Cabo Ligado Weekly: 31 January-6 February

February 9, 2022 Cabo Ligado

Total number of organized political violence events: 1,153
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,724
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,630

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Insurgent violence last week continued in both coastal and inland Macomia district. According to a claim made by the Islamic State (IS), insurgents attacked Olumboa, a village on the coast of Macomia district directly west of Ilha Matemo, on 31 January. There, according to the claim, the insurgents killed one civilian in the village, whom the group accused of collaborating with local militias. No independent sources corroborate the claim.

The next day, on Ilha Matemo itself (which is part of Ibo district), insurgents launched an afternoon attack that carried on through the night. Arriving by boat, the insurgents burned buildings – including a hospital – and looted food and other goods in Matemo town, killing at least three civilians in the process. One local account estimated a far higher death toll, saying that 19 people were killed in the attack. IS later claimed the attack, asserting that insurgents burned 60 homes and stole five boats but not mentioning any deaths. Insurgents remained in the town overnight, leaving only the next morning when they were targeted by aircraft, presumably Mozambican military helicopters. Eventually, the insurgents left Matemo with six stolen boats, one of which was later recovered with stolen goods inside it.

Insurgents also left behind graffiti in Matemo, defacing a United States Agency for International Development-branded tarp with a message in Kiswahili telling civilians that troops from the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and Rwanda will not protect them from insurgent coercion. The graffiti and the attack itself are notable for their boldness. Insurgents have largely refrained from directly challenging Rwandan forces since they lost control of Mocimboa da Praia, preferring instead to operate in areas patrolled by Mozambican and SAMIM troops, which have shown less combat effectiveness against insurgents. Similarly, insurgents have avoided extended operations in areas with little tree cover since the arrival of foreign intervenors, in an attempt to limit the utility of foreign and Mozambican air assets. Launching a multi-day island raid and rhetorically confronting the Rwandan military is a notable attempt to demonstrate strength, coming from an insurgency many analysts considered to be on the run months earlier.

On 5 February, insurgents launched a series of raids in southern Macomia district, all along the N380 road that connects Macomia town to Pemba. The raids appeared to move from south to north, beginning near Nacate, which is on the border between Macomia and Quissanga districts. A group of insurgents ambushed a civilian hunting group in the afternoon, killing four of them and stealing the meat they were carrying. Just to the north of Nacate, insurgents then attacked the village of Rafique, where they beheaded one man and kidnapped at least 10 young women and girls. Further north along the N380, insurgents then waylaid two trucks, burning both and killing one truck driver. The other driver remains missing. By the night of 5 February, the insurgents arrived in the village of Bangala 2, which is roughly 10 kilometers south of Macomia town. Insurgents burned buildings in the town, but no civilians were harmed as they had already fled after hearing reports of the earlier attacks.

IS claimed the Bangala 2 attack, although the specifics of the claim were rendered unclear by what appears to be a case of shoddy IS copy editing. As written, the claim asserts that insurgents killed three members of Congolese local militia and burned two vehicles. It is unclear if the specifics of the claim are meant to refer to a Mozambican local militia, or if the content of the claim was confused with an IS-associated attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Also on 5 February, insurgents ambushed a patrol near Nova Zambezia, Macomia district, that, according to one report, was made up of Mozambican, Rwandan, and SAMIM soldiers. The patrol killed five insurgent attackers in the resulting firefight, and one Mozambican soldier was also killed in the fighting. Nova Zambezia was the target of frequent insurgent attacks in late 2021 and early 2022.

The next day, on 6 February, insurgents raided Nambedo, in southeast Nangade district. They looted food from the village, but no casualties were reported. Southeast Nangade has been another site of repeated insurgent activity in recent weeks.

