Cabo Ligado Monthly: January 2023
January At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED records 21 political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in January, resulting in 79 reported fatalities
Reported fatalities were highest in Muidumbe district, where insurgents clashed with both Local Forces and Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) troops
Other events took place in Macomia, Mueda, Nangade, Meluco, and Mocímboa da Praia
Vital Trends
Clashes between insurgents and security forces intensify
Nangade district remains quiet
Insurgents maintain presence in Mocímboa da Praia district
In This Report
Who are the Naparama?
LNG project security and state legitimacy
Radio wars
January Situation Summary
Reported fatalities resulting from political violence increased in January, compared to December 2022. The pattern of recorded events reflects just five incidents of violence against civilians, one of which was committed by suspected police. On the other hand, ACLED recorded 16 armed clash events between the insurgents and security forces last month. Of the month’s 79 reported fatalities, all but two occurred in clashes between insurgents and security forces. Reported fatalities were almost evenly shared, with security forces, including Local Forces and Naparama militia, incurring at least 34 reported fatalities.
This likely reflects the activities of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM), which officially launched Operation Vulcão at the start of the month. Clashes over the month involved FADM with, variously, Local Forces, SAMIM forces, and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).
The greatest concentration of recorded clashes was in Muidumbe, reflecting Operation Vulcão, and the movement by insurgents out of Macomia and Meluco districts where the operation was originally concentrated. Nangade district in the north saw no recorded clashes in January. In December, just one clash was recorded. This trend likely reflects SAMIM and FADM operations which have dispersed groups that had been based in the forest in the Nkonga area of the district. These operations have been ongoing since September.
Notable in January was the presence of insurgents in Mocímboa da Praia district. There were sustained clashes between insurgents and the RDF around the village of Calugo, south of Mocímboa da Praia. This prompted the RDF to establish an outpost at nearby Luxete village. The clashes followed a visit to Calugo by a large group of insurgents on 25 January, when they purchased supplies and offered to clean up.
Who are the Naparama?
By Tom Gould, Cabo Ligado
In an unusual video published by Islamic State (IS) on 6 February, masked fighters interview a shirtless man, kneeling in front of an IS flag, with a distinctive red bandana tied around his forehead. The man, he says, is a member of the Naparama – a recently formed militia with mystical beliefs that has inspired men across Cabo Delgado province to enlist in the fight against the insurgency. Its members believe a magic ritual makes them impervious to gunfire; but the man in the video has just been captured, and out of shot more than a dozen of his comrades lie dead, piled on top of each other, punctured with bullet wounds.
“There were 31 of them and by God’s will 14 of them have been sent to hell,” says an IS fighter from behind the camera. “This one will soon meet his fellows.”
The video was filmed in the forest around Iba village in Meluco district, but it was in Cabo Delgado’s southern Namuno district, 200 km away, that the Naparama emerged three months ago, seemingly from nowhere, to become one of the province’s most prominent fighting forces.
Their first appearance was on 10 November 2022. As insurgents tore through Namuno, which had not been hit since the start of the conflict until October 2022, reports circulated on WhatsApp that a new civilian militia, calling themselves the ‘Naparama,’ had captured up to 19 insurgents and killed five.
By the end of November, it was clear that this nascent group had rapidly expanded, with bands of fighters pursuing insurgents across Balama and Montepuez districts. In early December, the first secretary of Frelimo in Cabo Delgado invited them to operate their own checkpoints and roadblocks. Around the same time, rumors spread that villages as far away as in Macomia district were raising funds to send their young men to Namuno to be inducted into the Naparama.
The explosive popularity of this group may be rooted in the infamous reputation of its predecessor of the same name, which formed in the late 1980s to fight on the Frelimo side of the Mozambican civil war. This original iteration of the Naparama was conceived by a traditional healer named Manuel António in Zambezia province, who claimed that a vision from Jesus Christ had led him to invent a medicine that turns bullets into water. Taking this potion from village to village, he mobilized a small army of followers to confront the Renamo rebels and bring an end to the war.
Professor Corinna Jentzsch wrote in Violent Resistance, which examines the history of the Naparama in the civil war, that between 1988 and 1989, António attracted several thousand members, and by 1991 his force controlled two-thirds of Mozambique’s northern provinces.
A remarkable aspect of this achievement was that the Naparama eschewed guns, fighting only with ‘weapons of cold steel’ such as spears, machetes, and bows and arrows, according to Jentzsch. Their preferred mode of attack involved charging the enemy en masse, singing as loudly as they could. This made a terrifying spectacle that often scared young, untrained Renamo fighters into retreat.
The revived Naparama in Cabo Delgado have inherited many of these traditions. Fighters are still ‘vaccinated’ by cutting the chest, traditionally with a razor, and inserting the potion into the wounds. The captured Naparama fighter in the IS video has visible scarring on his body.
