Cabo Ligado Monthly: October 2021
October At A Glance
Vital Stats
ACLED recorded 19 organized political violence events in October, resulting in 62 fatalities
Reported fatalities were highest in Mocimboa da Praia district, where operations by Mozambican forces and foreign allies against insurgents near the Messalo River remain ongoing
Other events took place in Macomia, Meluco, Muidumbe, Nangade, Palma, and Quissanga districts
Vital Trends
Mozambican, Rwandan, and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops worked to consolidate their gains against insurgents in October, opening more areas of the conflict zone to returning civilians
Looting and/or destruction of civilian property by Mozambican troops and pro-government militias also increased on October -- ACLED recorded eight instances of looting and/or destruction of civilian property perpetrated by government forces
The return of displaced civilians increased pace in October, especially in Muidumbe and Palma districts
In This Report
Analysis of informal trade during the conflict, focused especially on the state of cross-border trade between Mozambique and Tanzania
Examination of the Mozambican government’s reconstruction plan for Cabo Delgado and its implications for the province’s political future
Discussion of the international training programs for Mozambican security forces and the prospects for comprehensive security sector reform
October Situation Summary
Compared to the height of the conflict, violence in Cabo Delgado was relatively limited in October. Yet the political decisions made in recent weeks will have major reverberations in the lives of Cabo Delgado residents -- especially displaced civilians attempting to return to their homes in conflict affected districts.
In the conflict itself, the story of the month was the continued apparent weakness of the insurgency. Civilians who escaped insurgent custody during October reported that insurgents are facing extreme supply shortages after being pushed out of their bases by offensives from the pro-government coalition. At least in the Messalo River valley in southern Mocimboa da Praia and northern Macomica districts, it seems insurgents intended to support themselves through small-scale agriculture near their bases. Without access to those fields and without other sources of food and other supplies, insurgents in that area appear to be suffering.
As the pro-government coalition gains confidence in its security gains, the Mozambican government has thrown itself into shaping the post-conflict environment in Cabo Delgado. As is covered in depth in this report, the government has formulated a reconstruction plan for the province that aims to restore and expand state infrastructure in areas where it has been damaged by insurgent action. In the short term, the government has also recognized that the province faces a dire food shortage, brought on by a combination of a lack of international money for food aid and the inability of displaced farmers to become self-sufficient without access to land and agricultural inputs. The government has encouraged displaced farmers from some areas to return to their homes in the hope of restarting agricultural production, and provided some others with materials to plant in their host communities, but it is unclear how food needs in the province will be met while those crops are growing.
Part of the uncertainty around food comes from the actions of Mozambican security forces in and around Mocimboa da Praia town in October. Police and military units have held up informal traders attempting to sell food and other goods in conflict-affected areas, accusing them of attempting to supply the insurgency. The interdictions appear to be attempts by security forces to extract rents from informal trade. With that trade set to play an important role in distributing food in Cabo Delgado through the lean season, rent extraction creates a major humanitarian issue on top of the obvious rule of law concerns it generates.
The Dynamics of Informal Cross-Border Trade Between Cabo Delgado and Mtwara
In May 2010, the then-President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza, and the then-President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, inaugurated the Unity Bridge over the Ruvuma River connecting the two countries. The inauguration of the bridge symbolized the union of two countries that worked hand in hand in Mozambique’s liberation struggle. Yet promised development around the bridge has not come to fruition. On the Mozambican side, the connecting road to Mueda remains unsurfaced, while on the Tanzanian side, the upgraded road and new rail links to Mtwara envisaged in the Mtwara Development Corridor plans have not been implemented. Despite not becoming a massive trade hub, today the bridge represents an important driver of commercial, social, and cultural relations between the people of Cabo Delgado province and Mtwara region.
