Cabo Ligado Weekly: 4-10 October
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-October 2021
Figures updated as of 8 October 2021.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,020
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,411
Total number of reported fatalities from civilian targeting: 1,538
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
In the midst of an effort by many displaced civilians to return to areas now occupied by Mozambican security forces, observers were reminded last week of the significant threat that Mozambican troops can pose to civilians.
At some point between 6 and 8 October, Mozambican security forces captured seven boats near Ilha Mecungo, off the coast of Mocimboa da Praia district. The boats were carrying food and other supplies from Pemba and were bound for Palma. An unknown number of crew members and passengers were arrested. They were still being held in Mocimboa da Praia as of 11 October. One source reports that Mozambican forces are demanding a ransom payment in order to allow the boats to continue their journey.
According to a speech by Mozambican Police Chief Bernardino Rafael, pro-government forces ambushed insurgents in Limala, southern Mocimboa da Praia district on 6 October, killing two. One of those killed, Rafael said, was an insurgent responsible for the massacre of over 50 civilians at Xitaxi, Muidumbe district in April 2020. Rafael gave the man’s name as “Muhamudu,” presumably a nom de guerre.
On 7 October, a pro-government militia in Muatide, Muidumbe district captured and executed four young men believed to be members of the insurgency. A local youth reported that the four appeared suspicious, leading militia members to detain them. The militia members found Mozambican military uniforms in their bags and, deeming that discovery sufficient justification due to insurgents’ frequent use of such uniforms, shot the men dead on the spot. The incident indicates the impunity with which pro-government militias operate. Summary executions of captives are not the actions of a group that is being held accountable by its sponsors. As more displaced civilians return to areas of the conflict zone, the government’s reliance on local militias to provide security may increase. This would likely mean even less accountability and greater opportunity for militias to undertake personal and political objectives separate from their role as auxiliaries for the police and military.
What a source in Miangalewa, Muidumbe district described as “heavy fighting” between Mozambican forces and insurgents took place near Miangalewa on 1 October. No damage or casualty estimates were available for the fighting, but it prevented work that day on the damaged bridge over the Messalo River in the area.
New details about earlier events also emerged last week. On 30 September, members of the Mozambican military beat a civilian in Nangade district who refused their demand to serve them alcohol. The man had to be treated at the district health center. The same day, members of a pro-government militia in Nangade district arrested and beat a Tanzanian trader on the suspicion that he aided the insurgency. They later freed the man, once it became clear that he was simply a trader who moved frequently between Tanzania and Nangade town.
On 1 October, 12 insurgents entered the Tanzanian village of Kiwengulo, just across the Rovuma from western Palma district. The insurgents looted food supplies, killing a civilian woman who identified one of the insurgents as being from the area. Tanzanian security forces were not able to apprehend the insurgents.
The same day, Rwandan authorities announced the arrest of 13 people accused of planning to detonate improvised explosive devices in Kigali. Police presented the accused and the recovered bomb-making materials to journalists. They asserted that the 13 have connections to the Allied Democratic Forces, an insurgent group in the Democratic Republic of Congo that is more closely integrated with the Islamic State (IS) than the Cabo Delgado insurgency, though both operate under the umbrella of the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province. Speaking to journalists, the accused said that they had been recruited by a Kenyan national who claimed to have been in Mozambique and that the Kenyan wished to launch attacks in Kigali “in revenge for Rwanda’s intervention in Cabo Delgado.” Police made no statement as to whether they had arrested the Kenyan. The Kigali arrests are an indication that the Islamic State may be working internationally to increase the cost of foreign intervention in the Cabo Delgado conflict.
Back in Cabo Delgado, on 2 October insurgents kidnapped a group of four women from fields where they were working outside Nangololo, Meluco district. One of the women later escaped, arriving in a village in Macomia district some days later.
The same day, insurgents struck again just across the border from Nangololo in Macomia district, abducting seven women from Nacate. Forces from the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) did not muster to pursue the attackers until 3 October, by which time the insurgents could not be found.
SAMIM forces did engage insurgents in Macomia district at some point during the week of 26 September, killing four insurgents on the coast near Mucojo. No further details of the incident are available.
SAMIM also reportedly captured a brother-in-law of insurgent leader Bonomade Machude Omar (see more below) in its 25 September assault on an insurgent base in Chitama, Nangade district. Another 19 insurgents were also reported captured.
An investigation by Mozambican newspaper Ikweli details abuses by Mozambican security services against civilians displaced from Mocimboa da Praia over the last six months. Civilians report patterns of behavior toward people from Mocimboa da Praia that include beatings, sexual assault, and confiscation of goods. In areas where foreign forces are now deployed, civilians report that Mozambican security force behavior has improved but can still be exploitative when Mozambican troops are not supervised by foreign counterparts. The investigation highlighted the beating of a 17-year-old boy from Mocimboa da Praia in Nangade town on 24 August. The boy was accused of being an insurgent and severely beaten by Mozambican security forces without having any chance to speak in his own defense.
Incident Focus: BBC Special
Last week, the BBC released a video investigation of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, entitled “Sons of Mocímboa.” Drawing on interviews with hostages who had escaped insurgent custody in Mocimboa da Praia, the video offered new descriptions of insurgent leaders and life in insurgent-occupied Mocimboa da Praia.
Civilians who had been held by insurgents in Mocimboa da Praia described a culture of fear induced by the group, in which large numbers of hostages were cowed into submission by brutal treatment from insurgents. Some recounted seeing people beaten and killed for failing to pray at prescribed times. Others described a “training” program for women and girls taken by the group, after which they would be forcibly wed to fighters and separated from the rest of the hostages. One said that some of the hostages were ransomed, with rates around $7,800 per person.