Its leadership structure is unclear. António himself died in battle with Renamo in December 1991. The potion is said to only be effective when certain rules are observed, such as refusing to retreat, or eating particular kinds of food. The failure of the potion is usually ascribed to the violation of these rules.
The modern Naparama are also known to go into battle chanting songs and armed with steel weapons, as was reported following their clash with insurgents at Nairoto in Montepuez on 22 November. However, IS claimed to have captured several rifles from the Naparama at Iba, which can be seen in the photos on social media. It cannot be independently confirmed whether they belonged to the Naparama, but the Simonov rifle is often used by Local Forces.
The Naparama’s unique appearance is a large aspect of their identity. When American journalist Michael Hiltzik met with the Naparama in 1990, he reported that a “tatty shred of red ribbon” tied to their clothes was their only uniform. This has also been readopted.
Much is still unknown about the Naparama and how they are organized. Their total number cannot be ascertained, but they have already established themselves as major actors in the conflict, even participating in operations alongside military forces. Perhaps more significantly, the Naparama represent an organized attempt by the local people of Cabo Delgado to fight the insurgency on their own terms. Jentzsch wrote that the Naparama’s message of defiance in the 80s and 90s “reclaimed civilians’ agency over a war that had reduced them to spectators.” This may prove to be their most salient commonality with the Naparama of today.
LNG Project Security and State Legitimacy
By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado
By the end of January 2023, over five months had passed with no political violence events reported in Palma district. In that same period in Mocímboa da Praia district, there were just 14 political violence events. This relatively pacific state of affairs allowed Patrick Pouyanné, CEO of TotalEnergies, to drive from Palma to Mocímboa da Praia town on 3 February in a convoy of just two cars and with no military escort. Having returned to Paris, he told investors that “what I've seen from a security point of view is good. Even life is back to normal. Villages, people are back.” This has been achieved through foreign military intervention, and investment by TotalEnergies locally. How to sustain a legitimate security framework, and indeed the legitimacy of government may be more complicated.
When visiting Cabo Delgado, Pouyanné reiterated the three conditions that would allow him to lift the April 2021 declaration of force majeure on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project: security to be restored; the resumption of public services; and a return to “normal life” for people in “the region.” Incident data indicates that significant progress has been made in security, at least in Palma district. Public services are returning to the key districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. And while life may not have returned to the normality that existed prior to 2017, recent months have seen a sustained return of displaced people, particularly to Mocímboa da Praia district.
Much of this has been supported by TotalEnergies. Shipment of cargoes from Pemba to Mocímboa da Praia is underwritten by the firm, and road rehabilitation in Palma has been funded by them. Businesses, small and large, are also assisted. The company has also supported the return home to Palma and Mocímboa da Praia of internally displaced people from Quitunda in Palma.
The security provided by the RDF and Rwanda National Police has created the conditions for relative stability. Yet more important for the project is what framework will be put in place to ensure the security of the site and supply lines for approximately five years of construction, and into the production phase. For the project, clarity on this will be a requirement not just for day-to-day operations, but also to satisfy investors. For Cabo Delgado and Mozambique, security frameworks will need to be seen to be legitimate.
Prior to international military intervention in August 2020, TotalEnergies agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Mozambique to provide for a Mozambican “Joint Task Force” to provide security for the project site, and “across the broader area of operations of the project.” The details of the agreement have never been made public. By January 2021, President Filipe Nyusi had drawn up a new “action plan,” and committed to securing a 25 km perimeter around the site. This followed insurgent incursions at Quitunda resettlement village close to the site, which had prompted an evacuation of staff. By March 2021, these agreements were moot following the sacking of Palma, in the first instance by insurgents, and secondly by Mozambican troops.
Since the arrival of Rwandan and SAMIM forces in 2021, there has been no clarity on the security framework for the LNG site, and the wider province. Currently, site security relies on the 200 Rwandan troops encamped in the project site at Afungi, along with 800 Mozambican troops, according to local sources. While there is no doubt in their immediate effectiveness, and the positive relations they have developed with the community in Palma, their legitimacy is unclear. If there is an agreement between the governments of Mozambique and Rwanda on the purpose, scale, and length of the intervention, it is not known.
If work was to resume on the project in 2024, construction could be expected to continue up to 2030 at least, with up to 10,000 workers involved. Critical supply chains would stretch locally to Mocímboa da Praia, and Pemba in Cabo Delgado. Offshore field development activities would also need to be supported which could bring into play the recently upgraded port of Mtwara in Tanzania. Approximately 70 km away, it is considerably closer to Afungi than Pemba, over 250 km to the south. Securing project construction and commissioning will be a more complex challenge than securing an abandoned project site, or taking the car from Palma to Mocímboa da Praia.