The Unity Bridge connects the Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique and the Mtwara region in Tanzania through the border posts of Negomano and Mtambaswala, respectively. It is currently the only crossing point open for commercial exchange between the people of both countries. The only other official border crossing is 200kms to the east, the Kilambo/Namoto crossing that links Mtwara town to Palma district by ferry boat. Since the insurgent attack on Palma in March 2021 forced the closing of the Kilambo/Namoto border post in April, more Ruvuma-basin trade has been routed through the Negomano border post. Traders who mostly hail from the districts of Mueda, Montepuez, and Pemba travel across the Unity Bridge to Tanzania to buy products such as clothing, electronics, and cosmetics, which are then sold on the Mozambican side.
Some traders who cross at the Negomano border told Cabo Ligado that Tanzania remains a good destination for shopping, because of the affordable prices and their close relationships with Tanzanian suppliers. They also said that the treatment of Tanzanian authorities towards Mozambican traders remains positive.
Traders from Palma, who before the insurgency often traveled to Mtwara town to trade fish and other goods, have found it more difficult to access Mtwara since last April, when the Namoto border was closed. Despite the closure, however, residents of Quionga, northwest of Palma, continue to illegally access Tanzania despite increased efforts by Tanzanian security forces to prevent illegal crossings. Local sources told Cabo Ligado that essentially almost all of the products arriving there come from Tanzania.
Between the two official border posts are a number of unofficial border crossings. Chikongo, in Tandahimba district, is a well-established crossing point linking Tandahimba with Nangade district by canoe. Kitaya in Nanyamba township to the east is a well-known trading post, serving the Palma district, with numerous unofficial routes across the border in that area. Tandahimba and Nanyamba have been the sites of all but one of the incidents in Mtwara Region in ACLED’s database that have been attributed to Islamist militia, including the spectacular attack on Kitaya in October 2020. This pattern should be no surprise. Established but informal trading and transport links build networks and relationships that operate out of view of the state. Insurgent operations in these areas may have built on the relationships and knowledge developed on porous borders.
The conflict has shifted traditional trade arrangements in the region. At one time, for example, the formal trade in food staples in Palma relied on Tanzania as its main base of supply. Now, Tanzania has introduced a ban on the entry of its food products into Mozambican territory via the Namoto border due to the conflict in Cabo Delgado. As a result, local merchants in Cabo Delgado buy mostly manufactured goods in Tanzania, while the purchase of food is done domestically, mostly in Pemba.
Since the pro-government coalition’s military successes in northeastern Cabo Delgado from August 2020 onward, the informal trade between Pemba and Palma has begun to pick up again. In October, traders started moving again between Palma and Pemba via Mocimboa da Praia and Mueda. Traders are accompanied by Rwandan escorts on the leg of their journey between Awasse, in Mocimboa da Praia district, and Palma. The cost of transport from Palma to Pemba ranges from 2,000 to 2,500 meticais ($31 to $39) per person, not including cargo. Before the conflict, the cost of transport from Palma to Pemba was 700 meticais ($11). High transport costs will ultimately impact the prices of goods and further increase the cost of living for displaced people returning home.
Another factor that has made the resumption of trade between Pemba and Palma more difficult is the prohibition against using the sea lane off the coast of Mocimboa da Praia and Palma for shipping. Traders who have tried to move products from Pemba to Palma by boat have been intercepted by naval forces, and sometimes suspected of supplying the insurgents. Fishermen who have managed to return to Palma have gone back to their fishing activities. The re-establishment of electric power has facilitated the refrigeration of the fish, and the opening of the Palma-Mueda road via Mocimboa da Praia has allowed them to travel to Mueda where they sell the fish at a profit.
In Cabo Delgado, the traders are adapting their strategies according to the dynamics imposed by the authorities in Mozambique and Tanzania, as well as by the ongoing conflict in the country itself. Informality is also seen as a strategy for obtaining livelihoods in a context where local youth are mostly excluded from the major economic driver in the province: large natural resource extraction projects. Some traders in Palma have reported to Cabo Ligado that due to lack of integration in the district’s natural gas projects, they have chosen to engage in small businesses such as informal sales, moto-taxis, and other less profitable activities.
The absence of a concrete strategy to integrate youth into the formal economy can make them vulnerable to the insurgency. The Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN), a government entity created to promote development and reduce asymmetries in the northern region of the country, offers no clear strategy in its Action Plan regarding informal traders in northern Mozambique and Cabo Delgado in particular. However, it recognizes that the lack of jobs makes young people vulnerable to recruitment networks, and as a solution, it says it will develop job opportunities for youth.
