Cabo Ligado Weekly: 25 April-8 May 2022
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-May 2022
Figures updated as of 6 May 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,232
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,950
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,701
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
The last two weeks have seen a resurgence of attacks and kidnappings in Nangade, Palma, and Macomia districts. On Saturday 30 April, insurgents were spotted approximately 6 km south of Nangade town, around the village of Chibau, where they reportedly killed an old man and burned down several buildings. One source alleges that civilians were also captured but the numbers cannot be confirmed.
The following morning, a 21-seat minibus was ambushed in the woods outside Litingina, 10 km south of Chibau in Nangade. The driver was able to evade the insurgents, who opened fire on the vehicle as it drove past. No deaths have been reported but three passengers were injured, including a woman, a child, and a man. Another source claims the insurgents then moved into Litingina, where they killed one person and injured another.
On 3 May, insurgents appeared again in the village of Muhia, about 10 km north from Nangade town, near the Tanzanian border. Local reports suggest they beheaded several people but the number of victims is not yet known.
The Nangade area is formally the responsibility of troops from Tanzania and Lesotho under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), working with the Mozambican Defense Forces, but locals report that these forces have been ineffective in combating the insurgent threat in the district. SAMIM forces have reportedly failed to respond, even when insurgents came within 2 km of their positions. This apparent lack of action has further undermined public confidence in the SAMIM operation to protect civilians, even when reports suggest the number of active insurgents in the area may be as low as six to eight, with only two or three who are actually armed.
Due to the security forces’ failure to contain the insurgent threat, the Nangade-Mueda road has been closed since 1 May, leaving the town cut off from supplies. This has disrupted banking services, leaving many unable to access their salaries, and stalled the ongoing polio vaccination drive.
Multiple sources confirm that troops from the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), who are usually responsible for Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts, have now intervened in Nangade to pursue the insurgents. Despite this, insurgents continued to circulate around the area and on 7 May, they attacked the village of 3 de Fevereiro, just east of Nangade town, and attempted to capture a woman and child, who both eventually escaped.
On 8 May, the insurgents struck again in the Rovuma village lowlands, capturing several people in fields around Nankuka, also in Nangade district. Local Forces – militias loyal to the government and Frelimo – reportedly went to confront the insurgents but turned back after they were unable to free the hostages. This insurgent group is reportedly composed of three Tanzanians and four Mozambicans, of whom one is missing an arm and the other has been shot. Once again, SAMIM and Local Forces were criticized for merely trying to deter the insurgents without fighting them.
Palma district also saw an insurgent attack on the village of Olumbe on 6 May. According to one source, the insurgents told the villagers to leave and looted the area for supplies, mainly food. Joint forces consisting of the RDF and the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) soon arrived and following a stand-off, all 20 insurgents were killed. Another source claims that before the insurgents were eliminated, three Mozambican soldiers were beheaded, suggesting there was already a military presence in the village when the insurgents arrived. A further source confirmed the presence of a military base on the outskirts of Olumbe. The incident is highly significant as the insurgents were driven out of Palma district at the beginning of February, according to a statement from the Mozambican Ministry of Defense. Ever since, the majority of violent incidents have occurred in Nangade, Mueda, and Macomia districts. Their return to Palma indicates that containing the insurgency remains a struggle for the security forces.
Islamic State (IS) issued a claim on 9 May for the killing of three members of the “Mozambican crusader army,” and the burning of a “barracks” at Quiterajo. A source in Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) has also reportedly confirmed the attack and the fatalities. Other sources said the attack occurred on the morning of 7 May, and also reported three deaths, as well as the injury of two others.
The attacks in Olumbe and Quiterajo, and the claim of responsibility by IS for the latter are significant, for what they tell us about the insurgents’ capacity, and what they tell us about IS. The decline in the scale and frequency of insurgent attacks in recent weeks suggested a diminished capacity to sustain an offensive. Attacks in these well-manned areas suggest otherwise. On the other hand, the weakness of the insurgents elsewhere brought into relief on 6 May when a group of insurgents in Macomia laid down their arms and surrendered to Rwandan troops. The size of the group is not known but it is said they come from various backgrounds, including Macomia itself and beyond.
