozen fighters posing with severed heads and IS flags, allegedly in Nangade. On the same day, another set of pictures was published showing a burning car and two bodies dressed in military uniforms, claiming to depict the aftermath of an attack in Nikuita village on 18 June. The next day, an album of photos was shared on social media claiming to show the results of an attack on Ngangolo in Nangade on 16 June. The pictures feature more burning buildings and a haul of captured weapons, ammunition and tactical vests marked “Polícia.”
Weekly Focus: Review of IS Media Coverage
Mozambique featured strongly last week in IS official media. Seven incident reports were produced, and three photo reports. “Mozambique Province” actions were also featured on a full page infographic in Al Naba magazine, which reported extensively on events of the previous week. A similar media push on Mozambique actions was not seen in Facebook content produced by IS supporters that target East Africa.
The seven incident reports came from Macomia and Ancuabe districts, continuing the recent pattern of reports from the south of the province. The small scale of the attacks, in terms of the strategic importance of individual targets, numbers of those involved, and the avoidance of engagement with the security services contrasts with the high media profile given to the events and the speed of the reporting. The insurgency’s last large mobilization was the attack on Palma on 24 March 2021 which was not reported in IS media channels until five days after the event. Fifteen months later, quick incursions into settlements in the south for the sake of modest provisions are reported within hours.
IS framing of the events in its official media channel focuses on geographical advance, displacement, and the economic impact of its attacks. The incident in Memba district in Nampula province is reported as an expansion of operations, while the displacement of “Christians” is reported despite the efforts of political leaders to reassure the population.
For the second week running, Al Naba mentioned the killing of two caretakers at the Triton Minerals owned Grafex mine site, threatening that Ancuabe would “become a new war zone, threatening the economic security of Christians and their government.” Most likely, the attack on the site – a not yet operational mining project – was not strategically planned. The company stated that no material damage had been caused. In fact, considerably greater damage was caused to Nanduli village three days beforehand. The only material damage reported in Al Naba continues to be the destruction of poor people’s homes.
While official IS reporting from the ground has accelerated and been given prominence, this is not reflected in unofficial propaganda pages on Meta’s Facebook platform that target East Africa. One personal account which distributes incident reports from across IS in Kiswahili only managed to carry three of last week’s seven incident reports. Facebook clearly remains an active conduit for IS propaganda: Cabo Ligado identified five Kiswahili language accounts in the past week alone that are actively spreading propaganda supportive of IS, but with no Mozambique focus. Indeed, the most recent study of the phenomenon, from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, mentions Mozambique just once. The report gives an accurate overview of the use of networks of accounts to amplify extremist messages in the region, identifying weaknesses in moderation practices within Facebook that allow violent jihadist ideology to flourish on the popular social media platform.
Government Response
The conflict in Cabo Delgado dominated President Filipe Nyusi's speech at independence day celebrations on 25 June. He discussed the scale of the threat, the role of foreign fighters, and the spread of “disinformation.” He also assessed the impact of recent attacks in Ancuabe and Macomia districts.
Addressing the nation from Maputo, Nyusi was direct on the scale of the threat presented, saying that the insurgency significantly undermines the socio-economic performance of the region and the country as a whole, and currently represents the greatest threat to national sovereignty and independence. His focus on sovereignty is consistent with the Mozambican government's rhetoric that the problem of insurgency in Cabo Delgado falls under “external aggression perpetrated by terrorists,” though more subtly stated. To underline this, he said the government knows the identity of insurgent leaders, and claimed that they were mostly foreign.
He accused foreign elements of carrying out a disinformation campaign, likely referring to the quickening pace of IS claims which circulate widely in Mozambican social media. He also mentioned media coverage in his remarks on the recent attacks in Macomia and Ancuabe. The attacks aim to spread terror and fear in the population, he remarked, and through media coverage, the insurgents seek to convey an image of strength, and of a reorganized and reinvigorated insurgency. Nevertheless, he noted that they do not control any village or administrative headquarters. While true, and a significant indicator of progress in the year since the taking of Palma, state authority does not yet extend far from the main road in the districts where the insurgents are now most active.
In another realistic note, he spoke of insurgents’ efforts to intensify recruitment with emphasis on the neighboring provinces of Nampula and Niassa, giving credence to reports that the cell in Memba district in Nampula was involved in recruitment. He concluded once again with a call for fighters to surrender to local authorities, and for greater vigilance of the communities in order to break the insurgents' networks of informants and logistics. Nyusi’s first offer of amnesty was made in January 2021. There are still no formal mechanisms for dealing with surrender.
Former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, also spoke at the event and leavened his successor’s remarks. He acknowledged that poverty is one of the factors that leads people, including children, to join the insurgency in northern Mozambique, and stated that the solution to the insurgency is to address the issue of poverty in places affected by the insurgency.
One of the main targets of insurgent attacks are government employees, who on 23 June asked the government of Cabo Delgado for a “risk allowance” as an incentive to return to their workplaces, in addition to food assistance and accommodation. Civil servants claim that these allowances will allow them to return to and stay at their workplaces in the conflict-affected areas, and will also reduce the number of requests for transfer to other locations deemed safe. In previous incidents, local authorities have issued statements demanding that civil servants return to their posts in conflict-affected areas under threat of administrative sanctions, and even expulsion. The Secretary of State in Cabo Delgado, Antonio Supeia, did not respond to the civil servants' request, limiting himself to praising them for their courage and patriotism.
Companies operating in northern Mozambique expressed concern over insecurity in the region during Mozambique's first Energy and Industry Summit. General Manager of the Australian company Syrah Resources in Mozambique, Agnaldo Laice, said on 23 June that the wave of violence that in recent weeks has expanded to the south of the province creates uncertainty about the safety of companies and the continuity of operations. Syrah Resources has even suspended its operations to and from the mining area, and saw its shares on the stock exchange drop by 20%.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) announced on 24 June that it has begun implementing the SADC Peace Building Support Programme under the Africa Peace Facility's Early Response Mechanism (ERM) "aimed at enhancing social protection mechanisms, law and order, humanitarian assistance and capacity building initiatives." The peacebuilding initiative in Cabo Delgado is part of the transition from Scenario 6 (Rapid Deployment Capability) to Scenario 5 (Multidimensional Force), with a robust mandate, focused on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. The program is funded by the European Union under the Early Response Mechanism of the African Union Commission in support of the Republic of Mozambique. The initiative, according to the statement, will create synergies with other programs, such as the Government of the Republic of Mozambique developed Cabo Delgado Recovery Plan (PRCD), budgeted at $300 million, of which $100 million has been secured.
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