The Cashew Trade: A Case Study
Cashews represent a particularly important segment of both formal and informal trade between Cabo Delgado and Mtwara. That trade has been slowed by the conflict, but hardly halted. As informal trade expands, Mozambique’s and Tanzania’s approach to the cashew trade will shape how cross-border trade networks function going forward.
On both sides of the river, cashew nut is an important cash crop for poor smallholders. Prior to the insurgency, trade, small scale investment, and basic livelihood activities in the Ruvuma corridor straddling Mtwara and Cabo Delgado operated relatively freely. It was common for Tanzanians to lease farmland in Cabo Delgado on a seasonal basis, while for Mozambican producers, Tanzania was an important market for cashews and other goods. As recently as 2019, up to half the cashew nut crop from Nangade district was smuggled to Tanzania. A state-managed marketing system in Tanzania provides a higher price for Cabo Delgado cashews than can be obtained in Mozambique, particularly for more isolated producers in the north.
Yet accessing that system, even in a time of economic crisis in Cabo Delgado, requires utilizing both formal and informal market mechanisms. A Mozambican truck with 15 tons of cashew nuts being stopped at the end of October 2021 in Mtwara’s Nanyumbu District highlighted how resilient cross-border cashew trade has been, even during conflict, and illustrates the difficulties of the trade.
According to Nanyumbu District Commissioner Mariamu Chaurembo, the truck was first sent back to Mozambique, presumably over Unity Bridge, to correct its paperwork, before being allowed to proceed. Chaurembo warned traders to be sure to comply with regulations, and to avoid ‘njia za panya’, or unauthorized routes. Such routes -- or more likely, the use of bribes along established routes -- is presumably how the crop entered Tanzanian without proper paperwork in the first place.
For the 15 ton crop to finally be allowed to pass into the Tanzanian market, it will need to be declared as being of Tanzanian origin in order to enter Tanzania’s Warehouse Receipt System -- part of an auction system managed by the Cashewnut Board of Tanzania and local producer cooperatives. As the nuts are Mozambican, some more paperwork will have to be fudged along the way to ensure that the crop gets sold.
Tanzanian politicians have more than once recommended that the two states actively support and encourage freedom of trade and movement as part of post-conflict reconstruction in Cabo Delgado. Actually doing so however, especially in the cashew sector, would go against significant vested interests. Free trade along the Ruvuma would negatively affect those benefiting from existing rents on market entry into Tanzania, as well as driving down prices for Tanzanian cashew farmers. On the Mozambican side, the state and private sector both have concerns over the smuggling of cashews, identifying it as a key supply side constraint to domestic cashew processors. Complicating matters further is that significant market actors, such as ETG and METL, buy large quantities of raw cashew nut and operate processors in both countries.
Free trade would likely lead to a decline in cashew smuggling and the informal networks that enable it, but it might be politically untenable to bring about. In many ways, that makes the issue a microcosm for the post-conflict future of cross-border trade. Any efforts to better integrate economies as part of a reconstruction plan may require a re-balancing of infrastructural development towards eastern Cabo Delgado and Mtwara, where natural gas projects are driving economic growth. Ultimately, integration will mean a return to the relatively free movement of people and goods pre-insurgency. With security forces’ priorities now likely to dominate planning on both sides of the border, if reintegration is to be part of the reconstruction, it will require a significant political push.
Reconstruction Plans for Cabo Delgado
In a presentation to international partners in late September, Mozambican Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário made it clear that his government believes the conflict in Cabo Delgado is in its final stages. In his opening remarks, do Rosário said that recent military successes by the coalition of Mozambique, Rwanda, and the Southern African Development Community “gives us confidence in the gradual normalization of life” in conflict-affected districts. With the government predicting that insurgent violence is winding down, it has decided to inaugurate a phase of post-conflict reconstruction by drawing up a reconstruction plan for Cabo Delgado.