Other reports suggest that not all of the insurgents surrendered peacefully. According to one source, Rwandan forces killed 10 insurgents in Pangane village in Macomia on the night of 6-7 May. The insurgents were reportedly all staying in the house of a local businessman, which Rwandan troops surrounded before opening fire, killing them all.
Civilians in Cabo Delgado have suffered mistreatment at the hands of government security forces. In Macomia, on 28 April, around seven youths fishing along the Messalo river near Chai were beaten and robbed by Local Forcesmilitia, who stole their fishing nets, fish, and money. In Nangade, on 23 April, at least nine youths were captured by Local Forces in the Rovuma lowlands, also on suspicion of working with insurgents, and were left in the forest with nothing to eat. Their fate is not known.
Two cases illustrate the variety of support roles that the insurgency relies on. Investigation by Carta newspaper into the arrest of five men on terrorism charges in Balama district has shed some light on the insurgency’s finance networks. Four men were arrested at the house of a primary school teacher who transferred funds to accounts in Montepuez district, and also used funds to purchase supplies for members of the insurgency who would stay in his house. The teacher’s younger brother was also involved with the insurgents, joining as a fighter after working as a trader between Palma and Mocímboa da Praia.
In a second case reported by Jornal Noticias, a man’s involvement ranged from fishing to feeding the insurgents, to tracking FDS movements. Originally from Nacala, he moved to Macaloé island in Macomia district where he worked as a fisher with his Tanzanian wife, and Congolese and Kenyan companions, allegedly to supply the insurgents. He was later taken for training along the Messalo river before being deployed as a scout. He was formally charged by the public prosecutor of Cabo Delgado with espionage, possession of weapons, criminal association, and membership of a terrorist organization on 28 April.
In Mtwara, sources say that in the second week of April, a man was arrested on suspicion of trafficking a child to Mozambique. The man reportedly had on him directions to the border in Mtwara. There have been cases of children trafficked to Cabo Delgado by people connected to the insurgency before, and it is suspected that was the case with this incident. The child has been returned to their family. Prior to this, there had been no recorded incidents in Tanzania related to the Cabo Delgado insurgency since February this year. Whether this reflects the success of security measures, or just that the Rovuma river is high after the rainy season, will become clear in coming weeks. With the rains over, the river should be easily crossable by the end of May.
Weekly Focus: Northern Strategy Delays
The Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy for the North (ERDIN) remains stalled, over six months since its completion. ERDIN, prepared by the Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), has been awaiting approval for over a month by the Council of Ministers. Two fundamental issues have reportedly delayed it: its identification of domestic issues that drove the insurgency, and absence of a military component. It is also thought to be perceived by elements in Frelimo as a donor-driven analysis.
ERDIN was to be the strategy of ADIN, a body created in March 2020 to coordinate government action in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula provinces. Cabo Delgado dominates ADIN of course, hence the approval in September 2021 of the Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado (PRCD), focusing on the restoration and development of infrastructure and public services.
The delay in approving ERDIN has been noted in the past three weeks by Joseph Hanlon of the UK’s Open University, the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Maputo, and Mozambique weekly newspaper Savana. Savana claims that the document has been with the Council of Ministers for more than a month but is meeting resistance.
The first obstacle, according to Hanlon, CDD, and Savana, is its focus on internal factors as being at the root of the conflict in Cabo Delgado. The draft strategy states that "at the root of the insurgency are perceptions of inequality, exclusion, and marginalization, which date back to the period of independence, and are all the more poignant given the region's wealth and economic potential." ERDIN doesn’t ignore external factors, referring to the porousness of national borders, drug trafficking, ivory poaching and smuggling, and the illicit gemstone trade, as well as links with “terrorist” networks in East Africa as contributing factors to the insurgency. But the complementary focus on internal issues contradicts the official position. The Mozambican government sees the insurgency as an externally driven attack on national sovereignty. President Filipe Nyusi said last September that the captured insurgents are of foreign nationality and that their leadership is unknown to Mozambicans. Studies by Mozambican think tanks such as the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR) and Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE) contradict this, identifying several Mozambican leaders among the insurgents.