An article that came out in the Mozambican newspaper Savana last week described how some insurgents that had entered Niassa province in November 2021 had begun to return to Cabo Delgado in the early weeks of 2022. That narrative tracks with attack reports, since the last confirmed insurgent attack in Niassa province took place on 22 December 2021. According to the article, insurgents found it difficult to operate in Niassa because it is so sparsely populated – as in Cabo Delgado, the insurgency there relied on civilian settlements to acquire food and other supplies. They were still able to move freely between Niassa and northwestern Cabo Delgado, however, despite the Mozambican and international deployments sent to stop them. According to the article, the freedom of movement for insurgents between Nangade and Mueda districts in Cabo Delgado and Mecula district in Niassa leave civilians who live along those routes vulnerable to recruitment into the insurgency.

Incident Focus: Macomia Situation

The recent rash of insurgent attacks along the N380 in Macomia poses a major problem for security in the district. After a period in which insecurity in Macomia district was largely localized in coastal areas and along the Messalo river in the north, attacks in 2022 have come mostly along the N380 corridor. The route connects Macomia town to Pemba to the south and Mueda to the northwest, making it a crucial path for people and supplies in the area. In the past week alone, there were five incidents along the N380, four south of Macomia town and one north of it. A local report after those attacks said that “cars still pass” along the N380 through Macomia, “but with fear.”

If traffic along the N380 were to be stopped by attacks on the road, much like traffic between Palma and Nangade was in the runup to the insurgent attack on Palma town, Macomia town itself would be in significant danger. SAMIM forces are based there, but they are reliant on resupply that would likely have to come via convoy from Pemba or Mueda. Despite this, SAMIM forces have proven remarkably ineffective in preventing attacks along the road. Last week’s insurgent attack on Bangala 2, less than 10 kilometers from the SAMIM base in Macomia town, didn’t draw any sort of security service response until the next day, when Mozambican forces arrived in the village.

Whatever is going wrong in the SAMIM response in Macomia, it bears little resemblance to the much rosier picture put forward by SAMIM Deputy Commander Dumisani Ndzinge in a press interview released last week. Ndzinge described the recent small group attacks by insurgents as a sign of SAMIM’s success at rooting out major insurgents bases in the district. The attacks, he said, are “a deliberate move to stretch security forces.” That is likely the case, but SAMIM’s unwillingness to be stretched appears to be threatening crucial lines of communication.

Ndzinge’s interview was also interesting for his account of cooperation between SAMIM and Rwandan forces. He said that cooperation was nearly non-existent when SAMIM first arrived in the country, but that “at this moment, our cooperation is almost where we want it to be.” As evidence, he said that two joint operations between Rwandan, SAMIM, and Mozambican forces have already been undertaken and that a third is being planned. Such joint operations may explain the report, mentioned earlier, of a Mozambican-SAMIM-Rwandan patrol near Nova Zambezia, which was ambushed by insurgents. Typically, “joint operations” in the conflict have referred to Mozambican forces operating with either Rwandan or SAMIM troops, so operations involving all three would signify a major step forward in cooperation.

Ndzinge said that SAMIM’s goal is to maximize coordination between the three pro-government forces so that geographic areas of responsibility can be dispensed with and joint operations can move throughout the conflict zone as needed. That may be a laudable goal from a military perspective, but it seems disconnected from the political realities on the ground. Rwandan troops seem intent on securing the Mueda-Mocimboa da Praia-Palma corridor, the area most crucial to the resumption of natural gas exploitation in Palma. Asking Rwanda to expand its mission, or to allow SAMIM into a potentially lucrative set of responsibilities, is unlikely to produce the response Ndzinge envisions.

Government Response

The economy of Palma town continues to improve, and businesses now appear to be working under the assumption that foreign workers will return in the relatively near future, presumably to resume work on the nearby TotalEnergies liquefied natural gas projects. According to a recent report, the Amarula Palma Hotel, which was besieged during the insurgent assault on Palma in March 2021, is undergoing extensive renovations to remove evidence of last year’s fighting and make ready for this year’s guests. In this enclave of security created by Rwandan and Mozambican troops, the most significant complaint among merchants is that banking infrastructure has not caught up with the rest of the economic recovery, making it difficult to access cash. Those quotidian concerns show how different the situation in Palma is from that in the rest of the conflict zone, where active combat, desperate displacement, or, in the best cases, cautious rebuilding are the orders of the day.