As discussed in the previous Cabo Ligado monthly report, it is not at all obvious that the conflict is coming to a close. With the Mozambican government determined to act as though it is, however, it is worthwhile to investigate what the reconstruction plan says about the government’s priorities for post-conflict life in Cabo Delgado.
Both the structure of the plan and the government’s rhetoric around it emphasize the urgency of rebuilding the province after the destruction of the last four years. Although do Rosário said in his speech that the security situation would determine the pace with which displaced people would be allowed to return to their home communities, he also acknowledged that time is of the essence for government interventions to help avert a food catastrophe among displaced people. Among the government’s immediate priorities, he said, is the distribution of seed and fertilizer “for the relaunching of agricultural production in order to capitalize on the rainy season that is about to start.” Indeed, that process was ongoing in October, with Agriculture Minister Celso Correia and ADIN head Armindo Ngunga personally delivering agricultural inputs to displaced people in Ancuabe district. More broadly, the government’s plan aims to spend roughly $200 million in the next year pursuing what it calls “quick wins” in reconstructing infrastructure and expanding state capacity in conflict-affected districts.
Yet the structure of the reconstruction plan also indicates Maputo’s other priority for Cabo Delgado: re-establishing political control over the province. Ever since the discovery of natural gas in Cabo Delgado, the Mozambican government has worked to consolidate political power over the province in Maputo, a process that only accelerated over the course of the conflict. The reconstruction plan pushes control further into the hands of Mozambique’s president. As the plan makes clear, the lead implementers of the plan at the national level are the Council of Ministers -- the president’s cabinet, which serve at his pleasure. At the provincial level, implementation is led by the Provincial Secretary of State, with the Provincial Governor explicitly relegated to an “assistance” role. The distinction is important because, under Mozambique’s recent constitutional reforms, provincial governors are directly elected by citizens of each province, but provincial secretaries of state are appointed by the president.
In one sense, this centralization of control is useful for carrying out the president’s agenda. President Nyusi has repeatedly focused on youth employment as an important goal for Cabo Delgado, both as a path to economic development and as a way to prevent insurgent recruitment. That priority is reflected in a proposed budget for reconstruction spending in Mocimboa da Praia district, in which the district’s education, youth, and technology department is slated to receive nearly half of the $42.5 million allotted for the district. District security services, which would be allotted the second-most money in the proposed budget, would receive only about 16% of the funds. Rebuilding infrastructure for the district’s central government and rebuilding public health facilities are the next two largest categories of spending, with 13% and 6% of the budget, respectively.
In another sense, however, centralization of implementation allows Frelimo to pursue political consolidation with international partners’ money. The total reconstruction budget is $300 million over three years. This does not include the development projects planned through ADIN, yet is still multiple times larger than annual state spending was in Cabo Delgado in the years leading up to the conflict. In an era in which Mozambique is ostensibly decentralizing government control and giving provinces and communities more say in how they are run, implementing the reconstruction operation through the presidency exacerbates the resource imbalance between local leaders and the president. Even if the money was distributed only on the basis of merit, it would be impossible for people in Cabo Delgado to escape the conclusion that access to crucial infrastructure funds is predicated on approval from the president -- who is also the leader of the Frelimo party.
Furthermore, there is plenty of evidence in the proposed budget for Mocimboa da Praia district that there is slack built into reconstruction expenditures that can be used to line the pockets of political allies. For example, in the budget, the central district government intends to spend 500,000 meticais ($7,833) on 150 photos of the president and national flags to display in and around rebuilt government buildings -- so roughly $52 on each pair of flag and photograph. These are important symbols of the state, and necessary expenditures for re-establishing state sovereignty in a district that was long under the control of insurgents. Yet the district office of the National Institute of Social Action also sets aside money to buy photographs of the president for its new offices -- at a cool 6,000 meticais ($94) per photograph.
