Cabo Ligado Weekly: 30 May-5 June 2022
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-June 2022
Figures updated as of 3 June 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,269
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,018
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,722
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
Insurgent activity was concentrated west and northwest of Pemba town last week, where Quissanga and Meluco districts meet in Quirimbas National Park, as well as in Ancuabe district, south of the park. Up to 20 people were kidnapped in Quissanga and Meluco districts in provisions raids, and later released once they had fulfilled their role as porters, while Ancuabe district suffered its first significant attack in Nanduli village. Nanduli sits close to Metuge district to the east, and is just 50 km from Pemba town. The concentration of activity suggests that a base has been established somewhere in the area.
On 31 May, six armored vehicles were deployed to the village of Bilibiza by the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM), 30 km from Quissanga district headquarters, following reports that insurgents entered the villages of Tapara and Tororo. These lie respectively 10 and 14 km to the west of Bilibiza along the Montepuez riverbed. One source claims that two women were kidnapped from Tororo forcing others to hide in the bush, while another source reports that several people were captured and made to carry away food for the insurgents before being released. On the same day, separate sources reported incursions on Massasse and Mitambo (sometimes written as Metamo) villages in Meluco district on either 30 or 31 May – sources are discordant. Massasse and Mitambo are approximately 20 km northwest of Bilibiza. Again, provisions were taken and the kidnapped porters later released. One source indicated that up to 50 insurgents came to Massasse. The incidents in the two villages created sufficient alarm to persuade government officials traveling in convoy to Macomia to celebrate the founding of the district on 1 June to suspend their trip.
Activity in Massasse and Mitambo follows two incidents in the same area on 26 May, when a public health services vehicle on the Meluco-Pemba road and the village of Pitolha were raided. Pictures released by Islamic State (IS) from the vehicle ambush showed a group of at least 26 armed young men. As the Massasse raid was for provisions, it indicates that there may be an insurgent base in the heavily forested land between Massasse and Bilibiza, according to a local source.
On Sunday 5 June, insurgents moved southwest into Ancuabe district, which has not seen any major attacks since the start of the insurgency in October 2017. Insurgents entered Nanduli village on Sunday afternoon, set alight a number of homes and killed at least one person. The same day, IS social media claimed credit for burning “dozens of houses” and beheading one civilian. The burning of homes is corroborated by NASA fire data, which reported several clusters of fires directly over Nanduli village on the night of 5 June. On 6 June, IS itself released what it claimed to be photos of the attack, showing a number of houses ablaze.
Casualty estimates vary considerably, with some sources claiming that two were killed, including a woman, who was beheaded, and the guard of a farm belonging to Frelimo politician Alberto Chipande, while two other sources report that there were at least seven fatalities in the incident.
The incident prompted many in the surrounding area to flee to the village of Silva Macua, while others continued on to Pemba, Chiure, and south to Nampula. A video emerged on social media, appearing to show people in Ancuabe with packed bags and suitcases trying to board a bus heading away from the district. A local source reports that bus fares have been hiked from 150 meticais per person to 400 meticais for people trying to escape Ancuabe.
The movement of insurgents into new districts in Cabo Delgado once again highlights the security forces’ inability to contain the insurgency. The pattern of violence across the province shows that when forces attempt to clear insurgents from a district, they simply withdraw and appear elsewhere. The fact that insurgent groups can still circulate around Cabo Delgado with apparent freedom also reflects a poor level of strategic coordination between international forces that are each responsible for their own operational areas. In particular, Rwandan security operations seem to have pushed insurgents south and west, where they are not facing adequate backstop operations from Southern African Development Community (SADC) or Mozambican forces. A similar problem emerged when Rwandan forces pushed insurgents out of Pundanhar in February this year.
Despite the wave of surrenders reported in recent weeks, insurgents' structures seem to be resilient. Two women who fled from captivity arrived in the village of Namuembe in Nangade district, and reported that there are between four and six insurgent bases towards Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, each with up to 30 people. This continued presence in the district is likely behind consistent reports of the killings of individuals in fields, or fishing that circulate in Nangade. In the past week, there were up to three unconfirmed reports of such attacks.
