• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,251

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,007

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,716

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Last week saw incidents across five districts, ranging from attacks on vehicles to small skirmishes. There have also been signs of some technical sophistication on the part of the insurgents, with sightings of a drone in Pemba, and an improvised explosive device (IED) on the N380.

On Thursday 26 May, a car belonging to District Services for Health, Women and Social Action (SDSMAS) was attacked in the area around the village of Muaguide in Meluco district. According to a source, healthcare equipment was stolen from the car, along with 9,000 meticais ($140) and some mobile phones. No casualties have been recorded, but a nurse traveling in the car is reported missing. Photos of the car have been released, showing the vehicle badly damaged inside and out.

According to one source, this was the second ambush in eastern Meluco last week. The day before, insurgents reportedly held up an ambulance near the Nguida crossroads. The source claims that the driver and a passenger managed to escape, but insurgents captured a woman before burning the vehicle and the goods inside. The military arrived and took the remains of the car to Muaguide.

On 28 May, in the middle of the day, another vehicle was ambushed outside the village of Tete on a stretch of road between Mocímboa da Praia and Palma, near the border between the two districts. The truck, a Toyota Canter carrying goods and passengers from Mueda to Palma, was accompanied by a security escort to Mocímboa da Praia and then left to continue on its own as the military were supposed to be patrolling the area. However, the area where the truck was attacked had no military presence. The insurgents shot at the truck as it drove past, puncturing its tires, but the driver managed to continue as far as Maputo village in Palma district, four kilometers beyond Tete. The attackers are assumed to have been targeting the truck’s load. 

According to other sources, another attack took place on the same day on the same road. In this incident, shots were fired at a car, though no injuries were reported. A third unconfirmed source reports a further incident on 30 May, between Tete and Quelimane, in which a civilian car was attacked. Passengers are thought to have sustained injuries.

This series of incidents may be associated with the group known to be in the Olumbe area. Their earlier raids for food suggested desperation, but these recent attacks, even if opportunistic, indicate they still present a threat. 

Insurgents also engaged in light skirmishes with security forces. On 23 May, insurgents attempted to raid the village of Mandela in Muidumbe district but were repelled by local militia following a short exchange of fire. On 25 May in Macomia, another group of insurgents coming from Chicomo clashed with security forces outside Quinto Congresso. It is not known if there were any casualties, but insurgents reportedly left five bags of dried cassava at the scene before fleeing. In the nearby area of Chai, a security consultant reports that there have been several incidents of random shootings from the hills and forests east of the N380 highway. The area has been the scene of continuing operations by joint intervention forces and the Mozambican military since April. 

However, security forces were unable to protect civilians from insurgent violence in all cases. On 26 May, insurgents attacked the village of Pitolha in Meluco district. It is not known how many casualties there were, but Islamic State (IS) social media posted a statement claiming responsibility for burning down homes in the village. IS social media also claimed responsibility for burning homes in Namituco village in Meluco on 29 May, although no other reports of this attack have so far been received. 

Local sources also report that insurgents attacked the area near the village of Primeiro de Maio, about 30 km from Meluco district headquarters, on the road to Muaguide. A man was allegedly captured while returning from his farm on 27 May and forced to call his family to tell them he was safe. The next morning, hearing that the military were approaching, the insurgents attacked the man and left him for dead. The soldiers took the man to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

In another case of escalating violence in Meluco district, on Sunday 29 May, security forces found a decapitated body on the roadside between Unguia village and Meluco district headquarters. The victim has not yet been identified.

These attacks, when considered in the light of attacks to the west of the N380 the previous week, suggest that armed groups may be moving out of areas of Macomia east of the N380 that are subject to operations by Rwandan, Mozambican, and Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces. 

Government security forces were also responsible for harming civilians. Carta de Moçambique reported last week that in Pemba on 20 May, four members of the security forces assaulted a displaced person for entering a restricted zone by the naval base, leaving him unconscious. A journalist from private broadcaster STV was also reportedly harassed by soldiers in Pemba on an unspecified date, according to the same report. While drone sightings may have made the military in Pemba nervous, such incidents have been a theme of the response to the insurgency for the past five years. 

