Cabo Ligado Weekly: 7-13 March
By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-March 2022
Figures updated as of 11 March 2022. Organized political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Organized violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.
Total number of organized political violence events: 1,194
Total number of reported fatalities from organized political violence: 3,818
Total number of reported fatalities from organized violence targeting civilians: 1,686
All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.
Situation Summary
The pace of insurgent attacks in Cabo Delgado seemed to slow last week, with the exception of Nova Zambézia in Macomia district, where a military garrison suffered repeated assaults that claimed up to six lives. The first attack was reported on the night of Sunday 6 March by a local source in Nova Zambézia, which is located just 7km from Quinto Congresso where a police officer was decapitated on 23 February by a group that had recently moved to the district from Congo, according to a military source.
The latest attack claimed the life of at least one soldier of the Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS). On 8 March, Islamic State (IS) took responsibility for the attack via social media channels, stating: “By the grace of God almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Mozambican army in the Christian village of Nova Zambézia in the Macomia region yesterday with automatic weapons, which led to the killing of one and the escape of the rest.”
The post included pictures of burning buildings, a body whose face had been mutilated, apparently belonging to the FDS soldier who had been killed, and a large supply of captured military equipment, including automatic weapons, ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenades. One local source said the dead soldier was a commander, although this has not been corroborated by other sources.
On Tuesday 8 March, Nova Zambézia was attacked again. According to a source, insurgents clashed with a combined force of FDS and local militia, five of whom were killed, including a female militia fighter. The next day, IS social media once again claimed responsibility for the attack, posting pictures of another body in military fatigues and more captured military supplies.
Macomia has been a hotbed of violence in recent weeks. In addition to the attack on Quinto Congresso, the villages of Litmanda and Chai were raided on 24 February. On 5 February, insurgents carried out a series of ambushes along the N380 road connecting Macomia to Pemba. At least six were killed and 10 women were kidnapped. The most recent attacks indicate violence in the district shows no sign of abating.
In Nangade district, approximately 30km from Nangade town, a source claimed that forces of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), FDS and local militia conducted a successful military operation on 7 March that reportedly killed more than 30 insurgents. According to the source, security forces tracked the insurgents back to their base before launching a ground assault with aerial support from helicopters.
These insurgents were allegedly responsible for a wave of attacks that have terrorized villages across Nangade since 18 February when Litingina was raided and six people were killed. A source estimated at the time that there were up to 50 insurgents in this group.
Despite the claimed success of this operation, Nangade witnessed another attack in Namuembe village on the afternoon of Friday 11 March. It is not yet known how many were killed or injured. The village is located just 5km from a displaced persons camp in Muade.
As at 8 March, one source in Nangade said only 13 out of 51 settlements in the district had not been attacked so far: Nangade town, Nang'omba, Tuliane, Ntoli, Itanda, Machokwe, Junho, Nanhagaia, Nhanga, Mualela, Chiduadua, Muade, and Ntamba.
Weekly Focus: Setbacks in the Return of Populations to Their Areas of Origin
Two main themes have guided government policy in relation to the conflict in Cabo Delgado in recent weeks: the reconstruction process, and the return of displaced people to their areas of origin. Last week, the newly sworn in Prime Minister, Adriano Maleiane told the Mozambican parliament that thanks to significant advances by the joint and combined forces of Mozambique, Rwanda and SADC, which resulted in the improvement of the security situation, the plan for the reconstruction of Cabo Delgado and the safe return of the populations to their areas of origin is underway. Maleiane's speech portrayed the situation in Cabo Delgado as gradually moving back towards normal life.
The prime minister's discourse of normality is intended to serve several purposes. First, it is crucial to convince investors to resume the on-shore liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, suspended about a year ago following the attack on the town of Palma. The revenues from LNG exploration will be significant as they will fund the government's programs. Since the suspension of foreign support to the state budget in 2016 following the uncovering of 'hidden debts,' the Mozambican government faces a significant budget deficit. Secondly, the pressure of displaced people represents a burden on the government, and highlights its limitations in providing humanitarian assistance to displaced people. The normalization of Cabo Delgado province is also fundamental to boost the image of President Filipe Nyusi, who goes to Frelimo’s congress in September this year weakened by the conflict in Cabo Delgado and the case of the hidden debts. The Frelimo congress, which is held once every five years, will elect the members of the Central Committee who will in turn elect Nyusi’s successor to contest presidential elections in 2024. Nyusi will want to reinforce his image of leadership in order to strengthen his influence on the future of the party, amid talk that he is seeking a third term as president — which is not allowed under current rules.
On the other hand, the discourse of normality, in the government's view, represents a victory over the insurgency, or at least a reduction in the insurgents' ability to threaten peace and security in the conflict-affected areas. Nevertheless, insurgents continue to carry out attacks on several fronts, and in recent weeks have made incursions notably around Macomia and Nangade.
A mission of the Council of Ministers – a body at least nominally headed by the prime minister – visited conflict-affected districts in Cabo Delgado, and its assessment contradicts Maleiane’s. The mission's four-day visit was aimed at evaluating the reconstruction process and the return of the inhabitants. In its assessment, despite recognizing advances in terms of restoring electricity, mobile communication and water supply, the mission noted with concern the slow pace of the reconstruction process, with most of the key infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and government buildings destroyed or abandoned, the absence of civil servants in the districts as well as the lack of basic conditions for them to carry out their activities. The mission not only noted weaknesses in the consolidation of security and called for the need to screen people returning to their areas of origin, but also undermined the government's promises that the return of the displaced families would happen soon. In addition to finding a lack of basic conditions in the districts affected by the conflict, the mission concluded that in order to ensure the population’s return, the government must mobilize more than a thousand state employees and agents in order to guarantee public services. The extent to which security forces are prepared to guarantee the security of public employees is an unresolved question. Civil servants and security agents are the main targets of the insurgents.
