• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,524

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,445

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,974

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Situation Summary

Insurgents struck again in Nangade last week, while the group responsible for the campaign through the southern districts of Chiure, Namuno, and Balama came to blows with the Naparama local militia in Montepuez district. On 22 November, the Naparamas had pursued the group of approximately 20 insurgents to Nairoto, on the bank of the Messalo river, 60 km north of Montepuez town. Equipped only with bows and arrows, the Naparamas clashed with the insurgent fighters while chanting hymns, and inflicted several casualties, according to news site Pinnacle News. However, five of the Naparamas were captured and beheaded, with photos of their decapitated bodies circulating online.

The occult Naparama militia eschews firearms and believes a magic potion makes its fighters impervious to bullets. They have rapidly grown in prominence in Namuno, Balama, and Montepuez since early November. Namuno and Balama districts had never previously been attacked, while Montepuez saw its first attacks earlier in the year. The extent to which this group has suddenly taken an active part in prosecuting the fight against Islamic State (IS) was signaled on 23 November in Mirate, Montepuez, where a group of Naparamas claimed to have captured a suspected insurgent and burned him alive in front of a crowd. A video of the scene has been shared on social media.

In the village of Nhanga on the Nangade-Mueda district border, insurgents killed at least one person and injured two others in a nighttime raid on 23 November. One local source claimed that up to 99 houses, 11 tents, and 2 motorbikes were destroyed. The precise extent of the damage cannot be independently verified, but NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System, which monitors fires with satellite imagery, detected several fires directly over Nhanga on the same night.

Following IS’s return to operations in Mocímboa da Praia district two weeks ago, when at least two fishermen were beheaded near Mbau on 16 November, one local source reported that insurgents looted the village of Calugo on the R762 road south of Mocímboa da Praia town on 24 November. According to this source, about 20 men, half of whom were armed with guns and the others with machetes, surrounded a vehicle and shot the driver dead before moving into the village. No one else was killed or injured, but they stole food from the bazaar and asked the residents, “Who told you to return to Mocímboa?”

Insurgents appear to be targeting the main roads leading to the north of Cabo Delgado province. On 20 November, two vehicles were ambushed on the N380 highway on the Muidumbe-Macomia district border. The staging post for these attacks may be in the mountainous area around Nkoe, Litandacua, Nguida, and Chicomo in Macomia, where sources suggest insurgents have established a training camp after being driven out of the Catupa forest. During the Mozambican War of Independence, this area was considered largely impenetrable by the Portuguese military. 

Weekly Focus: Regularization of Local Forces Presents Risk and Opportunity

The Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) are to be given responsibility for Local Forces, under legislative amendments proposed by the government, according to reports. FADM is governed by Act No. 18/97 of 1 October 1997, the Law on National Defense and the Armed Forces. The proposal takes forward the government policy priority of regularizing Local Forces. The amendment would provide for Local Forces to ultimately be the responsibility of the Chief of General Staff, currently Admiral Joaquim Rivas Mangrasse. The development raises questions about which groups will qualify as Local Forces, and how they might be integrated into the Defense and Security Forces (FDS). Accounting for such a significant frontline development will also be a challenge for those providing military support to the FDS.

Thus far in 2022, Local Forces have been most active in the four districts of Nangade, Macomia, Muidumbe, and Mueda in the north of Cabo Delgado province. There has been just one incident involving Local Forces across Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts this year, reflecting the higher levels of security there.

The term ‘Local Forces’ is used to describe communal militias which have been organized out of necessity to defend themselves against insurgents. They are associated with Frelimo veterans of the liberation war, or from areas associated with a concentration of such veterans, an association that lends them some legitimacy.

Ensuring that these forces reflect, and respond to, state authority is critical to state legitimacy. This explains President Filipe Nyusi’s decoration for service of 235 members of the Local Forces on Mozambican Heroes Day in Mueda last February. The following April, Minister for National Defense Cristóvão Chume highlighted the need for them to be properly regulated, and work within government frameworks, and respect human rights. Minister Chume also spoke that day of his pride in the Local Forces, based on his experience when he commanded the Northern Operational Theater for FADM.