In a worrying, if not unprecedented development, several sources claim that SADC forces  encountered insurgents planting an IED on the main N380 supply route between Macomia and Awasse towns. A security consultant source also records the appearance of a drone over the Mozambican navy base at Pemba harbor. 

IEDs are not new in Cabo Delgado. In September 2021, a Rwandan military column was damaged by such a device. At the time, it was reported that other such devices had been discovered in Mocímboa da Praia before they could do any harm. The attempted escalation to the use of IEDs made sense for an irregular force targeting a regular mechanized army. Recent roadside ambushes have not been targeting military columns but civilian traffic. If IEDs remain an option for the insurgents, this may change. Allied to sightings of drones over Pemba port, it is clear that the insurgents retain enough technical sophistication to present a significant risk to armed forces. Drone use may not be new. The then Interior Minister, Amade Miquidade, warned of use of drones by the insurgents back in May 2020. 

Weekly Focus: Life in Palma 

A semblance of normality has been returning to Palma district in recent months, driven by renewed optimism for the liquefied natural gas project (LNG), and the ability of the security forces, Rwandan and Mozambican, to keep open transport links that supply the town, and enable some to access markets beyond Palma. Commercial activities are a welcome return to normal. Development policy and land allocation may also reflect a return to normal, according to critics. A recent allocation has attracted criticism for bypassing community consultation procedures, and potentially creating the type of resentments that have contributed to the conflict.

Much commerce is apparent in Palma. The fishing community at Namadingo village (also known as Maganja) on the southern side of the Afungi LNG project site receives traders from Mueda on a weekly basis while Palma-based traders are able to move fish to markets in Nampula as well as Mueda. Namadingo lies less than 1 km from the Afungi site, allowing its fisher community to benefit from site security.

The return of business people and employees of contractors is also giving a boost to the higher end rental market according to Cabo Ligado’s source. The contractors’ return is evidenced in the trucks loaded with supplies that have been arriving for the LNG site and the support camps. The circulation of cash has also attracted traders of Somali and Indian origin, who are slowly returning to the town.

Palma has come a long way in the past 17 months. In 2021, the new year began with an assault on the model resettlement village of Quitunda, on the edge of the LNG project site. Violent clashes in Olumbe to the south of the town and Quionga to its north, marked the first quarter of the year. By March 2021, all routes into the town were closed and residents were suffering from hunger. On 17 March 2021, Mozambican security forces opened fire on people as order broke down at a food aid distribution. Seven days later, the insurgents launched their attack on Palma.

In that context, recent incidents in Palma district are relatively minor. Recent raids for food on Quifuque island, and at Olumbe village reflect an insurgency under strain. Nevertheless, last week’s attack on an armed vehicle coming from Mueda is a reminder that the insurgents have not gone away. The attacks also underscore that the security provided by Rwanda’s security forces is not watertight. Military escorts are not currently mandatory on the roads in Palma district. This reflects the sea change in the security environment since Palma has been secured by Rwandan forces. Whether last week’s attack indicates that Rwandan forces are stretched as they continue operations beyond their bases in Palma and Mueda remains to be seen.

Commercial space has been secured through military means but in the longer term will need to be maintained by institutions underpinned by a social contract. The Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) sees the recent allocation of 12,000 hectares of land in Palma district as undermining both. The land was provisionally granted to the Cabo Delgado Economic Development Promotion Center (CPD) by the Council of Ministers on 17 May.

CDD criticizes the decision for its lack of respect for institutions, and its potential to fuel resentment. It notes that CPD – established in May 2021 – shares many functions with the Development Agency for the North (ADIN), thus questioning its necessity. It alleges that no effective community consultation, as required by law, could be undertaken at a time when so many people are displaced.

CDD’s concern is that as CPD does not have the resources to develop such a large tract of land, it is likely to be parceled out “to accommodate the interests of the political elites and international financial capital.” This, CDD argues, would ignore the roles of inequality, poorly functioning institutions, and consequent resentments in fuelling the insurgency. 