The former hostages also described two leaders of the insurgency, with whom they interacted repeatedly. The first was a man the BBC video refers to as “Abusuraca” and “Nuro.” He is also known as “Ibn Omar” and was named by the US government as Bonomade Machude Omar. According to the State Department, Omar is both the senior military official and “communications conduit” for the insurgency. Former hostages described him as a brutal captor who personally mistreated civilians in insurgent custody. Many also felt personally betrayed by him, as he was a well-known local trader in Mocimboa da Praia before joining the insurgency. They cite Omar as an early organizer of the insurgency, who acquired weapons for the group and was an organizer of the first insurgent attack in Mocimboa da Praia in October 2017.
The second leader discussed in the video is identified as Abu Dardai Jongo. Informants who knew Dardai as a young man described his ascent as a local trader in Macomia and his commitment to proselytizing for Islam. They recounted that, in 2016, Dardai branched out into human smuggling, moving people across the border with Tanzania and south to Montepuez. Given the destination, the people he transported were likely artisanal ruby miners, digging on and near the sizable ruby mining concession in Montepuez. Upon returning to Macomia after his time in the smuggling business, acquaintances said that Dardai’s character changed, that he had become “a different person.” Shortly thereafter, Dardai left Macomia to join the insurgency.
Taken along with other studies of insurgent leadership, the BBC investigation underlines the clear importance of northeastern Mozambique trading networks to the insurgency. Both Omar and Dardai were successful local traders and Dardai worked as a human trafficker, two professions that draw on the transnational networks of kinship, religion, politics, and finance that drove the Cabo Delgado economy before the discovery of gas. The investigation -- conducted by a BBC team that specializes in open source intelligence based on photo and video analysis -- also underscores just how little media the insurgency has created and disseminated. For all of its apparent connection to the Islamic State’s global network and mission, the Cabo Delgado insurgency’s communications strategy has remained stubbornly localized and delivered overwhelmingly through word of mouth.
Government Response
Though the rain has not yet begun to fall, the rainy season in Cabo Delgado is imminent. With opportunities for effective planting growing slim, there is still disagreement among displaced people over whether and when to return home. The Mozambican government has offered little clear advice one way or the other. The situation is made even more complex by the recent movement of insurgent fighters away from longtime base areas in Mocimboa da Praia and western Palma districts and into areas that civilians are considering resettling, such as Macomia and Quissanga districts. One civilian, displaced from Muidumbe district, summarized the problem by observing, “I'm not sure if I should go back. It's just that the new attacks are scary, they're making people confused and that's complicated.”
Among displaced people in Chiure considering a return to Macomia district, opinions are mixed. Some are actively moving home, loading furniture and other goods onto trucks and driving east. Others -- especially those hailing from coastal areas in Macomia district where insurgents have been more active recently -- are inclined to wait out the rainy season in Chiure and see what the security situation is afterwards. Those who are returning cite registration drives by the Mozambican government to add returnees to government records as part of their inducement to return, while those who choose to stay cite statements by Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi warning that return may be premature. Their dueling narratives underline the lack of clarity from the Mozambican government about how to manage returns.
For some displaced people, however, there is little security available even outside the conflict zone. Civilians at a relocation site in Nangua, Metuge district complained last week that some of them have been without food aid for over three months. Their ire at the lack of aid was increased last week when civilians newly displaced to the site following a recent insurgent attack on Lindi, Quissanga district were registered, given food aid, and offered housing. No accompanying aid disbursement to existing site residents was conducted.
Infrastructure repairs in the conflict zone continue apace. Electricity was restored in eastern Palma district last week. Mozambique’s national electric company is now working on getting the power back on in Muidumbe district, the last district in the conflict zone still without electrical service.
In Maputo, Mozambique’s Council of Ministers announced last week that it would ask parliament to approve the creation of a Central Office for Combating Organized and Transnational Crime as part of the government’s counterterrorism agenda. The office, which would fall under the purview of the Attorney General, is a response to recommendations from the African Union and SADC. In theory, having an office dedicated to transnational threats would improve Mozambique’s capacity to collaborate on law enforcement with regional partners. Poor collaboration has long been a point of contention for countries hoping to partner with Mozambique on counterterrorism issues, such as Tanzania.
The week’s biggest news came on the international front, when SADC leaders agreed to extend the SAMIM mandate for an undisclosed period following a summit in Pretoria. The extension does not appear to include any shift in the mission’s operations, nor any increase in troop levels. The president of Botswana, Mokgweetsi Masisi, said that SAMIM would “continue with offensive actions” against insurgents, and President Nyusi said that regional forces will work to consolidate security gains already made. “The construction phase,” he said, “will follow later.” Masisi urged SADC member states to support humanitarian efforts in Cabo Delgado, but offered no indication that SAMIM would play a humanitarian role in the near future.
Following the extension, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres gave an interview in which he endorsed the concept of an “African military force” that could bring peace in Cabo Delgado. He said that, should such a force arise, he would consider urging the UN Security Council to support that force financially. Guterres’ responses seemed to suggest that he was unaware that SAMIM is operational -- at one point he noted that Rwandan troops are already deployed in Mozambique and that SADC had made an agreement to deploy forces. If SADC’s ultimate plan to fund SAMIM runs through the UN, it appears that its communication of that plan has not been wholly successful.
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