Cabo Ligado Weekly: 17-23 April 2023

Apr 26

Written By Cabo Ligado

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By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-April 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 21 April 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

Total number of political violence events: 1,626
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,664
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,000

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

Insurgents returned to their ‘hearts and minds’ strategy last week following their assault on Miangalewa on 15 April, but the apparent lack of response to these movements is contributing to growing distrust of state authorities, particularly in coastal areas of Macomia district.

One source reported that insurgents have taken to sleeping overnight in some villages around Quiterajo, Macomia district, and in the village of Ntoni, some fighters prepared iftar for villagers during the week to break their Ramadan fast. Inviting people to iftar is widely used in East Africa to strengthen relationships between individuals and groups. The Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM) stationed in Mucojo rarely pursue the insurgents, the source said – a claim also reported by Integrity on 24 April.

A group of five insurgents appeared in Nazimoja, about 15 kilometers south of Mocímboa da Praia, on 19 April to buy food and distribute money among some of the locals, up to 250 meticais (about 4 US dollars) per person, another source told Cabo Ligado. The next day, about 30 insurgents arrived in Pangane in Macomia, socialized with the fishermen for several hours, and bought food for Eid al-Fitr celebrations, according to online news service Carta de Moçambique.

While people in locations such as Mucojo bemoan the lack of response by security forces when insurgents appear, those waiting to return are discouraged by that lack of action. Macomia District Administrator Tomás Badae met with displaced people in Macomia town’s Nanga neighborhood last week, according to the same Carta report. They reportedly asked him to do more to provide security. In reply, he told them to ask insurgents to surrender when they appear. Carta’s report indicates that the insurgents likely have existing relationships with communities in the area, naming two active leaders from the area as Muamudo Saha, active around Mucojo, and Mussa Daniel, active in Quiterajo.

This response is unlikely to allay distrust of government authorities which appears to be growing in conflict-affected parts of the province. Carta also reported last week on tensions between Local Forces and the FADM in Miangelewa, with the FADM asking Local Forces to hand over their weapons. Relations between the two forces are deteriorating, and they now carry out separate patrols and operations due to mutual suspicion and distrust.

In Nabaje, approximately 15 km south of Mocímboa da Praia on the coast, a group claiming to have been held hostage by insurgents managed to surrender to the authorities on 19 April. The group included 10 or 11 women and one man, according to a local source. They were first taken to the Rwanda Defence Force, which accompanied them to Mocímboa da Praia town. There have been consistent sightings of insurgents in the south of Mocímboa da Praia district since the beginning of the year.

Weekly Focus: An Eid al-Fitr Greetings Podcast

Islamic State (IS) supporters have since May 2021 been producing Swahili language podcasts targeting East Africa. These were initially distributed through a network of pages on Facebook, as well as through dedicated Telegram channels. Following an investigation published last year by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue into the use of Facebook by IS and al-Shabaab, the networks that supported the distribution of these podcasts appeared to break up, though the Telegram channels remained.

The flagship weekly show is over one hour long and features a summary of IS actions as reported in the most recent edition of IS weekly magazine al-Naba. This is supplemented with translations of features from older editions of al-Naba. Last week’s edition featured recorded greetings from listeners to mark Eid al-Fitr.

The greetings themselves were pedestrian. Eighteen voice notes, recorded in a variety of settings, were presented. Many expressed hope that those in dar al-kufr, or outside the caliphate, would be able to undertake hijra, and join their comrades. Others prayed for prison assaults to release detainees. Eid greetings were sent to IS leadership, including the leadership in East Africa, both Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Three recordings feature children repeating the IS slogan “Daulat Islamiya – Baqiya!” In one, a small boy calls on God to “destroy the unbelievers.”

Distribution of this, and other recent episodes, across Facebook indicates that networks of accounts are re-emerging on the public platform following their apparent removal last year. The main page through which the podcast is distributed has been back up since December 2022. The original post with this most recent episode was shared over 60 times in the initial four hours after it was posted. Posts of previous episodes have not been shared more than 70 times, suggesting that this first burst of sharing is undertaken by affiliated accounts. The extent of onward private sharing within Facebook cannot be determined.

While Facebook’s design means that overall reach cannot be determined, we can see that it is not insubstantial. Accounts that typically distribute IS propaganda in Swahili distribute the post through their own public pages, and at times by posting it in large, publicly accessible Facebook groups. One such group that regularly receives such posts has over 6,000 members.

Clearly, Facebook remains a strategic choice for the promotion of IS in East Africa, and considerable effort has been made to sustain regular podcast production for almost three years, and to regain a foothold on Facebook. However, it is notable that content is not specific to Mozambique, or DRC. Before last year’s crackdown on the platform, reports of insurgent activity in both countries were a regular feature.

Weekly Round-Up

Attorney General Buchili’s counterterrorism proposals

Attorney General Beatriz Buchili presented the annual report on the state of the justice sector to the National Assembly on 19 April. In her presentation, she claimed that corrupt state officials facilitate the presence of “terrorists” in the state, proposed the establishment of a new national body to coordinate counterterrorism work, and flagged up legislative steps to address terrorist financing.

On corruption, she specified the illegal issuance of birth certificates, identity cards, residence permits, and passports to foreigners, including “terrorists.” Buchili gave no specific figures that illustrate the extent of such practices, in relation to terrorism or otherwise.

She also announced the upcoming establishment of a National Council for Combating Terrorism for the coordination and sharing of information relevant to preventing and combating terrorism. It is not clear how this would differ from the Central Office for Combating Organized and Transnational Crime, a body with a counterterror focus for which enabling legislation was passed in December 2021. Both bodies share the functions often associated with national counterterrorism bodies. On terrorism financing, Buchili proposed statutory action to better control the financing of non-governmental organizations and political parties.

All of these proposed actions have likely been driven by the grey-listing of Mozambique as a “jurisdiction under increased monitoring” by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in October 2022. However, the measures listed do not directly reflect the list of actions agreed between Mozambique and FATF at that time.

US Joint Combined Exchange Training to continue in Mozambique

The United States will continue to conduct ‘Joint Combined Exchange Training’ with the FADM, the US embassy in Maputo announced last week after completing a two-month mission with FADM commandos and marines. The US is also currently completing its fourth tactical combat first aid course in Mozambique, in which 150 FADM soldiers are enrolled.

EU sanctions IS Mozambique

The European Union has added IS Mozambique and two of its leaders – Abu Yassir Hassan and Bonomade Machude Omar – to its sanctions list. Both were designated “terrorists” by the US State Department in 2021, which identified Hassan as a leader of IS Mozambique, and Omar as heading its Military and External Affairs Departments, characterizations not presented in the EU designation. The sanctions include a travel ban and an asset freeze. EU citizens and organizations are also prohibited from providing economic resources to IS Mozambique and its proscribed members.

IESE publishes biography of insurgent in Cabo Delgado

The Institute for Social and Economic Affairs in Mozambique has published a short biography of an insurgent fighter in Cabo Delgado examining his motivations for joining the extremist group. The fighter, nicknamed ‘Jorginho,’ grew up in a Muslim Makonde family in Nangade, and worked various jobs in trading, transportation, and mining, before falling under the influence of radical Tanzanian sheikhs. Based on his Facebook page and conversations with people who knew him, IESE concluded that Jorginho's desire to escape poverty drew him to the insurgents’ promise of wealth and paradise. IESE also argues Jorginho’s experience highlights the nuances of the conflict, which are often reduced to an ethnic rivalry between Mwanis and Macuas on one side and Makonde on the other.

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