Cabo Ligado Weekly: 26 June-2 July 2023

By the Numbers: Cabo Delgado, October 2017-June 2023

Figures updated as of 30 June 2023. Political violence includes Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, and Violence against civilians event types. Violence targeting civilians includes Explosions/Remote violence and Violence against civilians event types where civilians are targeted. Fatalities for the two categories thus overlap for certain events. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available.

  • Total number of political violence events: 1,655

  • Total number of reported fatalities from political violence: 4,701

  • Total number of reported fatalities from political violence targeting civilians: 2,016

All ACLED data are available for download via the data export tool and curated data files.

Situation Summary

After months of relative peace in Cabo Delgado, last week saw a surge in violence as insurgents attacked two villages in Mocímboa da Praia district and ambushed a security forces patrol around Cobre, near the Macomia coast, killing at least 10 soldiers. The Cobre incident, over the weekend beginning 30 June, saw the largest loss of life for the security forces in Cabo Delgado since an insurgent assault on Mandava village in Muidumbe district on 29 April killed five soldiers. 

On 2 July, Islamic State (IS) released an unusually comprehensive set of materials for the Cobre attack. A detailed report from Amaq News Agency was immediately followed by a claim for the incident from IS, 11 photographs, and a video statement from Macomia, published on IS social media channels. While it is accepted that the killings took place, there are some uncertainties in the details.

Amaq claimed that 10 Rwandan and Mozambican troops were killed in “a counter-attack by Islamic State fighters,” after they approached insurgent positions in Macomia. This, according to Amaq, was followed by a two-day “man-hunt” of troops who got lost around Cobre, also known as Ilala, and that led to the killing of at least 10 soldiers.

One source in the area corroborates this version, saying that the initial operation against an insurgents’ base took place near Singuidita in northern Macomia on the banks of the Messalo river, just 25 kilometers northwest of Cobre.

The nationality of the deceased is disputed. Cabo Ligado understands that a joint operation by troops from the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was launched in the area south of Quiterajo on 27 June. While IS claims to have killed Rwandans, they offer no definitive proof of this. The selection of identity cards shown in one IS photograph are all Mozambican. Rwanda Defence Force Spokesperson Brigadier General Ronald Rwivanga dismissed the claim as “very fake news,” while a source close to FADM claimed that Rwandan troops were amongst the victims. There are inconsistencies on this point in the IS communications. While claiming to have killed Rwandan troops, the Amaq report later says “the attack came after the Mozambican army and its allies under SADC mobilized their forces in Macomia, in preparation for launching a military campaign in the region.” The official IS claim refers to “SADC forces,” while captions on the photos refer to Rwandans. The confusion may arise from the similarity between uniforms supplied by the European Union Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM) to trainees, and those of Rwandan forces, particularly helmets. As such, there is no evidence yet of either Rwandan or SAMIM troops being killed or injured in the incident.

There is also inconsistency in timing. The Amaq report says the killings took place during a two-day pursuit that started on Friday 30 June, while the IS claim states they occurred on Friday itself. 

The seizure of materials is not disputed. According to Amaq, the haul included “eight medium machine guns, five rocket launchers, and three mortars, in addition to light rifles, boxes of ammunition, and the belongings of some of the fleeing soldiers.” On the latter point, Cabo Ligado was able to confirm that one of the soldiers whose identity card was included in an IS photo is alive, but confirmed to his family that he had been in an ambush. 

IS also claims that it captured one Mozambican soldier, whose picture was included in the Amaq report, as well as in a separate IS photo report. His fate remains unknown. A shoulder patch indicates he is an army commando. This supports reports from sources, and online, that the troops were part of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) trained by the EUTM. 

The killings are a significant blow to FADM counter-insurgency operations. QRF troops, in particular, have been specifically trained to undertake such operations. To come off so badly in the encounter will be a blow to their morale. It will also likely lead to the Mozambican government strengthening requests for weaponry from the EU, and others. 

For the insurgents themselves, it was a significant victory. The video statement showed a masked man speaking in Arabic, flanked by one other and standing over the corpses of three dead soldiers, presumably at the scene. He quotes IS spokesperson and leading ideologue, the late Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, saying “disbelievers, tyrants, do you think we will stop? We will remain until the end of time. We will stop fighting when we pray in Rome.”

Earlier in the week, in Mocímboa da Praia district, insurgents were involved in two incidents in the Mbau area in the south of the district. On the afternoon of 28 June, insurgents burned several homes and, according to one local source, killed a man in Limala village. Carta de Moçambique reported that locals had discovered an insurgent hideout nearby, and took some of their belongings, prompting the insurgents to attack the village in retribution.

Three days later, insurgents appeared in the nearby village of Kalugo and fatally shot a woman as they went from house to house looting goods, according to local sources.

Since January, insurgents have concentrated their efforts on winning ‘hearts and minds’ along the coast of Macomia and Mocímboa da Praia by trading peacefully with local villages. Parallel to this, they have been increasing numbers in the area, with sources estimating between 200 and 400 fighters. It is not yet clear what has prompted the return to violence, but it may be related to the ongoing security forces operation just to the south along the Macomia coast. The resistance encountered by this operation indicates the strength of the concentration of insurgents.  

