Cabo Ligado Update: 27 January - 9 February 2025

Feb 12

By the numbers

Data highlights in Cabo Delgado province (27 January-09 February 2025)

At least 5 political violence events (2,014 in total since 1 October 2017)
At least 6 reported fatalities from political violence (5,927 since 1 October 2017)
At least 6 reported civilian fatalities (2,472 since 1 October 2017)

Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) remains active in northwest Cabo Delgado, sourcing supplies through looting villages. A number of ISM actions have taken place close to state forces’ positions, including those of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), which has not responded. In the south of the province, disorder has subsided to some extent. In Chiúre district, residents forced Mozambican military out of their town, expressing mistrust in their capacity to provide protection. ISM maintains a presence in coastal Macomia despite RDF patrols. The RDF is showing restraint in recent months, which is likely to continue amid concerns over its role in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Situation Summary

Political violence in Cabo Delgado province was characterized by ISM actions that predominantly targeted civilians. While remaining active on the coast and in territory around the Messalo river, the group also undertook attacks to the southwest, in Meluco and Montepuez districts. Beyond Cabo Delgado, there were further clashes between the Naparama militia and state forces in Nampula and Zambézia provinces.

IS targets the N380 highway

Insurgents kidnapped around 10 people, including children, in the village of Quinto Congresso in Macomia on the N380 on 2 February, Lusa reported. On 6 February, insurgents attacked the village of Litandacua,, killing at least two civilians and remaining in the area for two days, despite the presence of a RDF outpost less than 10 kilometers away in the village of Litamanda. On 8 February, insurgents attacked the village of Chai, just south of Litamanda on the N380, but there were no reported casualties.

On the coast of Macomia, up to 50 insurgents remain present around Mucojo and Pangane, where Carta de Moçambique reports that fighters talk to and buy food from locals at night after the security forces patrols have passed.

At least four killed in insurgent thrust into Meluco and Montepuez

Insurgents beheaded at least three artisanal gold miners around Ravia in Meluco district on 26 January, local sources reported. Islamic State (IS) claimed to have killed five, in a statement posted on social media that did not provide any visual evidence. Over 90 people from the nearby villages of Namoro and Nairoto fled to Montepuez town. One source reported that insurgents were seen carrying looted food into the bush in a stolen tractor.

On 3 February, insurgents struck again in the village of Nicocue on the R698 road connecting Montepuez town to Mueda, with IS claiming to have killed one person and burned a vehicle and a house. The R698 is the main alternative route to the N380. Attacking both of these roads simultaneously may be a strategic move to disrupt transport between the north and south of Cabo Delgado. Around 40 insurgents were seen crossing into Meluco from Macomia on 18 January.

Insurgent activity continues in Mocímboa da Praia

Insurgents were reported on the island of Quilhanhune on 29 January, and two days later they kidnapped a group of fishermen and took them to Tambuzi island, demanding a ransom of 10,000 meticais, according to a local source. The insurgents also stole foodstuffs from the captured fishing boats.

On 2 February, insurgents assaulted a FADM forward position in the village of Mitope, just under 15 km from Mocímboa da Praia town, where the RDF is headquartered. According to photos published by IS, insurgents seized assault rifles, light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and a considerable quantity of ammunition, as well as boots and communications equipment. IS also claimed that the insurgents burned around 20 homes and shops in the village.

Clashes between Naparama and security forces turn deadly

Tensions between security forces and the Naparama militia continue to escalate, and on 2 February suspected members of the militia beheaded a neighborhood secretary in the town of Morrumbala in Zambézia province. Mediafax reported that the victim was killed in revenge for allegedly collaborating with security forces in the repression of post-election protests. Two Naparama were then shot dead in a subsequent exchange of fire with police, according to Lusa. The governor of Zambézia, Pio Matos, condemned the beheading as a “barbaric act,” while the Renamo mayor of Quelimane, Manuel de Araújo, blamed the police for “persecuting” civilians, forcing them to “end up protecting themselves.”

Three days later, seven suspected members of the Naparama militia were killed in a clash with police in the village of Aube, near the city of Angoche in Nampula province, the website Ikweli reported. Carta de Moçambique reported that the Naparama were protesting against the cost of living and that a member of the police Rapid Intervention Unit was wounded in the exchange of fire.

Focus

ISM has entered 2025 seemingly recovering from the impact of Cyclone Chido on its operations in December. That month, the group was involved in just eight violent incidents, down from 30 in November, the second highest month in 2024. For January, ACLED records 12 violent events involving ISM, resulting in at least 22 fatalities. In February, there have been a further six such events up to 9 February, with nine reported fatalities. In the recent history of the conflict, these numbers are not particularly high. Both events and fatalities were approximately twice as high in January 2024. However, they appear to be trending upward.

