Cabo Ligado Weekly: 24-30 January
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-January 2022
Figures updated as of 28 January 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,149
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,702
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,613
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
Insurgent violence in central Cabo Delgado continued last week, with attacks in Macomia and Meluco districts. On 26 January, insurgents returned again to Nova Zambezia, Macomia district. They surprised people working in the fields on the outskirts of the village, beheading at least one man. Surviving civilians, as well as many from nearby villages, fled south to Macomia town following the attack. Insurgents have attacked Nova Zambezia repeatedly in the past two months, most recently on 15 January.
The next day, insurgents struck Mitambo, in eastern Meluco district. Again, the group targeted people working in outlying fields, beheading one man. Mitambo, like Nova Zambezia, sits along the N380, the road that connects Pemba and Macomia, and then continues north to Mocimboa da Praia. The road has been one of the main axes of insurgent activity in 2022. Continued attacks along the road pose a threat to Macomia town, which risks becoming isolated if the N380 around it becomes too dangerous for regular traffic.
On 28 January, insurgents raided two villages in Meluco district slightly to the west of the N380. In the first attack, on Iba, insurgents burned and looted homes and killed at least six (one local source put the number as high as 12) civilians. Many civilians fled north to Macomia town, in part because they were prevented from fleeing west to Montepuez by a Mozambican military roadblock on the road through Meluco district to Montepuez. Among those who escaped to Macomia was the Iba village chief, who told reporters that, though Mozambican forces were capable enough to block displaced people from seeking safety in Montepuez, they were inexcusably slow to respond to the attack on his village.
After leaving Iba, insurgents later that night attacked Muaguide, some 15 kilometers to the southeast. There, they killed eight civilians. The Islamic State (IS) later claimed an attack on 28 January in a place they called “Muhibi” in Meluco district – it is likely they were referring to Muaguide. In the claim, IS described a clash between insurgents and Mozambican military forces, saying that one Mozambican soldier was killed. No independent sources confirm that there was a clash in Muaguide.
A joint force of Rwandan and Mozambican soldiers ambushed a group of insurgents near Naquitengue, in southern Mocimboa da Praia district, on 29 January. Two insurgents were killed, including an insurgent leader named Twahili Mwidini, according to Mozambican police chief Bernardino Rafael. Rafael claimed that Mwidini had been responsible for the kidnapping of two Brazilian nuns during the insurgency’s August 2020 attack on Mocimboa da Praia town. The nuns were later freed after a $25,000 ransom was paid.
A court in Pemba handed down jail sentences last week for 22 young people convicted of supporting the insurgency, with jail terms ranging from 30 years for those convicted of joining the insurgency to ten and a half years for those who were minors when arrested. The group was arrested after their ship, which was traveling up the coast from Nampula province to an island off of Mocimboa da Praia, sank near Pemba in June 2020. Survivors of the wreck told reporters at the time that they were traveling to fish, not to join the insurgency. The judge in the case dismissed this claim, saying that the only plausible reason to enter the conflict zone is to fight, either on the side of the government or the insurgency. In reality, however, many civilians before and since June 2020 have tried to maintain their livelihood by fishing off of conflict-affected areas of Cabo Delgado. The convictions and long sentences in this case appear to be more the result of pressure on the judicial system to play a role in counterterrorism than clear evidence of wrongdoing by the convicted.
Outside Mozambique, Salim Mohamed Rashid was arrested in Democratic Republic of Congo on 28 January, where he was allegedly working with the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Rashid was a fugitive from justice in Kenya, where he faces terrorism charges after having been deported from Turkey after being arrested trying to enter Syria. Prior to his arrest, Kenyan police alleged that Rashid was in Mozambique and working with the insurgency there, based on mobile phone records. To have him appear in DRC working with the ADF is among the strongest evidence yet of direct collaboration between the IS affiliates in DRC and Mozambique.
Information about earlier events also came to light last week. On 8 January, some 400 Mozambicans fleeing violence in northern Cabo Delgado crossed into Tanzania at Maparawe. Tanzanian military forces met them and, in keeping with Tanzania’s policy of deporting Mozambican refugees attempting to escape the conflict, returned them to Mozambique across the Unity Bridge in Mueda district. Insurgents attacked the village of Alberto Chipande that day, which is close to Maparawe. The displaced Mozambicans were likely Alberto Chipande residents.
On 18 January, insurgents wearing Mozambican military uniforms beheaded two men on the road outside Nkoe, in western Macomia district. Their families were ordered to bring the heads back to the village, as a warning to village leaders. The attack was similar to a 15 January incident near Nova Zambezia that also involved beheading and the delivery of a head as a warning.
Incident Focus: Funding Questions
Two intertwined questions about the future of international interventions in Cabo Delgado came to the fore in last week’s news: how will the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) fund itself going forward, and how will the Rwandan deployment in Mozambique do the same?
The news is grimmer for the prospects of future funding for SAMIM. Last week, Lesotho’s Finance Minister Thabo Sophonea said that the country might have to withdraw its troops from SAMIM before the mission’s current extension is up in March. According to Sophonea, his government “doesn’t have money to continue paying the soldiers’ allowances in Mozambique. We also don’t have money to pay for their food.” SADC, he continued, had promised to pay soldiers’ allowances and to provide ammunition, but have not been providing the funds.
The Lesotho Defence Force is currently the fourth-largest troop contributor to SAMIM with about 125 soldiers, making up over 11% of the mission’s deployed strength. Lesotho also provides one of the five aircraft SAMIM uses in the regular course of operations. If Basotho troops were to return home, it would have a significant impact on the mission’s ability to provide security in Nangade district, where they are currently deployed alongside Tanzanian and Mozambican forces.