However the land may ultimately be used, and however the process was managed, CDD highlights how the official view that the insurgency has been driven by outside agitators limits the possibility for change in how Cabo Delgado is governed. Pressure on the official view is mounting. The Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy for the North (ERDIN), if approved soon as President Nyusi indicated on 27 May, recognizes just such issues and recommends a more inclusive approach to development planning as one way of addressing grievances that have driven the insurgency. Future decisions concerning the 12,000 hectares will be a good indicator of any change in the government’s present analysis.  

Government Response

President Filipe Nyusi attended a series of events last week in which he commented on the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Perhaps the most anticipated of these events was a session of the Frelimo Central Committee. At the opening of the two-day event, which began on 27 May, Nyusi was cautious about the success of counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado, while acknowledging the progress of the joint forces in reducing insurgent activities. He said that the actions of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS), supported by Rwandan forces and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), have substantially decreased and weakened insurgent capacity. On the other hand, Nyusi described the latest insurgent attacks as sporadic and essentially aimed at obtaining food. 

Nyusi called for caution against triumphalist speeches, warning that the insurgency remains a major threat and challenge for the country. He acknowledged the need to strengthen the capacity of Mozambique's defense, despite relying on the support of foreign forces. He also spoke of the need for investment in the social development of both Cabo Delgado province and the northern part of the country. The Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado is already underway, he remarked. He also promised his government would approve ERDIN, the five-year strategy for the development of the north, within days. The draft was completed in November 2021, with support from the African Development Bank, World Bank, United Nations, and the European Union, and awaits approval by the Council of Ministers. 

Also at the meeting of the Frelimo Central Committee, Nyusi reaffirmed the government's commitment to the implementation of the LNG project in the Rovuma basin. The Mozambican president foresees the start of LNG production in the second half of the year through the offshore Coral Sul floating platform. He did not specifically mention onshore LNG production at the Afungi site, suggesting his views overlap with those of consultancy firm Eurasia, which says it is unlikely that LNG production will restart in the next 12 months due to the persistence of attacks.

Speaking on 27 May, Nyusi said that the government has not yet authorized the return of displaced populations to their areas of origin and did not elaborate on when and under what circumstances the returns will take place. On the contrary, Nyusi said that just as the people have not received an “official command” to leave their areas of origin, he does not expect them to wait for an approval from his government for them to return. He also called for a greater involvement of the Attorney General in cases of violations by people returning to their areas of origin. Nyusi was speaking at a conference marking 10 years of the Ombudsman’s office, established under the constitution to defend citizens against the state. 

The General Police Commander, Bernardino Rafael, announced the dispatch of police inspectors to investigate cases of human rights violations committed by agents of the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) in Cabo Delgado. Recently, local people in Macomia town complained to Rafael of aggression and extortion by the UIR forces, and asked for their withdrawal from the area. Reports of aggression and ill treatment by Mozambican police date back to the beginning of the conflict in Cabo Delgado and persist until now. Over the past month, there have been reports of abuses by the FDS in Palma, Local Forces in Macomia, and a recurrent practice of military abuse in Pemba, the capital of Cabo Delgado. The solution to the problem will require a structural rather than a reactive approach. Nevertheless, investigating particular cases such as the case of mistreatment in Macomia is an important starting point to restore public trust on government authorities. 

The hardships of those in internally displaced people (IDP) centers continue to increase. In addition to the reduction in food rations, displaced people have seen their food purchasing power reduce due to the rising cost of living in the country. Displaced people who receive World Food Program (WFP) vouchers of 3,600 meticais ($56) for food collection in their local stores can no longer buy the same amount of products as they did a few months ago. This situation will likely exacerbate the tendency for people to return to their areas of origin. Data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) displacement tracking matrix indicate that 97% of the displaced reported that their main need is food, and that some 2,097 displaced people returned to their areas of origin, and 1,036 arrived at the accommodation centers between 11 and 17 May.  

In Nampula, the administrator of Rapale district told displaced people there that there would be no more food aid. If they want to continue receiving food aid, they must go to the largest IDP center in Nampula, in Corane, Meconta district. 

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