• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,033

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,425

• Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,545

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Reports last week underlined the extent to which Mozambican security forces remain a threat to civilians in Cabo Delgado, even as the threat posed by insurgents has lessened. On 26 October, Mozambican forces killed at least 10 (and, according to one source, over 20) civilian fishermen off the coast of northern Macomia district. The men were working out of Ilha Matemo, in Ibo district, but had recently come ashore in the Macomia village of Pangane to get fresh water. There, authorities attempted to interdict the fishermen, accusing them of violating a ban on maritime activity north of Ilha Matemo and the ban on civilians in Pangane. The men fled back out to sea, and Mozambican forces pursued them, eventually opening fire and killing all but two of the fishermen. Sources say that the ban on maritime activity off northern Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia, and Palma districts is well known, but that people in Ilha Matemo and elsewhere continue to fish in those areas because they have no other options to find food or earn money.

Civilians are also threatened by state security forces on land. In Likobe, near Chai in northwestern Macomia district, the Mozambican army tortured and killed a civilian man on 30 October. The man was working in his field, which is in an area declared off limits by the military. After killing the man, soldiers returned to the area near Lake Chai that houses most civilians in the Chai administrative post and told locals about the killing, warning them not to cross into restricted areas if they wish to avoid  meeting the same fate.

Mozambican national television last week aired an interview with a young girl who had escaped the custody of insurgents. The girl claimed that, as part of a program of socialization into violence, insurgents forced children into cannibalism and killed children who refused to participate in military training. The girl’s story, though harrowing, does not square with many other accounts of the treatment of children in insurgent captivity put forward by escaped adults. Adult accounts report boys being trained for combat and girls sexually exploited and trafficked, but neither cannibalism nor widespread killings of children. 

Mozambican police announced last week in a press conference that it had confiscated three RPG-7 grenade launchers in Cabo Delgado. No further context was provided about the seizure of the weapons -- part of a trend of police reports about firearms confiscations becoming less detailed.

A new incident from earlier in the month also came to light last week. Sometime between 21 and 23 October, civilians in Nagalue, Macomia district discovered three bodies in the village. Those who made the discovery believe that the deceased -- one child and two adults -- were civilians killed by insurgents. The bodies had been decomposing for some time when they were found, and local militia members who inspected the scene estimated that the people had been killed some time ago. 

Incident Focus: Tanzania’s Information Environment

The scale, military success, and political focus of the 14 October 2020 attack last year on the Tanzanian border town of Kitaya seemed to presage a significant shift in the conflict. Just ten days before a general election, insurgents were able to mobilize a large force, overrun a town with an estimated population of over 5,000 people, and repulse a military detachment stationed nearby. Video clips of fighters ripping up election posters of President Magufuli echoed previous threats  made against him by jihadist groups in Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the propaganda that had been spreading all year in East Africa’s jihadist spaces on social media.

The Kitaya attack marks the high point of insurgent actions in Tanzania. Security operations in Mtwara and Ruvuma regions involving military, police, and national intelligence -- which were already significant -- were strengthened in the wake of the Kitaya attack. Thus, subsequent to the Kitaya attack, ACLED records just three attacks in Mtwara from October 2020 to February 2021.  Since February, ACLED has recorded only three violent clashes in Mtwara, all of which have occurred since the interventions by Rwanda, and by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).

These are sparse data, and may reflect restrictions on access to information put in place by Tanzanian authorities since the conflict began more than the actual rate of incidents. The attack on Kitaya was not officially acknowledged until one week after the incident. Given its scale, news of it started to circulate immediately, making it difficult to deny. Reports of smaller attacks or clashes involving small groups, perhaps focused on looting shops in small settlements, is easier to suppress, and when received is not always verifiable. Indeed, the Tanzanian military last week publicly denied that the confirmed insurgent attack of 20 October in Kilimahewa, Tandahimba district took place.

Restricting reporting by mainstream media in Tanzania is straightforward for the Tanzanian state. Arbitrary suspension of media outlets has always been a feature of Tanzanian governance. The memory of Azory Gwanda, a journalist for the Aga Khan-owned Mwananchi Communications, also looms large. Gwanda was taken by unknown people in November 2017 while covering the security operations taking place then in Kibiti District, Pwani Region against an incipient jihadist insurgency whose leaders fled to Cabo Delgado. He is believed to be dead. Perhaps inevitably, this has led to an increasing reliance by the media on Mozambican sources that have contacts in Tanzania rather than drawing directly from Tanzanian sources for news of insurgent action in Tanzania.