The second obstacle preventing the approval of the ERDIN is the absence of a significant military component. Its focus on strengthening the capacity of the state and the justice sector reflects the significance it gives to internal drivers of the insurgency. It proposes supporting the FDS in establishing “meaningful dialogue” with communities, and to provide training in human rights.
Reforming and re-equipping the FDS, as well as financing the Rwandan and SAMIM deployments in Mozambique, has been a priority for Nyusi's government. In February, President Nyusi requested EU assistance for both interventions. In April, the EU announced €1.9 million for SAMIM under the SADC Rapid Response Mechanism in Cabo Delgado and provided €89 million for training and capacity building of Mozambican troops under the European Peace Facility.
Such funding does not match President Nyusi’s ambitions. As ERDIN does not provide a mechanism to fund security sector reform, the government is now looking for alternative means. On 5 May, President Nyusi, speaking at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced that a strategy for mobilizing funds to strengthen military capacity is underway. The proposed Mozambique Support Trust Fund would complement the work of ADIN with reform, capacity building, and modernization of the FDS. This may provide the mechanism that President Nyusi can present to donors to underwrite reform and re-equipping of the FDS. The idea of a trust fund was first mentioned by the finance minister, Max Tonela, in an interview he gave in Washington DC in April.
Joseph Hanlon has observed that donors thought that in November 2021, they had government support for this approach, through their engagement with the responsible minister, Celso Correia. Delays since November suggest this was a miscalculation — and Correia is no longer the responsible minister, Savana reports, with ADIN having passed to the finance ministry under Max Tonela.
Delaying ERDIN approval may be a means of Frelimo reasserting control over ADIN’s mission, despite it being dependent on donors financially. ERDIN followed an approach – Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments – developed by the United Nations, World Bank, and the EU. One of its primary purposes is to “provide an inclusive process to support political dialogue and participation of stakeholders,” something that does not sit easily with Frelimo’s analysis of the conflict. Delaying ERDIN approval, while presenting a complementary mechanism through the trust fund may be a response to perceived donor overreach.
ERDIN itself may get a chance at approval following a meeting of Frelimo’s Central Committee at the end of this month, which could discuss the plan and potentially approve it. The Central Committee is the most powerful Frelimo organ outside of the five-yearly Congress, and outranks the Political Commission which meets every fortnight to guide government policy.
Government Response
The process of reconstruction and the return of displaced people to their areas of origin in Cabo Delgado was the theme of Cabo Delgado Governor Valige Tauabo’s tour of conflict-affected districts. Starting in Quissanga on 29 April, he claimed, without presented figures, that returns had been significant, but urged they be done gradually, according to a source in the district. He said the government’s plan for returns to the district would be done in phases, with people firstly returning to Quissanga town. Quissanga has already benefited from some rehabilitation, with the local health center and the Police District Command both having been reconstructed.
The following day, Tauabo visited the districts of Macomia and Muidumbe. A source in Miangalewa, Muidumbe district, said the rate of return there is lower than in Macomia partly because there is still a climate of fear, although the area has seen some security reinforcement. In Macomia, Tauabo visited the Rwandan troops deployed at Chai. The Rwandans have been conducting joint operations with SAMIM forces there since 30 March 2022, an area under the responsibility of SAMIM. The governor praised the work of the Rwandan forces and said that the return of the population to that area would take place soon.
In Mocímboa da Praia, work is underway to restore essential services, though return to the town has yet to start. By the end of April, several containers were installed in the main town to allow the resumption of state services while the rehabilitation of destroyed infrastructure continues. Sources on the ground say the containers were provided by TotalEnergies.
