Cabo Ligado

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Cabo Ligado Weekly: 5-11 December 2022

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  • Total number of organized political violence events: 1,539

  • Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 4,508

  • Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,984

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Situation Summary

Insurgent activity was centered in Macomia district last week. The most significant incident took place on 6 December, when approximately 100 soldiers of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) were forced to withdraw from Nguida, approximately 20 km northwest of Macomia district headquarters, following an assault that left at least three FADM troops dead. Initial reports suggested the insurgent force was as large as 300, but this is likely a great exaggeration. Nonetheless, it is likely that the attacking force was numerically superior. It is the fifth attack on Nguida since October. 

Since then, Mozambican and forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) have made two attempts to retake the village — first unsuccessfully, and then apparently successfully. Sources in Cabo Delgado say a first attempt was made on the night of Friday 9 December, which was pushed back. Islamic State (IS) has since published a claim to have ambushed a joint Mozambican and SAMIM patrol on Saturday, without inflicting any fatalities, though injuring some soldiers and damaging five vehicles, according to the claim.

The successful assault on the insurgents’ position by a joint SAMIM/FADM force came on the night of 11-12 December. Details are scarce, but a source within SAMIM says the militaries suffered no casualties in the operation. There are also reports emerging of insurgent attacks on the nearby villages of Nkoe and Nova Zambezia on 12 December, likely perpetrated by insurgents displaced by the operation in Nguida.

Elsewhere, the Naparama militia have escalated their activities. Two weeks ago, the first secretary of Frelimo in Cabo Delgado invited the Naparama to operate their own checkpoints in collaboration with the authorities. Last week, Cabo Ligado received reports that they have begun setting up roadblocks in the administrative post of Katapua, in Namuno district. This has already led to friction between the Naparama and local police authorities as Naparama militia members have been accused of groping women and forcing them to strip under the pretext of checking them for markings and wounds that would identify them as insurgents. The local administrator has reportedly condemned this behavior.

Despite such controversies, the Naparama continue to grow in popularity across the province. Galvanized by distrust of the government security forces, villages in Macomia are raising funds to send their young men to Namuno district to become “vaccinated” with the magic potion the Naparama believe grants invulnerability to bullets, one local source told Cabo Ligado. Once they have been inducted into the militia, they intend to attack the insurgent stronghold in the mountains near Nguida, the source said.

Elsewhere in Cabo Delgado, security forces have gone on the offensive. In Mueda, Local Forces ambushed insurgents near the village of Homba in the southwest of Mueda district on 7 December. Four insurgents were killed and two more injured, according to the Lusa news agency. In southeast Nangade, on 6 December, SAMIM  troops continued clearing operations near Nkonga, where two of their soldiers were killed on 29 November. Reports suggest SADC troops engaged the insurgents, but the number of casualties cannot be confirmed.

Also in Nangade, three suspected Tanzanian insurgents were arrested near the village of Lissulo on 8 December, one local source claims. Allegedly, they raised suspicions when they asked residents the direction to Mocímboa da Praia and were not recognized by the local population. In Nangade, local sources say that people should carry a pass anytime they go to farms more than 3 km away. For distances of more than 5 km, they should carry a declaration issued by the Neighborhood Chief. Their current situation is not known.

In Macomia district headquarters, there was a reported case of police brutality on 3 December in which a member of the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) assaulted a shopkeeper with a bottle after he was asked to pay for the food he had just bought. The police officer and the victim were taken to the district command.

Civilians in Muidumbe, meanwhile, are facing threats from Local Forces, who are accused of extorting citizens traveling around the district, and small street vendors. Newspaper Evidências reports that traders are being forced to pay up at checkpoints, or have their goods confiscated. Displaced people who have been forced to take refuge in other villages are reportedly forced to bribe the Local Forces when they try to return home to collect food, the paper reports. Such incidents raise wider concerns about prospects for establishing accountable and professional law and order services in the province. 

Weekly Focus: The Struggle for Nguida

The 6 December attack on a FADM outpost at Nguida came the same day that IS media channels released the first of two photo sets of its Mozambique affiliate pledging allegiance to the organization’s latest caliph. The new leader’s appointment had been announced on 30 November, along with the announcement of the killing of his predecessor who had been in place since March. Both developments point to the insurgency being robust, and illustrate the challenge faced by both Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS), and international intervention forces.

Witness accounts of there being approximately 300 fighters involved in the attack in Nguida are almost certainly overblown. Even if exaggerated by a factor of four, it may have been the largest force gathered by the insurgents since last year’s international intervention. An attack on the UIR base in Pundanhar in July is believed to have involved scores of fighters. The allegiance pictures indicate that around that time fighters had gathered in significant numbers, and possibly quite close to Nguida. The first set of pictures, taken in a river bed which is likely the Messalo river, shows close to 80 fighters. The pictures are posed in ways directed by IS’s media apparatus, and were released just five days after the announcement of the new caliph.

Nguida lies just 20 km south of the Messalo river. The insurgency’s most significant bases prior to international intervention were located close to the river in Mocímboa da Praia district. Though those bases near Mbau were cleared in August 2021, the river and its surrounding areas have continued to provide sanctuary for the insurgents operating across Macomia, Meluco, Mocímboa da Praia, Mueda, and Muidumbe districts.