More seriously, the budget reports wildly different cost estimates for core supplies that will be necessary to rebuild district governance. Four different district offices set money aside for tents as temporary housing for the officials who will be in the vanguard of rebuilding state power in Mocimboa da Praia. Cost estimates per tent range from 1,800 meticais ($28) for the district central government to 10,000 meticais ($156) for the public health service to an incredible 50,000 meticais ($783) for the district office of economic activities. These kinds of discrepancies do not represent large dollar amounts in the scheme of government corruption, but they are harbingers of the kind of creative budgeting that could fund what amounts to a direct patronage system from the presidency to Cabo Delgado communities. If implemented, such a system could leave Cabo Delgado citizens with even less local control over their political future than they had before the conflict.
International Training Programs
The insurgency in Cabo Delgado exposed the fact that Mozambican armed forces were not prepared for counterinsurgency. A June 2020 security brief from the Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais (CEEI) at the Joaquim Chissano University set out a frank critique of the limitations of Mozambican security services, calling for a comprehensive restructuring, ranging from addressing equipment shortfalls to improving training through to the development of enhanced strategy and tactics to deal with evolving terrorism and insurgency threats.
Maputo has been on the search for such support. An array of trainings have been provided by private contractors, neighboring countries, and the international community. With the European Union Training Mission standing up in October, it is worth looking back at past and present training programs in Mozambique to understand whether they have been effective and coherent in their response to the challenges faced by Mozambican security services.
The earliest publicized training programs set up in response to the conflict was run by the South African private military company Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), which provided training for a 120-man team of Mozambican police (PRM) in the latter half of 2020. The training was meant to promote the development of a “fire force” capacity within the PRM, which would combine ground and rotary wing assets to conduct offensive operations against insurgents. With the Mozambican government shifting control over the counterinsurgency effort from the PRM to the Mozambican military (FADM) in early 2021, however, the “fire force” concept was effectively retired. Only one component of this PRM unit saw any action in the wake of the March 2021 Palma attack. It is unclear whether this trained team has been kept together or is now split up within the PRM’s structures.
In February 2021, Mozambique contracted the South African arms manufacturer Paramount Group to provide air assets and armored vehicles as well as associated training through its newly established Advanced Training and Support Division with its Dubai-based partners, Burnham Global. This included training pilots and ground support crews for newly acquired helicopter gunships, and training for a batch of newly purchased armored personnel carriers.
Training of two FADM companies was provided by Zimbabwean forces ahead of the SADC Standby Force Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) agreement, although it is not clear what the training involved. Zimbabwe has offered training as its primary contribution to SAMIM. In August 2021, Zimbabwe’s Defence Minister announced that it would be deploying over 300 trainers to this effect. However, as of the end of October, this had still not happened. No official explanation has been provided beyond the claim that a bespoke additional status of forces agreement (SOFA) is pending. This has been outstanding since early August, despite the fact that the existing SAMIM SOFA already makes provision for training (See Article 3, Section 1(e)). No specific mention was made of a bilateral training commitment in the communique of the 12th Session of the Mozambique-Zimbabwe Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security meeting convened in Maputo in mid-October.
Rwandan support includes commitment to provide a training and capacity-building component, but as with the general agreement over security cooperation, publicly available detail of what this will comprise has been limited, beyond the general focus on civil-military cooperation and community policing. One recent publication suggests that this will only occur after the Rwandan force has wrapped up its operational role. In early November, PRM Commander Bernadino Rafael announced the beginning of a six-month mixed force training provided by Rwanda, focusing on kidnapping, terrorism, and human and drug trafficking. The programs will also include counterintelligence training, which will take place outside Mozambique.
The price tag for Mozambique on new equipment and training by private contractors and others, such as that provided by Rwanda and Zimbabwe, is unknown. Researchers from civil society organizations estimate training costs by private contractors alone have been over$40 million. How Rwanda’s mission is being financed is still unknown, although Rwandan President Paul Kagame has indicated several times it is being done without external financing.
Other training is paid for by those providing it, as part of international support packages. Since 2020, the United States has provided two short-term training modules focused on building specialist capacities for FADM’s elite fighting units. This Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program focuses on training by and for special operations forces. One JCET course for Mozambican marines was conducted between March and May 2021; 100 FADM commandos completed another six-week training course in early September. In addition to the JCETs, another US training mission in June and July 2021 provided a Tactical Combat Casualty Care and Combat Livesaver course designed to improve the survival rate of troops in combat situations for 60 FADM members. Further training modules have not been announced, but can be expected.
