Cabo Ligado Update: 22 July-4 August 2024
Situation Summary
In the last two weeks, the Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) launched a major offensive into Macomia district, concentrating on the Catupa forest and the coast, while insurgents clashed with Mozambican and Tanzanian troops in Nangade district.
The RSF began patrols along the northern Macomia coast around Quiterajo on 23 July, where they presented lectures and videos to locals about the dangers of violent extremism, one source told Cabo Ligado. On 27 July, the Rwandans attacked insurgents at Marere in southern Mocímboa da Praia district, enveloping their position from the north and the south, via Quiterajo. Reports from various sources indicate that fighting continued across the Mbau Administrative Post up to 1 August.
This operation appears to have set the stage for a serious thrust deep into Macomia from Mocímboa da Praia. On 29 and 30 July, heavy gunfire was heard along the Macomia coast, between Quiterajo and Mucojo. At least two helicopters were reported to have strafed insurgent bases in the Catupa forest and around Mucojo. It is not clear to what extent these aerial attacks have been supported by ground troops, who will be needed to hold cleared territory.
Naval forces also engaged insurgents along the coast. Islamic State (IS) claimed to have clashed with Rwandan patrol vessels near Darumba and Crimize, though it is more likely they belonged to Mozambican security forces. A local source confirmed at least one exchange of fire between military boats and insurgents fleeing Mucojo.
IS also claimed that ISM wounded several Rwandans in an IED attack on 31 July on the road between Limala and Mbau in Mocímboa da Praia district, where the RSF maintains a forward operating base. This has not been corroborated by other sources, but according to sources, insurgents have been planting IEDs prolifically in recent months. The type of air operations undertaken by Rwandan troops recently will depend on infantry holding ground that air fire clears. IEDs will present a significant challenge to this.
Reports from civilians fleeing the coast for Macomia town suggest insurgents have suffered heavy casualties, but this is yet to be verified.
The RSF offensive extends to the bank of the Messalo river in western Macomia, where insurgents have migrated in recent weeks, likely in anticipation of this offensive. On 29 July, gunfire and shelling were heard around the villages of Nkoe, Nharide, Kunamede, and Likobe, which are clustered in the vicinity of the N380 highway. Kunamede was first identified as a likely Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) base by a source in March 2024. While sources are inconsistent over their locations, Kunamede and Likobe likely lie east of Chai and Litamanda.
This offensive follows the deployment of several hundred Rwandan troops to Macomia town to replace the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique, which officially withdrew on 15 July. The RSF arrived in Macomia town on 23 July and is expected to occupy bases along the N380 and near the border of Quissanga and Meluco districts.
Meanwhile, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) engaged insurgents in Nangade for the fourth time in a month, following their three-day skirmish between 11-13 July. On 31 July, insurgents appeared in Namuine village, just over 10km from Nangade town, and looted food distributed by humanitarian agencies. The next day, insurgents captured five farmers and interrogated them about the positions of Mozambican and Tanzanian troops before releasing them. On 2 August, TPDF and Mozambican forces went in pursuit of insurgents around Namuine, and machine gunfire, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades were heard that afternoon. No details of the clash have been confirmed so far. The concentration of Tanzanian activity is remarkable, as prior to July, ACLED records no events involving TPDF since November 2022.
A small group of insurgents was also reported moving south shortly before the Rwandan offensive got underway. Around 15 armed insurgents were seen in Mussomero village, just a few kilometers from Quissanga town, on 24 and 25 July. On 27 July, a band of insurgents, presumed to be the same group, passed through Bilibiza village before marching further south into the Pulo forest toward the N1 highway connecting Pemba and Montepuez. Panic spread through the villages of Intutupue and Silva Macua on the N1 as insurgents approached on 29 July, according to Lusa. Their purpose is not yet clear.
Focus: How strong is ISM: the UN Monitoring Group report
The most recent report on IS and al-Qaeda of the United Nations’ Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team usefully places ISM in the context of jihadist groups globally and in the region. The report perhaps exaggerates ISM’s capability and misrepresents its experience of the conflict in recent months. Nevertheless, the insurgency has been resilient, and the report sheds light on how that may continue. Its most notable finding is the increasingly important role of IS’s al-Karrar regional hub in Somalia for global financing and regional recruitment. Regional networks have been critical to the development of violent jihadist groups in east and southern Africa, so a strengthened hub is potentially widely destabilizing.
