Cabo Ligado Update: 7 August-3 September 2023

Sep 6

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-September 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 1 September 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

Total number of political violence events: 1,676
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,759
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,030

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Cabo Delgado continued to experience a fairly low level of violent activity in the last month, with the exception of two significant attacks on the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM), both in eastern Macomia district.

The first took place on 8 August with a dawn raid on an FADM base in the Catupa forest comprising up to 50 fighters, a local source told Cabo Ligado. The base was overrun and at least seven Mozambican soldiers were killed, according to Islamic State (IS)-affiliated news agency Amaq, which published photos of the dead bodies. Amaq also claimed that insurgents seized 50 rifles, as well as mortars, rocket launchers, and ammunition. Much of the base was burned to the ground and the fires were detected by NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System, which uses satellite imagery to record and present fire events.

Insurgents arrived in Pangane village on the Macomia coast the next day and bought food. On 14 August, a large military convoy of 40 vehicles arrived in Mucojo, 10 kilometers south of Pangane, carrying reinforcements from the South Africa and Botswana contingents of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).

The second significant attack took place on 22 August near the village of Quiterajo, with insurgents ambushing a convoy of four FADM armored personnel carriers with rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire, killing up to nine soldiers and officers. One vehicle was driven off the road and set on fire. The convoy was carrying the head of the army, Major General Tiago Nampelo. It seems likely that he was deliberately targeted, suggesting his movements had been leaked to the insurgents from within the security forces.

FADM acknowledged the ambush in a statement on 23 August, but denied any soldiers had been killed. The statement also claimed that two senior insurgent commanders, named as Abu Kital and Ali Mahando, had been killed in the attack in Catupa forest on 8 August. Two days later, FADM Chief of the General Staff Admiral Joaquim Mangrasse announced that insurgent leader Bonomade Machude Omar, also known as Ibn Omar, and two companions had been killed in the ambush on 22 August. IS has not yet commented on Ibn Omar’s death. Some sources claim that Ibn Omar was replaced as leader by Farido Selemane Arune in June last year, though he has since remained a critical figure in the insurgency.

While fighting has been concentrated largely in coastal Macomia, it appears some insurgent cells have migrated westward in the past month. Insurgents attacked an FADM base at Litapata in Muidumbe district near the Messalo river on 8 August but no casualties were reported. These insurgents have since been joined by a steady stream of fighters spotted moving away from the coast along the Messalo. On 15 August, a large number of insurgents were seen crossing the N380 road in Macomia, near the villages of Chai and Quinto Congresso, reportedly including men, women and children. Sources told Cabo Ligado that some of these insurgents appeared to be marching towards Mueda district. On 20 August, the village of Homba in Mueda was abandoned after receiving reports that insurgents were nearby, according to Lusa.

Insurgents may also have been captured further afield. One unconfirmed report claims a group of alleged fighters was arrested in the Ngura area of Ancuabe district on 28 August, said to be fleeing fighting in Macomia. The number of those arrested is not known. Three days later, another group of six insurgents were reportedly found somewhere in Nangade district having escaped Macomia but this is also not yet confirmed.

Several civilian fatalities were also reported in Cabo Delgado in the last month. On 16 August, FADM soldiers reportedly killed a fisherman at Ingoane in Macomia district. One source told Cabo Ligado he was shot by a patrol while apparently trying to flee after being stopped and asked for documents. On 17 August, in the village of Nanquidunga in Mocímboa da Praia district, just south of Mocímboa da Praia town, a mother and her daughter were killed by a grenade that had been left in the ground several months ago, Carta de Moçambique reported.

Focus: Succession

The death of Bonomade Machude Omar, also known as Ibn Omar, leaves the insurgency at an inflexion point. The most able military leader of the insurgency, his death comes in the wake of the death or killing of a number of his colleagues in recent months. Greatly reduced from their 2021 high point, by when they had paralyzed the province’s economic infrastructure, the insurgents are now mostly confined to Macomia district. This presents some challenges. Firstly, such a capable military leader will need to be replaced, either internally, or potentially through IS-affiliated networks. Secondly, the group is likely to be faced with intensified operations by FADM and SAMIM troops. While FADM’s capability is limited, intensified SAMIM operations are expected in Macomia in preparation for their scheduled withdrawal in July 2024, particularly during the current “pacification” phase, set to run until October 2023. In these circumstances, the group will need to move beyond Macomia if it is to have a future.

Observatório do Meio Rural has the most complete biography of Omar. Born in Ncumbi village in Palma district, he was brought up in Mocímboa da Praia town. As well as secular schooling there, he also undertook religious studies. Following school, he served in the navy, and later spent some time in Tanzania. Upon his return, he established himself as a trader in the Nanduadua neighborhood of the town. Involved in the insurgency from the first attacks in Mocimboa da Praia in 2017, he quickly became its most prominent military leader. In a widely circulated video clip from March 2020, he appeared both ruthless, and charismatic, warning Mocímboa da Praia residents of collaborating with the authorities.