Weekly Focus: Escapees’ Testimony Reveals Insurgency’s Resilience
Two women who had been with the insurgents for close to two years turned themselves in to the authorities on 31 May at Namuembe village in the south of Nangade district. Like others before them, they were sent out to scavenge for food, and took the opportunity to escape. The young women, aged 20 and 25, were captured in attacks on Mocímboa da Praia and Palma towns respectively. While the dates of their initial capture could not be determined, the women say they were with the insurgency for up to two years; Mocímboa da Praia, where the youngest woman says she was taken, was overrun in August 2020, while Palma was attacked in March 2021. In the meantime, the women claim to have been moved around during their captivity to a number of bases in various districts, including the Siri 1 and Siri 2 bases along the Messalo river considered to have been a headquarters of sorts, as well as bases in Pundanhar in Palma district, and in Nkonga in Nangade district, from where the women were able to get away. Their account sheds some light on the resilience of the insurgency, and the strength of international military intervention.
The women’s testimony illustrates the extent to which military intervention has disrupted the insurgents’ structures. Due to operations conducted by Rwandan and Mozambican forces, they say they were “in more places than they could count,” mostly in forested areas. Joint operations took out the Siri 1 and Siri 2 bases north of the Messalo river in September 2021. Another significant base south of the river was taken out the following November. The two women were likely on the move after the Siri 1 and Siri 2 attacks, forced north across N380 that runs from Mocímboa da Praia to Awasse, to the forested areas of Pundanhar in Palma district, and from there to Nkonga in the south of Nangade district. Losing access to funds and supply chains, the women say the remaining forces are suffering from hunger, a repeated theme over the last few months.
Yet despite these setbacks, the women describe their captors as a group that remains resilient, with leadership structures still intact. The base they left was in heavily forested land around Nkonga village in the southeast of Nangade. The women reportedly claim that the insurgency now has four to six bases, each with up to 30 people. How many of them are fighters, and how well they are armed are not known. They also spoke of two commanders, one in Nangade district and another in Macomia district, who are able to meet at the sites of abandoned camps in Mbau – which may be a reference to the old Siri 1 and Siri 2 camps.
The accounts of these women suggest two considerable weaknesses in the response to the insurgency. Firstly, there is the inability of SADC forces to prevent the establishment of at least one new base in Nangade district, a designated SADC Area of Operation. The ease with which women could walk from the base to safety will be of concern to residents and underscore doubts in the local community, and in Maputo, about the commitment of SADC forces, from Tanzania and Lesotho, present in the district.
Secondly, there is the seeming failure to hold ‘liberated’ areas. If the women’s accounts are true, and insurgents are still moving to and from the areas around their former bases, then a joined up leadership still exists between the insurgency’s branches in Nangade and Macomia, with at least rudimentary communication despite the international forces’ intervention. The recent attacks to the south in Macomia, Meluco, and Ancuabe, and to the north in Palma and Nangade, in the light of leadership structures that are in touch with each other, are of considerable concern.
Government Response
The incursion into Ancuabe, one of the areas spared by the violence represents a huge concern for the Mozambican government on multiple counts. First, Ancuabe is outside the operational areas of the joint forces of Mozambique, Rwanda, and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). The insurgent move into Ancuabe will stretch government forces, and lead to consideration of geographic expansion of the mandates of both SAMIM and Rwanda.
In the course of May, insurgent attacks were reported in Macomia, Nangade, Palma, and Meculo. This spread of attacks has increased the pressure on government forces and will likely require the forces to further stretch to respond to these new fronts. However, stretching the forces without increasing their number presents a huge challenge considering the size of Cabo Delgado province. Increasing the number of troops deployed, when foreign missions are already experiencing funding constraints, is unlikely.
