Cabo Ligado Monthly: May 2020
Cabo Delgado’s Security Environment
Since the start of 2020, the security situation in Cabo Delgado has worsened significantly, especially in the central districts of Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Macomia, Ibo, and Quissanga. The insurgency is showing signs of evolution, making more brazen attacks and demonstrating an ability to adjust tactics between large-scale and small group attacks. May 2020 was no exception, with insurgent attacks continuing unabated, and insurgents showing high levels of capability and coordination. ACLED records 48 conflict events in Cabo Delgado in May, and the current fatality estimate for the month stands at 120, similar numbers to April, which saw 135 estimated fatalities in 44 conflict events.
May Conflict Geography
The geographical area of insurgent activities did not expand in May, with most attacks taking place in Macomia, Quissanga, Mocimboa da Praia, and Nangade. Attacks along the N380 during May signified an overall north-easterly move of the center of gravity for insurgent action from April. Among the N380 attacks were strikes on Nacate (12 May) and Awasse (12 May), during which insurgents destroyed houses and the local hospital, and took a vehicle. Insurgents also destroyed communication posts and optic fiber in Ntotue, where a Vodacom tower was taken down (14 May), and Diaca (13 May). Contacts also reported insurgent movements in Mocimboa da Praia, south of Palma moving in the direction of Nangade, and Bilibiza and Quissanga Sede areas, showing no signs of declining.
May Conflict Dynamics
Conflict dynamics in Cabo Delgado changed in early May in the face of state counterinsurgency operations supported by private military company Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) north of Metuge, prompting insurgents to shift from direct confrontation with Mozambican defence and security forces (FDS) to targeting local communities, destroying villages, and targeting suspected collaborators.
The month, however, ended with a glimmer of hope for the Mozambican state’s counterinsurgency effort. Despite Macomia becoming the most recent district capital to suffer an insurgent attack on 28 May, following earlier attacks on Mocímboa da Praia, Quissanga, and Namacande (the capital of Muidumbe district) in March and April, insurgents soon vacated Macomia town and the government then began what seems to be a more coordinated offensive that resulted in insurgents retreating northward through Mocimboa da Praia and into Nangade.
Insurgents, in turn, have adapted quickly to being the pursued rather than the pursuers. Following the 28 May attack on Macomia, insurgents reverted to a tactic they have used intermittently since 2018 in which insurgent fighters withdraw after a major attack and break up into smaller groups to conduct more attacks on smaller villages. The result was attacks on Litimanda (Macomia district), Ulo (Mocimboa da Praia district), kidnappings of girls in the machambas of Nabubussi (a neighbourhood of Mocimboa da Praia), as well as a beheaded body found at the Meluco crossing (north of Ancuabe and south of ADPP), as well as Mucojo (Quissanga). It can be expected that the insurgents will continue attacks on villages further south, including areas previously not targeted, as well as in the north, towards Mocimboa da Praia and Nangade. This will not only stretch FDS resources, but demand continuous reactive deployments.
Though they all target civilians in smaller communities, these small group attacks are not uniform. The insurgent group in Macomia seems far more indiscriminate and brutal in its attacks than attackers in other areas. There are intermittent references from a source to a “Group of Eight” being responsible for these attacks. Attacks at Nova Zambezia, Chai, and Litamanda in Macomia district involved beheadings of civilians and other civilian casualties. Such attacks stand in contrast with past attempts at winning hearts and minds of locals, in Mocimboa da Praia district.
Insurgents have also acted to secure no man’s land areas by blocking important access roads, and forcing villagers from places like Litamanda, Ulo, Chai, and Nova Zambezia. The trend continued in early June -- following the government’s attack on an insurgent base at Mahere (Mocimboa da Praia district), insurgents responded with increased movement in Nangade to secure no man’s land. Insurgents also moved north past Quelimane (Mocimboa da Praia) and then reportedly west to an area allowing for retreat and enabling future attacks on the Awasse-Mocimboa da Praia road and Nangade.
Islamic State Central Africa (ISCAP) was relatively quiet regarding the conflict in Mozambique in May, playing down the Macomia with a one paragraph reference in al Naba. For its part, Al Qaeda has been silent on Mozambique following a brief mention in mid-May on its al Tabhat media channel.
Constraints on Government Response
Sustainable supply lines remain a factor inhibiting the government’s counterinsurgency effort. Contacts reported persistent strains on government-associated supply streams during security services’ responses to attacks in Metuge, Quissanga, Mocimboa da Praia, and Macomia districts during the preceding two months. Supply streams include logistical support, funding, and delivery of arms and ammunition. The battle for Macomia, in particular, exposed persistent weaknesses in the government’s counterinsurgency capabilities as well as limitations to DAG’s use of helicopter gunships to support government ground forces. DAG helicopters injured civilians and, reportedly, killed Mozambican soldiers in addition to insurgents in Macomia, due to their inability to tell friend from foe. These unnecessary casualties raise questions about the efficacy of security force-DAG tactical cooperation.