The EUTM is the most comprehensive training component currently in play. Off the back of an EU Council decision in July 2021, it was officially launched on 15 October as part of the EU’s commitment “to support a more efficient and effective response by the Mozambican armed forces to the crisis in Cabo Delgado province.” It is a two year mission that will train eleven companies -- approximately 2,000 troops -- into a Quick Reaction Force within the FADM. It will build on the Portuguese training mission -- a four month training program staffed with 60 trainers that began in May 2021. Indeed, Portugal will maintain the lead role in the program, which will be commanded by Portugal’s Brigadier General Nuno Lemos Pires. Training will also be provided by instructors from Finland, Spain, Italy, France, Greece, Romania, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Estonia.
The training will include a focus on “operational preparation, specialised training including on counter-terrorism, and training and education on compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians, and on respect for the rule of law.” It will also “support the development of command and control structures and mechanisms of the [Quick Reaction Force].” By mid-December, 140 trainers will be in situ divided between two training bases, one for commandos and one for marines.
The initial price tag of almost €20 million is expected to increase at least four-fold once further spending on equipment is authorized by Brussels. Training will be staggered over the two years, in part to allow time for qualified trainees to be identified. Those who have already undertaken training with Portuguese instructors will be included in the EUTM training pool. It is unclear if PRM members trained by DAG will also be eligible.
The EUTM has a specific mandate to “coordinate its activities” with other international actors, and a proactive stance in that regard may enhance prospects for greater coherence. However, the efficacy of this will depend on Mozambique’s willingness to promote such an approach. No effective coordination between the various international training programs in Mozambique will be possible without clarity between the training entities and Maputo about the overall strategic goals of Mozambican forces.
The EU can bring lessons learned from the challenges of its other training missions in Mali, the Central African Republic, and perhaps most significantly, Somalia. The EU mission in Somalia has been in place since 2010, and the effectiveness of EU support there has been hampered by the lack of an agreed strategic vision for Somalia’s security architecture.
Both EU and US training missions have emphasized the centrality of human rights standards and the importance of building civil-military relations. The EUTM, specifically, has agreed to a monitoring mechanism that will assess trainee’s compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. This focus will be bolstered by building an integrated gender and human rights policy approach in support of the mission with multilateral intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies.
However, the EU and US training does not provide in the field mentoring, an issue of concern raised in a December 2020 assessment of the EU mission in Somalia. Given the limited combat field experience of Mozambican commanders, this is a critical component that might be provided by other training options. DAG training had envisaged a field mentoring role and some analysts believe Zimbabwean trainers could be well suited to play this role.
While operational forces have recognized the importance of improved coordination, communications, and intelligence sharing in the field, this will remain a huge challenge with respect to the various training programs in play. Mozambique retains point responsibility for maximizing coherence between these trainings to ensure that they complement and reinforce one another. The long term efficacy of the programs will depend on Maputo’s ability to incorporate the training programs into an overall strategic concept for its security forces.
SADC Extends SAMIM
On 5 October, SADC’s Organ Troika (for Politics, Defence and Security) agreed to extend the SAMIM deployment by a further 90 days. This decision did not expand the mission beyond the existing numbers deployed, though, due to a lack of available funds to support the mission, with troop contributing countries having to scrounge within domestic budgets to fund their contributions. A further extension is expected in January, as the security situation will not have been fully consolidated. SAMIM head, Professor Mpho Molomo, has already indicated that ongoing security challenges have influenced SADC’s intention to deploy more ground troops into areas of Cabo Delgado where SAMIM offensives have pushed out insurgents. An expansion of operations will, however, be contingent on available funding. SADC has called on the international community to support the mission but has not provided details of what it is specifically asking for. Much will depend on what role Mozambique prefers for SAMIM. To date, its attitude toward regional intervention has remained lukewarm, and there is a lingering impression in some quarters that the regional bloc’s involvement would not be welcome by Maputo over a longer period.