Since the start of the conflict, Ancuabe has been a quiet district and safe haven for the thousands of displaced people fleeing the violence-affected areas. With panic and a sense of insecurity now in place, a massive flight of residents and displaced people from Ancuabe is imminent, and will have implications for the humanitarian response. The displaced people leaving Ancuabe will increase pressure on centers and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Pemba, Montepuez, Metuge, Chiure, and neighboring Nampula province. These districts are already under pressure, and the increased influx of displaced people will exacerbate the difficulties in providing humanitarian support. The World Food Program (WFP) is already at the limit of its capacity to provide food support to those displaced by the conflict in Cabo Delgado. An increase in displacements without incremental funding will complicate humanitarian assistance.
The attacks in Ancuabe and the recent insurgent movements in Quissanga and Meluco could affect the trend of the return of displaced people to their areas of origin. According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix data, between 27 April and 17 May 2022, about 70 percent of IDPs had expressed an intention to return to their areas of origin. In the same period, 7,800 IDPs returned home to the Muidumbe, Palma, and Mocímboa da Praia districts. Both the number of returnees and the trend of return are likely to be impacted by the incidents in Ancuabe, Quissanga, and Meluco.
Challenges in providing food assistance to the displaced are already being felt in Macomia town, where those displaced from the latest attacks on Chicomo, Licangano, and Nkoe on 22 and 23 May have been forced to return to their villages due to a complete lack of food assistance and other supports. Those who have returned have found their homes destroyed or burned, goods looted, and supplies vandalized. In the Pulo resettlement in Metuge district, in addition to irregular provision and distribution of food aid, low temperatures are bringing new hardship to the displaced, who complain of a lack of blankets and warm clothes to face the winter. Children, who are in the greatest numbers, are suffering the most from the problem. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) said on 1 June that more than 400,000 children are displaced by the conflict in Cabo Delgado.
No less important is the psychological trauma. The attack that lasted only a few hours in Ancuabe precipitated the displacement of the people in almost all the villages of the district. This incident shows that even with reduced capacity, small insurgent attacks can generate panic and massive displacement of populations. The psychosocial situation of the displaced is pointed out by the Deputy General Coordinator of Doctors without Borders (MSF), Mario Fumo, as being extremely worrying. Even in situations of low intensity attacks, the displaced continue to experience the traumas of sexual violence, beheadings, and loss of family members, hence the call for urgent intervention.
The US Department of State released its annual report on the state of religious freedom in the world. The report looks at government policies that violate religious freedom, and at the actions of the US government in promoting these rights. The 2021 Mozambique report discusses the impact of the conflict in Cabo Delgado on religious freedom. In its analysis of the government's response to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the report notes the arbitrary detention of civilians "because they appeared to be Muslim by their clothing or facial hair," citing reports from media and Islamic organizations. These practices feed into a sense of exclusion and marginalization of the Muslim majority in Cabo Delgado, one of the factors behind the insurgency according to the Northern Resilience and Integrated Development Strategy (ERDIN).
The report notes the transfer of the then Bishop of Pemba, Luiz Fernando Lisboa, from Mozambique to Brazil, after he received threats due to his criticism of the government's response in managing the conflict. It also notes that Muslim leaders in Mozambique have condemned the attacks perpetrated by a radical sect of Islam, which is not in line with the practice of “traditional” Islam in Mozambique. It also refers to the efforts of religious organizations and civil society in the search for solutions to the conflict, which involve addressing issues of exclusion, poverty, injustice, and oppression, rather than religion. The continuing armed attacks precipitated the closure of several religious establishments in Cabo Delgado. According to Father Jeancy Kayaba Masoka, Parish Priest of Macomia, in the diocese of Pemba, six of the seven parish communities in the north of the diocese of Pemba have ceased to function, with the exception of Mueda.
Finally, in Kigali, Mozambique’s Minister for Justice, Constitutional and Religious Affairs, Helena Mateus Kida, signed two agreements with Rwanda’s Minister of State for Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Soline Nyirahabimana, on 3 June. The two agreements, for extradition and mutual legal assistance, allow for extradition between the two states.
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