Cabo Ligado Update: 8-21 July 2024

Cabo Ligado update - 6-19 July 2024

Situation Summary

This reporting period began with an unprecedented riot against Mozambican Defense and Security Forces (FDS) in Macomia on 9 July that resulted in the deaths of at least two soldiers,  five according to one report, and left two more badly injured. The FDS members were set upon by a mob after a soldier killed a market trader who was walking outside after curfew on the previous evening. 

The Ministry of National Defense expressed “profound regret” for the incident and claimed the victim raised suspicions after being seen carrying an empty machine gun ammunition box and fled upon being questioned by soldiers. According to the ministry, he was killed accidentally when soldiers tried to fire warning shots. Local sources said the victim was only trying to find somewhere to relieve himself when he was summarily executed. Cabo Ligado understands that the FDS and local government are the only healthcare providers in Macomia, and it’s possible some of the soldiers’ lives could have been saved if there had been better medical care available.

Demonstrations against the FDS reportedly included calls for them to withdraw entirely from Macomia. Shops and businesses were closed, and traffic was suspended on the road between Macomia and Pemba. Local sources reported that security forces attempted to disperse the crowd with live fire, prompting people to flee into the woods.

The riot was the culmination of longstanding tensions between the FDS and the local population. In June, the police Rapid Intervention Unit was accused of extorting and arbitrarily detaining civilians in the Nanga A neighborhood of Macomia, where many of the demonstrators initially gathered following the shooting of the market trader. 

The calls for the removal of the FDS come despite ongoing insurgent activity in the region. A caravan of insurgents was seen crossing the N380 road towards Chai in Macomia around 17 July, one source told Cabo Ligado. It is believed they have set up camp west of Chai, which is known to be a bolthole for the insurgency as the terrain is both fertile and practical to defend.

Elsewhere, a series of clashes suggest that insurgents have reestablished a presence in Nangade district. Clashes took place with security forces around the village of Quinto Congresso, approximately 50 kilometers east of Nangade town, on 11, 12, and 13 July. At least two insurgents were killed by the FDS and the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force (TPDF), which had been pursuing the insurgents since 9 July, according to a security source. It is rare for the TPDF to be involved in combat. The previous day, insurgents had been observed a few kilometers north, around the village of Chitama. There have been nine recorded incidents of political violence in Nangade this year, compared to four in all of 2023, suggesting that insurgents are gradually bolstering their strength in the district.

Insurgent activity also persisted in Mocímboa da Praia district. Islamic State (IS) claimed to have captured and killed a civilian near Mbau on 10 July, but this has not yet been corroborated by other sources. Integrity Magazine reported that “a large number” of insurgents were observed on the road near Mangoma village, just over 10km from Mocímboa da Praia town, on 16 July. Three days later, insurgents persuaded residents of Nazimoja village to sell them food, claiming they were ill, according to Carta de Moçambique

Hunger is also becoming a critical issue for civilians in Mocímboa da Praia. The conflict has forced farmers to abandon their fields and many are now relying on a meager diet of sweet potatoes and cassava, ZumboFM reported. Displaced people in Macomia town are also complaining of hunger, with some taking the risk of returning home to villages threatened by insurgent violence in search of food.

Focus: Managing radicalization in Tanzania

Evidence is emerging in Tanzania of the re-emergence of Salafi madrasas, with encouragement by the state as it attempts to bring them under the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (Bakwata). This reflects Tanzania’s long-standing approach of bringing such groups into the mainstream. While this approach has been broadly successful, there is evidence that such unregulated Salafist madrasas have been sites of radicalization of children and martial training in the past. There is, therefore, a risk attached to this approach for Tanzania in the first instance, and for neighboring countries where Tanzanian fighters are present. 

Around 10 July, District Commissioner Peter Magoti of Kisarawe district, neighboring Dar es Salaam, announced the discovery of 156 children living in makeshift accommodation in two mosques in the district. The children came from across Tanzania, including Mtwara and Singida regions bordering Mozambique, as well as “neighboring countries,” according to Magoti. He ordered all children to be returned home within 24 hours. As he was accompanied by the District Peace and Security Committee, the issue was framed as a security concern, as much as a child welfare issue. However, just a few days later, he visited the two mosques again, accompanied by Bakwata, donating 150 bags of cement to each for the construction of dormitories. 

The historic connection of one of the two mosques, Masjid Salaf Mosque, to violent jihadism likely explains this approach. The mosque is a branch of the Ibn Taymiyyah Salaf Foundation, led by Sheikh Qassim Mafuta from Tanga region. In 2012, he was identified by the United Nations as being connected to al-Shabaab in Somalia. Twelve years later, he is still based in Tanga, though he now preaches vehemently against violent jihadism as practiced by al-Shabaab, and IS affiliates. This has been achieved through the Tanzanian state’s policy of appeasement towards groups that disassociate from violent jihadism. 

This approach has risks. Tanzania has in the past been a destination for children from northern Cabo Delgado, though this practice has ebbed away for now due to both the conflict and government policy. The discordant approach taken in Tanzania may present a low to medium level of risk to Mozambique if Tanzanian authorities are not sensitized to the potential to feed the conflict. Local officials may be reluctant to monitor institutions seen to have political favor, thereby presenting risks to child welfare, as well as a risk of radicalization. However, the low level of political violence from Islamist groups in Tanzania over the years indicates the success of this approach. This approach will almost certainly continue through 2030 and President Samia’s expected second term. 

Round Up

National Electoral Commission excludes CAD from October elections

Mozambique's National Electoral Commission (CNE) has excluded Venâncio Mondlane's party, the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD), from participating in the 9 October 2024 legislative, gubernatorial, and provincial assembly elections. This decision does not prevent Mondlane from running in the presidential election. According to a Mediafax report, the CNE argued that the CAD did not comply with the legal requirements for submitting candidacies, which led to the nullification of its candidacy process. Part of the reasons for the rejection include a series of irregularities in CAD's registration process. The CNE also cites irregularities in the statutes, such as the fact that the CAD was founded on 27 April this year, and did not inform the Ministry of Justice, Constitutional and Religious Affairs within 15 days, as required by law. Instead, it was informed on 18 June. The Constitutional Council will now have to either uphold or overturn the CNE's decision.

IS continues to highlight preaching in Macomia district

IS’s al-Naba weekly newsletter of 18 July featured ISM preaching activities in Darumba, Olumba, and Manica villages near the Macomia coast. Three days later, IS issued a photo report through their social media channels that appeared to have been taken in Olumboa village, approximately 15 km south of Mucojo. According to al-Naba, some videos were shown, and the importance of hijra, or migration, was stressed in the village meetings. This refers to joining the mujahideen, suggesting that active recruitment is taking place. 

Girls are forced to marry insurgents in Cabo Delgado, reveals Save The Children

The Cabo Delgado conflict has evolved into a complex humanitarian crisis forcing children into marriage, including from armed groups, reveals a new report from Save The Children. The report mentions cases of girls being kidnapped by armed groups, sexually abused, and forced to marry. Several girls have since returned with babies. The research carried out in Chiúre and Palma districts between 20 November and 4 December 2023, also reveals the role that economic vulnerability in conflict areas is also leading to child marriage within families that struggle to meet basic needs. The report details situations in which parents and caregivers reportedly sent their daughters to marry men from organized armed groups, and from the wider community, for protection or for money to flee the conflict area.

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Cabo Ligado Update: 22 July-4 August 2024

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Cabo Ligado Update: 24 June-7 July 2024