Cabo Ligado Weekly: 23-29 January 2023

Jan 31

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-January 2023 ¹

Figures updated as of 27 January 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events.

Total number of political violence events: 1,580
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,583
Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,007

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

The pattern of incidents last week suggests some insurgent groups may be dispersing across Cabo Delgado from Macomia and Muidumbe districts, where most clashes and attacks have been concentrated so far this year.

On 24 January, the villages of Nacala and Homba in southern Mueda, near the Messalo river, came under attack, marking the first incident in the district since December last year. Insurgents entered Nacala in the midafternoon, but nearby farmers warned residents of their approach and most managed to escape. Local Forces engaged the insurgents, managing to shoot one of them, but suffered two injuries themselves, a local source claimed. According to another source, Local Forces claimed to have killed five insurgents. One woman who fled reported that 37 houses were burned and five insurgents were killed, but this has not yet been corroborated by other sources. A statement issued by Islamic State (IS) claimed its fighters killed one man and burned dozens of homes. No casualties at Homba have been reported so far.

Insurgents also appeared at the Ravia gold mine in Meluco on 29 January wearing the uniforms of the Mozambique Defense Armed Forces (FADM). One witness provided a vivid description of the incident: the group of young men, most aged between 14 and 22, was armed with rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s, but unusually they did not attack, and instead bought food, clothes, and other supplies. The mine workers were divided into Muslims and Christians, but were then assured they would not be killed. The insurgents paid for the goods with cash which they carried in briefcases. After concluding their business at around 5 pm, they left heading west.

The witness also claimed that the leader of the insurgent group was a Kenyan from Mombasa, and that one other was from Zanzibar. This was not the only report of foreign fighters last week. In Meluco, a man said insurgents had bought food from him on several occasions, four of whom were Somalis and two were from Pakistan (see below).

A similar incident took place at Calugo, 30 km south of Mocímboa da Praia town on 25 January, when a group of around 30 insurgents arrived, reassured residents there was no need to be alarmed, and peacefully bought food and mobile phones. One source claimed they even directed residents to tidy up the village. The insurgents reportedly spoke Kimwani, suggesting they were from the local area, as the language is mostly spoken along the coast from Palma to Pemba.

Following the Calugo incident, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) pursued the insurgents and confronted them near Luxete, approximately 10 km from Calugo on 26 January. In the ensuing clash, up to 13 insurgents were killed, according to one local source, while two RDF soldiers were injured, another source claimed. Clashes continued for several days, and by 29 January, 22 insurgents had been reportedly killed in total while four Rwandans were injured, with one fatality from the Local Forces.

Weekly Focus: Assassination of IS’s al-Sudani in Somalia

United States (US) forces killed Bilal al-Sudani, a suspected senior IS figure, in northern Somalia last week, the US Department of Defense said in a statement. Al-Sudani, along with 10 others, was killed in an assault undertaken by US special forces in northern Somalia on 25 January, according to a later White House press briefing. Though the involvement of his office in Mozambique has been documented, the longer-term implications for IS’s ambitions for its East African affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique are, as yet, unclear.

IS Somalia, based in Puntland in the far north, is believed to host IS’s Karrar ‘office,’ a regional hub supporting IS affiliates in East Africa and elsewhere, and reporting to IS’s general directorate of provinces. Karrar is one of the three most active current hubs. The other two are known as Furqan, serving Nigeria and West Africa, and Siddiq in Afghanistan, which serves Afghanistan and South Asia.

Its functions are described in the 13th and most recent report to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on IS. Its most critical purpose is being a conduit for funds from IS to affiliates in the region. Perhaps not surprisingly, the report notes that such funding is “an important element of the loyalty shown by affiliated groups.” Karrar has also supported IS in Afghanistan, as well as affiliates in East Africa. One source of support may be the proceeds of extortion of businesses in Mogadishu.

Al-Sudani had long been a violent jihadist. He was designated a “terrorist” by the US Treasury in 2012 when he was with al-Shabaab, according to the White House press briefing. He likely joined a faction loyal to IS soon after IS rejected al-Qaeda in 2014. It was further explained in the briefing that the purpose of the raid had been to capture, not kill, al-Sudani. Given the use of special forces, and not remote methods, this was likely the case.

Al-Sudani was targeted for his role in managing financing networks. While the United States’ most pressing concern may be Karrar’s role in supporting IS in Afghanistan, it is also concerned about the support it has either provided directly or facilitated for IS affiliates in DRC and Mozambique. In March 2022, al-Sudani was mentioned in a US Treasury statement as an associate and supporter of one of three men identified as being “financial facilitators” of IS activity in Africa, including Mozambique.

Karrar has also had a more direct role in the region. In 2020, according to the UN’s 12th Monitoring Report, “back-up trainers and tactical operatives” from Somalia were in both Mozambique and DRC. This is what likely led to the first use of improvised explosive devices by insurgents in Mozambique in 2021. This support has probably been maintained. In just the past week, Cabo Ligado has received two reports mentioning “Somalis” or people “of Somali origin” and Pakistanis, as well as a Tanzanian, and a Kenyan as being seen in groups of insurgents.

