Cabo Ligado Weekly: 21-27 June
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-June 2021
Figures updated as of 25 June 2021.
Total number of organized violence events: 911
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence: 2,933
Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,447
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
The security situation continued to worsen around Palma last week, with frequent clashes between insurgents and government forces reported. On the evening of 22 June, displaced people sheltering in Quitunda heard shooting in the area and fled, fearing that fighting would reach them in Quitunda town. Many remained in the bush overnight. The next morning, Quitunda residents reported hearing heavy weapons fire to the south, which they believed to be a move from government forces to push insurgents out of their bases in southern Palma district.
That government effort did not succeed, and by the afternoon of 23 June insurgents had arrived at Patacua, just to the south of Quitunda. There were clashes at Patacua, and government forces drove off the insurgent advance with the help of at least one of the government’s Mi-8 helicopters. Rumors on social media that insurgents shot down one of the Mi-8s appear to have been overstated -- all government helicopters returned to their bases safely that day. One military source told Agence France-Presse that one helicopter was forced to land due to technical problems, but was fixed and returned to Pemba the same day, an account that was confirmed by Cabo Ligado’s sources.
By 24 June, a source in Quitunda was reporting that insurgents had raided most of the areas in southern Palma district outside of Quitunda where civilians were still staying, including lower Palma town, Olumbe, Monjane, and, crucially, Maganja. Many of the thousands of civilians who had left Quitunda for Maganja, on the coast of the Afungi peninsula, in hopes of securing a ship out of Palma district were forced to return to Quitunda as a result of the raids. Insurgents burned homes in the raids, but no casualty estimates are available.
A group of displaced civilians who arrived in Nangade town on 26 June reported that they had come from western Palma district, and were fleeing ongoing fighting between insurgents and government forces. They said they left because they feared being confused for insurgents while working in the forest. The group said that there had been a clash between insurgents and government forces on 22 June at Nhica de Rovuma in western Palma district. No casualty estimate for that clash is available.
Incident Focus: SADC Deployment
The biggest news from last week came out of Maputo, where national leaders at a Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit agreed to send a SADC Standby Force mission to intervene militarily in the Cabo Delgado conflict. SADC released no details about the size or scope of the deployment or its timing -- indeed, the actual mandate agreed upon at the summit remains a closely-held secret -- but the commitment to intervene itself constitutes a major inflection point in both regional and Mozambican attitudes toward the conflict. The Mozambican government had made great efforts to delay SADC intervention, apparently preferring bilateral or private interventions over which it could assert more control. Other SADC leaders long seemed willing to go along with that approach, or at least unwilling to spend the political capital necessary to force a change of course. Clearly, at least one of those positions has shifted, as Mozambique has accepted in principle the regional body’s decision to intervene.
The shape of the SADC intervention is still unclear. A SADC technical team working in Mozambique in the run up to the decision generated a proposed regional deployment that included just under 3,000 troops as well as air, naval, and logistical assets, but SADC offered no indication of whether that proposal had been accepted. One of the few details that was announced is that SADC forces will be headquartered at the port of Nacala, in Nampula province. The location is convenient from a logistical perspective, as troops and equipment can be loaded and unloaded at Nacala relatively easily. From a combat perspective, however, it sits at quite a distance from even the Mozambican security forces’ main bases, much less the front line. Nacala is some 180 kilometers south of Pemba, and well over 400 kilometers from the current locus of fighting in Palma. Perhaps the distance is what Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi was referring to when, in a speech welcoming the SADC deployment, he clarified that “it will be Mozambicans who are on the front line.” Nyusi also claimed that each participant in the SADC force will have to “ratify” the decision to join, adding a potential source of delay for the deployment.
Another indication of the shape of the deployment is its tiny budget. Angolan foreign affairs minister Tete António told reporters that the initial outlay agreed upon by SADC totals $12 million, for which each country has committed to pay their share by 9 July. If that budget is not increased with donations from other sources, it indicates a significantly smaller deployment than the one proposed by the SADC technical team. For comparison, in 2013, the South African government estimated that deploying 400 troops to intervene in the Central African Republic would cost over $7 million in the initial month and about $2.3 million for each month after that. Deploying a force over seven times that size for $12 million is not doable. That said, it is possible that countries and international organizations outside the region who are interested in the conflict could provide external funding to augment the SADC contributions. That would expand the deployment’s size and staying power, but at the price of further reducing Mozambican and SADC control over the strategic direction of the conflict. Indeed, sources suggest that SADC will be looking toward the United Nations for funding for the mission.
SADC member Comoros offered a further hint about the intervention, when Comoros foreign affairs minister Dhoihir Dhoulkamal pledged during a meeting in Maputo that his country would provide intelligence support through the proposed SADC structure. Dhoulkamal also said that “over time [his government] will clearly define what the contribution will be” to the Standby Force. As expected, then, there will be an intelligence component to the deployment, and a final deployment structure has not been decided.
Another variable in the mix is the role of Rwanda in a potential SADC deployment. A Rwandan military spokesman told reporters that Kigali has plans to deploy troops to Cabo Delgado, but that “plans are not finalized yet.” SADC denied any knowledge of a potential Rwandan deployment, saying it had not been informed by the Mozambican government. Yet sources on the ground say that there are already as many as 200 Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado gathering information for a more substantial deployment in the future.
Government Response
On the ground in Cabo Delgado, the struggle to return to normal life on the edges of the conflict zone carries on. In Macomia district, Mozambique’s police chief and the governor of Cabo Delgado used a rally on 25 June to urge civilians to return to coastal areas of the district, including Pangane. The leaders offered guarantees that the area around Pangane is now safe, and that civilians can fish there without fear of insurgent attack. Insurgents were active in Pangane at least as recently as last month, but people who have been displaced from the coast to Macomia town report that government troops have been working to secure the area. The same people say that the government has urged them not to speak to reporters about government operations in eastern Macomia.
To the west, in Mueda town, similar levels of optimism are hard to find. A combination of resource stress from the conflict, population increase driven by displacement, and a breakdown in banking infrastructure have led to massive cost hikes for staple goods. A kilogram of fish that is $2.37 in Montepuez -- the next major town to the south of Mueda -- is twice that amount in Mueda. Similarly, a rooster that would be $3.95 in Montepuez sells for $11.85 in Mueda. The situation is attracting speculators, who are capable of filling some demand, but prices have yet to decrease.
While prices are lower in Montepuez town, displaced civilians there are demanding access to vouchers to allow them to buy food. According to a local source, the vouchers are only being distributed to displaced people living in resettlement camps, leaving the vast majority of the displaced with a comparatively reduced ability to buy food at a time when the vouchers will likely drive up prices. The voucher distribution system appears to be an attempt to limit food aid fraud, but if the program prevents most displaced people from receiving assistance, it risks doing more harm than good.
On the international front, outside of SADC, a potential European Union (EU) military mission to train Mozambican troops will be discussed by EU foreign ministers at a meeting on 12 July. Portuguese foreign minister Augusto Santos Silva told reporters that he hopes the mission will be given final approval at the meeting.
At a meeting of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Italy’s foreign minister urged the creation of an anti-Islamic State task force dedicated to confronting the Islamic State in Africa. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken endorsed the idea, although no details were put forward about what the task force’s work would be. Mozambique attended the meeting as an observer.
22 June 2021: Monjane
22 June 2021: Olumbi
23 June 2021: Cabo Afungi
24 June 2021: Maganja
24 June 2021: Mongane
24 June 2021: Olumbi
24 June 2021: Palma
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