Compounding the tactical and supply challenges is the fact that Mozambican government forces are generally poorly trained, lack battlefield experience, and are unfamiliar with the local culture and language. The lack of combat-experienced leadership compounds this, resulting in low levels of morale, high desertion rates (including to insurgent ranks), and, many believe, information leaks that enable insurgents to stay one step ahead of the military. Continuous deployments without sufficient ground and aerial backup remain a major challenge, even factoring in DAG contributions.
Narratives and Perceptions
The Mozambican government’s announcement of a victory at Macomia came to seem somewhat hollow as reports, photos, and videos emerged of the destruction caused during the occupation and civilian casualties that were not reflected in official statements. The fact that insurgents occupied Macomia for three days, and nearby Chai for four, before withdrawing without seeming to suffer a major battlefield defeat casts doubt on the government’s triumphant narrative. Initial claims that two insurgent leaders from Tanzania were killed in the battle were later clarified, putting the location of the killings in Nova Zambezia. No evidence that the killings of the two leaders took place has been put forward, by either the Mozambican or Tanzanian governments.
Local confidence in the government’s ability to provide basic security remains low. Communities are invariably viewed with suspicion by government forces, often as insurgent collaborators, and military-civilian trust is further undermined by excessive use of force, indiscriminate arrests, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances perpetrated by the FDS. In May, President Filipe Nyusi resumed accusations that external forces are driving the conflict, a narrative that discounts local grievances and likely fosters increased discontent and suspicion among the people of Cabo Delgado. High levels of discontent allow the insurgents to continue their strategy of exploiting local grievances with the Mozambique government and promote an extremist Islamist ideology, a pairing that is the trademark of Islamic State franchising. This strategy was on display in Mocimboa da Praia in May, with several contacts reporting insurgents trying to separate people from government control by urging residents of Ulo, Nabadje, Kalugo, Moma, Luchete, and Nanquidunga to abandon their villages in order to avoid abuse by government forces.
May Humanitarian Report
Though it falls slightly outside the time frame of the May report, it is worth discussing the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Rapid Response Plan for Cabo Delgado for the second half of 2020, which was released on 4 June, as part of a broader discussion about how the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado worsened in May. The Plan, which outlines the international humanitarian community’s approach to providing services in Cabo Delgado, describes a dire state of affairs, with huge numbers of civilians displaced and humanitarian aid reaching few of them.
According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) data from May, there are now roughly 211,485 people displaced in Cabo Delgado, which is about one in every ten people living in the province. Of those, 116,782 were still living in districts that saw insurgent attacks in May, meaning that they are at high risk to be further displaced. Indeed, many of the 30,620 people IOM estimated were displaced in Macomia district in May were forced to flee the area near the end of the month by the insurgent incursion into, and subsequent battle for, the district capital.
Displacement is not a new problem in the province. Cabo Delgado citizens have been moving to avoid the fighting since attacks began in 2017, and IOM estimated that Cyclone Kenneth, which hit the province in April 2019, forced roughly 41,000 people from their home communities. Yet the government has been slow to provide formal refugee centers and other services for its displaced citizens. Five new centers were completed in the south of the province in May, which were built to house 6,000 people (about 3% of the total displaced population). Almost immediately, they became home to 18,000.
As a result of this lack of facilities, IOM reports that the “vast majority” of the displaced population is living with host families, an arrangement that makes it difficult to distribute food aid and other services efficiently. The disconnect between refugees and service providers is simply not sustainable -- three quarters of displaced families have not received humanitarian assistance of any kind so far, and 83% of host families cannot afford to support the refugees that they are housing. Under those conditions, tensions rise and social cohesion lessens, which in turn increases the risk of gender-based violence, atomization of family units, and insurgent recruitment.
It is only getting harder to reach many of those who are sheltering in the conflict zone, as fighting further diminished humanitarian infrastructure in May. The Rapid Response Plan calls for $10.8 million in food aid for the province in the latter half of 2020 to feed 190,000 hungry people and provide agricultural inputs to 95,000. The distribution plan for that aid aims to target it at the most vulnerable people in the province, “including IDPs and remote communities.” Yet the conflict poses real challenges to that goal -- in May alone, insurgents burned down the World Food Programme office in Macomia and made off with vehicles and communication equipment belonging to the organization. The equipment is replaceable, but establishing consistent distribution networks in an area where there are no guarantees of staff and infrastructure safety is a challenge.
Similarly, on the health front, the conflict is creating a huge strain on the medical community’s ability to reach people. Health centers are frequent targets for insurgent attacks, both as sources of supply for the insurgents and as symbols of government legitimacy. As a result of attacks on health infrastructure, the UN reports that Mobile Health Brigades in the province have shut down and many local health workers have become IDPs themselves. International groups face similar challenges -- Medecins Sans Frontieres pulled out of Macomia altogether after insurgents sacked the health center they helped operate there. So far, COVID-19 and the conflict have stayed as separate issues, although May saw the first infections in Palma outside the Total LNG project. If and when the virus spreads, there will likely be few resources available to counter it. Even clean water to wash hands with is at a premium, as demonstrated by cholera outbreaks in districts hit by conflict and displacement earlier in the year.