TotalEnergies’ commitment to the project is not in doubt for the moment, even if Pouyanné is signaling that they will not be rushed. It remains to be seen if they have the patience to wait for a significant improvement in the capacity of Mozambique’s Defense and Security Forces (FDS). The recent shooting of a civilian by a drunken soldier in one of Mocímboa da Praia’s neighborhoods suggests much remains to be done on that front. The alternative is to continue to rely on Rwanda’s presence. Yet this too presents a quandary. Mozambique’s increasingly influential neighbor, Tanzania, is unlikely to be comfortable with Rwandan forces settling in so close to its border. Perhaps TotalEnergies, with significant interests in Tanzania, could broker such a response.
For the people of Cabo Delgado, these options offer little comfort. Continued investment in the project will bring benefits to business interests in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, but less so to other districts. In that context, continued reliance on foreign forces to fulfill the basic state function of security for the benefit of a strategic investor is unlikely to address the basic governance failures that Islamist extremists have taken advantage of.
Radio Wars
By Fernando Lima, Cabo Ligado
Chairman of state-owned Rádio Moçambique, Abdul Naguibo, was in Cabo Delgado last month for the resumption of local broadcasts in the province, a project supported by TotalEnergies. The project involves the repair of Rádio Moçambique signal repeaters, the rehabilitation of community radio premises in Palma, and the production of content in local languages for Rádio Moçambique. The possibility of local broadcasts in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia is agitating the waters of the world of community radio in northern Cabo Delgado.
Radio infrastructure in Palma was destroyed during the insurgent attack in March 2021. The same fate had earlier befallen community radio in Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 in a series of attacks that culminated in the town’s occupation in August of that year.
For the Rádio Moçambique project, local language content will be produced in Pemba and then retransmitted in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia in Shimakonde, Kimwani, Kimakwe, and Emakwa languages. Prefabricated offices and equipment, financed by TotalEnergies, have already been ordered, according to local sources. The oil company will have its own program slots to explain the gas project, employment opportunities, and other support programs under their ‘Pamoja Tunaweza’ (together we can do it) initiative.
Community radio with local language content has an important role to play in communities where rumor, suspicion, and insecurity are still strong. But not everybody has the same perspective on these recent developments.
Prior to the conflict, Cabo Delgado had a well-developed network of state and non-state radio, with a range of backers. TotalEnergies supported Palma Community Radio up to the fall of the town. The National Forum for Community Radio (FORCOM) is a non-government organization that coordinates the activities of community radios nationwide, including many Multimedia Community Centers (CMC). Prior to the conflict, there were active CMCs, in Mocímboa da Praia and Muambula in Muidumbe district, and in Nangade district headquarters. The Institute for Social Communication (ICS), a public body, plays a similar role nationwide, and worked with Palma Community Radio, among others, prior to the fall of the town. There are currently no stations affiliated with Muslim organizations broadcasting in the province. Radio Haq in Nampula has a limited range and barely reaches Pemba in the south of Cabo Delgado. Boosting this will likely not be possible. Community radio stations are restricted to transmitters of just 250 watts. If Muslim-affiliated radio is to expand, new stations will need to be established in Cabo Delgado itself.
The panoply of community radios includes radios funded by the private sector like the Gemfields-owned Montepuez Ruby Mining station in Namanhumbir, as well as those funded by the Catholic church and evangelical Christian denominations. Radio São Francisco de Assis, a Catholic station broadcasting from Nangololo mission in Muidumbe, was burned down in November 2020 after an incursion by insurgents. At one point, even the Ministry of Agriculture had its own network of radios broadcasting on rural development.
“Local authorities and district administrators are discovering the power of these local radio stations. And they want to control them,” says an adviser to dozens of radios built all over the country. According to local sources, ICS is thought by some stakeholders in the industry as being interested in taking over CMC-based radio stations that had been operational before the conflict. ICS itself is not blamed for this. One independent radio executive says that “it comes straight from the government,” likely the official Information Office (Gabinfo).
“What prevents them [ICS] from stronger intervention is that they do not get enough funds from the government,” explains a volunteer in one of the radios destroyed by the jihadist attacks. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is one funder of ICS. “The day UNICEF stops its support, they will be in trouble,” says the radio activist. He considers the advantage of ICS is that they can pay salaries while other radios just have non-paid volunteers. Under a law regulating the ‘mobility of state employees,’ ICS radio stations can benefit from people already being paid by the state to work there, such as teachers. There is competition there too. FORCOM is currently in discussion with an international donor about the possibility of support for a radio station in Mocímboa da Praia, according to a local source. On the other hand, TotalEnergies’s interest in continuing to support local media may be an opportunity for ICS to expand its reach in the province.
The higher level competition for funding and influence is important, but perhaps the real radio wars are fought by journalists. Ibraimo Mbaruco has been missing since the evening of 7 April 2020. Hedisappeared after leaving the offices of the TotalEnergies supported Palma Community Radio to return home. In his last message to friends, he said that he was surrounded by soldiers.