The insurgency first came to Nguida in May this year. Prior to last week’s attack, it had since suffered nine organized political violence events, eight of them initiated by the insurgents. The village is now thought to be largely abandoned. The most recent incidents prior to last week took place just one week apart on 10 and 17 November. Weapons and ammunition were seized from FADM in the latter incident. Since the beginning of October, ACLED has recorded three further organized political violence events at Namituco and Lyukwe, two villages close to Nguida.

The ongoing struggle for control of Nguida indicates that Macomia is far from being under control. Assuming that the attacking force came from a number of locations, they also seem to have relative freedom of movement across northern Macomia and its environs. Combined with the freedom of movement illustrated by their free passage through Chiure, Namuno, and Balama districts in October and November, there is a considerable security challenge.

The most obvious option in the short term is to re-deploy Rwandan troops to Macomia district. Despite Mocímboa da Praia and Palma districts being their designated areas of responsibility, they have been deployed elsewhere. One source has confirmed that up to 400 Rwandan troops have recently been deployed to Ancuabe district since late November. Another tells of a deployment to Balama, also, in November, but that those troops were quickly withdrawn. Rwandan forces have at least twice before been deployed to Macomia, in April this year, and in November 2021. Rwandan troops were also seen in Ancuabe district after the insurgents’ first push south last June. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has reiterated this month his willingness for the Rwandan contingent to be deployed wherever it is needed to combat the insurgency. A larger, more permanent presence in southern districts would significantly bolster security and response options.

With reports of fighting in Macomia continuing into this week, it would not be surprising to see the return of Rwandan troops to the district.  Such a deployment in Macomia, in which troops from South Africa are deployed as part of SAMIM, would underscore the still limited capacity of FADM and SAMIM to project power in areas touched by the insurgency. If such an operation is not to displace the problem rather than eliminate it, there will need to be a considerable improvement in operational coordination between forces.  

Government Response

The government continues to make statements about the reasons for the insurgency and its actors, without providing evidence. Last week, President Filipe Nyusi said some people are pretending to be politicians while recruiting "future terrorists." He warned them that the FDS was close to capturing them, and that they would not be pardoned and returned to their communities but instead would face criminal accountability. People who have escaped from the insurgency have denounced such people by name, Nyusi said. Whatever course of action is taken will test the country’s already fragile criminal justice system. 

It remains to be seen whom exactly he is referring to. The so far vague accusation seems of a piece with a tendency, reported on by Cabo Ligado in recent weeks, to brand any inconvenient individuals as ‘terrorists.’ Obviously, opposition politicians could fall into the ‘inconvenient’ bracket, especially as Mozambique gears up for municipal elections next year — including in some places in Cabo Delgado and Nampula which have never had municipal elections before. The following day, Nyusi called again on people to be vigilant for possible “terrorists” in their communities, asking them to report any strange movements.

The president also had advice for the FDS, when he spoke at the Ministry of the Interior’s annual Coordinating Council event on 5 December. He said the police and military should adapt their modus operandi in order to face, with "more aggression," the insurgents’ new way of acting, characterized by small groups spread in areas where they had not been active before. Nyusi admitted that the challenge of ensuring public safety in areas previously affected by "terrorism" persists, and warned the police once again to pay attention to combatting illegal immigration, saying that it is associated with transnational organized crime, including “terrorism.”

In order to reinforce maritime surveillance, the US government donated and delivered, on 7 December, a 10-meter coastal patrol boat to the Mozambican Navy. The boat, valued at $700,000, is equipped with modern telecommunications and interception systems. In addition to the crew, the boat is capable of carrying 10 military personnel on patrol missions. 

The donation naturally provoked memories of the offshore security boats that the secret services bought from Lebanese shipbuilding group Privinvest in what became the notorious “hidden debt” deals; the US donation came in the week that the final verdict was announced in the trial of 19 people accused of financial crimes around those deals. Former President Armando Guebuza’s son was one of those given the longest prison sentences, 12 years.

Accepting the new boat from the US, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense, Casimiro Augusto said that it was coming at a "very special" time, when operations in the Northern Operational Theater were "running satisfactorily.” Augusto was also asked about the case of the Botswana major that killed a female soldier under his command, before turning the gun on himself; Augusto said the Mozambican authorities are investigating.

The Country Chair of TotalEnergies, Maxime Rabilloud, was in Cabo Delgado again last week, this time cutting the ribbon on a 1.1 km road opened to the public on 10 December, along with provincial Governor Valige Tauabo. The construction of the road had the financial support of TotalEnergies and will allow the circulation of people and goods from the upper area to the lower area of the town of Palma. One member of the Cabo Ligado team visited Palma at the weekend and found life in the town eerily normal: an oasis of calm in the province where the conflict still prevails. But the French energy company shows no sign as yet of lifting its declaration of force majeure on the Mozambique liquefied natural gas project — sticking to its requirement that the pacification that has been achieved in Palma be realized across Cabo Delgado.

But there is a positive development to report from Nangade, where the much-criticized Tanzanian forces marked World Aids Day on 1 December by providing tents, escorting a march from the health center to a memorial center, and providing security for events to mark the day. The move appears to be a step toward trying to improve relations with the community there after more than a year of deployment marked by mistrust on the part of the local population.

Correction: An earlier version of this update stated that Local Forces ambushed insurgents near the village of Homba in Mueda district on 8 December. It has been corrected to clarify that reports indicate that the incident instead took place on 7 December.

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