It remains to be seen to what extent last week’s operation will affect the insurgency. This will depend on the amount and quality of intelligence materials that the raid was able to recover. Any money transfers expected from Karrar will almost certainly not be coming through now. Fear of any intelligence haul will likely see financial networks going quiet, and seeking to adapt, all the while unaware of what intelligence has been found. With that in mind, foreign fighters in the field may now feel more isolated than before.

Weekly Round-Up

Tanzania deploys police to Cabo Delgado

Tanzania announced at the weekend that it is to deploy police in Cabo Delgado as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Speaking at the end of a pre-deployment training, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police Renata Mzinga said that Tanzania had committed to a total deployment of 120 officers of the police Field Force Unit (FFU), and 39 other police officers. The deployment announced at the weekend is of an initial advance party of 54 officers.

The FFU is an elite division of the Tanzania Police Force, equivalent to Mozambique’s Rapid Intervention Unit. It is best known for control of unlawful demonstrations or outbreaks of civil unrest. In recent years, it has been deployed in Mtwara region along the border with Mozambique.

They are most likely to be deployed in Nangade district, which is Tanzania’s Area of Responsibility as part of SAMIM. Tanzania initially deployed over 270 troops to Cabo Delgado in 2021. The deployment reflects the continuing improvement in relations with Mozambique under President Samia Suluhu Hassan.

SADC summit

SADC held an Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government in Windhoek, Namibia on 31 January. Namibian President Hage Geingob chaired the meeting as chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, alongside outgoing chair Zambia and the next, incoming chair South Africa. Mozambique’s Minister of National Defense Cristovao Chume attended as President Filipe Nyusi’s representative.

As expected, Cabo Delgado was high on the agenda. The end of the summit communiqué urged member states to “respond to requests for critical capabilities” for SAMIM, reflecting the tenuous state of the mission’s funding. There was no mention of a preliminary report of the inquiry into the video of SAMIM troops throwing corpses on a bonfire, but stressed that findings would be made public when concluded. Appropriately, silence was observed to remember SAMIM troops who had lost their lives during the mission.

Excitement over signs TotalEnergies is preparing to return

A report in Africa Intelligence that TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne is about to visit Mozambique has caused excitement – especially given the way it was followed up locally by Carta de Moçambique, whose headline proclaimed “TotalEnergies returns to Cabo Delgado.” Cabo Ligado sources confirmed that Pouyanne is due to visit in the coming weeks, but were not more specific than that. It is also important to note that when he does get to Maputo, TotalEnergies’s decision is not a foregone conclusion. He might give a positive sign on going back to work, but he might equally confirm the position that the situation does not yet allow a restart.

The return to work on the liquefied natural gas project is hotly anticipated by companies hoping to win contracts related to the project, and also by the government which is excited by the news of a possible visit. But, although the conflict may currently be subsiding, it is a long way from the level of security that Pouyanné has previously said is a condition of work restarting – that is, a return to normal life throughout Cabo Delgado.

Security and humanitarian issues dominate US ambassador visit to Mozambique

On a recent trip to Mozambique, US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said on 27 January “we have to redouble our efforts to push back against terrorist activity” in northern Mozambique. Without going into detail, she told reporters that she had “extensive discussions on the situation in Cabo Delgado” and the US is working closely with the Mozambican government on their security strategy.

Thomas-Greenfield added that the US is already providing training and equipment to Mozambican police forces, but humanitarian needs must also be addressed in order to defeat the insurgency. It may not be a coincidence that on the same day, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it would be forced to suspend the distribution of food aid in Cabo Delgado from February, unless 102.5 million US dollars ($) is found to guarantee support for the next six months – this is apparently despite a donation of 65.5 million euros (US$71m) from the EU announced on 26 January. Up to a million displaced people in Mozambique are currently reliant on humanitarian assistance.

The WFP’s funding deficit in Mozambique has been a chronic issue for some time, but it has been drastically exacerbated by the war in Ukraine which has diverted much-needed donations away from Africa. Aid rations were reduced in April and May last year, and the WFP warned in December 2022 that it might have to suspend its operations in February 2023. In a press conference on 30 January, Thomas-Greenfield told reporters she had met with UN officials in Mozambique, who no doubt took the opportunity to try to solicit the emergency support necessary to preserve the UN’s humanitarian work in Mozambique.

New publications

Both the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and the Rural Environment Observatory (OMR) published reports on the conflict in the past week. CDD’s “Evolution of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique” reviews the conflict, ending with two scenarios: The less likely scenario is a recognition by the government of the latent social and economic issues that gave rise to the conflict, and the rollout of comprehensive actions to address them. This, in CDD’s view, would address the root causes of the insurgency. More likely, according to CDD, is a continued focus on a military solution. The report is perhaps notable for not mentioning a negotiated solution, which CDD has advocated for in the past.

OMR’s report looks at the spaces for civil society leadership in Cabo Delgado. The report outlines the historical background that has shaped civil society in Mozambique. It very usefully highlights the disruption that the conflict has brought to the participation of individuals and associations in social and political processes. It also recognizes the harm that the influx of international aid and international aid organizations can have on local models of association.

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