The Monitoring Group estimates that ISM now numbers 250-350 fighters and notes the uptick in events involving the group in 2024, a finding that agrees with ACLED reports. The report stresses ISM’s increased targeting of state forces, and describes its tactics as being “sophisticated, calculated, and well executed,” citing the 10 May attack on Macomia. In this regard, ACLED data present a more nuanced picture of the group’s strength in 2024.
The monitoring group considered data up to 21 June. During this period, from the start of the year to 21 June, there has been an uptick in events involving ISM, with 60% of these events involving ISM targeting civilians. However, it is the fatality count in clashes with state forces, at least 143 or over 60% of all fatalities in the year up to 21 June 2024, that represents the most significant loss of life. This includes significant losses for ISM, particularly in clashes with the RSF. The two most significant examples are the death of at least 10 and up to 70 ISM fighters in Mbau on 29 May this year and the killing of at least 10 in an operation in Nampula at the end of April.
Yet after seven years of insurgency, ISM is resilient. Part of this resilience stems from support from IS in the region in terms of finance, recruitment, and technical assistance. Central to this is the al-Karrar hub, which the Monitoring Group judges to have grown in importance. This is seen in the increasing activity of IS Somalia itself, though the hub’s function is international, particularly in terms of fundraising for affiliates, including ISM. Financing for ISM via al-Karrar has been documented by both the UN Group of Experts for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Bridgeway Foundation. In the face of RSF operations, ISM will continue, and likely increase its targeting of civilians in northern Mozambique.
Round Up
China, Tanzania, and Mozambique hold joint military exercises
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has joined with the TPDF and the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique, in joint military exercises. The exercise officially celebrates Tanzania’s 60 years of military cooperation with China and is a reminder to other powers of the depth of the relationship. Dubbed Peace Unity 2024, the exercises were launched in TPDF’s Comprehensive Training Centre at Mapinga in Bagamoyo district, north of Dar es Salaam. Peace Unity 2024 will include “joint counter-terrorism maneuvers,” according to a PLA spokesperson. China has made a considerable commitment to the event, sending engineering vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and medical vehicles to Mapinga, as well as naval craft at Dar es Salaam port. The exercise is expected to continue until mid-August.
Police chief apologizes for abuses in Macomia, complains about logistics for upcoming elections
On July 31, Bernardino Rafael, the commander of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, apologized to the population of Macomia district, Cabo Delgado province, for abuses committed by the Defence and Security Forces (FDS). The apology comes in response to an incident in which residents attacked several members of the FDS for using excessive force against civilians. The police commander acknowledged the mistakes and called for unity between the residents and security forces to effectively combat ‘terrorism.’
Three days later, Rafael reportedly expressed concern about the shortage of logistics for the upcoming general elections, scheduled for 9 October 2024, highlighting the lack of fuel for police vehicles. According to Rafael, although the police are in a state of readiness, they are not adequately prepared, considering that elections are a costly process. The general elections will include presidential, legislative and provincial elections simultaneously.
Three IS financiers to face US sanctions
The United States Treasury designated three men for sanctions whom it alleges are involved in ‘terrorist’ financing. In a 23 July statement, the treasury stated that the three are critical members of IS terrorist financing networks involving Somalia, Uganda, DRC, South Africa, and Mozambique.
EUTMM to receive new commander
Brigadier-General Luís Fernando Machado Barroso will lead the EU Military Training Mission in Mozambique, replacing Major-General João Gonçalves. The Portuguese army general will take over in September, focusing on training Mozambique's special forces, known as the Quick Reaction Force, until June 2026. Barroso currently coordinates the teaching of crisis and armed conflict at the Instituto Universitário Militar in Lisbon, Portugal’s main military staff college. Previously he was head of the university’s military science doctorate department and was commander of Portugal’s military emergency support regiment.