Cabo Ligado Weekly: 23-29 August
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-July 2021
Figures updated as of 30 July 2021.
Total number of organized political violence events: 951
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,218
Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,471
Please note: ACLED’s real-time data updates are paused through the end of August 2021. Data for the period of 31 July to 3 September will be released on 6 September, at which point real-time data publication will resume. All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
Most events in the Cabo Delgado conflict last week took place at the edges of the conflict zone, as major combat operations either slowed or took place hidden from public view. On 23 August, Rwandan troops raided an insurgent base they called “Ubaua,” somewhere in Quissanga district. There were no reports of a battle, and though the Rwandans recovered firearms from the base, it may have been deserted. No insurgent activity has been reported in Quissanga district for months.
The same day, in Nangade town, a Mozambican soldier on patrol in the town’s Chitunda neighborhood accidentally fired their weapon. The negligent discharge hit a civilian woman, who later died after being evacuated to Mueda for treatment. No one had been arrested for the negligent discharge as of 25 August, leading many civilians in the town to complain about the level of impunity enjoyed by Mozambican troops.
On 24 August, fishermen traveling to the Macomia district coast were waylaid by insurgents in Mucojo. The insurgents killed 10 of the fishermen, decapitating them, and injured another three who then escaped. The three injured fishermen reported the incident to authorities. This is the second consecutive week of insurgent incidents on the Macomia coast, which may be a result of insurgents moving south from Mocimboa da Praia district ahead of the advance of Mozambican and Rwandan troops.
On 26 August, the Mozambican military intercepted a boat off the coast of Mocimboa da Praia district that was carrying seven tons of food and other supplies north towards Palma. The boat’s papers said that its destination was Ilha Matemo, which is to the south of where it was intercepted. Authorities say that they suspect the supplies were to be delivered to insurgents. An investigation is underway.
The next day, Mozambican military leadership announced that a combined Mozambican-Rwandan force had occupied an insurgent base near Ntchinga, Muidumbe district, about six kilometers from the district capital of Namacande. The announcement offered no details of the occupation, nor any indication of whether insurgents were present when government forces arrived. Photographs and video later emerged of Mozambican troops in Ntchinga village, along with insurgent graffiti they found there. Local militia members fought insurgents at Ntchinga as recently as February 2021, and insurgents shot a publicity video there in April 2020 when they first occupied the village.
There were multiple reports last week of more Rwandan troops entering Cabo Delgado. Some sources described the influx as part of an overall increase in the Rwandan deployment to Mozambique, but it is unclear if that is the case. More likely, they are there to relieve Rwandan troops currently deployed to the front line and will have little effect on Rwanda’s overall deployment levels.
In southern Tanzania, a column of trucks carrying armored personnel carriers, motorbikes, and soldiers south was spotted in Mtama, Lindi district. The route they were on leads toward the Negomano border crossing into Mueda district in Cabo Delgado. The source did not see the trucks reach the crossing, so they may have been sent only to patrol on the Tanzania side of the border. However, they may also have been part of Tanzania’s contribution to the Southern African Development Community Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).
Incident Focus: Dar es Salaam Attack
There was also an incident in Dar es Salaam last week with potential, though murky, connections to the Cabo Delgado conflict. On 25 August, a man opened fire in the city’s diplomatic quarter, killing two police officers with a pistol before taking their rifles and walking toward the French embassy. Outside the embassy, he engaged in a standoff with Tanzanian security forces, killing another policeman and a private security guard and injuring six others before being killed by police.
The gunman’s motives are not yet clear, but Tanzanian authorities were quick to draw a connection between the attack and the ongoing violence in Cabo Delgado. Speaking to a local television station, Tanzanian police chief Simon Sirro speculated that the attack could be a response to Tanzania’s announced involvement in SAMIM. “There are problems [in Cabo Delgado]” he said, “our soldiers are there.”