According to the United States Department of State, which designated him a terrorist in August 2021, he was the group’s overall military leader, and led one group attacking Palma in March 2021. Another group in that attack was led by the late Abu Yassir Hassan, similarly designated by the US in March 2021. Omar was involved in operations across Cabo Delgado, according to the Department of State, as well as in Mtwara region in Tanzania.

Omar is not the only leader that the group has lost. Abu Yassir Hassan passed away this year, not in combat, sources say. Thought to be Tanzanian, and at times dubbed a religious leader, he too had a significant military role to play, as evidenced by the US claim for his involvement in the Palma attack. The death of another Tanzanian-born figure, Mustafa al-Tanzani, was announced by IS in April 2023. According to a source, he had been killed by SAMIM forces in an operation on Matemo island the previous month. Little is known of him, but the recording of his death by both intervention forces and IS suggests his importance.

Mozambican authorities have not been shy in claiming other fatalities. Bernardino Rafael, Commander General of the police, claims that up to 30 “leaders” have been killed. He did not name any particular figures, or indicate the period to which he was referring. On 23 August, the defense ministry claimed that Abu Kital and Ali Mahando had been killed, claiming that Kital had been an assistant to Omar. No information was given on Mahando, though according to a local source Ali Mahando, known as Sheikh Ali, was a significant figure, with roles as a madrasa teacher and fighter. Issa Wachio, another militant figure regarded as significant by intervention forces, was killed in an FADM ambush in Nangade district in May this year.

With both Hassan and Omar gone, as well as others, succession becomes an issue. While Omar has maintained his status as a military leader, Farido Selemane Arune has been regarded as at least of equal standing since last year. Whether he can claim legitimacy in the absence of those two figures is not clear. Below figures such as Farido and Omar, the insurgents have developed a cadre of commanders, such as Muamudo Saha and Daniel Mussa from Macomia. The group’s relatively flat structure over the years, with commanders based in different parts of the province, will have allowed some capacity to develop. Whether Farido, or anyone else, has the military capability, strategic vision, and legitimacy with the group to take the reins is not known. It is unlikely that IS will impose an external figure, but it may lead to intensified technical support from outside, whether from IS Central Africa Province, or from further afield.

Though the insurgents have been successfully holding off FADM and SAMIM operations in Macomia district, the challenge before them is real. Their ability to continue to do so will depend on their ability to maintain and supply bases in the area, and the capability of their remaining fighting force. The number of active fighters has most recently been estimated by the United Nations as 180-220, down from 280 estimated in December 2022. Recent movements by some fighters westwards from bases in Macomia suggests that the group may once again be looking to break up in the face of sustained pressure, as it did in the months following international intervention in 2021. They successfully weathered a sustained onslaught at that time, and may well be able to do so again.

Round-Up

Mozambique strengthens legislation against money laundering and terrorism financing

The Mozambican Assembly of the Republic unanimously passed legal amendments on 11 August to enhance efforts against money laundering and terrorism. The changes strengthen oversight of non-profit organizations, financial institutions, insurers, real estate, vehicle sales, and gem trade. They also introduce increased penalties for non-compliance, simplified risk assessment measures, and specific financial sanctions for terrorism. These amendments are crucial for Mozambique to be taken off the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) "grey list", with the FATF's next assessment scheduled for 23 October 2023.

Government plans $120 million dam in Cabo Delgado

The Mozambican government, along with partners, is allocating over $120 million to construct a dam on the Muera River, addressing water shortages in the "Makonde Plateau" encompassing Mueda, Muidumbe, and Nangade districts. The project includes pumping stations, pipelines, and distribution extensions. Located near Muidumbe, it will provide a long-term water supply. Meanwhile, Mozambique's parliament is considering a special budget for Cabo Delgado due to ongoing security challenges but no details have been announced.

EUTM likely to extend mission in Mozambique

The European Union Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM-Mozambique) is likely to extend its mandate. EUTM-Mozambique has so far been largely unable to evaluate the readiness of their trainees in combat. An intermediate report recommends extending their mandate beyond 2024, with the possibility of including Cape Verdean troops to enhance military cooperation.

Meanwhile, SAMIM, in partnership with the EU, initiated training for boat operators on EU-donated boats in Cabo Delgado on 7 August at the FADM naval base in Pemba. Twelve boat operators from FADM and four from SAMIM have begun basic training. SAMIM has received two boats, with six more expected by October 2023. These boats will eventually be handed over to FADM to support security operations in Cabo Delgado.

More than 800,000 still displaced despite civilian returns

Just over 819,000 people remain displaced as a result of armed conflict in northern Mozambique, according to figures from Mozambique’s National Institute of Disaster Management (INGD). The agency claims that about 409,000 have now returned home since the start of the conflict in October 2017. The International Organization for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix estimated in March that there were just over 834,000 people still displaced and that around 420,000 had returned home.

IS fighters contracting AIDS in Mozambique

An anti-IS al-Qaeda chat server has leaked an internal circular, purportedly from IS, saying that fighters in Mozambique are contracting HIV from their wives and slaves. IS leadership advises conducting medical tests on non-virgin enslaved women before distributing them among fighters and killing those who refuse to convert to Islam, according to the document. Captured women with AIDS who do convert can be released for a ransom, the document says.

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