Even in Mocimboa da Praia town, where Rwandan and Mozambican soldiers appear to be offering the same level of security guarantee they are providing in Palma, the government continues to prevent the return of displaced civilians. Cabo Delgado Governor Valige Tauabo told reporters last week that despite the progress made in securing the town and restoring infrastructure, the government “cannot yet advise” people displaced from the town to return home. From his comments, it appears the government’s policy is that the insurgent threat will have to be eliminated throughout the district before the government allows Mocimboa da Praia town to be repopulated.

Further out in the district, however, there are some signs of normalcy. In Nanil, near Diaca in western Mocimboa da Praia district next to the border with Mueda, schools reopened last week. The village has become a jumping off point for traders traveling by convoy between Mueda and Palma. Teachers who were displaced from the village are returning.

More schools opened last week in nearby Muidumbe district, where 14 schools serving some 5,000 students were declared open in a ceremony on 31 January. At the ceremony, the Muidumbe district administrator hailed the openings, saying that another three schools will be opened in the district soon. For small pockets of conflict-affected areas, there is the beginning of a return to normalcy.

For those who remain displaced, however, the situation is not improving. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which provides aid and programming for displaced youth in northern Mozambique, reported last week that its proposed budget for work in Mozambique was only about 40% funded in 2021. The $56 million shortfall in UNICEF’s budget is indicative of a broader problem for international aid groups working in northern Mozambique, which have faced major budget issues since the crash in international aid funds following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the ground, these shortfalls manifest themselves in frequent reports of irregular food aid distributions and inadequate lodging for displaced people.

Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi promised in a speech last week that the country would pass new anti-terrorism laws in 2022, aimed at both prosecuting active insurgents and preventing activities the government sees as gateways to insurgent recruitment, like illegal mining. The laws will come in addition to the statutes under which, the Mozambican judiciary reports, 306 people were prosecuted for terrorism-related offenses in 2021 in Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. The 306 include Mozambican, Tanzanian, and Iranian citizens, the latter from the crew of a drug running ship who were interdicted in 2019 and charged, likely erroneously, with supporting the insurgency. Of the 306, 143 were sentenced to jail terms, and 155 were released due to lack of evidence.

On the international front, TotalEnergies CEO, Patrick Pouyanné, appeared to justify the confidence of businessmen in Palma during his visit to Mozambique last week. He told reporters that he wants to see “sustainable security” in Cabo Delgado before work on his company’s natural gas project in the province resumes in earnest, but congratulated Mozambique and the foreign intervention forces on the security progress made thus far. He also extended TotalEnergies’s investment in Mozambique, inking a deal to buy BP’s retail and wholesale fuel businesses in the country. Both the visit and the investment indicate the company’s continued belief that its natural gas project in Mozambique will come to fruition.

The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council announced last week that it will be sending a shipment of Chinese military aid to Mozambique this year to bolster SAMIM’s efforts in the country. The shipment is part of China’s commitment to support African peacekeeping missions through the AU. It is unclear what specific equipment the shipment will contain or when it will arrive, but it is sure to be welcomed by SAMIM, which faces significant financial and supply struggles. Indeed, in its communique, the AU also urged the EU and UN to help fund SAMIM.

Though the decision to send the aid to Mozambique was taken by the AU, the Chinese government almost certainly signed off on it, making this China’s first direct involvement in the counterinsurgency effort in Mozambique. It is worth noting the Chinese decision to get involved through multilateral African structures in the AU and SADC, rather than through its bilateral relationships with Mozambique or Rwanda. That approach stands in contrast with the EU approach, which has involved setting up a training mission directly with the Mozambican military and will likely involve offering to fund the Rwandan intervention in Mozambique directly.

The US increased its own bilateral security cooperation with Mozambique last week, announcing the start of another Joint Combined Exchange Training with Mozambican forces on 31 January.