Links to the party, veterans’ structures, and other formal leadership structures can be the basis for formal collaboration. Links with Frelimo have perhaps made it easier for the FDS to collaborate with such militias in the north. Recent developments in the south, and the emergence of militia drawing on the Naparama tradition may be more difficult to manage. Naparama groups that have appeared in Namuno and Montepuez have no clear leadership, and no obvious links to the administration. Legitimacy for their participants is drawn from perceived spiritual powers, rather than association with the state and the liberation struggle. Applying new legislation to such groups may prove more challenging than with the Local Forces in the north. It may also prove challenging when state messaging is unclear. The Naparamas could be said to be taking their lead from General Commander of the Police Bernardino Rafael, who in late September urged people to confront insurgents with their “machetes and knives,” words which Prime Minister Adriano Maleiane had to later qualify as being just a call for increased collaboration with the authorities. 

For those supporting the FADM, such as the European Union, the proposed regularization of Local Forces under the Chief of General Staff presents a challenge. There is opportunity in supporting security sector reform that has high level political support. Yet there is also risk in being associated with the behavior of a militia that falls under the command structure of FADM, but over which FADM will have limited influence.   

Government Response

During the inauguration of the Coral Sul Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) project on 23 November, President Nyusi reaffirmed that security conditions are in place in Palma for the resumption of economic activities. He stated that the defensive cordon in Palma district, developed with the support of the Rwandan and Southern African Development Community forces, was now well established. Eni, the Italian energy company that has led the development of the FLNG project, reiterated that it is considering the possibility of expanding its FLNG portfolio in Mozambique given the success of the Coral South project. Eni's Director of Natural Resources Operations Guido Brusco, quoted by DW, said that the second platform would allow it to increase production in the short term, alongside "onshore developments" that have been delayed by insecurity.

International Monetary Fund Mozambique mission chief Alvaro Piris Chavarri said on 22 November that they expect the TotalEnergies-led Mozambique LNG project to come on stream in 2027, and "the third project," presumably the ExxonMobil-led Rovuma LNG, in 2028. Chavarri said in an online press conference that "there has been some marked improvement on the ground in recent months" in terms of the violent conflict in Cabo Delgado, noting that "there are still attacks, now more isolated, smaller," but he warned "there's certainly scope for a resurgence" of violence.

Also during the past week, the port of Mocímboa da Praia reopened after nearly two years of interrupted operations due to attacks by the insurgents in the area. The first cargo was scheduled to arrive on 29 November, according to public broadcaster TVM, which Zitamar News was able to confirm on the day. The port will be used, among other things, to receive supplies for the gas projects in Palma district. 

While Nyusi says that the security situation is under control and that some of the insurgents are fleeing, he acknowledges that the insurgents continue to enter Mozambique. Nyusi said, quoted by AIM, “the terrorists are entering via Niassa and Tete” provinces rather than entering from Tanzania in the north. “They travel in trucks to go and join the bandits,” he said, warning that the “terrorists” are trying to recruit young people to their ranks across the country. 

Nyusi’s fears don’t tally with research that has been published on this issue thus far; there have been insurgent cells in Niassa province, but no evidence of insurgents coming through Malawi, to either Niassa or Tete. Illegal immigration through Malawi is surely an issue, but has more to do with economic migrants from the Horn of Africa moving to South Africa. The president’s comments are consistent, however, with recent comments from the defense minister — and with a general narrative that has been pushed by the government since the start of the conflict, that it is driven by “terrorists” coming from outside Mozambique.

Minister of the Interior Arsénia Massingue said last week that the training of “special forces” of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique to combat terrorism, kidnapping, human trafficking, and the drug trade, which was first announced in November 2021, is still ongoing. Massingue explained to the press that the initial six-month training was extended due to the complexity of the instruction. Asked for a new deadline, she refused to mention dates, saying only that "our country has contacted several partners to carry out this training and it is taking place." It is unclear what exact role these “special forces” will have, who is training them, or how they will relate to other elements of the police, such as the Rapid Intervention Unit, currently deployed in Cabo Delgado.  

Nampula State Secretary Mety Gondola has reassured concerned businesspeople that a plan is being drawn up to reinforce security in districts with a high concentration of people displaced by the conflict. He was speaking with tourism operators in the province who were asking for security measures to be tightened for the upcoming festive season. It is unclear if the plan Gondola spoke of is just for Nampula, or will cover other locations with large numbers of displaced people. The security challenge brought by large movements of people has been an issue with which Pemba, in particular, has been grappling for some time.

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