Weekly Focus: IS Supporters Welcome Release of Tanzanian Clerics

An IS supporting podcast welcomed the release of “our sheikhs” last week in the High Court in Arusha in northern Tanzania. The most recent edition of the podcast, released on 30 June, features listeners’ greetings for Eid al-Adha. Over 20 listeners’ voice notes were presented, praying for the podcast producers, IS leadership, prisoners, and the “mujahideen.” A similar special edition was broadcast in April for Eid al-Fatr. The podcast is distributed through social media platforms such as Telegram and Facebook, and is in Swahili language. 

The welcome underscores the role of Tanzanian clerics in IS networks in the region, including in Mozambique. A Tanzanian figure called Ulanga is now the religious leader of the insurgency, having been appointed earlier in the year. Tanzanian clerics were critical in seeding the ideology of the group in its early days in Mocímboa da Praia. 

Amongst those acquitted was “our great Sheikh Abuu Ismail,” as the listener described him. Ibrahim Leonard Herman, aka Abuu Ismail, according to court documents, was acquitted on 19 June 2023 along with eight others on the 26 charges they had been facing. The charges related to the bombing of the Arusha Night Park Bar in Arusha in northern Tanzania on 13 April 2014, in which one man died. Though the defendants were arrested between April and July that year, their trial did not begin until April 2022. 

The case highlights weaknesses in how Tanzania’s judicial system deals with offenses under its Prevention of Terrorism Act. According to one source in Tanzania, such cases are often so weak that a “bush lawyer” could win them. The High Court judgment listed weaknesses in crime scene management, and maintenance of the chain of custody for material evidence. The judgment also noted administrative errors in the recording of confessions – which were later retracted – and that confessions did not directly relate to the charges. Regarding the defendants’ claims they were tortured, the judge determined that he had “no reason to believe that their defence of torture is unfounded.” In one case, this may have been extreme. Abdallah Maginga Wambura claimed the amputation of his leg almost two weeks after his arrest in 2014 was due to the beatings he received in custody. 

There are lessons here for Mozambique, particularly the National Criminal Investigation Service and the Director of Public Prosecutions, in the importance of good case management in complex terrorism cases. In all, 21 defendants were found not guilty in Arusha in the past fortnight. The challenges faced in Tanzania underscore how considerable capacity is required to investigate, manage, and successfully prosecute such cases. The impact of the delay on the prosecution’s case was noted by the judge, and is another lesson for Mozambique in the need to proceed promptly. 

The recognition of Abuu Ismail and his co-accused shows how IS leverages pre-existing networks to get a foothold in a new region. Abuu Ismail’s activities long pre-date IS presence in East Africa. His arrest in 2014 came up to three years before IS first tried to expand into East Africa. How strong these networks are now is not clear. Prior to his arrest, he was known in Mwanza as a radical cleric, though was operating somewhat on the margins of Muslim communities. Other contributors to the podcast indicated the extent to which such extremist views are marginal. One prays for the “mujahideen” while bemoaning that they have no clerics to lead such prayers. Muslims want to live under Islamic law, he said, but they are “prevented by our scholars.” Another remarks how hard it has become to undertake hijra to join the fighters, likely referring to Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In Mozambique, a strengthened state, and supportive religious institutions will help marginalize extremist elements, but the Arusha court case underscores the importance that investigative and judicial capacity will have in years to come.  

Weekly Round-Up

Recruitment suspected amongst Nampula fishing communities

Provincial commander of police in Nampula, António Bashir, expressed concern last week over the recruitment of youth in the province for the insurgency in neighboring Cabo Delgado. Speaking at the Nampula Province Development Observatory on 22 June, he remarked that even that day, he had been informed of 49 youths from the province found on islands off Cabo Delgado, claiming to have gone there to fish. 

There is a long tradition of migratory fisheries labor from Nampula to Cabo Delgado. Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira, in a recent paper, describe in detail how this works, and how, in some cases at least, it is linked to recruitment for the insurgency. However, there are no maritime security patrols being undertaken in the area by either SAMIM, Rwandan, or Mozambican forces. This presents a considerable risk, allowing for re-supply, and movement of fighters, as well as the potential reception of new recruits. Given the build-up of insurgents on the Macomia coast, closing this gap should become a security imperative now. 

Defense officials from Mozambique and Malawi discuss counter-terrorism cooperation

Officials from Malawi and Mozambique emphasized their commitment to combating terrorism during the annual meeting of the two countries’ Joint Commission on Defense and Security last week. Mozambique’s permanent secretary at the Ministry of National Defense, Casimiro Augusto Mueio, credited security cooperation between the two countries with helping to defeat the IS-backed insurgency in Cabo Delgado. Malawi has closed its borders to prevent insurgents from crossing and engaging in illegal activities such as human trafficking and smuggling. 

Canadian firm to upgrade FADM spy planes

Canada's PAL Aerospace will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of South African manufacturer Paramount's Mwari aircraft for the Mozambican army, according to a recent report. PAL will integrate Advanced Integrated Multi-sensing Surveillance-ISR software and supply other observation systems, improving visibility for counter-insurgency operations against insurgents in Cabo Delgado.  The DRC ordered six Mwari aircraft in 2021 for use against the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in North Kivu province.

© 2023 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). All rights reserved.

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