The government's plan to bring back the populations to their areas of origin continues to be marked by uncertainties and setbacks. The authorities in Cabo Delgado had scheduled the process of resettlement in Mocímboa da Praia to start on 6 March 2022, with the transfer of displaced people from the district of Palma to Mocímboa da Praia. No movement of civilians to be settled in Mocímboa da Praia was observed that day. On the following day, 7 March, which is Mocímboa da Praia’s ‘city day,’ a significant number of civilians were expected at the celebrations. However, the few dozen civilians who attended the event left the town after the celebrations were over. Despite the proclaimed tranquility in the district, in reality security issues continue to be the major obstacle to the return of the population.
Civilians who participated in the festivities in Mocímboa da Praia reported that they were prevented by the defense and security forces from moving to certain areas of Mocímboa da Praia town, including their own homes due to unspecified security issues. The town was abandoned a little less than two years ago, and besides the rubble, the dense undergrowth that has returned in some villages around the town constitutes a danger as it can be used as hideouts for insurgents.
As the government planned to return the displaced people, Nangade has in recent weeks recorded several attacks by insurgents. Besides the killings, the insurgents have caused the displacement of many families. Macomia is where the situation is also worrying, with three deadly attacks against FDS positions reported in the last few weeks. If the situation in Macomia remains volatile, this may also discourage people to return home in the neighboring district of Meluco, where several villages remain abandoned because of insurgent incursions last January.
Government authorities identify infiltration as one of the growing security weaknesses, particularly amongst displaced populations who return to their areas of origin. According to the police commander in Cabo Delgado, Vicente Chicote, the increase of insurgency infiltration into the communities occurs at a time of great shortage of supplies and starvation in the insurgency. Chicote said that insurgents send their relatives to the communities, where apart from pretending to be displaced people, they carry out espionage actions, by identifying possible areas to be targets of attacks.
The challenges in providing humanitarian assistance to displaced people outside Cabo Delgado continue. At the accommodation center in Nicoadala, central Zambezia province, which hosts mostly displaced people from Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Macomia, displaced people are leaving the centers because of hunger and lack of basic conditions. While some are voluntarily returning to their areas of origin, others are trying to settle in other places in Nicoadala to develop subsistence activities. They claim to receive only 10 kg of maize flour and rice every 30 days per household, which is not enough, and the products arrive in a state of deterioration.
Government Response
President Nyusi was in South Africa on 11 March for the third session of the South Africa-Mozambique Bi-National Commission. This was preceded by meetings of respective foreign ministers, Naledi Pandor and Veronica Macomo Dhlovo, as well as other senior officials and ministers. The Commission, established in 2011, has only met on two previous occasions; the last time before the COVID-19 pandemic in August 2017. Relations between the countries have not been good in recent years, and there was a sense of relief when President Cyril Ramaphosa in his opening remarks emphasized the importance of this meeting breathing new life into their respective bilateral relations.
Ramaphosa also emphasized South Africa’s interest in expanding energy cooperation with Maputo and the importance of building “energy security,” support for Mozambique’s candidature for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council and building joint programs “to advance youth development, women’s empowerment, poverty alleviation and job creation.” Gas from Mozambique already supplies South African petrochemicals giant Sasol, and the company is planning to supplement that supply with LNG imported through a new terminal in Matola, southern Mozambique. The “crisis” in Cabo Delgado was mentioned in passing in this address, and renewed SADC’s commitment to a collective response, noting the “necessity” to strengthen the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations to promote peace, security, stability, and sustainable development.
The final joint communiqué also only mentioned Cabo Delgado in passing as part of a brief summary of continental security concerns. Certainly, efforts to contain the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province were on the agenda, along with joint effort to combat trans-border crimes like car hijackings, kidnappings, and drug smuggling. Speaking on the sidelines of the Commission meetings, South Africa’s Police Minister, General Bheki Cele, confirmed that the country’s elite investigation unit, the Hawks, was working with Interpol investigating the four men named by the US on 1 March as IS financiers with connections to the insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique.
Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) remains silent on the announcement of a new caliph by IS. Given that the announcement seems to have been carefully managed across most of IS, this suggests that ISCAP’s links with IS’s central bureaucracy are strained.
The 10 March announcement that Abu Al Hassan Al Hashemi Al Quraishi – a pseudonym – succeeds Ibrahim Al Hashimi Al Quarashi, killed by US forces on 2 February, was buttressed by a well crafted media campaign. On 10 March, the teaser for the announcement contained a link to an open Telegram account, which linked to others, to bring users to IS channels to receive the announcement. These channels carried the announcement in an Arabic language audio file. By 11 March, at least five provinces had pledged bayat, or allegiance, including West Africa and Somalia. Pledges were expressed in staged photo stories distributed through IS media channels, likely prepared before the announcement.
By 14 March, this had not included ISCAP, though the most recent issue of Al Naba, which announced Abu Al Hassan Al Hashemi Al Quraishi appointment, carries reports of the 23 and 24 February attacks in Macomia district. Bayat is fundamental to IS recognition of affiliates, so ISCAP’s absence thus far is surprising. This may reflect the actions of Uganda People’s Defence Forces’ Operation Shujaa, currently underway in the DRC and targeting ISCAP/Allied Democratic Forces, as well as military intervention in Mozambique. At the same time it is not cut adrift. The most recent issue of Al Naba carries reports of the 23 and 24 February attacks in Macomia district.
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