Whether the shooter was responding to SAMIM, or had any involvement with any armed groups, remains unknown. His attack has not been claimed on any official Islamic State (IS) channels, but competing narratives have appeared on social networks alternately tying him to IS and distancing him from it. A clip that purports to be the shooter handling a pistol and lip synching to an IS chant has made the rounds among pro-IS social media accounts, suggesting that he operated as a so-called “lone wolf” in support of IS. Another clip has circulated showing him praising leaders from Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi at an event mourning the passing of the late Tanzanian president John Magufuli earlier this year, which has been used to suggest his attack was not directed at the Tanzanian state.
Whether or not this attack came at the direction or encouragement of IS, it is clear that Tanzanian authorities believe their involvement in Cabo Delgado makes such attacks more likely. The easiest way for insurgents to reverse the losses they have suffered at the hands of international interveners would be to reduce the will of intervening countries to continue their deployments in Cabo Delgado. If IS wished to assist in that effort, planning or encouraging attacks inside intervening countries would be a logical step, and one the group has taken before in response to other interventions in IS-associated conflicts.
Government Response
Life in Palma town is beginning to return to normal. Hundreds of people who had been staying in Quitunda have returned to the town, and the town market is once again hosting a range of local traders. Prices for food staples have fallen even in nearby Namandingo, where a kilogram of rice is down to 90 MZN ($1.41). In July, a kilogram of rice was going for 110 MZN ($1.73 at the time) in Quitunda.
In Nangade, however, supply issues remain acute. According to a 24 August report, over 200 displaced civilians remain in the reception center for displaced people in Nangade town and food there is running low. Officials are working to both extend supplies and get people registered so they can access government services. In the meantime, many of the displaced are destitute and have trouble accessing food for themselves.
For displaced people residing farther south, the Mozambican government continues its mixed messaging around when and if displaced populations should return to their home communities. Local authorities in Chiure district are reportedly selling land in the district to displaced people who have taken shelter there. The scheme appears to be an accommodation to the prospect of displaced populations remaining in Chiure for the foreseeable future. It could also, however, be a scam that preys on displaced people’s uncertainty about the future -- apparently, no receipts of the transactions are being issued by local authorities.
Conversely, there appears to be something of a public relations campaign underway by Mozambican security forces, urging displaced civilians to begin planning to return to their homes. Local government and security forces in Macomia continue to make the case that at least the western part of the district is safe, and there have been renewed efforts to bring civilians back to Quissanga district as well. Indeed, last week the government began work to repair the road connecting Quissanga town and Bilibiza to the N380, the main north-south route through eastern Cabo Delgado. The Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) is taking the lead on the project, making it the first major public works project ADIN has overseen since it was launched a year ago.
Getting reliable press briefings from the Mozambican government about the Cabo Delgado conflict remains a major challenge. This has become increasingly salient as until recently Rwandan forces have been a relative fount of information. With members of Mozambican civil society bemoaning that the polished Rwandan media strategy makes it seem like Rwandans are doing all the fighting, the Mozambican government has reportedly reached an agreement with Rwanda to be the first to break news about events in Cabo Delgado. Rwandan press statements have been in short supply recently, perhaps reflecting that agreement.
Maputo’s move to regain control over the narrative in Cabo Delgado has not, however, resulted in any added access for Mozambican journalists in the conflict zone. Local journalists complained last week that they are consistently denied opportunities to report on the conflict, and are given less access than international journalists. One local journalist called the situation “incomprehensible” and “a threat to press freedom,” saying that it drives a widespread belief that the government is “hiding something that is happening on the ground.”
On the international front, African Development Bank president Akinwumi Adesina told reporters last week that he expects TotalEnergies to resume work on its liquified natural gas project in Palma district within 18 months. The Bank is a major donor to the project, and the statement can be read as an effort to pressure the French company to move toward a resumption of work. For its part, TotalEnergies has reportedly dispatched executive Maxime Rabilloud to Maputo to take stock of the project. Rabilloud previously managed major concessions in Brazil for the company.
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