• Total number of organized political violence events: 1,013

• Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,382

• Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,538

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Situation Summary

The Cabo Delgado conflict spilled over into Mueda district last week for the first time since November 2020. Though the insurgency is not threatening Mueda town directly as it once did, operating in northern Mueda does represent an expansion of the insurgency’s footprint. The first reported attack last week in Mueda district appears in a Carta de Mocambique article from 28 September, which says that insurgents beheaded seven civilians in “Litiminha,” Mueda district before Mozambican troops responded, killing five insurgents. It is unclear, however, whether the incident took place in Mueda district or in Litingina, Nangade district. Sources on the ground near Litingina reported civilians fleeing the area on foot on 28 September, hearing gunfire in the distance and sleeping in the bush for three or more days.

The same Carta de Mocambique article reports another attack in Nangade district, in which a band of 10 insurgents kidnapped three women from 5º Congresso. No fatalities were reported in the incident. The kidnapping report was confirmed by a source on the ground, who also reported concerns from civilians on the ground that joint Mozambican-Southern African Development Community’s Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces were too slow to respond to insurgent attacks in the area.

On 1 October, insurgents struck in Palma district, along what Rwandan forces have described as the “northern axis” between Palma and Mocimboa da Praia towns. The attack occurred in Quitico, near Olumbe in southern Palma district. Insurgents killed three civilians, kidnapped one, and looted recently-received humanitarian aid packages that were in the village. Many of the surviving civilians fled by sea to Ilha Vamize. The insurgents, a group of seven, were reportedly later surrounded and killed by pro-government forces. As civilians and humanitarian aid return to areas of the conflict zone that had previously been deserted, civilian targeting by insurgents is likely to increase in an attempt to access food aid and other supplies.

Insurgent activity in Mueda district became clearer on 2 October, when a group of insurgents attacked Namatil, near the Tanzanian border. Arriving in the village near midday, the insurgents opened fire and made their way directly to the village market, in an apparent attempt to loot supplies. Border guards in the town engaged the insurgents, who fell back, but not before kidnapping a woman and two children. The insurgents also left a handwritten note, in Arabic and Kiswahili, addressing civilians in the town. The note claims that insurgents have no quarrel with civilians who have shown no ill will toward the insurgency, and states that the insurgency’s goal is that “God’s religion should rule.” It also urges “those with guns at Nachitenje” -- presumably, members of Mueda local pro-government militias -- to give up their weapons. A source on the ground in Nachitenje reported that insurgents last week approached women washing clothes outside the community and told them to spread the word that an insurgent attack on the town was imminent. 

New information about earlier incidents also came to light last week. The Islamic State (IS) released two claims to attacks in Mozambique, later accompanied by photographs. The first claim described an attack on 23 September in “Manazi Muga,” Nangade district, in which IS forces clashed with local militias and burned down homes. It is unclear to which village “Manazi Muga” refers, but IS did release original photos of burning homes, claiming that the homes belonged to Christians in a Nangade district village of that name. 

The second claim, also backed up with photographic evidence, described an attack on “Lukuanba” -- presumably Lucuamba, a village near Litingina in Nangade district -- on 24 September. According to the claim, IS forces beheaded two civilians, burned a motorcycle, and burned homes in the village. Accompanying photos show a motorcycle burning and the body of one civilian man. Cabo Ligado received earlier, unconfirmed reports of fires in the Litingina area on 24 September. The claim also suggests that “Manazi Muga” is in the vicinity of Lucuamba, which may offer a clue as to the location of the earlier attack.

Rwandan forces gave a press conference in Mbau last week, offering details on their push south through Mocimboa da Praia district. According to the Rwandan claim, insurgents attacked advancing Rwandan forces at Naquitengue on 20 August with 12 insurgents killed in the resulting battle. The spokesman also described a 1 September battle on the north bank of the Messalo River, southwest of Mbau, in which Rwandan forces faced off against a “huge number” of insurgents, killing “many.” The spokesman made no specific casualty estimates about the 1 September engagement, nor did he offer any news of Rwandan casualties during any incident. Following the battle on the north bank of the Messalo, the spokesman said, the surviving insurgents escaped across the river. The implication is that the remaining insurgents are now in Macomia district, outside of the Rwandan forces’ area of responsibility and in SAMIM’s operational area. SAMIM forces in Macomia appear to be less aggressive in their pursuit of insurgents than their Rwandan counterparts to the north -- perhaps because there are more civilians to protect in Macomia district than in Mocimboa da Praia district.

SAMIM, for its part, also offered updates last week on earlier engagements. In a press release, SAMIM increased its estimate of the number of insurgents killed in its 25 September attack on an insurgent base in Chitama, Nangade district to 19. Among those killed, SAMIM claims, was Rajab Awadhi Ndanjile, a native of Litingina who SAMIM claims led insurgent forces in Nangade district and was a founding member of the insurgency. 