Meanwhile, reports of the alleged coercion of civil servants have emerged this week. According to Carta de Moçambique, civil servants from the Municipality of Mocímboa da Praia were given a 10-day deadline to report to their posts, or face administrative measures. The memo, from the president of Mocímboa da Praia’s Municipal Council, and seen by Cabo Ligado, ordered civil servants to be in Mueda by 15 May, when they would be taken to Mocímboa da Praia.
Further south, some 180,000 displaced persons in the districts of Metuge, Ancuabe, and Chiúre will get replacement identity cards thanks to an initiative of the secretary of state of Cabo Delgado province. The authorities have stated that returnees must be fully identified to be accepted back to their areas of origin.
Difficulties in providing food assistance in the internally displaced people (IDP) centers could worsen in the coming days. According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), the World Food Programme (WFP) has said that it may further reduce, or even be forced to suspend food aid rations from June 2022 if funding is not guaranteed as soon as possible. WFP had already halved its food rations for April and May, to the equivalent of 39 percent of a basic 2,100 kilcalorie daily intake. To continue to ensure its operations in northern Mozambique run at full capacity, WFP needs about $17.3 million monthly.
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has expressed concern over the increased number of children abducted in Cabo Delgado in areas affected by the conflict. Official figures indicate that at least 51 children have been abducted by insurgents in Cabo Delgado in the past 12 months, and at least 350,000 children are displaced. To address this and other violations against children and women, UNICEF will support the purchase of equipment for the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC) to strengthen its capacity to investigate cases related to violence against children, as well as gender-based violence.
ERDIN concerns notwithstanding, the PRCD reconstruction plan moves ahead. Joao Machatine Laimone, ADIN’s Coordinator of the Communication Programs and Crosscutting Issues Unit, told the ADIN Supervision Committee on 29 April that actions are already underway to rehabilitate infrastructure in Macomia and Quissanga districts. Machatine also said that ADIN was witnessing spontaneous returns in most of its areas of operation.
Machatine was also present at the launch of the CDD annual report on "Conflict Resolution in Cabo Delgado and Resolution Dialogue in 2022 and Beyond.” At the launch, he reaffirmed ADIN's leadership role in the reconstruction process of Cabo Delgado, and that the focus of his organization is on tackling the socio-economic factors that contributed to the insurgency. At the same event, CDD advocated the adoption of inclusive dialogue between the different actors as a central approach in the conflict resolution strategy. CDD suggested a dialogue approach should be taken from national to district levels in order to discuss "issues of power, resources, rights or financial gains, but also less tangible issues such as respect, esteem, and feelings." It was not clear whether the proposal also refers to a direct dialogue between the government and the armed insurgency in Cabo Delgado.
President Nyusi was in Cabo Delgado to attend the graduation ceremony of the Mozambican Civic Service at the Montepuez Education and Basic Center on 6 May. These forces, a type of reserve, are playing an important role in Palma, particularly in restoring destroyed infrastructure, according to the president.
President Nyusi’s visit to Montepuez followed a three day official visit to Uganda, that began on 27 April. The most interesting development during the trip was President Nyusi’s statement on Facebook that Uganda had been providing logistical support to the Local Forces in Cabo Delgado. As for further support, President Museveni was non-committal, but expressed willingness to support if needed. What constitutes “logistical support” is not yet known.
Montepuez also carries symbolic value in relations between Mozambique and Uganda, where Nyusi made an official visit in the last week of April. President Yoweri Museveni was trained at the Montepuez base when the Front for the National Salvation of Uganda (FRONASA) was formed, a forerunner of today’s ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM).
Vice Admiral Hervé Blejean, in charge of the EU military training mission for Mozambican praised the role played by SAMIM and Rwandan forces, as well as the important coordination role of Mozambican forces in ensuring security in Cabo Delgado province. Blejean made these statements after a visit to Cabo Delgado, including Macomia district, where operations are ongoing. There, he said he saw a safe environment although he believes that much remains to be done, as the insurgent threat is still present.
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