The government’s failure to contend with the scale of displacement in Cabo Delgado tracks with its slowness to publicly acknowledge the scale and nature of the conflict. This is not the first time in recent memory that displaced Mozambicans have suffered for the government’s desire to maintain a public fiction that a conflict is not as bad as it really is. In 2016, when fighting between the government and Renamo guerrillas in Mozambique’s central provinces was endangering civilians, President Nyusi’s government tried to block neighboring Malawi from formally reopening a refugee camp for fleeing Mozambicans on the grounds that there was no war in Mozambique. 11,000 displaced Mozamicans were left without access to basic services until the Malawian government decided to go ahead with the reopening. The faster the government can move away from the mindset that there are gains to be made by downplaying the problem, the better off Cabo Delgado civilians are likely to be.
Regional Involvement
In January 2020, ahead of taking up the Chairship of the African Union (AU), South African minister for International Relations and Cooperation, Naledi Pandor, told a briefing of African diplomats in Pretoria that southern Africa faced a growing Islamist threat with the insurgency in Mozambique; the matter was raised tangentially at the subsequent AU Summit in February, but is not a formal item on the AU’s Peace and Security Council, which Mozambique was elected to this year.
Despite Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi being deputy chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and slated to take over as chairman in August, Mozambique’s reluctance to engage the available multilateral peace and security infrastructure had been evident for some time. For over two years, Mozambique characterized the insurgency as the work of bandits and criminals, but as the security situation deteriorated it looked for support from private security sources and from bilateral relationships with countries in the region and further afield.
As the situation worsened in late 2019 and early 2020, Maputo reportedly looked unsuccessfully for bilateral assistance from Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Angola, and had a brief dalliance with Russian mercenaries the Wagner Group, before contracting the Dyck Advisory Group on a short-term basis for much needed aerial support that its own forces were unable to provide.
Pressure for Mozambique to work within the parameters of SADC’s peace and security architecture grew in early 2020; on 30 April, President Nyusi and Mozambique’s Defence Minister Jaime Neto met with Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa, who chairs SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, at Chimoio. No concrete commitments emerged from the meeting.
On 19 May, Mnangagwa hosted an extraordinary summit of the Troika -- the leadership of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security -- in Harare to discuss the insurgency. This was attended by other Troika members, Zambia and Botswana, as well as Mozambique. SADC’s chair, Tanzania, which has a direct security interest in Cabo Delgado, was not present. The subsequent Troika Communique provided an unprecedented green light, urging “member states to support the government of Mozambique in fighting against the terrorists and armed groups” in Cabo Delgado.
So, how will the region assist, now the veneer of political cover has been secured? Although the communique does not specifically guarantee military assistance, this is the most obvious area requiring support. A rapid response was never on the cards, even if evidently needed; the deployment of SADC’s Standby Brigade would require the authorization of a SADC Summit; the Brigade also reportedly needs 54 days preparation time for deployment. In the meantime, SADC’s Planning Element, which operates as a tool of the Troika, will be engaged with member states as options are explored.
SADC has deployed troops to the DRC and Lesotho in recent years, but Cabo Delgado presents a very different challenge, requiring a bespoke response that can draw on specific competencies; support must also navigate the complexities and challenges of working with Mozambique’s security and intelligence services. Then there is the question of who will pay; SADC’s budget has little wiggle room and most countries in the region were already facing major defence budget cuts, including South Africa, where the Defence Minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula, warned in December 2019 that lack of funding had rendered the defence force “unsustainable.” A mission to Cabo Delgado is not likely to be short either; any exit strategy must also include leaving behind a competent Mozambican fighting force.
So who will help? The Chimoio meeting fuelled speculation about possible Zimbabwean assistance, especially given the proximity of DAG’s boss, Lionel Dyck, to Mnangagwa and Zimbabwe’s military commanders, but current economic woes (rank and file soldiers are reportedly earning less than US$50 a month) reflect a wider set of challenges and eroded capacity faced by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. Despite this, concerns about an alliance of military interests with comprador capitalists, as like that witnessed in the late 90s intervention in DRC, nevertheless continue to circulate.
Notwithstanding constraints, it is South Africa that is most likely to lead. On 22 May, Pandor told the media that South Africa was ‘in negotiations” with Mozambique around the issue of assistance. No further details have been forthcoming. South Africa’s Special Forces Brigade have been touted for possible deployment; posited as a force multiplier for the SADC Brigade, they offer an array of competencies, from reconnaissance and intelligence gathering to offensive actions and training. They have also been involved in a number of joint exercises with other SADC member states’ Special Forces as part of SADC Brigade training.