New information also emerged about a much earlier incident: an engagement between Wagner Group mercenaries and insurgents on 5 October 2019. The account comes from a Wagner tablet computer that journalists obtained from Libya. The tablet contained an after action report for an incident in which around 60 insurgents ambushed two Wagner vehicles on the road near Limala, in southern Mocimboa da Praia district. Insurgents attacked the vehicles with rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles, killing the Wagner unit’s commander and injuring two other mercenaries. The Wagner report claimed that the assailants wore green camouflage uniforms -- presumably taken from the Mozambican military -- and spoke in Arabic.  

Incident Focus: SAMIM Status of Forces Agreement

Cabo Ligado obtained a copy of the status of forces agreement (SOFA) between Mozambique and SAMIM last week. The document was long a subject of controversy, delaying the finalization of SAMIM, but the document itself (presented without its annexes) offers little indication of the sources of contention around it. It does, however, point to where diplomatic challenges could arise going forward.

The SAMIM SOFA contains the provisions common to such documents. It lays out that SAMIM’s initial authorization is for three months, and that the maximum number of personnel deployed under SAMIM will be 2,916. It indemnifies SAMIM forces against any legal action in Mozambique resulting from actions taken in the course of their duties. It even provides for SAMIM forces to communicate freely by telegraph (among other modes) while in Mozambique. 

The SOFA notably does not contain, however, any clear metrics for measuring the success of the SAMIM intervention. The mission’s mandate pledges that it will help create a “secure environment” in Mozambique and help “restore law and order” in Cabo Delgado, but offers no benchmarks for the mission to aim for in pursuit of those goals. The only pathway provided for measuring and reforming the mission is the possibility of transforming it from a “Scenario 6” situation in the parlance of the SADC Rapid Deployment Capability -- which is known as “peace enforcement” -- to a Scenario 5 situation -- “peace support.” The decision about whether and when to move between scenarios falls to the Regional Coordination Mechanism -- that is, the SADC Troika.

Given that the first three months of SAMIM’s mandate are set to expire in October, the Troika will need to make a decision on extending the mission and the basis for intervention going forward quite soon. The Troika, along with Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi, are meeting in Pretoria on 5 October to consider SAMIM’s progress. A decision about the mission’s immediate future is expected shortly thereafter.

Government Response

Mozambique expects to spend $200 million in the next year, and $300 million overall, to help rebuild areas of Cabo Delgado affected by the conflict. The announcement came during a presentation by Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário to potential donors, who are expected to help finance the rebuilding plan. The prime minister said that short-term projects will include “replacement of public administration, health facilities, schools, energy, water supply, sanitation, telecommunications, access roads, civil identification, psychosocial support and self-employment, above all for young people" -- an ambitious agenda with combat still ongoing. The $300 million budget is significantly smaller than the $763.6 million outside donors had pledged to Mozambique’s Northern Integrated Development Agency, suggesting that much of the promised money either has not been delivered or is earmarked for longer term development work and projects outside of the conflict zone.

One of the priorities do Rosário mentioned in his presentation was restoring pensions and other forms of direct financial assistance that had been disrupted by the conflict. That work will be particularly important to the estimated 9,000 military veterans who have not received their pension in the last two years in Cabo Delgado. The estimate, which was released last week by the Veterans Ministry, was accompanied by a pledge from the government to restore pensions as soon as possible. Many veterans have lost documentation of their veteran status in the fighting, so restoring their documentation will be a key part in bringing back pension support. Given that local pro-government militias draw so much from veteran populations, it will be important for the government to appease veterans before their pension demands lead to potential unrest.

For some displaced Muidumbe residents who have not joined local militias, the last week offered the first chance since their displacement to visit their homes. Mozambican security forces have begun allowing civilians to move from Mueda to Muidumbe to inspect their homes and make preparations for an eventual return. This has allowed Muidumbe residents to survey the damage to the homes and villages they left. It has also led to a rash of looting as people with few resources return to find neighboring homes vacant and easily accessible.

On the natural gas front, Mozambican officials last week urged TotalEnergies to reduce what had been framed as a year-long delay in moving to the production stage on the company’s liquified natural gas (LNG) project in Cabo Delgado. Arguing that the security situation is improving, Mozambican finance minister Adriano Maleiane said in a speech that the proposed delay could be cut down to allow construction to resume before April 2022. Yet TotalEnergies appears to take the opposite view of the situation. In a document for investors, the company estimated that LNG production would be postponed to 2026, a production delay of two years on top of existing postponements. The company’s announcement indicates that it is unconvinced by recent security gains -- a level of caution echoed by President Nyusi himself, who warned in late September against declaring premature victory in the conflict. Yet such an extensive added delay poses a major economic and political risk for Mozambique, which has built its development plans around the prospect of receiving money from LNG production sooner rather than later.

Correction: This report has been updated to clarify that the engagement between Wagner Group forces and insurgents took place on 5 October 2019, not 5 November 2019.

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