Despite these restrictions, as noted, Cabo Ligado has been able to verify three incidents in Tanzania since international intervention in Cabo Delgado, all small scale involving less than twenty attackers, with securing supplies confirmed as a motive in two attacks. Verified clashes have taken place in border areas in Tandahimba District, and across the border from Nangade, and in Mtwara District, the rural areas to the east of Mtwara region, across from Palma District. These reflect the breaking up of insurgent camps and disruption of supply networks on that side, involving the Tanzania People’s Defence Force SAMIM contingent stationed in Nangade.

With Tanzania now having a significant military presence on both sides of the border, we can expect that access to information will remain at a premium. 

Government Response

Even as Mozambican forces are violently enforcing restrictions on civilians movement and food-gathering activities in Mocimboa da Praia and Macomia districts, demand for food products and other forms of trade in the conflict zone is only increasing. In Palma, that demand has begun to be met in part with overland transport of goods, with a convoy of trucks -- accompanied by a military escort -- arriving in town last week. The convoy traveled from Mueda via Mocimboa da Praia, the first authorized use of that route by civilians since insurgents took control of Mocimboa da Praia. 

Even with the newly arrived convoy, however, food prices in Palma remain alarmingly high. On 29 October, rice was selling for 120 meticais ($1.88) per kilogram, which is more in dollar terms than the price on 29 January, when the town was almost completely isolated by an insurgent blockade. Corn flour is selling for 92 meticais ($1.44) per kilogram, which is more in both metical and dollar terms than the price on 29 January. Even with the high prices, however, a source in Palma reports that people there prefer being able to buy food at the market to being at the mercy of sometimes unpredictable food aid distributions. Their hope, the source said, is that the government will invest the security resources necessary to allow greater movement of goods going forward, which would reduce prices.

Outside of the conflict zone, the Mozambican government is encouraging food production among people displaced by the conflict. On 28 October, agriculture minister Celso Correia and head of the Northern Integrated Development Agency Armindo Ngunga arrived in Marocane, Ancuabe district to distribute 12 tons of agricultural inputs to displaced families there. A provincial government official, speaking at the event, urged displaced people to grow crops in Ancuabe district to increase their self-sufficiency without returning to their homes in the conflict zone. 

In Montepuez district, however, food aid irregularities led to protests on 26 October. During what was meant to be a registration event to add more people to the list of those receiving food aid in Nakaka, displaced people began to march against the misallocation of food aid to locals. Distribution lists still do not include many in the area, leaving some displaced people without access to food. 

Demands for food access were also front of mind at a meeting in Pemba between Mozambican Deputy Attorney General Glória da Conceição Adamo and civil society organizations on 25 October. Representatives from a range of local and international aid organizations told Adamo that the food aid voucher system is still subject to major inefficiencies and corruption, leaving many without access to aid. They also complained about ongoing violence by Mozambican security forces against civilians, especially the targeting of displaced people traveling without identification documents. To be stopped without documents, the organizations asserted, is often to become the victim of beatings and extortion at the hands of security forces. Adamo agreed that these were major abuses, calling the situation “glaring,” and promised to investigate. She also, however, confessed that her office lacks the investigative resources necessary to gather information on crimes by security services, saying that it is difficult to identify perpetrators in the military and police force because “they are very mobile people” and have often left the area where crimes took place before prosecutors can begin an investigation.

In Maputo, Mozambican Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário told parliament that the government’s counterinsurgency effort is making “progress,” allowing for more and more displaced people to return home. He also reported that the administration believes natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado put on hold by the conflict will begin generating revenue in 2026 -- a significant delay from earlier estimates, but still optimistic according to experts.

On the international front, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa reaffirmed his government’s commitment to SAMIM, extending the authorization for up to 1,495 South African troops to join the mission for another three months, matching the extension SADC granted to the overall mission. Despite reports conflating the number of troops authorized with the number deployed, South Africa has far fewer than 1,495 troops in Mozambique at the moment -- experts estimate the true number at under 500. In his letter to parliament, Ramaphosa estimated the cost of deployment for the duration of the extension at $64.5 million, although it is unclear if that describes the cost of the existing deployment or the cost of sending the full authorized force. There is also no indication in the letter of any plan to reimburse South African taxpayers for the cost of the deployment from an outside funder.

The head of the European Union Training Mission in Mozambique, Portuguese general Nuno Lemos Pires, gave a long interview last week in which he laid out some of the goals of the mission. According to Pires, the mission will train 11 “rapid reaction units” -- five from the fuzileiros and six from the army -- with the aim of having them ready to deploy within two years. Two such units -- one navy and one army -- graduated the program last month, having begun training when the program was under the auspices of the Portuguese government. The training takes place in Catembe and Chimoio, in southern and central Mozambique respectively, far from the combat zone in Cabo Delgado. Though Pires expressed confidence in the training mission, experts still have concerns about the Mozambican military’s ability to staff 11 such units.

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