It is difficult to say if Sophonea’s claim that SADC is not living up to its funding promises is true, but it does seem clear that Lesotho has held up its end of the funding bargain. According to an internal SADC document obtained by Cabo Ligado, Lesotho has paid in full its promised contribution of roughly $375,000 toward the mission, and has received in turn just over $200,000 in payments to support its deployed forces. In total, SADC has collected just over $6 million of the $7.3 million promised by member states to support SAMIM, with DRC, Mauritius, and Malawi owing the vast majority of the outstanding $1.3 million (Malawi claims that it has paid its contribution, but the funds had not appeared in SADC accounts as of late November 2021).
It is clear from the SADC document that the regional body hopes to find “alternative funding” from outside SADC, but to this point the only funds appear to be from member states. With fiscal pressure building, those member states may not be able to maintain their deployments in the long term, which would significantly deplete the already thinly-spread pro-government coalition in Cabo Delgado.
The prospects for funding for the Rwandan deployment are brighter, but raise their own questions. Hervé Bléjean, the head of the European Union Military Staff, told the European Parliament last week that Rwanda had submitted a formal request to the EU to fund its mission in Cabo Delgado. The EU’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, is reportedly “determined to respond favorably” to the request, paying the support out of the European Peace Facility. The move seems aimed at building closer cooperation between the EU and Rwanda in Mozambique, as Bléjean urged the parliament to allow the EU training mission in Mozambique to coordinate with Rwandan forces and for EU troops to be allowed to deploy to Cabo Delgado so that they cannot be “accused of being less courageous” than Rwandan, SAMIM, or Mozambican troops.
Bléjean’s eagerness to put EU troops in harm's way in Cabo Delgado should be considered next to the news that TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné is in Maputo this week for discussions with Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi about the possibility of resuming work on the French energy major’s liquified natural gas project in Palma district. During his trip, Pouyanné told reporters that he hopes to resume work in Palma within the year. Rwandan troops have focused their efforts on improving security in eastern Palma and along the corridor connecting Palma town to Mocimboa da Praia and Mueda, creating an island of security in what is still an active combat zone, but doing little to extend that island beyond the immediate security requirements for the gas projects to continue.
Borrell was supposed to be in Maputo at the same time as Pouyanné, but postponed his trip due to a COVID-19 infection in his entourage. The announcement of EU funding for the Rwandan deployment, combined with Pouyanné and Borrell’s planned trips to Maputo, gives the strong impression that the EU is acting to preserve a major European company’s investment through support of a third party intervention in the Mozambican conflict. Pouyanné did little to dispel that impression by visiting Kigali before arriving in Maputo, saying only that he had not sought a security agreement between TotalEnergies and Rwanda, but making no comment on arrangements between Rwanda and the EU. If the Rwandan deployment remains as it is, and TotalEnergies resumes work in Palma, it will be hard to avoid the conclusion that EU support is largely for TotalEnergies’ benefit.
Government Response
One measure of the Rwandan military’s success at securing the Mueda to Palma corridor is the ease of trade along that corridor. According to a source who recently made the trip, authorized mini buses carrying goods for trade can make the trip from Mueda to Palma in six hours, stopping for frequent roadblocks manned by Mozambican and Rwandan forces that ensure only authorized vehicles make the trip. The price for passengers varies between 1,000 meticais ($15.66) and 1,500 meticais ($23.49), and cars are lined up to receive authorization for the trip. This system supports a booming business in trade between Palma and the rest of the province.
Some positive news on food aid distribution emerged last week, with the World Food Programme (WFP) returning to Quissanga district. WFP, along with a range of other humanitarian groups, delivered food aid and other assistance to 2,650 people in the district. It is unclear how many of the recipients are people who have remained in Quissanga throughout the conflict, and how many are recent returnees who are trying to escape situations in resettlement sites where they lack access to food aid.
There was also good news regarding school openings. At the end of 2021, the Cabo Delgado provincial government reported that 219 schools in the province were closed due to the conflict. Last week, the government announced that the number of closures is down to 183. A government spokesperson told reporters that the school openings will contribute to the provincial government’s plan to limit educational delays as a result of the conflict. The plan also includes literacy programs conducted through churches and mosques and added resources for secondary schools.
For people remaining in resettlement sites, the arrival of the rainy season is a major challenge. In the Meconta district of Nampula province, rains began in earnest at the beginning of last week. Displaced families in the Corane resettlement site there report that their shelters – often little more than tents – have been damaged or destroyed by the rain, and that the roads are so bad that WFP and other humanitarian agencies are having trouble reaching them to deliver aid. As heavy rains reach further north, these kinds of problems will threaten much more of the displaced population.
In an effort to roll back displacement in Niassa province, provincial secretary of state Dinis Vilanculo visited Mecula district last week. He urged people who could do so to return to their homes, and promised that the government would rebuild some homes destroyed by insurgent attacks in the coming months. He also urged local residents to cooperate with Mozambican security forces to prevent a return of insurgent violence in the district.
On the international front, Tanzanian president Samia Suluhu Hassan traveled to Pemba last week and met with her Mozambican counterpart to discuss the conflict. Both leaders agreed on the need to improve border security along the Ruvuma River, and cited the insurgency’s ability to operate on both sides of the border as an obstacle to victory in the conflict.
In addition to strengthening security ties with Mozambique, Tanzania also expanded its security cooperation with the US last week. Tanzanian marine special forces conducted joint training operations with US special forces, and Tanzanian police trained with the US Coast Guard. The training programs are part of a long-running effort on the part of the US to increase security cooperation with Tanzania.
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