Of perhaps greater concern is the pattern of ISM engagement with state forces FADM and the RDF in recent months. This has been falling, without a tangible improvement of security for civilians. In July 2024, almost half of the 27 violent events involving ISM were engagements with FADM. This proportion has fallen steadily since. In January 2025, ACLED records just one event between FADM and ISM, an attack by the latter on a FADM position in Quiterajo, Macomia district. ISM engagement with the RDF has also been falling in recent months, from being involved in almost all its events in July, to none in January. Meanwhile, civilians are being significantly affected by insurgent violence: All but one of ISM’s 22 victims in January were civilians.

There are two possible explanations for Mozambican state forces' reluctance to engage with ISM. The first is a lack of professionalism on the part of the security forces. This was illustrated vividly in images IS released showing ISM’s attack on a FADM forward position in Mocímboa da Praia on 2 February. Along with the weapons and ammunition were about 11 pairs of military boots, left behind by the troops who fled the attack. FADM troops on the frontline are not always willing or prepared to take on ISM. Second, their attention may have been pulled toward anti-government protests held in the wake of the election. While Mozambican forces had just one encounter with ISM in January, FADM and the police Rapid Intervention Unit were involved in four incidents in Cabo Delgado province involving opposition supporters during the month. These included the targeted killing of organizers of the opposition party Podemos, breaking up anti-government protests, and the forced disappearance of civilians in Macomia district.

The RDF is constrained by the political environment in Mozambique, as well as the attention being paid to its operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. If it is unable to defend rural communities, including many not far from RDF combat outposts, its positive reputation with communities in northern Mozambique may be at risk. The RDF, which works diligently at community relations in Cabo Delgado, is much better placed than FADM to gather intelligence from local communities. This may be placed at risk if the RDF is seen as unwilling to respond effectively to ISM operations.

Round Up

RDF completes latest troop rotation

A new contingent of Rwandan military and police forces started to arrive in Cabo Delgado at the end of January, as part of a regular troop rotation. Data from the Flightradar 24 app indicate flights from Kigali to Nacala on 31 January, and 7 February. Mozambique's defense minister, Cristóvão Chume, clarified for the Mozambican media that there was no increase in the size of Rwanda's deployment, simply a rotation of personnel.

Venâncio Mondlane cuts ties with Podemos

The former presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane has ended his relationship with the Podemos party, which supported his presidential candidacy in the general elections on 9 October 2024. In a statement signed by Dinis Tivane, an adviser to Mondlane, it was announced that Mondlane had terminated all agreements with Podemos. The statement said they felt that their political partner had been inflexible and insensitive in defending the cause of the people demanding electoral reform and accused Albino Forquilha's party of "treason" and "acting against the will of the people." At a political rally in Gaza province, Mondlane told supporters he was forming a party that would be launched later this year.

Chapo skips EAC-SADC summit on DRC

President Daniel Chapo did not attend the joint summit of the heads of state and government of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community held in Dar es Salaam on 8 February. Chapo’s absence may have been to distance Mozambique’s cooperation with Rwanda in northern Mozambique from Rwanda’s controversial presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

US and UAE airstrikes target IS regional hub in Somalia

President Donald Trump announced on 1 February that the US had undertaken air strikes at Islamic State Somalia (ISS) positions in the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia. According to Trump, the attack targeted a “Senior ISIS Attack Planner.” The airstrikes, undertaken alongside United Arab Emirates forces, followed some weeks of ground operations by Puntland forces.

The figure targeted is likely Abdulqadir Mumin, head of ISS, and thought by some to be the overall leader of IS itself. Contrary to Trump’s statement, this is not the first such strike in Puntland. In May last year, US forces claimed to have killed at least three militants in a similar air strike, also believed to have been targeting Abdulqadir.

These operations are of regional interest. IS’s Karrar hub in Somalia is understood to serve as a financial hub for the group’s operations globally and regionally. The United Nations and the Bridgeway Foundation have both documented payments from the Karrar hub to support operations in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda. ISS itself has grown considerably in recent years, attracting increasing numbers of fighters from East African countries, according to the United Nations, indicating the presence of active IS recruitment networks in the region. The UAE, too, is providing wide support to operations against IS in the region. As well as being operational in Somalia, it has recently supplied armored personnel carriers to FADM.

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